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Book abstract
Corporate investigators provide investigative services to organisations faced with internal 
norm violations. Four main professional groups of corporate investigators can be identified 
in the Netherlands – private investigation firms, in-house security departments, forensic 
accountants and forensic legal investigators. These corporate investigators move in a semi-
autonomous social field with a high level of discretion and autonomy. Extensive access to 
sources of information and settlement options, together with a context of highly fragmented 
legal frameworks, produce a corporate security sector that can provide its clients with a 
choice of solutions for norm violations. Corporate investigators are highly flexible in their 
investigatory work and in relation to the settlements that they recommend to their clients. 
Corporate investigators incorporate normative and reputational considerations, such as 
due process and fair play, into their day-to-day business. They largely work autonomously, 
engaging the criminal justice system only when this is considered desirable in the light of 
pragmatic or normative considerations. Other settlement options involve engaging civil 
and labour courts, arranging matters through out-of-court settlement agreements and 
making use of internal (labour) regulations of the organisation. Cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies and corporate investigators is fairly rare – public/private relationships 
are better conceptualised as coexistence, with public and private actors meeting only on an 
ad hoc basis. This means that the state has little insight into what happens in the corporate 
security sector. While this has the benefit for society that the criminal justice system is 
spared the trouble and costs of investigating and prosecuting these matters, it also means 
there is effectively no democratic control over the corporate security sector. For reasons of 
transparency and control, it may be wise to make the private investigation permit – now 
only obligatory for private investigation firms – a prerequisite for all corporate investigators, 
regardless of their professional or institutional background. As a result of the empirical work 
reported upon here, it is proposed that control over such a permit system should be placed 
with the Dutch Data Protection Authority, rather than the police.
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Preface
From the moment that I was introduced to the subject, corporate security has intrigued 
me. From a criminological point of view, it remains largely obscured because of lack 
of attention. From a societal point of view, the same could be said. While police and 
(to a lesser extent) private security enjoy much consideration, both by society and 
criminology, the day-to-day business of corporate investigators remains relatively 
unknown. The field is shrouded in mystery. This may have been one of the attractions 
of the subject for me. The Research talent grant, awarded in 2012 by the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), allowed me to pursue this subject. I am 
very grateful to NWO for funding my research and making my PhD project possible. 
In addition, I owe much gratitude to the anonymous professionals who were kind 
enough to participate in this research. By acting as respondents for the interviews 
and as gatekeepers for further recruitment of respondents they have proven to be 
essential. Without their expertise and support, the book that is before you would not 
have come into being. Additionally, I would like to take this opportunity to express 
special gratitude towards the two anonymous companies where the observations 
were executed. I have gained much insight into my research subject through the 
opportunity that was granted to me by the companies that have been so gracious in 
opening their doors to me. These experiences have been essential to my dissertation 
and have been both very  educational and very engaging.
 In the Netherlands, doctoral students are fortunate enough to be an employee 
instead of a student. I would like to thank the Erasmus School of Law for supporting 
my research and for adding to my development as a social scientist. I have thoroughly 
enjoyed my time as an employee of the Criminology department of the Erasmus 
School of Law of Erasmus University Rotterdam, both previous to and during my PhD 
research. In specific, I would like to thank my former colleagues from the Criminology 
department. You are a great group of people and I have been fortunate to work with 
you. In this light, I would also like to thank my students, with whom I have been very 
pleased to interact. Looking to the future, I want to thank my current employer, the 
Criminology department of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU), in specific Prof. Dr. 
Wim Huisman and Prof. Dr. Edward Kleemans, for providing me with the opportunity 
to continue my work in academia. I very much look forward to continuing my research 
and teaching in Amsterdam.
 Furthermore, I am very grateful to the members of the Doctorate Committee for 
commenting upon and assessing my dissertation. Specifically, I want to take the 
opportunity to thank my supervisors, Prof. Dr. René van Swaaningen en Prof. Dr. 
Nicholas Dorn. René, thank you for believing in the project and in me. Your critical 
outside perspective, as you tend to call it, has been essential to the substance of this 
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dissertation. I have enjoyed working with you and I am certain our paths will continue to 
cross. Nicholas, in many ways this book is a result of the fortunate circumstance that I was 
assigned to you as a student-assistant back in 2007. Back then I could not fathom that I 
would be captivated by the subject you had introduced to me in such a measure that I 
would write my dissertation about it. Your support, both personally and professionally, 
continues to be essential to my criminological career. Your sharp comments have 
improved my research – and my command of the English language – to a great extent. 
I feel very fortunate to have had the privilege of having you as my supervisor. I have 
not suffered from the often-voiced predicament of PhD students who are obliged to 
wait endlessly for a response from their supervisors. On the contrary, there might have 
been times when I would have preferred a day’s rest in between submitting a chapter or 
paper and having to redraft it. I feel my dissertation is infinitely better as a result of your 
involvement. On a more personal note, I could not have wished for a more intelligent, 
inspirational, funny and warm supervisor than you. Our email conversations often make 
my day.
 One of the added benefits of writing your dissertation is formed by the social ties you 
create during this time. When I first started working at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
I could often be found in L6-002, the office of Robby Roks and Joep Beckers. I have 
thoroughly enjoyed our conversations about academia, our respective research projects, 
students, football and life in general. I had fun working and not-working with you. Robby, 
I have always admired the dedication and the enthusiasm you combine with a healthy 
amount of cynicism with regard to our work as criminologists. To me, you are the prime 
example of the future of criminology. Joep, I am honoured to have you as my paranymph 
and as my friend. Although our professional paths have separated some time ago, I am 
glad we are keeping in touch. I believe there will always be a place for you in academia, 
should you decide to come back some day – you know the students would be thrilled. 
Lisa van Reemst, my other paranymph – the same goes for you. You have been my office 
mate for five years and during that time, I have come to know you as the sweetest, most 
genuine person. I have had so much fun working with you. I want to thank you for being 
there for me during the good and the bad times. I am proud to call you my friend and am 
so glad we are not losing sight of each other, even though we now work in different cities. 
It is my time to finish my PhD now; I am looking forward to celebrating once more as a 
result of the finalisation of your dissertation.
 Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the people who are closest to me 
and who have supported me during my PhD research (and, well, in ‘life’). Many doctoral 
students express their relief after finishing their dissertation, having to be locked away 
in a room for a period of time. I have been lucky enough to be able to avoid that. My 
dissertation is a product of my hard work, combined with the support and understanding 
of my family and friends. First of all my parents, Leni Buisman and Paul Meerts. You have 
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both provided me with the implicit and explicit support necessary for such an endeavour, 
starting with the way in which you raised me. Thank you for giving me the freedom and 
confidence to pursue this path. I feel very fortunate to be your daughter. Thank you for 
your unconditional support and love. Mom, you have always been the pillar in my life and 
my inspiration. You have been a great role model, combining a flourishing career with 
raising a family. And specifically, thank you for getting me into the social sciences – and 
as a bonus, I ended up at Erasmus University, just like you. Dad, if anyone can relate to the 
motivation and effort necessary to finish (or even start) a dissertation, it is you. I have great 
respect for what you have accomplished, with your dissertation as icing on the cake. Your 
life in academia and your travels have inspired me to look beyond what is conventional. 
My brothers and sister, Fedor, Iris and Edo Meerts, you three are my safety net. Thank you 
for having my back. Fedor, you and I are headstrong to an equal amount and growing 
up together has sharpened my mind to a great extent. From growing up to growing old 
together, you continue to be my best friend. Barbara Huigsloot and Marlou Schellekens, 
my other best friends, thank you for your support and friendship. Barbara, I have trouble 
remembering the time when we were not yet friends and I could not imagine life without 
you. As your parents tend to say, you and me are like sisters. Thank you for being an ear to 
talk to, a shoulder to cry on and a friend to laugh with. For the both of us, a new chapter of 
our lives is about to unfold. I can’t wait to see how the story continues. Marlou, studying 
criminology has long since rewarded me with your friendship, one that has evolved far 
beyond the lecture rooms. I am proud to see what you have accomplished in such a short 
period of time. Thank you for all those times studying, laughing and crying together. Let’s 
keep up that great tradition until we are grey and old. Ilka and Elwin Burik, by entrusting 
me with the care of our beloved horse Blannish, you have afforded me with a daily moment 
of zen which has been essential to the process of writing my dissertation. I cannot thank 
you enough for that. And finally, I want to thank my dearest Kinsley Roosburg. I imagine 
being catapulted into this strange process we call a dissertation would have been difficult 
for anyone but you, especially at such a hectic time as the final year. Your cheerfulness 
and optimism in life is a big support and inspiration to me. Thank you for understanding 
the PhD process, thank you for unconditionally believing in me and thank you for always 
being there. You have been good to your word and have indeed made my life easier. And 
importantly, more fun. I cannot count the times we have said the words ‘after the PhD…’. 
So now it’s time for that holiday.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
A large-scale fraud in which the municipality of Rotterdam has been defrauded 
for millions of euros – the Waterfront-affaire (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2017). A large-
scale real estate fraud in which a pension fund and others have been defrauded for 
millions of euros – the Vastgoedfraude (Van de Bunt, Holvast, Huisman, Meerts, Mein 
& Struik, 2011). The payment of multiple bribes and large-scale corruption in multiple 
countries by SBM Offshore (Functioneel Parket, 2014). These are all cases in which 
internal norm violations have led to considerable damage to both the organisations 
involved and Dutch society. Interestingly, the first line of investigation in these cases 
was not the criminal justice system – instead, internal investigations were done by 
corporate investigators. These are all examples of cases in which an official report 
has been made to the authorities. However, many cases that are investigated by 
corporate investigators never reach the criminal justice system (Williams, 2006a). 
Although traditional criminology is well aware of the issue of the dark number of 
crime – the fact that much criminal occurrences will not become known to the state 
(or to criminologists for that matter) – it is usually assumed that crimes in those 
instances remain un-investigated. The work of corporate investigators remains 
largely unknown to society and criminology alike.
 The prevention and repression of crime is traditionally seen as a task exclusively 
reserved for governments (Boutellier, Van Steden, Bakker, Mein & Roeleveld, 2011). 
As Max Weber (1946) noted, the monopoly over legitimate use of force is the 
essential tool of governance of states. As a result, criminology has traditionally been 
mostly concerned with state activity in the reduction and management of crime. 
From a historical perspective, it has been argued by Garland (2001) and Wood and 
Shearing (2007: 7) that although “the governance of security has for some time been 
regarded as the primary responsibility, and indeed exclusive responsibility, of state 
governments [this] has not always been the case. From a historical perspective this 
way of doing is very new indeed – it constitutes no more than a hiccup in history”. The 
argument is that the prevention and reduction of crime has historically been a shared 
responsibility and that we are in recent years moving back towards that ‘normal’ 
situation. In their discussion of an emerging plethora of public/private arrangements, 
Van de Bunt & Van Swaaningen (2005) argue that in this process, market rationales 
have permeated the criminal justice system as well.
 A long list of publications over the years shows that the focus has been broadened 
to (critically assess the contribution of ) regulatory agencies (see for example 
Mancini & Van Erp, 2014), civilians (see for example Van Steden, 2009) and private 
security firms (see for example South, 1988). As Jones and Newburn (2006) put it, 
there is a growing academic recognition for the pluralisation of policing. It is now 
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commonly recognised that police forces are not the only players in the security 
field. In the Dutch situation, multiple other actors are involved: regulatory agencies, 
special investigative units within ministries and the input of local government are 
just some examples (Van de Bunt & Van Swaaningen, 2005).1 In addition to state-
provided security services, there now is a substantial private security industry as 
well. In specific places, such as the Port of Rotterdam, public/private security-scapes 
emerge (Eski, 2016). Services provided by this private sector range from guarding 
and surveillance, to technical equipment services (Van Steden & Huberts, 2006). 
These are the types of activities that usually come to mind when one refers to ‘private 
security’. A “very distinct sector within the security industry” is formed by private 
investigators (ibid.: 21). This book is concerned with private investigators, or more 
accurately corporate investigators. On the one hand, this means that the book focuses 
on a smaller group: i.e. only those investigators whose clientele consists of (public 
sector and commercial) organisations, excluding the detectives working for private 
citizens. On the other, as will be explained below when the research is outlined, my 
understanding of corporate investigators is wider than in most studies (including a 
range of different actors, see below).
Most research on private security focuses on the sector more generally, including 
private investigators as just another form of private security (see for example 
Shearing & Stenning, 1983). The rise of private forms of security provision is often 
seen as a (direct) result of increasing demands on public police in a time of neo-
liberalisation of social policy (Jones & Newburn, 2006). Adding to that the growth of 
semi-public places, mass private property and risk awareness (Beck, 1992), one should 
not wonder that private security is booming. “Despite talk of public monopolies 
and the like most jurisdictions have generally housed a variety of policing bodies” 
(Jones & Newburn, 2006: 6). Public/private relationships in the field of security are 
often conceptualised along these lines. Theoretical concepts such as privatisation 
and responsibilisation are then used to indicate that the state either privatises some 
of its activities to private parties, or that the state mobilises private actors for the 
fight against crime (Garland, 2001). In that broad tradition, public law and public law 
enforcement bodies and strategies – police, prosecutors and criminal courts, and/or 
administrative agencies – are taken as conceptual starting points (see for example 
Janssen, 2011; Fijnaut, Muller, Rosenthal & Van der Torre, 2007). Relations between 
the public sector and private security are then posed in terms of cooperation by the 
latter with the former (Hoogenboom & Muller, 2002; Hoogenboom, 2009; Dorn & 
Levi, 2009; Cools, Davidovic, De Clerck & De Raedt, 2010). Whether or not this is the 
1 See for example also Van Reemst (2016) on safety tasks of other first other first responders than the 
police.
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right way to conceptualise private security more generally is not a question to be 
answered in this book. However, it is argued that for corporate security specifically, 
these notions fail to provide a correct conceptualisation. 
The research reported on in this book was executed as a PhD-project at the Criminology 
department of Erasmus University Rotterdam. It is funded by the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) through a Research Talent grant.2 The 
research examines the rather under-researched field of corporate security (Walby & 
Lippert, 2014). Although interesting work has been done on different components of 
the corporate security sector (for example Hoogenboom, 1988; Gill & Hart, 1997; Van 
Wijk, Huisman, Feuth & Van de Bunt, 2002; Williams, 2005; Nalla & Morash, 2002), there 
exists a rather limited body of work on the corporate security sector as a sub-sector 
of the private security sector (Meerts, 2016). This research is therefore for a large part 
exploratory, mapping the sector and its legal frameworks (chapter 2), its activities 
(chapters 3 and 4) and its relationships with the criminal justice system (chapter 5). 
All of this has implications for the theoretical conceptualisation of corporate security 
as well. 
 Research focused on corporate investigators and corporate justice is highly 
relevant to criminology in multiple ways. First, the corporate security sector, like 
criminology, is highly interdisciplinary. Professionals with different backgrounds work 
as corporate investigators, all bringing their specific expertise with them. This means 
that the research subject and the analysis of that subject benefit to a great extent 
from an interdisciplinary approach, combining social sciences with law. Second, 
although the attention for social control originating from other sources than the 
police is growing, little research has been done as of yet on corporate investigators 
and corporate justice. It is, however, a booming sector which provides services that 
may affect both individuals and society. Creating a better understanding of this 
sector is therefore important. Third, the theoretical notions used for public/private 
relations may be in need of some adaptations with regard to their applicability to 
specific parts of the private security sector such as corporate security. In trying to 
fit everything into a state-centric discourse, criminology may be overlooking some 
important characteristics of private security.
2 https://www.nwo.nl/actueel/nieuws/2012/Gehonoreerde+voorstellen+MaGW+Onderzoekstalent.html.
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 To achieve a better understanding of the corporate security sector, the following 
research questions are used as a guide for the research:
The research questions as presented above, motivating the research, were defined 
in 2011 and have been subject to development during the research process. 
Therefore, the research questions are put into context in this first section. Research 
question 1 is used to explore the corporate security market and to determine the 
day-to-day business of corporate investigators. This question is answered in chapter 
2 (with regard to the professionals who are active in the corporate investigations 
market), chapter 3 (with regard to the corporate investigative process) and chapter 
4 (with regard to corporate settlement options). Research question 2 maps the legal 
frameworks that guide corporate investigators’ activities and the extent to which 
corporate investigators seem to abide by these rules and regulations. This research 
question is answered in chapters 2 to 4 as well, chapter 2 providing the more general 
legal frameworks and chapters 3 and 4 relating the legal contexts of corporate 
investigations and corporate settlements more specifically.
 Research question 3 reflects upon the question of autonomy of corporate 
investigators. The reasoning used in most literature, derived from the state-centric 
discourse (see below), is inversed here. The question is whether there is any room 
for corporate investigators to work autonomously and if there is, how far this 
freedom may reach. In addition, research question 3 refers to the situation in which 
Central research question
What is corporate security, how can its shifting relationship with law enforcement 
be conceptualised and what is its significance for the wider society? 
In particular:
1.  What are the raison d’être and methods of corporate security in providing 
corporate justice? 
2. How does this stay within – or breach – regulatory/legal frameworks? 
3.  How wide, in practice, is the sphere of discretion for corporate security, either to 
act alone, without informing public law agencies, or to inform and possibly to task 
them? 
4.  When, how and why does separate working change into case-sharing? How does 
this reflect the public and private interests at stake? 
5.  What are the consequences of the flexible relationship that corporate security has 
with law enforcement?
20
Chapter 1 
law enforcement agencies may be actively involved in corporate investigations 
by investigators and clients – either by informing them or using law enforcement 
agencies for their own (strategic) purposes. These questions are answered in chapter 
4 (when discussing the corporate settlement options and the reasons (not) to report 
to the authorities) and chapter 5 (with regard to the public/private relations found 
in this research). The answer to this question is relevant to research question 4, 
which may be seen as a follow-up to research question 3. Central to the answers to 
research question 4 is the typology of public/private relations presented in chapter 
5. The reasons for establishing contact with law enforcement authorities are related 
in chapter 4 and 5. Chapter 5 furthermore discuses formal and informal relationships 
between law enforcement and corporate investigators, presenting a typology for ad 
hoc contacts as well.
 Research question 5, finally, turns to the consequences of both the existence of the 
market for corporate investigations and the relationships between it and the criminal 
justice system. This research question is answered throughout the book when 
themes such as investigator/client relations, the position of the involved person, 
the use of forum shopping and the relations between corporate investigators and 
law enforcement agencies are discussed. The ‘consequences’ mentioned in research 
question 5 are both practical (what are the consequences for the individuals and 
organisations involved and for society) and conceptual (what are the consequences 
for the applicability of commonly used theoretical notions).
 The main research question is an amalgamation of the various more specific research 
questions. As will be apparent from the above description, the research questions 
are answered in different sections of the book. Chapter 6, then, concludes the book 
by drawing everything together and formulating an answer to the various research 
questions and drawing conclusions with regard the central research question.
This chapter continues with setting the stage for the research by defining some of its 
core concepts. Section 2 expands on this by discussing some of the more commonly 
used theoretical notions on private security and – most notably, the public/private 
relationship. These theoretical notions are critically assessed in the context of the 
research and a different approach is suggested. Section 3 delineates the methods 
used in the PhD research which is the basis for this book. Finally, a brief overview of 
the book is given to the reader.
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1. Defining core concepts
This research explores the corporate security industry by focusing on private, corporate 
investigations into behaviour by organisations’ staff, management, subsidiaries and 
sub-contractors, that is considered problematic by these organisations. Before this 
is possible however, a clear understanding of the core concepts must be obtained. 
In this book the terms ‘corporate security’ and ‘corporate investigators’ are used to 
emphasise the difference with the private security sector more generally (which 
contains a wide range of security services not discussed here – for example static 
guarding, surveillance or cash-in-transit transports) and private investigators 
specifically. The corporate security sector consists of professionals, providing 
specialised and tailor-made ‘high-end’ security services to their clients. The terms 
‘corporate security actors’ and ‘corporate investigators’ are both used here to signify 
these professionals. Although corporate investigators may be involved in additional 
activities (such as pre-employment screenings and drafting and implementing 
integrity codes), this research focuses on the investigative activities of corporate 
investigators: mainly forensic accountancy, (private) investigations more generally, 
IT-investigations, asset tracing, and (assistance with) settlement and prevention 
tactics (Williams, 2005; Meerts, 2013). 
 There may be many actors involved in these kinds of activities. Important selection 
criteria for inclusion in the definition here are that the investigations should be (one 
of the) main professional activities of the investigator; that the investigations involve 
a person as a subject (person-oriented investigations)3; and that the investigations 
are done in a corporate setting (within an organisation).4 This means that for example 
information bureaus gathering information in bulk without having a specific person 
in mind (Hoogenboom, 1994) and private investigators working for individuals 
(mainly divorce cases) are excluded from the research. Clients of corporate security 
may be both commercial and (semi-)public organisations. Respondents indicate 
that most of their clients are medium to large-scale companies, which they attribute 
to the costs of investigations. In this book, the term ‘client’ is used to indicate the 
consumers of corporate security services. In the case of an in-house corporate security 
department, the client is for example the company’s management. In this research 
the following groups are considered to be part of the corporate security sector: 
3 For a definition of person-oriented investigations, I refer to the guidelines for person-oriented 
investigations for accountants, which state: “[an investigation] of which the object consists of the 
actions or non-actions of a (legal) person, for the execution of which activities of a verifying nature will 
be done, for example the collection and analysis of (whether or not) financial records and the reporting 
on the outcomes” (NIVRA/NOvAA, 2010: 4).
4 To specify, the ‘corporate setting’ is not limited to commercial firms: (semi-)public organisations may 
also serve as a client to corporate investigators.
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private investigation firms, in-house security departments, forensic accountants and 
forensic (departments of ) law firms. Many corporate investigators have a background 
in law enforcement. Chapter 2 focuses more specifically on the different professional 
groups of corporate investigators.
 In addition, the focus of the research is on (investigations into and settlements of ) 
internal norm violations. The norm violation must occur in the context of an employee/
employer relationship.5 External threats, such as large-scale DDoS [Distributed Denial 
of Services] attacks by organised crime networks, are therefore excluded (unless they 
are executed by someone within the organisation). Anyone with a labour relationship 
with an organisation may be subject to corporate investigations. Moreover, it is 
important to note that corporate investigators have a distinct ‘downwards gaze’: most 
corporate investigations are focused on (lower level) management and employees, 
while the organisation itself, as a ‘legal person’ is often neglected (Williams, 2014).6 
‘Norm violations’ is a broad-scope concept, which may be used for all types of 
employee behaviour that is deemed problematic by an organisation. As will be 
discussed below, one of the unique selling points of the corporate security sector 
is that investigations are not limited to criminal acts (Williams, 2005). The greater 
part of ‘norm violations’ (consisting of economic loss, misappropriation of assets, 
reputational issues and the like) occurring within organisations never reaches the 
criminal justice system (Dorn & Meerts, 2009). These norm violations may concern 
(alleged) criminal behaviour such as fraud, but they may just as well be about 
behaviour that is considered undesirable rather than criminal, for example behaviour 
that is non-compliant to internal regulations. All kinds of undesirable behaviour may 
be investigated by corporate investigators; however, most norm violations have an 
economic background (theft, fraud, favouritism in the granting of contracts, etc.). 
Many of the norm violations investigated by corporate security may be defined as 
white-collar crime in the sense of Sutherland as they often “consist principally of 
violation of delegated or implied trust” (1940: 3) – regardless of the question whether 
this violation is punishable by criminal law or not.
 Corporate investigations are often followed by one of several corporate settlement 
options, discussed in chapter 4. Corporate settlements are solutions to norm 
violations, which may be derived from public law (criminal law), private law (contract 
law, tort or labour regulations) or internal regulations (of specific organisations). A 
key feature of corporate settlements is that they are a result of corporate decision 
5 This is taken broadly though: it may also involve temporary workers (who have a labour contract 
with the temp agency instead of the organisation within which they actually work) and employees of 
subsidiaries.
6 However, most investigative reports also include a section on organisational issues which made the 
transgression possible – see chapter 4.
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making within the context of organisations (as a reaction to internal norm violations) 
(as opposed to a decision taken by a state official such as a public prosecutor). The 
different corporate settlements may be argued to constitute a system of corporate 
justice. Within this system of corporate justice, corporate investigators and clients 
may be flexible, forum shopping in a way to get to the solution which is considered 
best suited in a certain case.
On the other side of the public/private divide is what is designated in this research 
as ‘law enforcement’. Strictly speaking, this term only applies to police agencies. 
However, here the choice is made to include police, prosecution and special 
investigative agencies such as the investigative agency of the Dutch tax authority 
(the FIOD) in the definition. The reason for this is that although they certainly 
have different roles to play and different tasks to fulfil, these actors all contribute 
to the criminal investigations and the prosecution (or out-of-court settlements) of 
crimes. All of these actors are charged with the investigation of criminal offences 
according to the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (article 141 and 142 Wetboek 
van Strafvordering, hereafter WvSv). When specific public actors are meant in this 
book, they are mentioned by name. Regulatory agencies such as the Authority for 
Consumers & Markets (ACM), the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) and 
the Data Protection Authority (AP) are excluded from the term law enforcement as 
their primary focus is not on criminal prosecution but on administrative control and 
administering administrative measures.
 ‘Public’ and ‘private’ may be conceptualised in multiple ways. First of all, ‘public’ and 
‘private’ may be used to signify the level of openness of for example investigations and 
solutions. The terms are used in this sense when the activities of corporate security 
within the private legal sphere are discussed. In addition, a ‘sectoral approach’ is used 
in this book, dividing the security sector along the lines of a governmental and a 
market sector (Jones & Newburn, 1993). This approach should be taken as an analytical 
tool – social reality, however, is much messier. As will become apparent in this book, 
public elements are introduced in the private sector and vice versa. It is important 
to note here that there is a high level of diversity within both the public and private 
sector. Many different opinions, interests and connections make for conflicts within 
the sectors as well as between them (Yar, 2011). 
 A public/private dichotomy may still be identified in terms of mode of service 
provision, the source and mode of financing (governmental funding or funding by 
a (private) organisation), and the status of investigators (whether they have powers 
of investigation) (Jones & Newburn, 1993). As such it is important to view corporate 
security in its own right and examine the activities within the sector autonomously 
and in relation to the public security sector. Below, sector 2 starts with an overview of 
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commonly used theoretical approaches.
2. Some theoretical notions on private security, 
corporate security and private/public relations
The use of concepts such as ‘privatisation’, ‘responsibilisation’ and ‘security networks’ 
implies a shift from the state as a main actor in the provision of security to a more 
diffused situation, in which both public and private actors have a central role. 
Although many scholars place the emphasis on the private side of crime control 
(see for example Shearing & Stenning, 1981), the implicit starting point remains the 
state. Arguments such as a hollowing out of the state, creating a control deficit in 
the face of growing demand for security, imply that it was originally the state who 
was the key actor. Historically, the state has had a limited task in the control of crime 
(Garland, 2001; Kerkmeester, 2005). Indeed, when it comes to white-collar crime, it 
is a well-researched fact that state intervention has traditionally been very limited 
(Sutherland, 1940). Only in recent years (2003), the Dutch government has instated 
the Functioneel Parket (FP), a special branch of the public prosecution office which 
focuses (for a large part) on fraud (for more on this, see Beckers, 2017). The issues 
of the state with regard to the dealing with white-collar crime do not constitute the 
main focus of this book; however, they are relevant to understand the popularity of 
the corporate security sector. 
 In this book, the key argument put forward by much of the literature – that the 
state is no longer able to provide society (here: organisations) with the security 
services it needs (here: a swift and efficient reaction to internal norm violations) – is 
put into question. As will be argued, investigations and prosecutions executed by 
public law enforcement agencies do (for the most part) not align with the needs of 
organisations. Private sector solutions, in the form of the corporate security industry, 
are better suited for this. This is not necessarily a historical shift, nor can it be put 
in terms of privatisation or responsibilisation: the historical absence of the state in 
the control over these matters makes such arguments untenable. Because of their 
importance with regard to the context in which this research has been done, some 
of the best-known theories about the relationships between private security and the 
state are discussed below. As will be apparent in the remainder of this book, these 
theories provide an uneasy fit with the realities of the corporate security market. 
Theories explaining the growth of private security may be categorised in multiple 
ways. Here I choose to make a classification in terms of theories that claim that an 
inability of the state to meet demands for security services has led to private actors 
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filling the gap (section 2.1) and those that link the growth of private security to 
the growth of mass private property (section 2.2) (Button, 2004). These different 
approaches may be called by different names by different authors; however, most 
theories about public/private relationships fall within these broad categories. Section 
2.3 reflects on the presented theory, followed by section 2.4, which provides some 
alternative views.
2.1 The over-burdened state – privatisation, responsibilisation and 
junior partner theory
Many theories on private security focus on a failure by the state to meet the growing 
demand for security. Different authors have termed this the ‘fiscal constraint theories’ 
(see e.g. Jones & Newburn, 1993). This term is used because the argument is that 
the public police organisation is subject to a restriction in its funding, leading to a 
situation in which the police are no longer able to cope with the demand for security. 
Concepts such as privatisation of security and responsibilisation of private actors are 
central here. By privatising some of its functions, the state tries to relieve some of the 
pressure. A shift from public to private is made in the provision of security (Williams, 
2005). Responsibilisation is the process in which the state activates other actors to 
share responsibility for, in this case, crime control. In this way, the state may actually 
extend its reach instead of ceding it to the private sector. 
 Fiscal constraint theories may be divided into two categories. On the one hand 
there are the radical perspectives, posing that “the growth of private policing is 
an inevitable consequence of the capitalist crisis, where the state draws in the 
private sector to strengthen its legitimacy” (Button, 2002: 28). This is basically 
responsibilisation as discussed above. On the other hand, there are the liberal 
democratic perspectives, which state that the growth of private policing is an 
inevitable consequence of the increasing demands on the public police, which 
cannot be satisfied (Button, 2002: 29). This fits well with the idea of privatisation. The 
most established theory in this tradition is the junior partner theory, first introduced 
by Kakalik and Wildhorn. In short, this theory looks at private security actors as being 
junior partners to the state. Public actors may use private security actors to advance 
the goals of the state (Hoogenboom, 1988). The void that has been left by the police, 
because of an inability to meet security demands, is filled by private actors. For this 
to be feasible, private actors must thus be considered to be complementary to public 
actors: a division of labour may be discerned in which private security focuses on 
prevention and the police focus on repression. Private security is seen to deliver 
services that can be considered a preparation for the tasks held by the police and 
the prosecution office. For example, a security guard may detain a shoplifter who has 
been caught red-handed until the police arrive. The police may then continue with 
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criminal investigations, (ideally) leading to criminal prosecution. In such a scenario, 
the work of private security ends where police tasks start. 
2.2 The growth of mass private property – nodal theory, anchored 
pluralism and loss prevention theory
In contrast to the ideas of (conscious) privatisation or responsibilisation policies, scholars 
such as Shearing and Stenning (e.g. 1981) see the development of private security as 
a result of a growth of mass private property. Because many (semi-)public spaces can 
now be found on private property, such as shopping malls and amusement parks, the 
domain of private security is growing along with it, simultaneously diminishing the 
domain of public police (Jones & Newburn, 1993). The main point is that power gets 
fragmented and divided among public and private actors alike. The growth of mass 
private property has in this view provided private and commercial actors with a sphere 
of independence, able to compete with that of the state. According to this strain of 
thought, complex networks combine to provide security. 
 One of the theories which may be seen to fit in the tradition of pluralistic models 
of security is the loss prevention theory which Hoogenboom (1990) termed the 
‘economic theory’. The theory derives its name from its emphasis on loss reduction 
instead of crime reduction. The economic relationships between private security and 
its clients are taken as a central point of departure. This theory furthermore suggests 
that the activities of law enforcement and private security are similar, contrasting 
with the views of junior partner theory about complementarity (Hoogenboom, 
1990). Public and private security providers are seen as competitors in a market of 
security and as (partly) interchangeable (depending on the needs of the person or 
organisation affected) (Williams, 2005).
 The ideas of nodal theorists such as Shearing, Stenning and Wood may also be 
viewed in this light. In short, nodal theory suggests that security is provided by a 
range of different providers, from which security consumers may choose. The state is 
seen as one of these providers but not as the primary one (Shearing, 1992). Although 
there is consideration for the issues connected to this type of “governing through 
crime” (Wood & Shearing, 2007: 5), security nodes are seen as more effective than 
state-provided security because they are able to utilise localised knowledge. In the 
words of Shearing and Stenning (1983): a new feudalism emerges. In addition to the 
nodal perspective on security, another pluralistic perspective is that of anchored 
pluralism (Loader & Walker, 2006). This perspective similarly holds that the security 
market is characterised by fragmentation and pluralism but contrary to the nodal 
standpoint, it does prioritise the state over other venues of security. The anchored 
pluralism stance is that the state still has a vital role to play as the main provider of 
justice, and as the legal ‘anchor’ of security provided by private actors. The reason for 
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this is that security is seen as a social good, which “severely precludes it being traded 
as a commodity and bought and sold freely on the market” (Loader, 199: 386). Loader 
goes on to argue that this does not imply that security ought only to be provided by 
the state (as this is not realistic); however, some democratic deliberation should be 
involved in one way or another.
 Both the nodal and the anchored pluralism perspective assume that the field of 
security is highly fragmented, caused by the growth of mass private property, and 
that the state is no longer the only player when it comes to the provision of security. 
Additionally, though, the debate between nodal governance and anchored pluralism 
is partly a normative one – highly simplified it is about the role the state should have 
in the provision of security and the question whether or not security may be traded 
as a commodity.
2.3 An assessment of traditional private security theories
The above theories all (implicitly or explicitly) use the state as the theoretical point 
of departure. Whether it is a matter of privatisation and responsibilisation (conscious 
acts by the state) or a matter of (unintentional) growth of mass private property, 
the assumption remains that the state was present in a dominant way and that this 
presence is diminishing. As will be apparent from the following chapters, the role 
of the state is better conceptualised by its absence, when it comes to internal norm 
violations within organisations. It must be noted here that the presented theories 
do not focus specifically on private investigations but are created for the private 
security sector more generally. It might therefore very well be that they work better 
for traditional police duties such as foot patrol.7 As noted above, the involvement of 
the state in the control of white-collar crime has historically been limited (Gill & Hart, 
1997). In this sense, the investigation and settlement of internal norm violations can 
hardly be described as being privatised: for the most part, this has been a private 
matter anyway (Williams, 2005). A similar argument may be made with respect to 
responsibilisation (Garland, 2001). Junior partner theory lays emphasis on the role 
of private security as a subsidiary of the state, advancing state objectives in terms of 
governance. However, previous work has indicated that such an interpretation does 
not have much merit for corporate security (Williams, 2005; Meerts & Dorn, 2009). 
More may be expected from the pluralistic perspectives set out above, however these 
suffer from the same ailment: the reason for the retreat of the state may be sought 
elsewhere, there is still an implicit argument that private security’s field of activity 
was once occupied by the state. In addition, the ‘competition-argument’ presented in 
the loss prevention theory must also be assessed critically (see chapter 5).
7 This has not been investigated in this research.
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 While the presented theories all allow for the existence of private forms of crime 
control, private crime control is usually seen to occur in either public spaces (such as a 
street) or public spaces within private property (such as shopping areas). They are thus 
located in specific geographical places which may be entered by the general public 
to one degree or another. The subject of this research does not fit this description 
in two important ways. First, corporate investigations and corporate justice are 
not limited to a specific location. Rather, the defining characteristic is the fact that 
there is a labour relation, providing the organisation authority over the person as 
an employee rather than over a specific location. Second, corporate investigations 
and corporate justice are not limited to crimes. This necessarily means that corporate 
investigators and the police are not interchangeable in general (although there may 
still be overlap between corporate security and police activities). It follows, thus, that 
although the above-mentioned theoretical notions have some value, they do not 
have a perfect fit with corporate security. 
2.4 Juridification – the exploitation of the dark number of economic 
crime
A rare example of theorising which is specifically focused on corporate investigators 
may be found in the work of Williams (inter alia 2005). Williams (2005) claims that the 
growth of the market for corporate investigations is not rooted in either a failure of 
the state or an expansion of mass private property. Instead, the success of corporate 
security is a result of an “exploitation of the dark number of economic crime” (ibid.: 
331). Crucially, Williams states that the traditional absence of the state in this area has 
led to the emergence and professionalisation of the corporate security market (see 
also Meerts, 2016). Through the marketing of a professional service which is directly 
responsive to clients’ needs, instances of internal norm violations are commodified 
within the market for corporate security. For reasons to be discussed in chapter 3, 
many internal norm violations within organisations would not have ended up in 
the criminal justice system, regardless of the existence of a corporate investigations 
market (Williams, 2005). Thus, what corporate investigators do is the commodification 
and exploitation of a dark number of norm violations. 
 Three strategic resources are essential for this popularity of corporate investigative 
services: “(1) the framing of economic crime; (2) secrecy, discretion and control; and 
(3) legal flexibility and responsiveness to client needs” (Williams, 2005: 326). As 
mentioned, corporate investigations are not limited to criminal acts. This means that 
the category of behaviour that may be investigated is broader, also including for 
example non-criminal breaches of internal regulations. On the other hand, it also 
means that the focus of corporate investigators can be more narrowly defined: a 
corporate investigation may be limited to the behaviour the client would like to have 
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investigated (for example, focusing on a specific breach of contract but not on the 
role played by the organisation in this event). The fact that corporate investigators 
may work discretely, producing a report as a final product on the basis of which the 
client may decide on further action, is also highly valued: openness and loss of control 
are not standard ingredients of corporate investigations. Finally, because corporate 
investigators do not work within the limits of the criminal justice system, they are 
flexible in the solutions they may provide, taking the interests of clients into account. 
A criminal prosecution may not serve the private interests of the client for reasons 
presented in chapter 4. In these cases, another legal venue may be used (for example 
labour law). 
2.5 Recapitulation and beyond: a public/private continuum
Based on the above, it may be concluded that public/private relations are not easily 
conceptualised as close cooperation or tightly-knit (hybrid) networks.8 The following 
chapters focus on the day-to-day business of corporate investigators. From this, it 
will become apparent that much of corporate investigators’ activities remain in the 
private sphere. Previous empirical work by Williams (2005, 2006, 2014), Gill and Hart 
(1997, 1999), Van Wijk et. al (2002) and Meerts (2014b, 2016) supports this statement. 
However, corporate security does not operate in a vacuum, free from any public 
involvement. As indicated in chapter 4, there are reasons for law enforcement to be 
involved in corporate investigations. The question remains how the cooperation that 
follows may be conceptualised. This is discussed in chapter 5 and 6. At this point 
in the book, it suffices to take the following as a starting point for public/private 
relations. Public/private relations can be seen as a continuum, one end representing 
a complete separation between public and private, the other end a close cooperation 
between the two. Three ideal typical forms can be identified along such a continuum:
i. Separation. Corporate security has a high degree of autonomy from public 
authorities: it acts as an aspect of firms’ management, keeping internal order 
within firms, by framing economic crime in terms of secrecy, discretion, 
control and legal flexibility (Williams, 2005). Here, corporate security is 
working separately from law enforcement. Typically, cases are investigated 
internally and handled through a corporate settlement; additionally the threat 
of criminal law may be deployed as an incentive to corporate settlement, 
however in most cases, the public agencies are not actually brought in.
8 In the broadest sense of the word, the term ‘node’ is sometimes used to signify (public or private) 
providers of security. In this sense, (corporate) security nodes indeed exist. However, traditional 
nodal theory implies there are networks between state and non-state nodes. Although corporate 
investigators certainly do not move in a vacuum and there are multiple interconnections, in most 
instances it would be too much to claim cooperation – rather, the field is characterised as coexistence 
(see chapter 5).
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ii. Ad hoc coexistence. As a result of strategic or normative considerations, 
corporate security may call upon law enforcement to assist, transferring the 
evidence from the investigations to the police (Klerks & Eysink Smeets, 2005). 
The level of cooperation may differ widely, ranging from mere information 
transfer to coordination (see chapter 5).
iii. Obligatory tasks. Corporate security may be a servant to law enforcement: 
for example in compliance functions, such as implementation of anti-money 
laundering regulations (see e.g. Van Erp, Huisman, Van de Bunt & Ponsaers, 
2008). 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of ideal types in public/private relationships
Separation Ad hoc coexistence Obligatory tasks
Separation Ad hoc coexistence Obligatory tasks
Separation Ad hoc coexistence Obligatory tasks
Situation iii (obligatory tasks) is about compliance functions within organisations. The 
context of public/private relations is different in matters of compliance, as it is about 
“the organisation as a potential suspect I would say. We as corporate security focus 
on the organisation as potential victim” [Respondent 39 – corporate investigator]. As 
explained in section 1 of this chapter, the research focuses on corporate investigative 
services, which excludes situation iii from the scope of the research. This does not 
mean that corporate investigators are not involved in compliance matters or in 
investigations as a result of obligatory tasks. 
 Situations i and ii then, are central to this research. Much of corporate investigators’ 
activities remain in the private legal sphere, in which a large measure of autonomy 
from law enforcement authorities may be claimed by corporate investigators. Much of 
what is discussed in chapters 3 and 4 is based on separation, rather than cooperation, 
and may be conceptualised as situation i (separation) above. However, this separation 
is not absolute. As a result of pragmatic and normative considerations, corporate 
investigators or clients may initiate law enforcement involvement (or, alternatively 
law enforcement may be involved through criminal justice investigations regardless 
of any conscious decision by corporate investigators or clients). It is argued in this 
book that ‘cooperation’ may be a misleading term for such relations, and ‘coexistence’ 
is used instead to signify public/private relations in situation ii. The words ‘ad hoc’ 
are used to indicate that public/private relations generally are a result of a specific 
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case, rather than any form of long-term cooperation efforts. Chapter 5 further breaks 
down the concept of ad hoc coexistence, by presenting a typology ranging from 
(private to public) information transfer, through (minor) mutual information sharing, 
to coordination.
3. Methodology
The fieldwork data gathered for this research have been collected through 
triangulation of qualitative research methods (Noaks & Wincup, 2004). The research 
questions described in the introduction to this chapter are mainly descriptive and 
exploratory. Qualitative methods are best suited to get the rich information necessary 
to answer these types of research questions (Mortelmans, 2016). In addition to the 
main research methods, to be discussed below, supplementary information was 
gathered in multiple ways. To start with, previous research has been used in the 
form of literature, and the relevant legal frameworks and other legal information 
were assessed. During the course of the research multiple academic and practitioner 
seminars and workshops, as well as networking events, were attended. The 
observations made and informal conversations held at these different events proved 
useful as background information and, in addition, were very helpful with regard to 
entrance into the field. In March 2016 a seminar was organised in the context of this 
research, which was hosted by John Moores University Liverpool. The seminar served 
as a platform for discussion between the academics, corporate investigators and law 
enforcement professionals who participated, and myself. In addition, three corporate 
investigators were interviewed. The aim of the seminar and interviews was to receive 
input from UK experts, to check the research data gathered in the Netherlands against 
the British situation. Although very helpful in this sense, the information gathered in 
Liverpool is not sufficient to make a comparison between the UK and the Netherlands 
(see chapter 2 for more on this) – neither was this the intention of the seminar and 
UK interviews. 
32
Chapter 1 
3.1 Interviews
The central research method is the semi-structured open interview. This type 
of interviewing is often used in qualitative research and is particularly helpful for 
exploratory research. In a semi-structured open interview a topic list is used to ensure 
relevant subjects are discussed (Beyens, Kennes & Tournel, 2016). Although the topic 
list contains a logical ordering, a key feature of an open interview is the flexibility of 
the interviewer and the interview process. As long as all relevant topics are discussed, 
many variations may occur in the order of subjects. In addition, topics may be added 
or deleted during the interview, according to the knowledge of the respondent 
(Baarda, De Goede & Van der Meer-Middelburg, 1996). In this research three different 
respondent groups were interviewed and three topic lists were used for these groups. 
Depending on the type of respondent, some questions were asked in a different way, 
some topics were added and others deleted. However, every interview discussed 
the following subjects: professional background of the respondent; types of cases 
in which corporate investigators are involved; reasons for corporate investigations/
settlements; process of the investigations; process of settlements; legal frameworks; 
public/private relations; and general opinion regarding the existence of corporate 
security. Every interview was concluded by the question whether the respondent felt 
any important subject had been neglected and whether he or she had suggestions for 
prospective respondents. The topics included in the topic lists served as conversation 
starters and reminders. In response to the information provided by the respondent, 
further probing was executed (Beyens et al., 2016). 
 The type of interview used for this research may be defined as an expert interview 
(Baarda et al., 1996). This type of interview poses its own unique issues, in addition 
to some benefits over a ‘normal’ interview. Expert interviews tend not be emotionally 
difficult for a respondent. The subject matter of interviews was such that it might 
be sensitive for the reputation of organisations, however, respondents were not 
personally emotionally involved. Another advantage of an expert interview is that 
respondents are generally well-informed, which means that much information may 
be gathered and the interview may be more efficient. On the other hand, experts, and 
especially those in management and higher positions are often pressed for time and 
hard to reach because they are shielded by administrative staff. Most respondents 
indeed indicated that they only had a limited timeframe available for the interview – 
however, as may be deduced from the average duration of interviews, most interviews 
were nevertheless of considerable length. Through the use of gatekeepers, access 
was granted quite easily (see below). Only one request was denied (the reason being 
that the respondent did not want to participate in any academic research) and one 
potential respondent failed to reply to repeated requests to reschedule a previously 
cancelled interview. Expert interviews call for a different approach than other 
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interviews because respondents are so well-informed. Repetition of questions and 
questions to which the answer seems obvious are not appreciated by respondents. 
Expert respondents may not feel they are taken seriously with this kind of questioning. 
The respondents in my research were eager to talk about their work (as they felt the 
research was a validation of the importance of their work).
 A total of 59 expert interviews form the basis of this research.9 The duration of 
interviews was on average one hour and eleven minutes, with outliers of twenty-
three minutes (the shortest interview) and two hours and fifteen minutes (the longest 
interview). Most interviews (50) were audiotaped and transcribed, although some 
respondents (9) preferred not to be audiotaped. In these instances extensive notes 
were made and typed up directly after the interview was concluded. The sensitivity 
of the subject matter was the reason given by the respondents who did not want to 
be audiotaped. Some respondents requested a transcript of the interview and this 
was provided to them. All interviews were done face-to-face and most were done 
individually (51). For practical reasons four interviews were duo interviews. Most 
respondents were male (49), while ten respondents were female. Most respondents 
fall into the age group 40 to 60 years old. The Randstad was the central location of 
most professional activities of most respondents, which consists of the four biggest 
cities of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht) and their 
surrounding areas; however respondents can be found all over the Netherlands. The 
average education level of respondents was high (academic education), although 
police respondents generally had a lower education level (being trained within the 
police organisation itself ).
 The three groups of respondents consisted of corporate investigators (33), law 
enforcement professionals (16) and clients (10). Among the corporate investigator-
respondents a differentiation can be made in respondents working for private 
investigation firms (10), in-house security departments (18), forensic accounting 
departments (5) and forensic (departments of ) legal firms (3). In this last group 
(forensic legal investigators), respondents had a double role as respondents could be 
both investigators in some cases and act as a client in other cases.10 Law enforcement 
professionals consisted of professionals working for the police (8), prosecution (5) 
and FIOD (3). Respondents falling within the category of clients were HR personnel, 
9 56 of these interviews were conducted in the Netherlands. An additional 3 interviews were done with 
corporate investigators in the UK (Liverpool).
10 Because they were approached and interviewed as clients, these respondents are counted in this 
category (which is why the numbers of investigators do not add up to 33 here). However, because these 
respondents also occasionally act as forensic legal investigators, they have provided useful insight. At 
the time of interviewing, the forensic legal investigator was a rather new phenomenon in the Dutch 
corporate security sector, which is why so few forensic legal investigators have been interviewed. Only 
during the research did this group emerge from the other interviews.
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(labour) lawyers, or general management. As may be gathered from these numbers, 
not all respondent groups are represented to the same extent in this research. 
Because the research questions are for an important part focused on the activities of 
corporate investigators, and because of the wide variety of backgrounds within this 
group, the decision was made to focus on corporate investigators, which explains 
why this respondent group is relatively over-represented.
Table 1. Overview of interviews
Number of interviews
Average duration interviews
Corporate investigators
Private security firms
In‑house security
Forensic accountants
Forensic legal investigators
Law enforcement professionals
Police
Prosecution
FIOD
Clients
HR, labour lawyers, management
Clients/forensic legal investigators
59a
1 hour 11 minutes
33a
10
18
5
16
3b
8
5
3
10
7
3b
a Three of these were conducted in the UK.
b These are the same respondents. They are only ‘counted’ in this table as clients.
3.2 Observations
In addition to the interviews, observations produced valuable data. Above, mention 
has been made of casual observation as part of participation in seminars and 
practitioner events. A more structured approach was taken in two observation periods 
with two different companies. Observations are often used in criminological research 
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and have the advantage over other methods of data collection that they can reveal 
information that is hard to obtain when for example directly asked (Bijleveld, 2009). 
The choice was made to do observations in this research to get more insight into the 
daily activities of corporate investigators and the (often subtle) relationships with 
(and frustrations about) the criminal justice system. The mere fact that the researcher 
‘is there’ may provide valuable information (Zaitch, Mortelmans & Decorte, 2016). 
Meaning may be derived from situations, which cannot be asked through interviews. 
In this way, the observations were very useful. Because of the setting in which the 
observations took place, they can be defined as ‘institutional ethnography’: in this 
type of observation, the focus is on the institutional reality of the setting (ibid.). 
 Observation as a research method is a flexible technique (Zaitch et al., 2016). 
Therefore, the observations were not highly structured, although an observation 
schedule was used to ensure focus. The observation schedule contained the process 
of investigations, the types of settlements and public/private relations as the main 
topics. It was used as a guide but not as a strict tool for observation. Observations 
were recorded by a daily record sheet, in which detailed notes were recorded. Some 
parts of the observations were participant, although it was clear at all times what my 
role was (I was there as a researcher, not a corporate investigator) (ibid.). Most of the 
time spend during the observations was not participant in this sense: although I was 
present and did execute some minor tasks for the observation companies, my main 
role was that of observant, not participant.
 The observations were executed in two separate observation periods. During 
the observation periods, a full-time position was obtained and full access to the 
systems of both observation companies was granted.11 Both observation companies 
granted me an access card or key to allow me to enter the premises independently, 
an employee account and an email address to access the digital environment. During 
the observations, I have been present full-time during working hours, participated 
in meetings and have had multiple informal conversations. In addition, during both 
observations, I have been able to witness an investigative interview by investigators. In 
both observations, I have selected reports and other information relating to finalised 
corporate investigations. These were analysed using a topic list (see section 3.3 for 
more information). Other internal documents, such as codes of conducts, yearly reports 
and information published on the intranet were also used for analysis. During both 
observation periods, I was granted extensive access to all information necessary to 
me (after signing a confidentiality agreement). Investigators and other staff were very 
helpful, offering to help me gather information, explain matters to me and they were 
very willing to talk about their work and showed great interest in my research. 
11 I cannot, of course state with a hundred percent certainty that no information was withheld. However, 
I had full access to the computer systems and any information requested by me was provided.
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 It must be noted that observation material is (maybe to a greater extent than 
information gathered through other methods) liable to interpretation bias, as the 
role of the researcher is larger in an observation setting. By entering the observation 
setting, the researcher necessarily influences the setting (Zaitch et al., 2016). This was 
most apparent during observation 2, when people started out somewhat cautiously 
towards me. This attitude changed rather quickly, however. In both observation 
settings there seemed to be a great passion for the profession. The workload for 
investigators was high in both observation companies, however employees indicated 
that there are also ‘slow’ periods during the year.
 Observation 1 was executed at the very beginning of the research (mid-October 
to November 2012) and lasted seven weeks. The observation company (1) was a 
private investigation firm, with at the time five people involved in the investigations 
(including the two directors) and one secretary. The backgrounds of the investigators 
were diverse, ranging from a legal, criminological to an accounting background. Two 
of the five investigators had previously worked as a law enforcement professional. 
The clientele of this corporate security company was diverse as well, but assignments 
mostly originated from medium-sized businesses, (semi) public organisations and 
law firms. With some clients, framework agreements had been made, which ensured 
prospects to future assignments to a certain extent. This company is referred to in the 
remainder of this book as Observation Company 1.
 Observation 2 was done near the end of the fieldwork period (beginning of 
February to March 2015) and lasted six weeks. The observation company (2) was a 
large Dutch company and the setting of the observations was the in-house security 
department of said company. The security department was at the time of observation 
headed by a manager, and divided in three parts (compliance, internal investigations 
and external investigations). All three sub-departments were headed by their own 
manager. The observations were done within the internal investigations department, 
which consisted at the time of observation of eleven employees (in addition to one 
manager and two secretaries). The internal process was structured in such a way that 
the department had three full-time investigators (all with a police background), three 
analysts (focusing on desk research) and five ‘intake-employees’ (forming a helpdesk 
where incidents might be reported by employees). This company is referred to in the 
remainder of this book as Observation Company 2.
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3.3 Case studies
An additional purpose of the observations was to gather material for case studies, 
consisting of corporate investigations reports and additional information on these 
investigations. A case study may be defined as a detailed, rigorous study focusing 
on a certain case or object. As is common in case studies, multiple ways to gather 
information about the case were used (Leys, Zaitch & Decorte, 2016). In total, twenty-
one reports were selected, ten of which were investigated by Observation Company 
1 and eleven of which were investigated by Observation Company 2. Cases were 
selected based on the following criteria: they should provide enough information (an 
investigation report or other substantive information needs to be present) and the 
case should involve a labour relation (internal norm violation). In addition, the cases 
which were selected can be divided in those where no report to the authorities was 
made (14) and those that did involve a report to the authorities (7). 
 Cases were analysed using a topic list containing main topics such as the scope 
and content of the case, methods of investigation, the settlements chosen and the 
involvement of law enforcement actors. With the aid of this topic list, each case was 
analysed and recorded. The selected cases were all (but one) person-oriented and the 
number of involved persons ranged from one to entire organisational departments 
(consisting of a large multitude of employees). There was a variety of norm violations 
(both criminal and non-criminal) but in general the norm violations had a financial 
component (mostly embezzlement). The norm violations that were investigated in 
the cases ranged from small (petty theft or the leakage of minor information) to 
substantial (millions of euros in fraud). A broad-scope exploration of all the cases 
at file at both observation companies revealed a large variety of norm violations, 
ranging from financial issues such as fraud, theft, corruption to integrity issues 
more generally such as breach of privacy, breach of trust, sexual harassment and 
unauthorised ancillary activities. Although the presentational style differed between 
Observation Company 1 and Observation Company 2, the same components could 
be found in both the investigative process and the way of reporting about the 
investigations. Cases were not selected at random but purposively, so as to ensure 
enough information about each case would be available.
 In addition to the investigative reports, which were the basis of the analysis of 
cases, other documents such as the (investigative) interview reports, the investigative 
journal, court rulings and media coverage were analysed. Furthermore, the 
investigators who had worked on the case were asked to answer certain questions 
and there were multiple informal conversations with investigators about the cases. 
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The information collected through the case studies was processed in Microsoft 
Word and coded and analysed with the aid of Atlas.ti, together with the interview 
and observation data. In addition, the collected information was contrasted with 
literature. This was an ongoing process and codes and topics were subject to 
improvement during this process (Decorte, 2016).
3.4 Some methodological reflections
As with any type of research, there are some specific methodological challenges 
which warrant some attention. First, the more general issues of validity and reliability 
are discussed. Following this, some more specific issues are highlighted. This section 
is concluded a reflection on my role as a researcher.
3.4.1 Internal and external validity
The term internal validity refers to the ‘credibility of claims’: can the information 
produced in the research be said to be ‘true’ (Maesschalk, 2016)? In interview settings, 
there always is the risk of socially desirable response tendencies (Beyens et al., 2016). 
One measure taken against this was not to react to questions from respondents 
about my opinion (see below). Although social desirability cannot be eliminated 
with certainty, there does not seem to be a very big risk regarding social desirability 
in this research for several reasons. First and foremost, the subject matter of this 
research is not sensitive to the respondents personally (although it might be to their 
organisation). Secondly, respondents were experts on the subjects at hand (and many 
were also experts on investigative interviewing).12 As explained below, respondents 
readily assumed the role of expert, there to provide me as a researcher with insight 
into their social reality. Thirdly, respondents generally expressed well-formulated and 
strong opinions, which might be an indication that these were in fact their opinions. 
Some subjects, such as public/private relations appeared to reproduce a ‘mantra’ 
which is prevalent in the research field – i.e. that cooperation is desirable. However, 
further probing revealed that some respondents indeed held this opinion, while 
others produced a more nuanced view upon reflection. I have endeavoured to remain 
keenly aware of the possibility of social desirability or other answering tendencies 
and I have used further probing to check the validity and reliability of respondents’ 
12 This last circumstance had advantages and disadvantages. A considerable advantage was that most 
respondents had no objection to be interviewed or to be audiotaped, as they were familiar with both. 
A disadvantage that may be identified was that because of respondents’ familiarity with the process of 
interviewing, many interview techniques did not have the desired effect. They either provoked (mild) 
irritation (for example in the case of repetition of questions in different terms) or they led respondents 
to fill out the course of the interview themselves by anticipating questions. This led me to change 
my strategy, treating the topic list as a more flexible guideline. In the end, all interviews provided the 
information they were intended to provide.
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answers. Another measure taken to avoid reproducing possible socially desirable 
answers as ‘facts’ in my research, was the use of triangulation. Qualitative research 
methods produce rich data. The methods used here – interviews, observations and 
case studies – produce data with a high measure of internal validity because they 
give the researcher the opportunity to check the data (Zaitch et al., 2016). The fact 
that multiple research methods have been used, producing data from different 
sources and gathered in different ways (triangulation), also benefits the internal 
validity (Maesschalk, 2016).
 When it comes to external validity, or the measure in which the results of this 
research may be generalised to the whole field of corporate security, more caution is 
warranted. In the strictest sense of the word, external validity may only be achieved 
when a sufficiently large sample has been used and the sample has been produced 
in a correct way (preferably at random). This is generally only the case in quantitative 
studies. Qualitative research data is richer in content than quantitative data, but the 
collection and analysis of qualitative data also takes more time. This makes it very 
difficult to get a sample which is large enough to be representative for all relevant 
actors within the research setting. In addition, as chapter 2 shows, there is no clear 
overview of the number of corporate investigators in the Netherlands. Finally, the 
covert nature of many of corporate investigators’ activities makes access challenging 
(see below). Choosing respondents at random would most likely not produce much 
useful respondents within the respondent groups of clients and law enforcement 
professionals (even if a complete list of all possible respondents could be obtained) – 
and even if useful respondents would be found, access without a gatekeeper would 
be very challenging.
 However, in a more general sense, some measure of generalisation may be possible 
in qualitative research as well (Maesschalk, 2016). Although efforts have been made 
to gather information about the four groups of corporate investigators identified 
here, not all groups were interviewed to the same extent, with in-house investigators 
being best represented within the respondent group. The same goes for clients 
and law enforcement professionals. This approach was purposively used to gather 
data in the most efficient way. Within the group of respondents, saturation of data 
was reached at the end of the fieldwork: the general patterns identified here may 
therefore be considered to be a good representation of the views of respondents.
3.4.2 Internal and external reliability
Internal reliability refers to the reproducibility of the research by other researchers 
(Maesschalk, 2016). This may be realised by providing other researchers access to the 
data. However, in doing so the confidentiality of the data may be compromised and 
respondents would no longer be anonymous. This situation is highly undesirable. 
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As such, internal reliability is attained by making the manner in which information 
has been gathered and the mode in which this information is used in this research, 
transparent. 
 In light of the discoveries of scientific fraud in social sciences in the Netherlands 
and beyond, transparency seems to be more warranted than ever (Van de Bunt, 2015). 
The use of quotes serves a double purpose in this way: quotes may highlight and 
emphasise a certain finding by using an example given by respondents themselves. 
In addition, quotes may serve as an indication that data in fact has been gathered.
 External reliability of a research is achieved when new research produces the 
same results (Maesschalk, 2016). Again, this is possible in an experimental setting 
but very hard to achieve in qualitative research. The best a qualitative researcher 
can do is being transparent about his or her own role in the research and collecting 
information. Section 3.4.4 focuses on my role in the research in more detail. First, the 
next section discusses the matter of establishing trust within the research setting.
3.4.3 Trust – access and confidentiality
Trust is hard to establish within an interview setting because an interview has a short 
time-span. It is therefore imperative that respondents trust that the information 
they share is treated as confidential. In this light, informed consent is essential. No 
parts of this research were covert and it has been clear to all respondents and other 
participants what my role was. Informed consent has been attained at every step 
(Vander Laenen & O’Gorman, 2016). For all methods used in this research (except 
open source data), confidentiality was guaranteed from the start. No information is 
presented in this book or in other publications based on this research, which may 
lead to the identity of respondents, specific organisations or specific cases. There is, of 
course a downside to this, as it makes the data gathering process less transparent and 
harder to duplicate. Protection of respondents is prioritised over transparency in this 
research. Anonymity is ensured for multiple reasons. First, the information gathered 
is sensitive information. Corporate investigators and law enforcement professionals 
deal with much sensitive information and it would be detrimental to the persons 
involved if this information would be openly discussed in detail in this book. Ensuring 
anonymity therefore has, secondly, the additional benefit that access to information 
is granted more readily. Third, much of the specifics which would be detrimental to 
anonymity are not relevant to the questions posed in this research. In this way, the 
content of the research is not affected by this choice.
 The way in which respondents are approached is also relevant with regard to trust. 
Respondents were contacted through email or telephone contact, based on contact 
information received through gatekeepers and other respondents. Through contacts 
established in previous research in the field (Dorn & Meerts 2009; Meerts & Dorn 2009; 
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Meerts 2013), gatekeepers were approached. Gatekeepers are key contacts who are in 
a position to make introductions and grant access (Noaks & Wincup, 2004). This mode 
of entry is especially useful for difficult-to-reach groups, such as experts (Baarda et 
al., 1996). For this research, gatekeepers proved essential in gaining access. Experts 
are generally hard to access and in the corporate security market, which is largely 
reliant on discretion, it is even more difficult. Adding to that the fragmentation of 
the field, the small amount of cases that are reported to the authorities and the fact 
that clients hardly ever publicise that they have ordered internal investigations to be 
done, getting access without a gatekeeper would have been very difficult indeed.
 Three different gatekeepers were used in this research. Once interviews were 
conducted, each respondent was asked to suggest new respondents. In this way, every 
respondent acted as an additional gatekeeper as well. This method of gaining access 
is called snowballing. Through snowballing, one may reach valuable respondents in 
an efficient manner (Mortelmans, 2016). Especially in the case of clients (who are 
difficult to identify because much of corporate security’s work is not publicised in 
the media) and law enforcement professionals with experience with corporate 
investigators (who are difficult to identify because many corporate investigations 
are not reported to the authorities), the snowball method proved effective. However, 
a sample achieved through gatekeepers and snowballing is also a selective one, 
as it depends on the network of previous respondents. To mitigate this, multiple 
gatekeepers were used. In addition, at a certain point in the research, saturation of 
respondents occurred: the same names (who had already been interviewed) kept 
reoccurring, independently of the gatekeeper through which the respondent had 
been approached (ibid.). The observation companies were approached after contact 
had already been established through interviews.
3.4.4 Getting captivated – a reflection on the role of the researcher 
A reflection on the role of the researcher is essential to any type of research: 
researcher bias may occur because of the methods used, the choices made and the 
interpretations the researcher produces. As mentioned, observations (and to a lesser 
extent interviews and case studies) are liable to this as well. During the interviews, 
my role as researcher now and then became apparent as some respondents tried to 
‘test’ me: by asking some questions they tried to find out whether I had sufficient 
knowledge with regard to the subject matter. Depending on the situation, I reacted by 
either showing my knowledge or assuming ignorance. The strategy I chose depended 
on my assessment whether or not showing knowledge would steer the respondent in 
any way. For example, when I was asked what I thought were the reasons not to report 
to the authorities, I refrained from answering the question. In this example, revealing 
the reasons mentioned in literature and previous interviews might have directed the 
42
Chapter 1 
respondents in a certain direction.13 However, I did present basic knowledge of the 
law when questioned: this is factual information and in this context (in which the 
respondent was keenly aware of the law because of his professional background) 
it would not steer the respondent in a certain direction. I was careful not to display 
any opinions during the interviews but was less hesitant to do so after the interview 
had been finalised and informal conversation ensued. Assuming either ignorance or 
knowledge had the added benefit of respondents opening up more. Respondents 
were experts on the subjects at hand and it was important to acknowledge this in 
the interviews (Beyens et al., 2016). The fact that I am a young woman may have been 
beneficial as well. Most of corporate security and law enforcement is “dominated by 
old men” as one manager during observation 2 stated.
 During the observations, most people reacted in a positive and curious manner, 
although it took some time to establish trust (Zaitch et al., 2016). After trust was 
established, more information became available and employees of the observation 
companies displayed much effort to share information with me and explain certain 
mechanisms. This is a good example of what Roks (2016) means when he writes about 
the changing role of the researcher over time. As the relationship with the research 
setting changes, so does the measure of access. The immersion in the field was not 
of such nature that capture was a real danger. Capture (also known as ‘going native’ 
or ‘over-rapport’) refers to the situation in which a researcher identifies with his or 
her research field in too great a measure, leading the researcher to miss information 
and results and interpretation of information to be affected (Zaitch et al., 2016). My 
relationship to my field of research and my research subject is not to be defined in 
the sense of capture, but it can be aptly described as captivation. Captivation in this 
context has a more positive meaning than capture: being captivated by the research 
subject may facilitate a more in-depth investigation and discussion. My captivation 
with (or fascination for) the corporate security market has promoted a critical stance 
towards existing private security theories, the fieldwork of this research and the 
conclusions arising from the fieldwork (as opposed to being captured, which may 
promote tunnel vision). 
13 For example, literature places much emphasis on the role of reputational damage when it comes to 
reasons not to report a norm violation to the authorities. In contrast, respondents attach much less 
importance to reputation.
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Book structure
In the following chapters, the research questions presented in the introduction to 
this chapter are answered, using the data collected in this research. The legal context 
within which corporate investigations and settlements occur is first discussed in 
chapter 2. This chapter also identifies the four groups of corporate investigators which 
are central to this research and discusses some notable differences between them. An 
important conclusion of chapter 2 is that the corporate security sector is fragmented 
in multiple ways. The four main professional groups of corporate security providers 
– private investigation firms, in-house security departments, forensic accountants 
and forensic legal firms – all have their own specific selling points and, importantly, 
their own legal frameworks. This leaves room for clients to actively search for the 
investigator who is best suited to investigate the norm violation the client is faced 
with (forum shopping). While legal frameworks may differ widely among different 
corporate investigators, activities are largely similar (partly as a result of diversification 
of the field). Because many corporate investigators follow similar norms (such as an 
emphasis on due process), corporate investigators of different backgrounds tend to 
adhere to similar rules in practice.
 Chapter 3 goes on to describe the investigative process and the methods that 
may be used to gather information in the context of corporate investigations. The 
process is discussed from the assignment confirmation to the report that follows from 
the investigations. Corporate investigators are not charged with the investigation 
of criminal offences according to the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (article 141 
and 142 WvSv) and as such do not have formal powers of investigation. In addition, 
corporate investigators tend to avoid terminology used in criminal justice proceedings. 
This sets them apart (symbolically) from law enforcement agencies. However, they have 
extensive access to information through the rights the organisation has as an employer. 
As such, corporate investigators have extensive possibilities of investigation within the 
limits of what they are allowed to do. 
 Chapter 4 follows the investigative process further, by describing what happens 
next: the settlements which may follow corporate investigations. Four categories of 
solutions are presented, originating from different legal venues: criminal law, the Civil 
Code (including private contract regulations and labour law) and internal regulations 
of organisations. Corporate justice achieved through corporate settlements is a good 
example of forum shopping: the solution which is most beneficial to the client is chosen. 
Chapter 4 also discusses reasons organisations may have to either avoid a report to law 
enforcement authorities or actively involve the authorities through a report. In general 
terms these may be divided into strategic and normative considerations.
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 Chapters 3 and 4 largely represent situation i (separation) presented in Figure 
1 above. In chapter 5, the focus shifts to situation ii (ad hoc coexistence). Public/
private relations in the field of corporate security are explored, focusing on a 
typology ranging from (private to public) information transfer (A), to (minor) mutual 
information sharing (B) to coordination (C). Some formalised attempts to cooperation, 
aimed at establishing a longer-term relationship, are discussed but these are yet to 
be successful. Public/private relationship seem to be likely to remain based on ad hoc 
occurrences because of the nature of corporate investigations, corporate justice and 
the types of norm violations that are usually the object of corporate investigation 
processes. Strategic use of different legal venues and forum shopping make 
relationships fluid and ad hoc. In this chapter, material derived from the case studies 
is explicitly used to clarify public/private relationships in the context of coexistence.
 Chapter 6, finally, concludes the book by providing an answer to the research 
questions and discussing the major concepts arising from the research: the concepts 
of forum shopping, the autonomy of corporate investigators within the private legal 
sphere, coexistence and non-contractual moral agency are used to discuss the unique 
nature of the corporate security market within the field of (crime) control. The role of 
private and public interests is furthermore discussed and attention is paid to the issue 
of the governance of the corporate security field. Some suggestions are given with 
respect to the regulation of and control over the corporate security market. Chapter 
6 furthermore provides a discussion and reflection on the research. It concludes this 
book by looking ahead to future research.
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Chapter 2
Legal frameworks
The legal context for private investigation 
firms, in-house security, forensic accountants 
and forensic legal investigators
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Introduction
There are multiple actors with different backgrounds active in the corporate 
investigations field (Williams, 2014: 59). These different actors have their own 
laws and regulations to adhere to, which are described in this chapter. Some rules 
are specific to the professional group, while others apply to all. In addition to the 
specific rules applicable to them, corporate investigators with different backgrounds 
seem to adhere to a similar set of general principles of law (most notably fairness, 
proportionality and subsidiarity). These general principles of law are codified for 
some but not for others (NVb, 2014; NIVRA/NOvAA, 2010). The differences in legal 
frameworks provide some corporate investigators with strategic advantages 
compared to others. As this chapter will show, all four groups have their specific 
selling points (which may or may not be directly related to the legal frameworks): 
in-house security departments are internal to an organisation, therefore providing a 
unique level of specialised knowledge about the organisation. In-house investigators 
and investigators working for a private investigation firm often also have a police 
background and are skilled interviewers. Private investigation firms are furthermore 
permit-holders and are external to the client, bringing with them an air of objectivity. 
This latter circumstance also applies to forensic accountants, who furthermore may 
be seen as financial experts. Investigators with a legal background finally, are experts 
in the legal interpretation of the findings and they may assist with settlements. In 
addition, forensic legal investigators may make use of their legal privilege to protect 
the outcomes of the investigations.
 The fact that there are different rules for different players makes for a rather 
scattered field, in which it is not altogether clear for those involved which rules they 
have to adhere to. The way in which the topic is handled by legislators does not really 
do much in clearing up this confusion. The issue of legislation pops up every once 
in a while in Parliament, however this has not lead to systematic, uniform legislation 
(Klerks, 2008: 17). An interesting point made by White (2014) in this regard is that 
legislators tend to regulate the kind of private security activity that is most visible, 
and thus, threatening to the legitimate position of the police. White focuses on the 
difference in regulation of in-house and external security (guards) in the UK more 
generally, however his argument could be extended to corporate investigations. The 
legal framework provide by the Dutch Law on Private Security Companies and Private 
Investigation Firms (hereafter: Wpbr) is mainly focused on the more traditional 
security activities. There are many specific rules in this law about security guards, 
cash-in-transit and private alarm companies but on private investigations the law is 
very general. The legal framework seems indeed focused on the most visible parts 
of the private security industry, as it mostly regulates such things as uniforms. The 
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inclusion of a requirement for private security firms to notify the police about security 
activities is interesting in the absence of such an obligation for private investigators. 
As this chapter shows, within the already limited mention of private investigations 
in the Wpbr, the law seems even more narrow as it specifically focuses on the most 
visible corporate investigators: the private investigation firms. The other types of 
investigators discussed in this chapter are excluded from the Wpbr.
 While it is certainly not the case that the sector is unregulated, one might suggest 
that the consequence of the dispersed nature of regulation is that many opportunities 
for forum shopping are created. Forum shopping is the process in which parties 
pick and choose from certain ‘forums’ to suit their specific interests. In international 
business relations, parties will for example choose a jurisdiction for the settlement 
of a dispute that will produce the most favourable outcome (Whytock, 2010). In the 
context of this chapter, it means that both clients and (to a certain extent) corporate 
investigators may choose from different legal frameworks. As this chapter illustrates, 
in the Netherlands, different actors are liable to different legal frameworks. The 
diversity in the legal frameworks applicable to corporate investigations is a prime 
example of the interdisciplinary nature of the sector and the remarkable position of 
corporate security. Corporate security constitutes a commercial sector (regulated by 
private law), offering a product that may have an outcome either relating to public 
law (criminal proceedings), private law (contract or tort), labour law (labour relations) 
or internal regulations. Chapter 4 of this book focuses specifically on these different 
outcomes in the form of corporate settlements. 
 While there are also other players active in the field of (corporate) investigations,14 
the focus in this chapter (and this book) is on four main groups: private investigation 
firms, in-house security departments, forensic accountants and forensic legal 
investigators. The different rules and regulations applicable to these four groups, 
and their respective advantages for clients compared to other investigators, are 
discussed. Some particular legal requirements are left to be discussed in more detail 
in following chapters, as they for example apply specifically to certain investigative 
methods. 
 Although the four professional groups of corporate investigators have their own 
specific legal framework, some general rules apply to all. Section 1 starts by focusing 
on these general legal frameworks. Sections 2 to 5 go on to discuss the specific 
legal frameworks applicable to different corporate investigators. All of this leads to 
14 For example, information-companies, debt collection agencies, IT specialists and companies 
specialising in employee absence might also be involved in investigative activities. Many of these 
actors do not have (or need) a permit as discussed in section 2 of this chapter because they are 
not investigating individuals (‘natural persons’). The focus in this research is on those professional 
investigators who investigate (persons) as their core professional activity. 
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differences between corporate investigators, leaving room for clients to choose the 
corporate investigator who is most suited for their present situation (forum shopping). 
Section 6 looks into the respective selling propositions of each group compared to 
others, through a focus on the themes: professional background and knowledge, and 
legal frameworks and position with respect to the client. A discussion concludes the 
chapter, reflecting on the legal context of different corporate investigators.
1. General rules and legal frameworks for investigations
One of the defining characteristics of criminal investigations is their far-reaching 
nature. In legal terms, ‘investigating’ is defined in the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure as ‘the investigations into criminal acts under auspices of the public 
prosecutor, aimed at a decision in criminal proceedings’ (article 132a). ‘Investigating’ 
in this sense is limited to the actions of law enforcement officers (article 141 & 142). 
Powers of investigation are exclusively granted to law enforcement agencies and 
since a large scandal in the 1990’s, the more intrusive of these are explicitly regulated 
in the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure as special powers of investigation [‘BOB’] 
(Title IVa and Title IV). Corporate investigators do not have powers of investigation 
(see also chapter 3) so these laws do not apply to their work. A corporate investigator 
is, however, bound to adhere to the Criminal Code, as are all natural and legal persons. 
This means, for example, that they cannot detain someone or use force against him 
and that they have to respect other people’s rights to privacy. 
1.1 The Data Protection Act (WBP)
With respect to privacy, there is specific legislation which is relevant to corporate 
investigators, the WBP [Dutch law safeguarding the protection of personal privacy].15 
This law applies not merely to corporate investigations, however the WBP serves 
as an important guide for these as well. Although the WBP restricts the gathering 
and use of personal data, it simultaneously leaves room for this. For example, article 
23 under 1b, states that personal data that have been made public by the involved 
person may be used. In a time when many people are actively using social media and 
hereby exposing much personal information, this means that corporate investigators 
may gather and use personal data quite easily (see also chapter 3). 
15 Chapter 3 discusses some specific parts of the WBP more in-depth, when it comes to the details of 
investigative activities.
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 Many rights and possibilities of corporate investigators are derived from the rights 
the client has as an employer (Williams, 2014: 68). In general terms, employers are 
allowed to exercise control over their employees, however they should take certain 
restrictions into account (CBP, 2015a). Firstly, there should be a legitimate reason for 
such control, which may be constituted by suspicions of criminal or other undesirable 
behaviour. Furthermore, less intrusive ways to gather the necessary information 
should have proven ineffective (in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity). The 
control should also be reported to the Data Protection Authority (AP – previously 
called CBP) and the Works Council of the organisation will have to grant approval. 
Employees should furthermore be made aware of the rules, the possibility of control 
and the manner of control (e.g. through a code of conduct). Finally, the employer 
should respect the right to confidential communication of his employees. This 
does not exclude the possibility of control over for example telephone or email 
communications, however the employer should distinguish between professional and 
personal communications. In case of suspicion of a crime, the employer is allowed to 
record telephone conversations. If the control that is to be exercised is covert, there 
should be a reasonable suspicion of a crime committed by one or more employee(s). 
The AP should approve this type of control in advance and the employee(s) should be 
made aware of the covert control after it has been completed (ibid.).
 With regard to some specific types of control the AP has issued guidelines, for 
example in case of camera usage (CBP, 2015b). The principles of law of subsidiarity 
and proportionality are important here. Because the breach of privacy is substantial, 
employers should weigh the necessity and the interests being served with the use 
of cameras against the interests of the involved person (in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality). If the goal that is to be reached by the use of cameras 
may be reached through less intrusive means, these should be applied (subsidiarity). 
In addition, the use of cameras should be reported to the AP and the Works Council 
will have to grant approval. Hidden cameras are allowed in special circumstances, 
one of which is (the investigation of ) suspicions of theft or fraud. This type of camera 
usage may only be of temporary nature (ibid.).
 The above possibilities for employers and, by extension, corporate investigators, 
leave ample room for information gathering in the context of corporate investigations 
(see also chapter 3). Article 27 WBP states that the Data Protection Authority should 
be notified of automated use of personal data. The use of certain personal data is 
restricted though: article 16 of the WBP prohibits use of personal data regarding 
religion, health, criminal past, etc. unless the law has granted an exception. One of the 
exceptions with regard to data regarding someone’s criminal past is made in article 
22 WBP, which for example states that one may use the data to protect ones interests. 
This means that employers (and by extension in-house investigators) are allowed to 
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use and process data about (prospective or former) employees. Interestingly, article 
22 (under 4) of the WBP explicitly frees parties that have a permit based on the Law 
on Private Security Companies and Private Investigation Firms from the prohibition 
to work with (gather/process) criminal data. Not all corporate investigators have such 
a permit though (see below). Those who do not have a permit might still be able to 
use this kinds of data, as sub c states that this is possible when ‘proper measures’ 
are taken and the Data Protection Authority has done prior investigations on its 
permissibility.16 
1.2 The Civil Code (BW) and anti-money laundering legislation 
(Wwft)
Another general set of rules relevant to corporate investigators, in addition to criminal 
law and data protection legislation, is the system of the Civil Code (BW). The Civil Code 
is important when it comes to settlement of internal norm violations (see chapter 4), 
but it is also a more general guidance. The Civil Code captures the relations between 
civilians and private entities and article 6:162 BW states that anyone who commits a 
wrongful act towards another may be held liable to repay damages. On the basis of 
this article, corporate investigators may be held accountable for any wrongful and 
unlawful actions during their investigations. Chapter 7 section 10 BW furthermore 
concerns the labour relations between employer and employee and provides the 
employer with certain rights, for example to set rules and control the compliance of 
said rules (article 7:660 BW). This gives the employer (and by extension, a corporate 
investigator) room to control his employees, investigate when necessary and take 
(disciplinary) action (Schaap, 2013). 
 Finally, the Law Preventing Money Laundering and the Funding of Terrorism 
(Wwft) may compel corporate investigators to notify the authorities of ‘irregular 
transactions’.17 This type of regulation relates more to the compliance functions of 
corporate security, however it may be relevant to investigative activities as well. 
This may for example be the case when corporate investigators find a fraudulent 
transaction which benefited the client – every further action with the money would 
be money laundering. Corporate investigators have explicitly been made subject 
to the Wwft in 2013 (Minister of security and justice, 2013). The Wwft compels 
16 In addition to national privacy laws, international and EU privacy regulations are relevant to corporate 
investigations as well. Corporate investigations may cross national borders and so may personal data. The 
Dutch privacy law is in accordance with the EU directive on privacy, dating from 1995. However, as of May 
2018 new EU privacy regulation will come into force (see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/). 
Were relevant, specific international and EU regulations are mentioned throughout the book.
17 This is not a report to law enforcement authorities in the sense of a victim trying to spark criminal 
investigations, but a notification of ‘unusual transactions’. It could, however, lead to a criminal justice 
procedure or investigations by the relevant regulatory agency in their own right.
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investigators to inform authorities about irregular transactions and prohibits them to 
notify the client about this. Failure to comply is an (economic) offence, punishable by 
criminal law. In this way, internal investigations may prove a liability for clients. 
But – we still have obligations, for example in connection to the reporting of unusual 
transactions. The client knows this because he is made aware of it in the confirmation 
document for the assignment. We will not communicate to him that we make a Wwft 
notification, but we will notify authorities when required. This may be a risk in an 
investigation. Clients might think that if they hire a forensic accountant, he has to 
notify. So sometimes we recommend to the client to make the assignment run through 
a law firm, to protect the client’s interests. [Respondent 40 – corporate investigator]
Some concern has been voiced about the use of (derived) legal privilege by 
lawyers to circumvent the applicability of the WBP and Wwft. However, the current 
interpretation of this question is that both laws are applicable in general but legal 
privilege may protect investigations from scrutiny based on these laws (Minister of 
security and justice, 2015).
This section has set the stage with regard to general legal frameworks, applicable to 
all corporate investigators. In addition to these, other (general) laws and regulations 
may apply, depending on the context within which the investigations take place. For 
example, if the investigations are within a financial institution such as a bank, financial 
regulation applies as well. Taking into consideration that corporate investigations 
take place within all sectors of economic activity (but also within the sphere of public 
administration), it would be impossible to map all these different legal contexts 
here. However, it is wise to keep in mind that in addition to what is discussed in this 
chapter, further regulations may apply in different contexts. 
 The rules and regulations discussed in the sections below are specific to the 
type of investigator. However, on a more ‘normative level’, there are commonalities 
between the four groups discussed. All corporate investigators interviewed for this 
research mention the importance of certain principles of law to guide them in their 
investigations. For some, these principles have been codified in a code of conduct, 
while for others they may just be an ‘internal compass’. Leading principles of law which 
are often mentioned are fairness (treating the subject with respect and keeping his 
interests in mind)18, proportionality (the method used should be proportional to 
the goal) and subsidiarity (when a less intrusive method is available, this should be 
used). Another widely-used principle is that investigations should have a reasonable 
18 The adversarial principle plays an important role here – the right of a subject to be heard and informed. 
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foundation: investigators should refrain from accepting an assignment without merit, 
for example when an employer merely wants to get rid of a difficult employee. 
2. Private investigation firms – those with a Wpbr-permit
The Wpbr is the only Act of Parliament that is specific to us. And then there is the 
code of conduct, made generally binding by the minister [of security and justice] and 
approved by the Data Protection Authority. That’s about the investigative activities. 
But that’s all there is really. Ok we’re not allowed to commit crimes or to act wrongfully; 
that would make us liable. And general principles of law are important but they are in 
the code of conduct. And we try to keep up with case law and adapt our own code of 
conduct if necessary. [Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]
For a long time, private investigators have been regulated as a ‘by product’, falling 
under the law prohibiting militia until 1999 (Wet op de Weerkorpsen). The law against 
(politically oriented) militia was created in 1936 (Fijnaut, 2002). Although the 
law was created to prohibit the formation of militia belonging to the NSB, a Nazi-
oriented political party, the definitions used were broad enough to also include 
private security companies. The minister of justice issued a decree in 1939 to exempt 
private security companies from the interdiction, simultaneously creating some 
rules for private security companies to comply with.19 Interestingly, in the Wet op de 
Weerkorpsen there is no mention of private investigation companies, the focus is on 
private security as such. Because of the growth of the private security sector after the 
Second World War, it was deemed desirable to regulate private security in a separate 
law. A working group (1974) and later an advisory committee (1979) were formed, 
both indicating that a separate law was necessary. However, because of the urgency 
of the matter, as a transitional stage, the Wet op de Weerkorpsen was amended (and 
renamed to explicitly include private security and private investigations) to provide 
a better fit with the private security industry (Wet op de Weerkorpsen en Particuliere 
beveiligingsorganisaties en recherchebureaus) (ibid.).20 This was the first (explicit) 
mention of private investigations in Dutch law.
In 1999, a specific law regulating private security organisations and private investigation 
firms was implemented (Wet Particuliere Beveiligingsorganisaties en Recherchebureaus – 
hereafter: Wpbr). The Wpbr does not provide much guidance for corporate investigators. 
19 See Staatscourant, 6 juli 2000.
20 There have been multiple other intermediary changes in the law but these are not relevant at this point 
(Fijnaut, 2002).
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The law is fairly general and mostly focused on regulating permits, rather than regulating 
the actual activities of investigators. It does, however, provide some definitions of what a 
private investigation firm is. Firstly, article 1, under 1 (e) of the Wpbr defines investigative 
activities as: ‘the collection and analysis of data’. This is a pretty broad definition. The law 
continues to define a private investigation firm as: 
A person or legal entity, who, in the performance of a profession or [as a] company for 
profit, does investigative work in as far as these activities are carried out at the request 
of a third party in connection with a private interest of that third party and in as far as 
they relate to one or more specific individuals (article 1 under 1 (f ) Wpbr). 
This definition has some consequences. First of all, as the law is applicable to private 
investigation firms, others who are not included by this definition are not subject to 
the Wpbr. This means that in-house security departments are excluded from the legal 
framework provided by in the Wpbr. In-house departments do not perform services 
for a third party as they are part of their ‘client’ (State secretary of justice & minister of 
the interior, 2009). Additionally, most forensic accountants are exempt from the Wpbr 
because they are investigating as part of their legally defined task (article 1 under 3 
Wpbr). Forensic accountants who are chartered accountants are by that definition no 
private investigators in the sense of the Wpbr. 
 The Wpbr is fairly broad scope, however there are more specific rules laid down in the 
ministerial ordinance on private security organisations and investigation firms (Regeling 
Particuliere beveiligingsorganisaties en Recherchebureaus – hereafter Rpbr). This ordinance 
regulates some practical matters, such as permits and education. It is illegal to maintain a 
private investigation firm without a permit (article 2 under 1 Wpbr), which is criminalised 
as an economic crime in the Law on Economic Crimes (article 1 under 4 Wed). Those who 
fall under the Wpbr and Rpbr need to have a permit from the Ministry of Security and 
Justice (for the organisation: article 2 Wpbr; for management: article 7 under 1 Wpbr) or 
the chief of police (for employees/individual investigators: article 7 under 2 Wpbr). Permits 
are granted to people who are ‘competent and reliable’ (article 7 under 4 Wpbr). As proof 
of competence, private investigators should possess a certificate of an accredited course 
on private investigations.21 Reliability means that a permit will be refused when someone 
has either been convicted for a crime resulting in a fine, a penal order or a transaction 
within the last four years; when (s)he has been sentenced to imprisonment or community 
21 This requirement does not apply to people born prior to April 1944 and working as a private investigator 
prior to the Wpbr came into force (article 26 Rpbr). With this, the legislator seems to accommodate the 
former police officers who have been working as private investigators for a long time. The Wpbr was 
late to occur and before it came into force, there already was a substantial private investigations sector 
in the Netherlands.
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service within the last eight years; or in case of ‘other known and relevant facts’. These 
other facts may for example be grave suspicions of (involvement in) crimes or known 
criminal associates.22
 Figure 2 displays the official identification card for private investigators in the 
Netherlands (also known as the ‘yellow pass’). It contains a photograph and some 
personal details (name, date of birth and registration number) of the investigator and 
of the company the investigator belongs to (name, registration number and phone 
number). A card is valid for a maximum of five years and the expiration date is displayed. 
Interestingly, the front of the ID card states that ‘you [the person to whom the card 
is shown] are not obliged by the government to cooperate with an investigation of 
a private investigation firm’. As we shall see in chapter 3, this ‘voluntary’ cooperation 
with investigations is very important for corporate investigators. The back of the card 
portrays the signature of the chief of police, the statement that the card holder is 
allowed to execute investigative activities and – if applicable – some restrictions.
Figure 2. Private investigator identification card
The Wpbr states that employees of private investigation firms have an obligation 
to be discrete about the information they gather during their work, unless they are 
legally required to divulge the information (article 13 Wpbr). It should be noted that 
the circumstance that a criminal act is discovered may mean that confidentiality does 
not apply. However, there is no such thing as a duty to report for private investigators. 
Whether or not a crime is reported to the authorities is up to the client (and partly 
the investigators) (more on this in chapter 4). The Rpbr furthermore dictates that 
investigation companies make sure that personal and other confidential data are 
stored securely (article 4 Rpbr). The aforementioned WBP handles these matters in 
more detail. 
22 See Staatscourant, 1 april 2014, nr. 9654.
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 The actual regulation of specifics of investigative work was left to the industry 
itself. It is, however mandatory for private investigation firms to have a complaints 
procedure (article 18 Rpbr). The specific rules that apply to investigative activities of 
private investigation firms have been articulated by a representative organisation 
of the Dutch security sector (NVb). This code of conduct is not merely binding to 
members of the NVb, because of article 23a of the Rpbr it applies to all private 
investigation firms. This code of conduct has been approved by the Data Protection 
Authority and is added to the Rpbr as attachment.23 All private investigation firms are 
obliged to have a code of conduct in place that is in accordance with the Privacy code 
of conduct as approved by the AP.
 In 2015 there were some 300 licensed investigation firms in the Netherlands 
that had about 700 licensed investigators working for them (Inspectie Veiligheid en 
Justitie, 2015). The corporate security market is however much bigger than merely 
those who are licensed under the Wpbr. Below, we will first focus on in-house 
security departments, after which our attention will turn to forensic accountants and 
investigators with a legal background.
3. In-house security departments
I take it you know the Wpbr, that law puts certain demands to investigation firms. 
Well, we are an investigation firm, it’s just that we investigate internally and not for 
externals, for others. It has pros and cons. The biggest pro is that we are not required 
to have a permit. [Respondent 39 – corporate investigator]
As mentioned above, Dutch law does not regard in-house security departments 
as private investigation firms and as such they are excluded from the Wpbr and 
Rpbr. The question of whether or not in-house departments should fall within the 
reach of the law has been discussed in Parliament. The idea behind the exclusion 
is that because a security department is part of a larger organisation, there will be 
internal checks and balances in place that should suffice. Making the Wpbr and other 
legal frameworks applicable to in-house departments would ‘lead to a substantial 
administrative burden for these organisations. This, when compared to the way the 
public (privacy) interest is protected, leads to the conclusion that extension of the 
reach of the law is not within reason’ (State secretary of justice & minister of the interior, 
2009). However, there are still many voices that suggest that the law should apply 
to in-house departments as well, by making the nature of the activities the criterion 
23 The Privacy code of conduct has been updated in 2015 and was again approved by the Data Protection 
Authority.
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for applicability of the law (see for example Klerks & Eysink Smeets, 2005). Although 
many respondents from in-house departments appreciate that they do not have to 
comply with (the mostly) administrative demands of the Wpbr, at the same time, they 
feel it is based on an arbitrary distinction. As the above quote shows, many in-house 
investigators see themselves as being an investigator in the sense of the Wpbr because 
their work is largely similar to that of private investigation firms. In practice, many in-
house departments follow the Wpbr regardless of their exclusion from it.
 Because of their exclusion from the Wpbr and Rpbr, in-house departments aren’t 
legally bound by the Privacy code of conduct as defined by the representative 
organisation of private security either. However, many in-house departments seem 
to follow the Privacy code of conduct by defining their own guidelines for their 
investigations, based on this code of conduct. 
What we did is, we made a privacy code of conduct for our investigations, which 
is more or less the same as the one that investigation firms use. Because we don’t 
want to act differently from them. So we work within the same limitations. We have 
published these documents on the intranet, so everybody in the company knows 
what the rules are we play by. Also to make sure that no deviations occur and you 
don’t get in trouble in court. We can show that we work the way the market works, just 
like the rest. So the official one may not apply to us but we made our own anyway and 
we agreed that this is the way we do our job. [Respondent 19 – corporate investigator]
All respondents working at an in-house security department indicate that they have 
their own internal regulations, mostly very similar to the Privacy code of conduct 
for private investigation firms, comparable to the statement of the respondent 
quoted above. Similarly, article 18 of the Rpbr is followed as all respondents from 
an in-house department indicate they have a complaints procedure regarding their 
activities. In addition, many in-house investigators have completed training in one 
form or another with regard to their investigative activities (even though they are not 
required to do so by law). However, a police background may prove to be sufficient 
for organisations with regard to relevant training and experience.
Of course you also receive some education internally for specifics related to the 
job. But the basic skills, knowledge of criminal law, that’s important. If they want 
to report in the end you need to know what kind of information the police need to 
prove theft etc. What I see in our line of business is that most investigators working 
for organisations, security managers, they have followed some course on this. And 
there are registers for security experts, with the right credentials. [Respondent 15 – 
corporate investigator]
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In addition to internal regulations and more generally applicable legislation such 
as WBP and the Criminal Code, the laws regulating specific branches of industry 
mentioned above are especially relevant for in-house investigators. Banks for example 
have to adhere to the Law on Financial Institutions (Wft), telecommunications 
companies to the Telecommunications law, and so on. It goes too far to discuss all 
these specific regulations here but it should be noted that this does affect the day-
to-day business of the company and as such, of the in-house security department to 
a greater extent than it does for other investigators. In-house investigators work for 
one client – the organisation they are a part of. The legal context of this organisation 
thus constitutes the background for all their investigations.
4. Forensic accountants
We have always advocated the opinion that the rules for accountants are more strict than 
those for private investigators. Some of our colleagues have filed for a permit just in case, 
but we think: look, the rules we use are more stringent than the Wpbr so it is nonsense to 
get a permit. So we won’t. And the minister has agreed with that standpoint. [Respondent 
27 – corporate investigator]
Many accountancy firms now have their own specialised forensic departments, those of 
the ‘Big Four’ (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, PwC) being the most well-known. The first 
to establish a forensic department in the Netherlands was KPMG in 1993 (Van Almelo 
& Schimmel, 2014). Although the ‘forensic accountant’ has positioned himself as a 
leading actor in the field of private (financial) investigations, the Dutch legislator does 
not differentiate between forensic accountants and normal accountants (De Graaff, 
2007). There is no legal definition of forensic accountancy and there are no specific 
laws for the forensic branch.24 There are, however, more general laws that also apply to 
the forensic accountant (as he still is an accountant), most notably the law regulating 
the profession of accountant (Wet op het accountantsberoep; hereafter Wab) and the 
law regulating the control over accountants (Wet toezicht accountantsorganisaties; 
hereafter Wta). In the Netherlands, there are two kinds of accountants: the chartered 
accountant (RA) and the accountant-administration consultant (AA). The RA and AA are 
different only with regard to their types of clients and their educational background, 
with the RA being educated on university level and the AA on college level. While 
the RA caters mostly to large and multinational companies and ‘organisations with 
24 Neither is there a specific education, leading to a title ‘forensic accountant’. There are, however, some 
courses within other academic studies, such as criminology (Leiden University) and the Big Four have 
their own internal courses.
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a public interest element’, the AA finds his clientele in small to medium businesses. 
They have the same tasks and responsibilities and both are mandatory members of 
the association of accountants (NBA).25 The different laws regarding the RA and AA 
have been combined in 2012 in one law (the Wab).26 
 To be allowed to use an accountancy title, it is obligatory to be listed in the register 
(article 41 Wab). Those who are legally allowed to call themselves accountant are 
subject to disciplinary proceedings (article 42 Wab). Since 2012, when the Wab came 
into force, the disciplinary proceedings are dealt with by the Accountancy chamber 
of the court in Zwolle, which consists of a mixture of judges and accountants. The 
appeals are dealt with by the Court for trade and industry. The five disciplinary 
measures which may be administered are a warning, a reprimand, a fine, a temporary 
removal from the register and a permanent removal from the register (article 2 Wet 
tuchtrechtspraak accountants; hereafter Wtra).
 Some respondents indicate they have been removed from the register at their own 
request. One reason mentioned for this is that the mandatory ‘permanent education’ 
hours (NBA, 2016) are superfluous and expensive for accountants who are not active 
as a traditional accountant. For accountants working as corporate investigators, 
being registered doesn’t have much added value. Without registration, they are not 
allowed to use the title RA or AA, however, they do not need this title when working 
for a private investigation firm (or in-house security department). “I have requested 
to be removed from the register but I am still perfectly able to look at the books and 
when they want me to report what’s in the administration and how much money 
went to account A, B or C, I can do that” [Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]. No 
longer an accountant in the official sense, these investigators are no longer subject 
to the rule of the disciplinary court. This is mentioned as another reason for removing 
oneself from the register (Van Almelo & Schimmel, 2014). That would, of course, 
be a perverse effect of the regulations, however it does not necessarily mean that 
the investigator in question is now ‘unregulated’. Depending on the position of this 
investigator, he or she then falls within the regime of the Wpbr (when working for an 
investigation firm) or the internal regulations of the company (when part of an in-
house security department).
 Because of the lack of a specific legal framework, respondents feel that the 
rules regulating accountancy do not align well with the activities of the forensic 
accountant. There are some guidelines designed by the NBA, however they should 
not be regarded as having a binding nature (NIVRA/NOvAA, 2010). The Accountancy 
chamber does take these guidelines as a point of reference in disciplinary proceedings 
25 Before, there were two organisations, the NIVRA (for RA’s) and the NOvAA (for AA’s).
26 For an overview of legal developments around accountancy in the Netherlands until 2007, see De Graaff 
(2007).
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though, and deviation from the guidelines requires explanation (see for example 
ECLI:NL:TACAKN:2016:49). Within the profession, there have been voices claiming that 
the forensic activities of a forensic accountant do not align with his legally determined 
duties and the investigations should be left to private investigators (Van Almelo, 2007). 
 The circumstance that the law does not provide specific rules for the forensic 
activities of accountants makes the aforementioned view of the state secretary of 
security and justice – that the Wpbr does not apply to forensic accountants because 
they are investigating as part of their legally defined task – a bit problematic in my view. 
Seeing that neither the law nor the disciplinary proceedings are specifically created 
for the forensic activities of accountants, it is not surprising that there is some debate 
among accountants (and other corporate investigators) about the applicable rules. For 
example, some forensic accountants have a Wpbr-permit, while others do not. There 
is a difference of opinion within the accountancy sector whether or not a permit is 
necessary and whether or not a forensic accountant should follow the rules laid down 
in the Wpbr. The corporate investigator quoted below is a forensic accountant himself.
It is odd though – some minister has said that [the Wpbr is not binding to accountants] 
as a reaction to questions from Parliament, based on the lobby of the big accountancy 
firms. But it’s strange if you think about it – those accountancy firms who are doing 
person-oriented investigations should fall under the Wpbr. [Respondent 40 – 
corporate investigator]
It may be argued that the rules binding forensic accountants are more based on 
principles of law than on actual hard and fast laws (Van Wijk et al., 2002). These 
principles of law have been codified in the rules of professional conduct for 
accountants, as issued by the NBA (NBA, 2014). As ‘fundamental principles’ have 
been noted: competence and diligence, integrity, objectivity, professional conduct 
and discretion.27 Other important principles of law identified by the NBA are 
proportionality and subsidiarity, the adversarial principle, the principle of fair play, 
the principle that results need to be verified, the principle that the accountant should 
refrain from giving a judgment and that he should be independent and impartial.28 
Although these general principles of law may be of guidance in many situations, 
27 Interestingly, the law indicates that accountants are bound to discretion about the information 
they gather during their legally mandated control tasks, unless they come across a fraud of material 
importance to the financial accountability of the client. In such a case, he should report this to law 
enforcement (article 26 Wta). ‘Fraud of material importance’ is fraud of such a nature or size that it may 
for example influence investment decisions of others. However, when the client acts directly upon this 
information by ordering an internal investigation and making a plan about the steps to be taken, this 
obligation to report does not apply (article 37 Bta [Besluit toezicht accountantsorganisaties]).
28 Chapter 3 will discuss this more in-depth.
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they may not be of much help in some circumstances more specific to investigative 
activities (Van Wijk et al., 2002). Van Wijk et al. conclude that forensic accountants do 
not always have enough rules to guide them and that they should be subject to the 
Wpbr (which was under construction at the time of their research). This suggestion 
was not implemented by legislators though and as shown above, the recent change 
in accountancy legislation and regulations has not brought specific (written) rules for 
forensic accountants either. The fact that accountancy regulation does not include 
rules for forensic work results from the fact that ‘these situations [in which there are 
no adequate rules] are connected to the detective part of the job, not to the use of 
accounting methods’ (Van Wijk et al., 2002: 229).
 Taking into account that forensic accountants seem to view themselves (and be 
viewed by others) and the regulations they have to comply with as top of the crop, 
this lacuna in the legal framework could be considered remarkable. The code of 
conduct for person-oriented investigations (which does not possess the legal status 
of professional regulation), expressly refers to the Privacy code of conduct for private 
investigators who are licensed under de Wpbr, to be used as a guideline (NIVRA/
NOvAA, 2010) and forensic accountant respondents indicate that they indeed use 
the Privacy code of conduct in their investigations. As the Wpbr is not legally binding 
to accountants, this should be regarded as a suggestion rather than a strict rule. 
It’s rather odd that for example the forensic departments of the Big Four don’t have 
to have a permit, while we do. I think that’s quite extraordinary. Because, just because 
they are part of an accountancy firm, they don’t have to meet that requirement. We, 
as private investigators, have to pass an exam, not that that’s very difficult but at least 
it is some kind of check. And they don’t have to do that. It’s as if when you’re part of 
an accountancy firm they think that you know everything. [Respondent 5 – corporate 
investigator (forensic accountant working for an investigation firm)]
However, among respondents, the view is prevalent that the code of conduct that 
has been made by the NBA is the most stringent of all regulations regarding private 
investigations. While the nature of accountancy regulations may be argued to be 
‘morally strict’ as a result of the emphasis on (legal) principles, the codification of these 
principles of law into legally binding laws is largely absent. As many commentators 
have stated, there is still no clear-cut framework for forensic accountants to work 
in (e.g. Van Campen & Van Hulten, 2015). The Privacy code of conduct for private 
investigation firms has integrated many principles identified by the NBA within its 
guidelines, and, as mentioned above, the NBA itself encourages its members to 
follow the Privacy code of conduct. However, there are some disagreements about 
the practical use of some of the principles of law which are incorporated in the 
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Privacy code of conduct and the NBA-guidelines. For example, many accountants 
argue that a forensic accountant should refrain from making a judgment. As the NBA 
code of conduct states, an accountant should limit himself to ‘reporting the facts and 
the circumstances and regulations that are relevant to these facts’ (NIVRA/NOvAA, 
2010: 15).
We are contracted-in to do fact finding, assigning value or giving meaning is not an 
accountant’s job. At the most you may describe the rules and describe the act. These 
are then laid side by side but a report should not state that the act has therefore been 
improper. [Respondent 36 – corporate investigator]
It seems though, that it is not the mere fact that a conclusion is drawn from the 
findings but rather the way in which this is done that is problematic. Accountants 
should refrain from giving a legal interpretation and from using normative language 
(such as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’) but it seems nearly impossible to avoid drawing any type of 
conclusion whatsoever (Van Almelo & Schimmel, 2014: 50). A recent decision by the 
Court for trade and industry seems to suggest that the crucial point here is not the 
interpretation of facts as such, but rather the way these conclusions are supported 
by the report (ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:118). This resonates well with the requirement from 
the accountancy code of conduct, that all conclusions made by an accountant should 
have a sound basis. “According to accountancy rules we should have a reasonable 
foundation for our findings. Which means that if you say, ‘this is red’, you should have 
the facts to substantiate that conclusion” [Respondent 41 – corporate investigator]. 
The accountancy profession has suffered considerable reputational damage since the 
start of the economic crisis of 2008. The role of the accountant in the years leading 
up to the crisis, and the (often sideways) share accountants have had in scandals, 
have led to substantial criticism. These criticisms focus primarily on the control task 
of accountants. In 2014 (and the years before that), the Authority for the Financial 
Markets (AFM) published a report in which it concluded that there were structural 
deficiencies in the major audit firms (the Big Four) and that fundamental reforms 
of the sector were necessary (AFM, 2014). Since then, the NBA has made several 
attempts to reform the sector and improve its reputation (Werkgroep toekomst 
accountantsberoep, 2014).29 One of the ways this is to be done is the oath accountants 
are required to take as of June 2016 (from May 2017 onwards, every accountant 
should have taken the oath) (Verordening op de beroepseed voor accountants).
29 The AFM fined all Big Four firms in March 2016 for failure to comply with their legal duty of care 
(AFM, 2016). However, these fines are based on the infractions found in the 2014 report. Recent AFM 
publications indicate that the sector is making serious improvements (AFM, 2015).
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5. Investigators with a legal background – forensic 
legal investigators
In those cases in which we are hired as an independent advisor there are no fast and 
hard rules, you have to formulate that together with the client. But I don’t think that 
this is causing many issues. I believe that you need to make rules when they’re needed, 
not before. And I’m not using any investigative powers, I ask people would you come 
over to answer some questions, you may bring a lawyer, you don’t have to, that’s it. It’s 
a developing profession, seven years ago it didn’t even exist and now there are many 
large firms who are getting into the market. So there is probably going to be some 
kind of regulation in future, to set standards for our investigations. [Respondent 30 – 
forensic legal investigator/client]
The most recent player added to the field of corporate investigations is the 
lawyer (Jennen & Biemond, 2009). Lawyers have long been involved in corporate 
investigations, however, before they were mostly clients. As clients, lawyers are 
often also partly involved in the investigations, for example because there are some 
(simple) actions they may do themselves, or they may be involved in the role of expert 
on the legal aspects of the investigations (e.g. whether or not the behaviour might 
(or should) be framed as criminal or as a private law matter) (Van Almelo & Schimmel, 
2014). At the conclusion of the investigations, when decisions are to be made about 
the steps that are to be taken, (labour) lawyers are often involved in the processes 
of advising and decision-making. More and more (large) legal practices have now 
developed their own investigative branch and smaller legal firms have also emerged 
that specialise in private investigations. 
 Much like the legal framework in place for accountants, there are no rules for 
lawyers that specifically focus on investigations. There are, however, more general 
laws regulating ‘traditional’ activities of lawyers, the Advocatenwet [the law on the 
legal profession] being the most important. Lawyers need to be registered to be 
able to act as a lawyer (article 1 Advocatenwet) and only those who are registered 
may call themselves lawyer (article 9a Advocatenwet). Like accountants, lawyers 
have a system of permanent education, with which they must comply (article 4.4 
Verordening op de advocatuur).30 The basic education is university (or college) level. 
An oath is required for lawyers (article 3 Advocatenwet). All lawyers are required to 
be a member of the Dutch order of lawyers (Nederlandse orde van advocaten; NOvA). 
30 There is no official education for investigative lawyers. However, there are some new initiatives targeting 
accountants and lawyers. These (academic) courses may be used for the permanent education points-
system. For example the course ‘financial forensic expert’ of the Erasmus University Rotterdam aims at 
both accountants and lawyers.
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This is a public body and its ordinances are legally binding (article 29 Advocatenwet). 
Disciplinary proceedings are held by Councils of discipline (presided over by a judge 
with two (or four) lawyer members and assisted by a clerk) in the district in which the 
lawyer operates and appeals may be made to the Court of discipline (presided over 
by a judge with one (or two) (judge) members and one (or two) lawyer members 
and assisted by a clerk). Disciplinary measures that may be taken are a warning, a 
reprimand, a fine, a one year suspension and a removal from the Bar register (article 
48 Advocatenwet). It is also possible to take no disciplinary action.
 The law dictates that a lawyer is responsible for the protection of his client. He 
does this in a way that is independent (from e.g. government), yet partial to his 
client and he should be competent, act with integrity and be a confidant to his client 
(article 10a Advocatenwet). In this sense, there is a difference between the other types 
of investigators, as this partiality is only for lawyers explicitly regulated by law. As 
the law is designed to regulate more traditional types of legal assistance and not 
investigations, this is not surprising. In the moderately inquisitorial judicial system 
of the Netherlands, lawyers have an important obligation to protect the interests 
of the suspect, who is more the object of investigations than an equal party to the 
proceedings (Cleiren, 2001).
 The code of conduct, issued by the Dutch society for lawyers (NOvA) is an 
elaboration of the general principles as laid down in the Advocatenwet but remains 
focused on the lawyer’s ‘core business’ (NOvA, 1992). The code of conduct is not 
legally binding, rather it is meant as a guideline for practitioners and disciplinary 
proceedings. Some specific parts of the guidelines can be used by lawyers when 
doing investigative work as well. Rule 29 of the code of conduct for example, states 
that the role of the lawyer should be clear in all communications with third parties. 
In disciplinary proceedings, this rule has been used to claim that the roles of the 
(fundamentally partisan) lawyer and the (independent and objective) fact finder 
should not be blurred (ECLI:NL:TADRSHE:2012:YA2502). In the ruling referred to here, 
the court decided that the complaint that was launched had no merit, arguing that 
a lawyer always is a partial service provider because of his profession, even in the 
capacity of investigator (which ruling has been confirmed by the court of appeal) 
(ECLI:NL:TAHVD:2013:33). In the same way, rule 30 of the code of conduct may also 
apply to corporate investigations. This rule states that a lawyer should refrain from 
providing false information. This could apply to for example an interview situation, in 
which it would be considered wrong to provide the person who is interviewed with 
false information. Similarly, rule 36 may apply as it states that a lawyer is not allowed 
to make a recording of a conversation without the prior consent of the person. Still, 
there is no specific legal framework available for investigative activities by lawyers, 
either by law or in the form of self-regulation.
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Lawyers have a special position in the Dutch legal system, insofar as they not only 
have an obligation to discretion (article 11a Advocatenwet) but they also have legal 
privilege (inter alia article 218 WvSv31). This means that – with few exceptions – they are 
not obliged to give authorities information about clients. There is some debate among 
investigators (and clients) whether the use of this legal privilege in investigations is 
an asset or should be considered as stretching the law. One of the risks of private 
investigations is that the report may be subpoenaed by investigative agencies and 
notwithstanding their obligation to discretion, investigators must comply with this, 
unless they have legal privilege. If the use of legal privilege is deemed necessary in 
investigations a lawyer will be involved, either as the investigator, or as the client to 
other investigators. 
In case study 1, Observation Company 1 was hired by a legal firm to do the investigations. 
This course of action was chosen over a direct relationship with the organisation in 
which the norm violation had taken place for several reasons, but the most important 
one was the derived legal privilege that may protect the outcomes of the investigations. 
All reports and communications with the law firm are protected by a derived legal 
privilege. This means that the reports do not need to become public. Since a public 
organisation was involved in this case, and legislation provides any citizen with the right 
to ask for inspection of documents of public authorities (Wet Openbaarheid Bestuur), 
without the protection of legal privilege, privacy sensitive information might have 
become public before the investigations were concluded. [Case study 1]
Many investigators and clients feel that the use of (derived) legal privilege is a safe 
way to proceed. However, others see some downsides to the use of legal privilege in 
corporate investigations.
We as forensic accountants have no legal privilege but lawyers do. If we’re involved 
by a lawyer we get derived legal privilege. But the thing is, if you do your internal 
investigations under the protection of legal privilege, a prosecutor or a supervisory 
authority will not accept the outcomes of the investigations. Because lawyers are 
really careful about what is written down in the end and everything that may harm a 
client will be left out. But if you don’t use legal privilege they might use your report 
and might not investigate fully themselves as well. You can use legal privilege, that’s 
the choice an organisation will have to make. But just know that your report will be 
judged differently if you choose to report to the authorities in the end. [Respondent 
27 – corporate investigator]
31 Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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When the lawyer acts as a client, the investigators who are hired may appeal to a 
‘derived’ or ‘secondary’ legal privilege.
It is not inconceivable that we act as legal representative to defend the position of our 
client in a legal procedure – well in such a case it is perfectly legitimate to do this in 
your capacity as legal privilege holder. And all the auxiliaries you use – whether that is 
your secretary or a translator, another expert or accountant – all act under the banner 
of your privilege. [Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client]
There is some debate about whether or not this derived privilege is something that 
will hold up in court. In a 2015 ruling, the Dutch Supreme court has decided that 
investigators who have derived legal privilege are not exempt from complying with 
a subpoena; they should provide the documents to the examining magistrate, who 
then decides whether or not the documents are protected by (derived) legal privilege 
(ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3714). As such, it is not entirely clear whether or not derived privilege 
protects an investigation, even when the investigations are done under auspices 
of a lawyer. There is, however, consensus that when derived privilege is used, the 
lawyer should actually be involved in some way and not merely be recruited when a 
precarious situation arises, in order to use legal privilege (Keupink & Tillema, 2013). 
The minister of security and justice has expressed the same opinion in response to 
questions from Parliament (Minister of security and justice, 2013).
What you should not allow to happen is misuse of your privilege. Say, for example, that 
a forensic accountant is investigating and that he finds something which he thinks is 
disagreeably sensitive. Without legal privilege, such a report is very convenient for 
the prosecution office, prosecutors could say ‘great we don’t have to investigate it 
further, thank you very much’. That’s the danger. Doing internal investigations without 
someone who has legal privilege to protect it, well, all the prosecution office has to do 
is ask for the report. But as a lawyer you shouldn’t allow your privilege to get abused. 
A lawyer shouldn’t just do some trivial things for show so that legal privilege will be 
applicable. No, that can’t be. [Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client]
In a ruling in a civil court case between the housing association Vestia and its 
managers, the court of The Hague has decided that the report following internal 
investigations by a law firm is not protected by legal privilege if the investigations 
are purely intended as fact finding (no juridical findings, qualifications or conclusion 
being presented). The court sentence states that ‘according to its assignment the 
investigation’s purpose was to acquire an independent and objective image of 
the facts. (...) This makes the claim that the report falls within the (functional) legal 
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privilege of the (lawyers of ) De Brauw void’ (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:248). For legal 
privilege to be applicable, it should be relevant for the (traditional) position of the 
lawyer as partisan representation of the client in legal proceedings. 
Many voices have suggested that the lack of regulation applicable to lawyers who 
operate as corporate investigators is problematic. As it is popular opinion that the 
code of conduct for lawyers needs to be updated, it has been suggested that the 
new version should include specific rules on investigative activities and the use of 
legal privilege (see e.g. Mr. Online, 2016). Others feel that the corrective effects of 
‘the market’ and the judicial system ensure the quality of investigations (see e.g. Van 
Almelo, 2013). This argument, however, could also be applied to the other investigators 
(with the possible exception of in-house investigators) who are regulated. In addition, 
as we will see in chapter 4, many corporate investigations never end up in court. It 
would therefore be very difficult for the judicial system to correct misbehaviour by 
investigators in these cases.
Now the legal frameworks regulating the activities of the different investigators 
have been discussed, the next section focuses on the way the differences between 
investigators are exploited by the different groups – and valued by their clients.
6. The selling propositions of the different types of 
investigators
Although the backgrounds of and rules for investigators differ, their actions are for 
a large part similar. The question then remains, what are the selling points of the 
different investigators – in other words why do clients choose them over others? 
This section discusses the different strengths and weaknesses of the four groups 
discussed above, based on the research data.
6.1 Background and specialist knowledge
All professional investigators feel they have an advantage over other types of 
investigators – and they do. The strength of one type of investigator is the weakness 
of the other – which is something that each type of investigator exploits as part of 
its own niche within the niche. When it comes to in-house departments, the great 
advantage for the ‘client’ organisation is their familiarity with the organisation in 
which the investigations take place. Although all types of corporate investigators 
have more access and find their way within organisations more easily than law 
enforcement investigators, it is inevitable that external investigators have less 
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knowledge with regard to the particular organisation than those who belong to it. In-
house investigators are the specialists with regard to that particular organisation, they 
know how the processes work and have multiple contacts within the organisation. 
This makes for easy access.
One of the reasons why we are so good at this, is that we understand the company 
better than an investigation firm would. Look, if you want to find deviations, you’re 
going to have to know normalcy first. And once you understand the normal process, 
then you may start to see deviations. We know this company, we know our way around 
and we understand its culture. [Respondent 39 – corporate investigator]
Not only do in-house investigators know the organisation subject to the investigations 
well, they also know the organisation’s (commercial) background. Details of 
investigations may differ between a bank, a telecommunications company or an 
industrial plant. External investigators usually have so many different clients, with 
different commercial backgrounds, that it would be impossible for them to know all 
of these in-depth. Often, people working in in-house departments have been formerly 
employed by law enforcement agencies (however, some are ‘regular’ employees of 
the organisation who have been placed with the security department because of 
personal interests etc.). This means that they usually have experience with police-like 
investigations and investigative methods such as interviewing, but much less so when 
it comes to administrative investigations, IT-investigations (although usually the IT-
department of the organisation can help out with this) or the legal implications of the 
investigations (for which the HR and/or legal department may step in). 
Observation Company 2 is the security department of a large Dutch company. The 
security department doing the investigations consists of eleven people who had some 
role in the investigations, with three full-time investigators and three desk researchers. 
Throughout the larger organisation there are also security officers located, one for 
every specific field in which the company is active. These security officers may assist 
in investigations when their segment is involved. In addition, specific IT questions 
(for example, when electronic data is needed) are asked from the IT department, 
which will then provide support. Compliance matters are left to the compliance 
department and Legal and HR may assist as well. In this way, the security department 
is the specialist on the investigations and has easy access to additional expertise from 
inside the company. As the manager said: ‘You see what kind of specialist knowledge 
is necessary, my guys have this knowledge about the specific electronics we as a 
company use and all of that. It’s useless to get someone from the outside to look 
into it, it’s impossible for him to understand all our systems and have the specialist 
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knowledge necessary to investigate these matters. [If you don’t understand the way 
this company operates and the systems and tools needed for that you will draw the 
wrong conclusion]’ [Excerpt from observation 2]
Because of their background in law enforcement most in-house investigators have 
experience with making a report to law enforcement authorities, which they often 
handle when the company decides on this course of action. Their law enforcement 
background is very helpful as it enhances the chance that a reported norm violation 
will be investigated by the authorities. 
If I report to the authorities and I have made my own case [the private investigative 
report], my chances of the report being taken up are much larger because it saves 
them some trouble but also because they know that it’s something serious. My 
advantage is that I know what they need. It’s just faster that way. A normal citizen who 
doesn’t have much experience with reporting to the police will find it difficult to find 
his way into the organisation. [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]
This advantage of having many people with a police background is not unique to 
in-house departments. Just like in-house departments, private investigation firms 
often also have many former police officers (or prosecutors) working for them. All the 
advantages of having experienced interviewers who are accustomed to the process 
of investigations are therefore present within private investigation firms. This police-
like image may be useful and it is often advertised as an asset on the websites of 
commercial investigation firms but it may also work against a firm. Competitors with 
an accounting or legal background tend to depreciate the police background of 
many investigation firms, claiming they are under-qualified ‘rent-a-cops’. 
The camera aimed at the cashier, doing a little stake-out and taking some pictures… 
They [private investigation firms] are not equipped to do quality work when it comes 
to fraud of course. Fraud, that’s being done by people at the top of the tree, it’s about 
a lot of money and they are being advised by expensive lawyers and tax experts from 
fancy firms. There is a lot of intellect hidden in a fraud. You’re not going to solve that 
with a camera and someone with a police background. [Respondent 32 – forensic 
legal investigator/client]
Especially forensic accountant-respondents seem to want to distance themselves from 
the image of being a private detective. An often-heard remark is that private investigation 
firms, seen as dominated by former police officers, are good for the more straightforward 
investigations but fall short when it comes to complicated fraud schemes.
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What we often hear is ‘oh so you are private detectives’. I wouldn’t say is a derogatory 
term but... it’s a different category of work. They are often very perpetrator-oriented. 
That’s not really our focus, who is ‘guilty’. It is the conclusion to our investigations but 
not our main focus. We focus on analysing facts. And usually these facts are complex 
and require intelligent background research, complex accounting, to get the full 
picture. [Respondent 40 – corporate investigator]
This view of corporate investigators working for private investigation firms as being 
incapable of complex investigations into fraud comes in part from the general 
opinion in the sector that police officers are not skilled enough for this type of work. 
Former police officers in this view would then also lack the skills and knowledge. 
Furthermore, the (many) courses given about private investigations (some of which 
are accredited) are below academic level (Klerks, Van Meurs & Scholtes, 2001). Many 
respondents feel the educational standards for private investigators are too low. “I 
would suggest that the educational standards and the representative organisation 
should focus more on the specialised work. Now my investigators have had to follow a 
course which is practically useless to them” [Respondent 13 – corporate investigator].
 Private investigations do indeed require more than merely a police background 
and private investigators are ‘not just a private form of public police’, as many private 
investigation firms themselves acknowledge. Consequently, private investigation 
firms tend to also hire forensic accountants, IT-specialists and other useful specialists 
to fill the gap in experience with administrative or IT-investigations and other specific 
skills. The combination of these people from different backgrounds makes that 
investigation firms are often able to cater to many investigative needs of clients. 
You know, an investigation has different dimensions, you have a financial part, a 
technical part, an operational part. And sometimes you need one investigator because 
he is better at that particular part than others because of his background and experience. 
[Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]
As chapter 3 shows, respondents tend to stay clear of ‘law enforcement language’. 
Respondents from investigation firms (just as other respondents) tend to distance 
themselves from an image of being private police and market their firm as being the 
best of both worlds: the advantages of private investigations more generally apply 
(see chapters 1 and 3) but in addition, they have inside knowledge of the workings 
of the criminal justice process. Private investigation firms tend to be generalists 
compared to other corporate investigators (or, conversely focus on one specific niche 
of investigations).
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Observation Company 1 is a small investigation company, known for specialised 
knowledge on different subjects. As one of the owners stated: ‘We’re trying to 
deliver a high quality product’. Because of the law enforcement background of one 
of the owners and another investigator, the company has a large network in both 
law enforcement and the commercial sector. Many assignments originate from this 
network or are based on positive word of mouth among organisations. The private 
investigation firm prides itself on its reputation of being a high-end and independent 
investigation firm. [Excerpt from observation 1]
Depending on the client’s wishes, private investigation firms may thus give advice 
about how to settle the matter at hand. This advice may or may not be included in the 
report (see also chapter 3). When the client wants to report the norm violation to the 
authorities, private investigation firms often provide help with this process. 
When our assignment comes directly from the organisation, with no lawyers involved, 
we will also take on an advisory role for the client and we may then also report to the 
authorities for the client. The question is then, how will you go about this. You could 
go to the local police station but our experience is that that’s a dead end. It might 
help to go directly to the chief public prosecutor, send him a letter with appendices – 
meaning our investigative report. [Respondent 2 – corporate investigator]
Not having a police background, forensic accountants conversely, have the reputation 
of being the experts on investigations into financial administration.32 They have been 
academically trained to produce and audit financial administration but the ‘forensic’ 
part is more learning on the job. Many forensic accountants who have years of work 
experience are also skilled interviewers. However, according to many respondents 
this is not their strong suit. “What we see is that forensic accountants are very good at 
forensic accounting but that doesn’t mean they are good at thinking about systems 
of fraud or what makes people tick.” [Respondent 32 – forensic legal investigator/
client]
When it comes to interviewing people, you might not want to leave that up the 
financial investigator who has looked into the administration. It might be best to 
let someone with a police background do the interview, because he might not have 
the know-how with regard to the content but he knows how to interview. He can 
assess how someone behaves, he understands that kind of stuff much better than 
the competent accountant who knows very well what the administration says but is 
32 However, some forensic accountants have worked for either police, prosecution or specialised investigative 
services such as the FIOD (the investigative service of the Dutch revenue authority) in the past.
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much less equipped to respond to the involved person and read his body language. 
[Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]
Even though forensic departments of big accountancy firms tend to diversify their 
services, for example by creating tools for the analysis of big data collections, their 
expertise lies with the investigation of ‘the books’. Just like private investigation 
firms try to employ ‘other experts’, forensic accountancy firms or departments also 
employ former police officers, legal experts and IT-specialists. The service provided 
does remain centred around forensic accountancy though, and they follow the (rules 
and) guidelines that apply to accountancy work. One of the implications of this is 
that forensic accountants tend not to draw conclusions based on their report. It is 
considered ‘not done’ for an accountant to assign blame because this is considered 
a subjective qualification and an accountant needs to remain objective.33 “We don’t 
even have an advisory role in this. I have my opinions but it’s not my decision, the 
organisation needs to decide for itself whether they [feel this is a crime and] want to 
report or not” [Respondent 27 – corporate investigator]. This is considered a drawback 
by clients, who often want to hear the professional opinion of the accountant about 
how to qualify the incident. “And after all that [a long and expensive investigation] 
you get a report filled with facts but just having the facts is of no use of course. 
Because these facts need a social and legal interpretation. Without a legal reading, 
facts are useless” [Respondent 32 – forensic legal investigator/client]. When a client 
does decide to report a norm violation to the authorities, most forensic accountants 
provide some assistance with this. 
I can give you examples of investigations which have cost a small fortune but looking 
at it, you think ‘What on earth did these guys do?’ So you have high rates but also 
– if you would get a second opinion on what they actually did, it makes no sense 
from an investigations-perspective. For example the Big Four [accountants], they are 
reproached now and then for their investigations, that they don’t yield much results 
and basically just map what the client already knows. That it costs a lot of money but 
actually yields no results. That they for example won’t find the money that has been 
defrauded or get it back. [Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]
The ‘weakness’ of forensic accountants is, conversely, the strength of investigators with 
a legal background. It is exactly the ability to provide a client with a legal qualification 
of the norm violation which gives forensic legal investigators their advantage over 
other investigators. Some forensic legal investigators provide a full investigative 
33 As discussed, there is some discussion about this though, some accountants feel they are allowed to 
draw conclusions as long as these are based on the factual results of the investigations.
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service, others specialise in the validation of investigations done by others. In the latter 
case, forensic legal investigators mainly look at whether the investigations are ‘correct’ 
in procedural terms, but also with reference to the facts that are presented (are the 
facts, which are necessary to take further steps, clear) and with regard to the legal 
interpretation of these facts (what does it mean from a legal point of view). Forensic 
legal investigators have no specific background in either financial administration or 
police investigations, however many forensic legal investigators have a prosecution 
background. In this way they are often familiar with the investigation process. The most 
important forte of forensic legal investigators is their extensive knowledge of the law. 
They are much better equipped than other investigators to draw conclusions from 
investigations and give specific advice to the client on how to proceed. 
When it comes to an investigation in need of a decent analysis with regard to the facts 
and the law, and when there is need for an advice regarding corporate governance – I 
would use a law firm for that. Other investigators say they can do it but in reality they 
deliver a poor result. [Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client]
Although not specialised in the investigations per se, forensic legal investigators 
in this sense provide a more encompassing service. Often, other investigators are 
contracted-in to do specific parts of the investigations resonating with their area 
of expertise. In this way, a forensic legal investigator may provide its clients with a 
report spanning both the investigative ‘facts’ and the legal implications that follow 
from that. And – when the client has chosen a particular settlement – the involved 
lawyer, or a specialised colleague from his firm may assist with that too.
We assist our clients when incidents occur within their organisation, we will investigate 
for them, we advise them on what kinds of measures are to be taken and in the event 
that a regulator or the justice department is to be involved, we will advise them about 
how to deal with these agencies. [Respondent 30 – forensic legal investigator/client]
6.2 Rules and ethics and position regarding the client
As we have seen in this chapter, the different types of investigators have different 
rules to follow. This has some implications for the choices made by clients. In-house 
departments, which, it goes without saying, can only be used when an organisation 
has such a department, are subject to (often quite strict) internal regulations. The fact 
that the regulation is mainly internal to the organisation (apart from more generally 
applicable legislation such as the WBP) may not be a ‘problem’, however it does 
put much responsibility on the organisation itself. The rules are constructed inside 
the organisation and the control over the application of these rules is also largely 
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organised within the organisation (although a civil claim against the organisation 
remains a possibility). The general control by the Works Council of the organisation 
(approving the rules) and the specific control of higher management on the actual 
investigations in case of a complaint, both keep things close to the organisation. This 
has value for the organisation, as there is less danger of matters becoming public 
knowledge. However, sometimes an organisation needs an independent outsider to 
investigate because of the issues at stake. In those cases, internal investigations by the 
in-house department are not deemed sufficient and another corporate investigator 
is contracted to either execute or validate the investigations. “Sometimes they have 
done their own investigations and fraud has been found but they feel they need 
an independent third party to as it were validate the investigations or come to that 
conclusion independently” [Respondent 27 – corporate investigator].
 While their position within an organisation may suggest that in-house 
investigators cannot be considered independent, the fieldwork suggests that in-
house investigators often clash with ‘the organisation’. Comparing my observations 
within an internal security department to those within a private investigation firm, 
my conclusion is that there is less of a difference between the two in this regard than 
I had expected beforehand. The in-house security department seemed to function as 
quite an independent unit within the organisation, while also being part of it. 
We are independent from others in our investigations. When we have by-catch we 
will investigate that in principle as well. The by-catch can be pretty big, for example 
a case that we’re still working on was initially by-catch. The organisation was also 
investigated, apparently it was possible for these things to happen without the 
processes noticing it. In these cases, we need some extra pairs of hands so we use 
some external investigators. But there can be tension between us and HR. We have 
a separation of powers, we are in charge of the investigations, HR decides on the 
sanctions. When we hear that a sanction is much lower than we would have liked and 
than what we find reasonable based on previous cases, that can generate friction. 
Especially [investigator] can go to extremes to make his point, he can be very fierce. In 
principle, we decide on content and scope of the investigations, there’s no influence 
from others on that. But of course, when it comes to the higher echelons the top 
has its opinions on it. That’s the way it goes isn’t it. The higher up the tree, the more 
interests are involved. [Excerpt from observation 2 – informal conversation]
Because of the different points of reference between managers and investigators 
– profit versus security/integrity – the in-house department is not always regarded 
straightforwardly as being a service provider to the rest of the company. In this sense, 
some disputes might occur within an organisation between management and in-
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house investigators. Interviews with in-house investigators and their internal clients 
seem to support this finding. Although very much aware of company interests, 
investigators often take a different approach to this than for example ‘normal 
managers’ do. 
I’m considered to be the paranoid one, who sees fraud everywhere. We have to 
convince them all every time around, that’s how we all feel. Because it clashes with the 
business of making money. When we investigate and one of our stores is affected or 
we lose a business partner, that looks like it costs a lot of money but in the end, you’re 
not making any money on the fraudulent behaviour you know. All of that is fictitious. 
You actually lose money over it as you are unjustly paying bonuses and commissions. 
[Respondent 48 – corporate investigator]
In most organisations, in-house security departments report directly to the Board of the 
company, thus granting them a semi-independent position within the organisation. “We 
report to the board of managers, there’s only my manager in between. That independent 
position is a crucial principle” [Respondent 39 – corporate investigator]. Because there 
is no commercially driven connection between the investigators and their clients, in-
house investigators often have more freedom in their investigations. There is no formal 
contract in which an investigative assignment is delimited and respondents suggest 
that this leaves more room to make independent decisions that lead to the expansion 
of the investigations. The respondent quoted above goes on to say “it is really nice to be 
able to work without the costs for your investigation being an issue. I have worked for a 
commercial investigation firm before and there you have to work on a commercial basis 
for a third party” [Respondent 48 – corporate investigator]. For a client who pays external 
investigators by the hour, an expansion of the investigations may mean significantly 
higher costs. Internal investigators are paid by the organisation anyway so in this sense 
the scope of the investigations matters less. However, a larger scope of investigations 
may mean that a particular part of the organisation is being hampered in its day-to-day 
business and the time an investigator spends on one case will have effect on the time he 
can spend on another. In addition, big cases may call for more manpower than is available 
in the in-house department and external investigators may have to be contracted then, 
as indicated in the excerpt of observation 2 above. These and other consequences make 
that costs also are a factor for in-house departments. 
You have to weigh everything during your investigations: am I going to continue, do I 
have all the information I need, is it useful to keep investigating? The question always 
is, what do you want to achieve and what do you need to achieve it? If you want to fire 
someone, you don’t need to prove he’s committed fraud a hundred times, a couple of 
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times is enough. It might be relevant with regard to retrieving the money. And for the 
processes inside the organisation. It is so hard to set limits, but it is important. You have 
to prioritise, the more time I spend on case X, the longer cases Y, Z and others have to 
wait. We’re only a small department for a lot of cases after all. [Respondent 43 – corporate 
investigator]
In-house respondents also indicate that they ‘sell’ their product to management by 
indicating the cost reduction they may achieve:
I am going to get more staff next year, we have shown that doing something about 
fraud can generate money by multiple business cases. If you lose one credit of 500.000 
euro, that means you will have to get say 400 new ones to compensate for it. That is a 
lot of new business you will need if you have 10 of these cases. And the same goes for 
internal fraud. [Respondent 31 – corporate investigator]
During observation 2, it became clear that contrary to investigations done by other 
investigators, not every in-house investigation culminates in a report. There is a 
bulk of (often minor) cases reported to in-house investigators and when it comes to 
minor or easy cases, sometimes the interview report or investigations log is deemed 
a sufficient record. In these cases, it is more cost effective not to write a full report 
(however, there still needs to be some record of the investigations and settlement). 
A report is necessary when sanctions will be taken bringing the matter outside the 
company (e.g. dismissal, a civil suit or a report to the authorities).
In principle we make a report for every investigation. I say in principle, because in fact 
this is not necessarily the case. Some cases are slam-dunks, we’re not writing an entire 
report for that. Often things are handled by HR or the manager and that’s it then, 
some milder, internal sanction. Look, when it’s clear what the facts are, when he has 
stated yes I did that, stupid, it won’t happen again – we don’t really need to make a 
report. We have his statement, we store that and record the sanction in our systems 
and that’s it. [Respondent 19 – corporate investigator]
Private investigation firms are commercial entities in their own right, external to the 
clients who hire them. The relationship to clients is therefore somewhat different 
from that of in-house departments. The fact that they are external to the organisation 
gives an investigation done by a private investigation firm an air of objectivity, 
although the commercial relationship between client and investigator somewhat 
dilutes the independence of investigators. While they are more expensive than in-
house investigators, many (especially smaller sized) organisations do not have their 
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own in-house security department and are as such reliant on external investigators. 
The hourly rates of private investigation firms are often lower than those of forensic 
accountants and investigators with a legal background. Their clientele consists of 
small and medium size companies and (semi) government organisations but larger 
companies may also call upon private investigation firms for investigative services. 
 The fact that private investigation firms need a permit, based on the Wpbr, 
may provide them with some legitimacy. In practice, the control over the permit, 
exercised by the police, is very limited (Batelaan & Bos, 2003; Inspectie Openbare 
Orde en Veiligheid, 2009: 8). Supervision is mainly focused on formal safeguards up-
front (regarding the decision to grant a permit) but there is no real control once a 
permit has been granted (Kolthoff, 2015). In addition, respondents indicate that the 
administration of permits is incomplete. 
If you try to gather information on how many private investigation firms have a permit 
you will find that the numbers known to the justice department and those known to 
the police do not match. And some have no identification card, which means that 
they have a permit but are not eligible for an identification card... And also that they 
might not be known to the police. So the supervision, that’s just really bad. And the 
police do not give it any priority either, it’s a purely administrative process for them. 
[Respondent 41 – corporate investigator]
Before the revision of the Wpbr in 2006, private investigation firms had to report on 
a yearly basis to the police about their activities, a requirement that has since been 
lifted (Klerks, 2008: 16). This mandatory report was not very informative and many 
private investigation firms did not see its point. “We had to report every year about the 
number of cases we did, but that’s just a checklist. It does not contain any information 
whatsoever on nature, size etc. Nothing about the type of client, it’s useless. But we 
report because that’s the law” [Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]. According 
to the official announcement in which the change in legislation has been made, the 
government felt that the costs connected to this obligation for the private sector 
outweighed the benefits for the state in receiving them.34 Hence, the requirement to 
file a yearly report was removed from the Wpbr.
 In addition to the permit, some private investigation firms have a quality 
certification issued by the representative organisation NVb. However, not every 
private investigation firm is a member of this organisation and some respondents 
even indicate they have discontinued their membership as they did not feel 
represented by the organisation. “We have debated whether or not to be a member 
34 See Staatscourant, 2 oktober 2006, nr.191.
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but we decided not to. Their focus is on the lower tier of the market, those whose 
clientele consists of private persons and smaller companies, the simple cases” 
[Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]. To complicate matters further, there 
are also other representative organisations available, such as the Association for 
private investigation firms (Bpob) or (the Dutch chapter of ) the American Society for 
Industrial Security (ASIS) or the European Corporate Security Association (ECSA). As 
such, there is not one representative organisation exercising control over all private 
investigation firms.
 Control over private investigation firms in reality comes down to the client or 
a judge (when a judge is involved in the settlement of the matter).35 This may be 
considered a bit problematic as investigators have a relationship of commercial 
dependence with their clients. The question could be asked whether the client would 
indeed interfere when his interests are served by some illegal activity of investigators. 
The dependence on their clients has led to a reputation of “the fired ex-cop who 
started his own little investigation firm. You know, the guy with the hat and the 
raincoat, hiding in the bushes. I’m not saying that they aren’t there as well, but that the 
minority” [Respondent 41 – corporate investigator]. Despite this image, most private 
investigation firms are professional organisations, focusing on corporate clients and 
bound by the Wpbr and the Privacy code of conduct for private investigation firms. 
This Privacy code of conduct is quite clear and provided some detailed guidelines, 
however it is largely up to the firm itself to control compliance (also by putting 
mandatory complaints mechanisms in place). One of the complicating factors with 
regard to control is the emphasis and importance investigation firms place on their 
independence. Private investigation firms rely heavily on their individual reputation 
of being an independent and objective party, even when they are bound to their 
client for commercial reasons. Many respondents stress that when they feel they are 
being used by a client, they will terminate the investigation (see also chapter 3).
During the inventory of cases for the case studies I came across some records of 
cases which were turned down or handed back to the client. When asked about this 
[investigator] explained that, in principle, all cases within the field of expertise are 
accepted. Observation Company 1 is a commercial entity and needs clients. However, 
there are cases in which there are conflicts of interests or in which there does not seem to 
be a just cause for investigating, or the assignment the client wants performed is not just. ‘I 
have had a situation in which the chair of the board of directors wanted us to look into the 
expenses of one of the other board members. But then you continue your conversation 
and then it becomes clear that there is no cause for that. That it’s just a conflict within the 
35 See chapter 3 and 4 for more detail. Neither in civil nor in criminal court are judges eager to expel 
evidence which is considered to be illegally obtained by private investigators.
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board of directors and that this director thinks it is very convenient if that person could be 
removed. That’s no just cause for an investigation.’ [Excerpt from observation 1]
One of the ways of procuring independence and preventing clients from interfering 
with the contents or outcomes of the investigations, is not to provide them with 
preliminary findings while the investigations are still in progress. Thus, this situation 
makes it difficult for a client to unjustly steer the investigation, however it makes it 
equally challenging for a client to exert some kind of control over the investigations. 
Respondents indicate they inform clients about progress of the investigations, so 
some general control is possible.
Once you get started you should remain in contact with the client because when an 
organisation is confronted with fraud this will have a lot of impact on that organisation. 
Tensions will occur so you need to be aware of that. But it is also important to keep 
them informed about your actions of course, what are you doing, what do they think 
you are doing. You can and sometimes should consult with the client about the course 
of your investigations but in the end it is our decision. Because we are investigating 
independently. Our investigations are concluded by a report and that report may be 
used as the basis for criminal procedures or a civil suit so you need to make sure it is 
done properly and will hold up in court. [Respondent 5 – corporate investigator]
Private investigation firms need to balance their independence and objectivity with 
the commercial relationship they have with clients. This is of course easier to do 
in a time where there are many assignments available than in a time of economic 
austerity. While it was impossible to make such a comparison in the context of this 
research, it would be interesting to focus on this subject in further research. 
 Just like private investigation firms, forensic accountants are external to the client 
and have a commercial relationship with said client. While private investigators are 
sometimes still regarded as the dodgy rent-a-cop who is going through the garbage, 
forensic accountants have quite a different reputation. The reputation of forensic 
accountants has long been that they are impartial, objective investigators and many 
(especially large) organisations tend to hire them ‘for the name’.36 The oath that has 
recently been made mandatory for accountants may help to sustain this image.
I wouldn’t hire a forensic accountant. For the simple reason that you don’t really get 
value for money. They do the same as investigation firms but their prices are sky high. 
I wonder why a company would hire them; I guess because of the Big Four logo. ‘Look, 
36 Whether this is changing in the aftermath of the reputational damage the accountancy profession has 
suffered in the economic crisis remains an open question at the moment.
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we have hired a big company and spend a lot of money so it should be ok’. But in 
my opinion there’s not much to separate them from a private investigations bureau. 
[Respondent 31 – corporate investigator]
In spite of the scepticism of this (in-house security) respondent, many large clients 
feel that it is safer to go for the big name than to hire a smaller investigation firm. Big 
Four (and other large) accountancy firms are well-known and are largely considered 
to be experts on corporate investigations. In addition, forensic accountants have 
an image to be more strictly regulated than other investigators. This would provide 
them with more legitimacy than the other investigators, who are sometimes referred 
to as ‘cowboys’. As we have seen in this chapter, this is not the case in the strictly 
legal sense. The legal framework applicable to accountants is put in place for their 
more traditional core tasks and they are not specifically adapted (or very helpful) 
to investigative activities. The (not legally binding) guidelines for person-oriented 
investigations and the more general rules of professional conduct for accountants, 
issued by the NBA, are not very specific either. They are focused on general normative 
considerations and principles of law and as such respondents seem to regard these 
guidelines and rules as normatively restrictive and stringent. As related above, these 
guidelines and rules are used in disciplinary proceedings and as such there is a 
reasonable measure of control.37 The case law provided by the accountancy chamber 
is effectively used as regulation by forensic accountants. Still, the fact that disciplinary 
proceedings are quite regularly launched against forensic accountants may be an 
indication that the rules to follow are not quite clear as of yet.
 The main selling point of forensic accountants, their good name and reputation as 
impartial, does warrant some critical reflection though. The commercial relationship 
with the clients is also relevant for forensic accountants and even though it may be 
easier for a large accounting firm to reject an assignment when this is deemed morally 
correct, the fact remains that to do so does create a loss of business. Furthermore, 
forensic accountants from large accounting firms might find themselves in the position 
where their firm is also the auditing accountant of the client. Although this situation 
is convenient for the client, it may not be desirable with regard to impartiality. Not 
only does the client represent a large commercial interest for the accounting firm, it 
may also be the case that the auditing accountant has made mistakes. Although not 
necessarily problematic, this does harbour the potential for conflicts of interest. Van 
Almelo (2016), in his collection of accountancy ‘slips’, shows that this is not merely a 
theoretical danger.
37 This control is of course dependent on someone complaining about the accountant and making a 
disciplinary case against him.
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Our disadvantage compared to large accountancy firms is that our services are limited 
to forensics. [But that is also] an advantage because we will not get in the conflict of 
interest situation, we can take any job and we can be firm in our report, we never have 
to be afraid that what we report has negative effects for colleagues who are doing the 
auditing services because we don’t have those. But on the other hand, it also means 
we don’t have our own steady customer base. [Respondent 2 – corporate investigator]
The same goes for investigators within large legal firms who do investigative work. 
In an investigation for the Dutch Railway company, legal firm De Brauw Blackstone 
Westbroek was criticised for being the investigators in the case, while also representing 
Dutch Railway in a procedure with the Authority for the Financial Markets in the 
same case (NRC, 2015). Although the results of the internal investigations have 
been validated by two second opinions, the double-role of the law firm remains 
contested (advocatie.nl, 2015). As mentioned above, lawyers are by law partial to 
their clients’ interests. However, when they are hired for investigations, this partiality 
is problematic as corporate investigators strive to be impartial.
There are now more and more lawyers who focus on the corporate side. They 
pretend to do independent investigations, which is obviously not true. Because 
they are lawyers, and they do not confirm by contract that their investigations 
are independent. If I was an accountant, I would be very critical about that. Ok so 
you have a report and it states many findings but whether it represents that which 
should have been investigated, you can’t tell. Nor whether they have written down 
everything that should have been written down. [Respondent 32 – forensic legal 
investigator/client]
This respondent, a lawyer himself, is quite critical about a lawyer’s ability to act 
as an independent and objective investigator. This situation is not improved by 
the possibility of the use of legal privilege by lawyers. The legal privilege may be 
problematic from the point of view of control and independence, it is at the same 
time a major benefit for clients. As mentioned, corporate investigations carry the risk 
of their findings being used in a criminal proceeding against the client. (Derived) legal 
privilege may protect against this risk and for this reason lawyers are often involved 
in one way or another in investigations. However, as mentioned above, when an 
investigations report does not contain legal qualifications and is purely about fact 
finding, the court has ruled that this is not protected by the legal privilege.
 One circumstance which might be valued by clients is that legal firms have a good 
reputation – just like forensic accountancy firms – and are considered as ‘morally 
sound’, while they do not have any specific rules to follow when it comes to corporate 
81
Legal frameworks
investigations. As is the case with accountants, the brand the firm’s name represents 
is important here. 
For me, as a lawyer, I don’t have to do anything. I’m not bound to rules. So I can do 
it [investigate] any way I see fit. On the other hand, accountants are regulated. They 
have a stamp of approval – I’m not sure anyone would believe in accountants anymore 
but if they do, the rules surrounding accountancy make for a sort of quality hallmark. 
A lawyer doesn’t have that, he only has his own name and reputation. [Respondent 
32 – forensic legal investigator/client]
The laws on the profession of lawyer are not specifically applicable to investigative 
activities and there are as of yet no specific guidelines for investigators with a legal 
background. There is a system of disciplinary proceedings but contrary to the case of 
forensic accountants, there have scarcely been any proceedings aimed at investigative 
activities as of yet. This all culminates to very little effective control. There is much 
discussion about whether or not this should be considered problematic. Many 
respondents with a legal background feel it is not – they feel that the legal obligation 
to be a good lawyer is enough.
Accountants have a set of guidelines for [investigations] which are actually 
quite inconvenient. When they interview people, their rules for person-oriented 
investigations may work against you. They are not completely illogical safe-guards 
but they can be very annoying because you have to for example give information to 
some person who might be a suspect, while you have to keep you client in the dark. 
So sometimes we work without the accountants. They are only detrimental to your 
investigations then. [Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client]
Though understandable from a strictly efficiency-oriented view, the fact that certain 
investigators are used or not used because of the legal framework that applies to 
them could be considered as a downside to the fragmented nature of corporate 
investigations regulation. This situation invites forum shopping by clients, not 
only on merit but also on applicable legal frameworks. Even though there are few 
examples known in which corporate investigators actually do break laws and more 
general normative guidelines, the possibility to do so exists and a client with ‘bad 
intentions’ may quite easily abuse this situation. Control is largely left to clients and 
corporate investigators themselves. In those cases in which a judge is involved in 
the settlement of the matter, respondents suggest that (regardless of the type of 
investigator) evidence is only rarely excluded.
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So if there’s no effective control and everything is pushed back – you would have to admit 
that the control over the use of the material that has been collected by a judge is very 
limited as well. That is, if it happens at all. There is a great ruling about a case in which the 
adversarial principle has been broken. And the judge just doesn’t care. He just accepted 
the report. If this is the way we treat this issue, you can make all the rules you want but if 
there’s no-one connecting consequences to the infringement of the rules… And the same 
goes internationally, most of the cases never reach a court in which control could be exerted 
over the ways in which information is collected. And if it does happen, there’s no hard and 
fast legal framework to compare the behaviour to. [Respondent 41 – corporate investigator]
Table 2. Overview of four different groups of corporate investigators
           Type of 
                 investigator
Aspects
In-house department Private investigation 
firm
Forensic accountant Forensic legal 
investigator
Specialist 
knowledge
Own organisation
Interviewing 
General
Interviewing
Often also expert 
knowledge on other 
areas (niche)
Administrative/financial
Often also IT‑tools for 
big data
Legal implications of 
investigations
Service provided Investigations 
Report (not in every case)
Report to law 
enforcement authorities 
if necessary
Investigations
Report
Advice and help with 
settlement
Investigations
Report 
Report to law 
enforcement authorities 
if necessary but no 
advice on how to 
proceed
Investigations
Report
Legal advice 
Help with settlement
Rules and ethics Internal regulations
Normative guidelines
Wpbr‑permit
Normative guidelines
Accountancy legislation
Normative guidelines
Lawyer legislation
Legal privilege
Normative guidelines
Control Internal control
Judicial control (if the 
case reaches court)
Control by police 
Judicial control (if the 
case reaches court)
Control by client
Disciplinary proceedings
Judicial control (if the 
case reaches court)
Control by client
Disciplinary proceedings
Judicial control (if the 
case reaches court)
Control by client
Costs Relatively low Medium High High
Position regarding 
client
Part of client ‘Independent’
Commercially 
dependent on client
‘Independent’
Commercially 
dependent on client
Possible conflicts of 
interests
Partial to client
Commercially dependent 
on client
Possible conflicts of 
interests
Reputation Reputation as being 
partial
Reputation as being 
client‑centred 
Well‑known as either 
generalists or niche 
Reputation as being 
impartial 
Big name: ‘You pay for 
the name’
Reputation of high 
morality
Big name: ‘You pay for 
the name’
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Discussion
This chapter has delineated the different legal frameworks surrounding corporate 
investigations in the Netherlands. Although one conclusion may be that there are 
many differences between the various investigators, it is important to note that while 
this may be the case, there are more similarities still. In their ‘pure form’ there are 
substantial differences between in-house departments, private investigation firms, 
forensic accountants and investigators with a legal background. However, there 
are very little corporate investigation units in this pure form. In-house departments 
and investigation firms predominantly staffed with former police officers recruit 
accountants, lawyers and IT-specialists, forensic accountancy (departments of ) 
firms employ former police officers, lawyers and IT-specialists and investigative 
(departments of ) law firms also hire people with an IT or public-sector background 
(in their case, mostly former prosecutors). Should some expertise be required that 
is not available to the corporate investigators, specialists are contracted-in for that 
part of the investigations. While the field is thus simultaneously specialising and 
generalising, the legal frameworks in which corporate investigators operate remain 
dispersed and unclear to most of the people involved.
 The overview presented in this chapter is not exhaustive. Specific laws are 
applicable to specific fields of industry, which for example may render disclosure to 
a supervisory agency necessary. It would be overly complicated and confusing to the 
reader to go into detail regarding all these regulations. However, this circumstance 
makes for a quite fragmented context of legal frameworks and many respondents 
are not up-to-date on all the rules they need to comply with (even when they think 
they are). One case in point is the controversy over the (non-)necessity for forensic 
accountants to have a Wpbr-permit. As stated in this chapter, forensic accountants 
are explicitly exempt from the permit obligation. The fact that there remains 
confusion about this point is an indication that this is considered peculiar by many 
of the investigators involved. Even more peculiar may be the relative silence in this 
regard about whether or not corporate investigators with a legal background should 
have a Wpbr-permit. In my opinion, it would be beneficial to the sector to have one 
set of rules, applicable to all involved. The fact that the different types of investigators 
try to incorporate each other’s strengths makes the fragmentation within the legal 
frameworks problematic, both from a level playing field point of view, and from the 
perspective of rights of the people involved. 
 While it proves difficult for investigators to be sure of the legal frameworks that apply 
to them, it is even more difficult for clients and maybe more importantly, for involved 
persons. Not being a suspect in the sense of a criminal justice procedure places the 
subject of investigations in a precarious position. Cooperation with investigations by 
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individuals might be voluntary, there may still be a lot of pressure from one’s employer 
to cooperate. The fact that rules differ between investigators makes it more difficult 
to ensure fair play. Many respondents feel this and commit themselves to the rules 
they deem most stringent, usually a mixture between the Privacy code of conduct for 
private investigation firms and the more general principles of law guiding forensic 
accountants and lawyers (which are in part already incorporated in the Privacy code 
of conduct). However, as a result of the voluntary nature of this, and the lack of control 
over their application, these rules and principles of law are vulnerable to deviation. 
Respondents stress their own reputation and their commitment to rules and principles 
of law and my research does not give strong indications of widespread problems. 
However, as chapter 3 illustrates, even when following the rules, investigators may for 
example place involved persons under duress. And, additionally, chapter 4 shows the 
profound impact which corporate investigations may have on individuals. 
 The corporate investigations industry thrives on the basis of the marketing of 
discretion and trust. This means that the sector is not very visible, neither to the public 
eye, nor to the state. White (2014: 44) has argued that “because of the distinctly ‘un-
police-like’ way they perform these functions” and the fact that they “also undertake 
functions which are not usually performed by police officers” (e.g. forensic accountancy), 
corporate investigators tend not to be associated with the police, which “equates to 
near zero visibility through the state-centric lens”.38 The lack of transparency has been 
problematised before, however the (political) discussion remains largely focused on 
private security more generally (see for example State secretary of justice and minister 
of the interior, 2009). Even when private investigations are mentioned, the discussion 
usually remains centred on private investigation firms instead of the entire corporate 
investigations industry (see for example State secretary of security and justice, 2016). As 
a consequence, all those investigators without a permit remain out of the (regulatory) 
gaze of the state (White, 2014). By abolishing the obligation to provide the chief of 
police with a yearly report on investigative activities (again, for those with a permit) 
the state could be said to actually further diminish its information position (although 
the yearly report was not very informative). One suggestion to enhance the state’s 
information position on investigative activities, made by inter alia Fijnaut (2002), is to 
institute a duty to report every crime to the police. Even leaving aside for the moment 
other issues such as capacity and expertise problems within the police and prosecution, 
such an obligation would prove counter-productive in my view. The flexibility in the 
legal venues chosen for the settlements of internal norm violations, as well as the use of 
discretion in investigations and settlements and the trust clients place in investigators 
are highly important to the success of the sector (Williams, 2005).
38 Although, as we have seen, within the sector there is a view of private investigation firms being the 
most police-like. This would substantiate White’s claims that these are the ones being regulated (as the 
Wpbr excludes all others from its framework).
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 As Van Wijk et al. (2007: 226) rightly state, such a duty would furthermore lead to 
a kind of ‘junior partnership’, with corporate investigators working as the junior in a 
field defined by the priorities of the senior (the state). As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, such a view of the corporate investigations industry does not align well with 
its practical reality. In addition, a duty to report would require a (legal) interpretation of 
the facts by the investigators, something which forensic accountants tend to stay clear of. 
Van Wijk et al. (2007) suggest that if such a duty would be considered desirable, it should 
be applied to the client, not to the investigator. Investigators are bound to discretion; this 
is one of the selling points of corporate investigation services. A duty to report would 
therefore put the investigator in a difficult position towards his client.39 Furthermore, 
corporate investigations are not restricted to the investigation of criminal behaviour, 
other unwanted behaviour being included as well – in these cases, there would remain a 
lacuna in control even when there would be a duty to report every crime to the police.
 A less drastic measure, which is more in line with the abovementioned practice in 
the corporate investigations field as well, would be to include all those who investigate 
professionally in the permit system of the Wpbr. As related in this chapter, respondents 
do not think highly of this system – there is very little actual control and educational and 
other demands on permit holders are regarded to be quite low. It would therefore be 
constructive to upgrade these in the process. One benefit of having a comprehensive 
permit system is that it would render control possible (at least in theory – in practice this 
also depends on prioritising of the supervising authority). Another is that the Privacy code 
of conduct, used already by most corporate investigators in practice, would be applicable 
to all corporate investigators. As suggested before by inter alia Klerks & Eysink Smeets 
(2005) and CBP (2007), the nature of the activities would then be the primary concern 
in the decision whether or not a permit is necessary, instead of the current situation in 
which the permit obligation is connected to an investigator’s professional background 
and relationship to the client. This would also make those who define themselves as 
for example ‘mediator’ or ‘information broker’ and occasionally provide clients with 
investigative services, liable to the law.
 There have been voices advocating the formation of a representative organisation for 
(all) corporate investigators. At the moment of writing, there are multiple representative 
organisations available (both nationally and internationally), however none that brings 
together all four major groups of corporate investigators. In the same vein, the formation 
of a central register for (corporate) investigation experts in the Netherlands has been 
39 As explained in chapter 4, there is a duty for public sector organisations to report crime to the police 
(article 162 WvSr [Criminal Code]). In many cases, organisations do not comply with this obligation 
and deal with the matter privately. Furthermore, there is a general obligation to give notification of 
suspicious transactions, based on the Wwft. This does not seem to lead to a more comprehensive 
overview of corporate investigations at the moment.
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suggested. At the moment there is a multitude of certification and educational institutes, 
resulting in a vast number of different professional titles and accompanying professional 
registers (Dubbeld, 2015). “I feel like our Dutch market is relatively juvenile. For example, 
we don’t really have a good institute to represent us. Look at the ACFE [Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners], with all due respect, some of its members got their membership 
as a free gift or something” [Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]. This quote from 
a manager of a private investigation firm expresses the feelings of many respondents: 
even though there is a multitude of representative and certification-type associations 
available, many corporate investigators do not feel represented by them because of 
a perceived focus on certain types of investigators within the association, or as a 
result of the perception that the quality standards of these associations are low. This 
research has not investigated the validity of these perceptions. However, the result is 
that many corporate investigators are not members of a representative association, 
and those that are, are divided among many different associations. Recently, new 
initiatives have attempted to create the desired uniformity by the formation of a 
representative organisation for financial forensic experts, with an accompanying 
register – and title.40 In the field of education, new initiatives are also formed to 
create courses in fraud examination.41 The question remains whether these initiatives 
will be successful. At the moment of writing it seems that rather than constituting 
a representative organisation which may represent all corporate investigators, the 
new initiatives add to the fragmented corporate security landscape. Because of the 
fragmented nature of the sector, combining all different actors into one representative 
organisation seems a considerable challenge. In the words of Thumala, Goold and 
Loader: “if the industry is not a coherent whole, it cannot be represented as such” 
(2011: 293).
 Unifying the legal frameworks for corporate investigations into one would 
not mean that there is no room for additional (self-)regulation with regard to the 
specific elements in which certain investigators differ from others. The legal privilege 
for example should not be rendered completely obsolete in cases of corporate 
investigations. Legal privilege is an important principle of law and when used 
correctly it protects those involved in legal disputes. However, as the court ruling 
in the Vestia-case has indicated, the applicability of legal privilege to ‘fact finding’ 
investigations should not be taken at face value. Additional (self-)regulation is likely 
to occur as a way for the different types of investigators to market their perceived 
40 According to the website of the in 2015 established NFFI (Nederlands Financieel Forensisch Instituut), 
its register is to date filled with a very modest number of experts (see www.nffi.nl). The Institute for 
Financial Crime (IFFC) was also founded in 2015 and is an example of a new representative organisation, 
active as a knowledge centre and explicitly aimed at public/private cooperation (see www.iffc.nl).
41 See for example https://www.accountant.nl/nieuws/2017/5/nieuwe-opleiding-fraudeonderzoeker/.
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superiority. This is already done at the moment as this chapter has shown. One could 
envision a system in which more specific (self-regulatory) codes that are desired by 
different professional groups of investigators are incorporated in the existing Privacy 
code of conduct. If all investigators fall under the Wpbr, it follows that the Privacy 
code of conduct applies as well. This is essentially self-regulation which has been 
approved by the Data Protection Authority. Any addition to the Privacy code of 
conduct by distinct professional groups may then also be handed over to the Data 
Protection Authority for approval. In practice, the different groups of investigators 
seem to be largely following the same rules already – but only one group does this 
based on an explicitly codified legal framework (private investigation firms). 
With regard to the fragmented nature of the legal frameworks in the Netherlands, it is 
interesting to look at other national jurisdictions. In the context of this research a very 
modest side-step was made to the UK.42 It seems that the private security sector in the 
UK has historically had more of an image problem than the private security sector in the 
Netherlands (see also White, 2014). The corporate investigator quoted below indicates 
that this circumstance might have made relations with the police more problematic, 
going on to suggest that this is one of the reasons the corporate investigations sector in 
the UK is eager to be regulated.
This brings me back to the appetite to be licensed because if the police could see this is a 
licensed, regulated occupation then they would have to say well ok you’re recognised now, 
you’re a lawful entity. You’re not criminals, you’re a profession and you can be regulated, 
you can have your license revoked if you don’t comply with the rules. [UK Respondent 3]
This connects to the point of applicable legal frameworks, in relation to which a notable 
difference with the Netherlands may be discerned. As Button already remarked in 1998, 
“there are no special statutory requirements to become a private investigator in the 
U.K.” (1998: 3). In spite of a 2013 announcement by the home secretary that the private 
investigations industry was to be regulated, a permit system and the accompanying 
42 This is a result of the Liverpool-seminar that I have organised together with John Moores University. 
The seminar served as a platform for discussion between participants (being academics, corporate 
investigators and law enforcement professionals) and myself. In addition, three corporate investigators 
were interviewed in this context. Interestingly, from the UK interviews similar information was 
derived as in the Dutch context. The UK respondents mentioned the same type of norm violations, 
investigative methods and corporate settlements as the Dutch respondents. With regard to public/
private relationships the same kind of frustrations emerged from the discussion with seminar participants 
as can be derived from the Dutch interviews and, similarly, from the UK interviews these themes also 
emerged.
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legal framework have yet to be arranged (Home Office, 2013).43 As such, the situation 
is that “there aren’t any all-encompassing rules, no. As long as they stick by the law of 
the land then they virtually do whatever the company expects them to do to carry out 
the company procedures and enforce the company regulations” [UK Respondent 1]. In 
the meantime, representative organisations have introduced their own licensing-type 
arrangement, however this is not obligatory. The very modest work in the UK points to 
a situation in which the corporate security market is (even) less regulated than in the 
Netherlands and the legal frameworks (even) more fragmented. It would be interesting 
to make a proper comparison between the Dutch situation (in which a licensing system 
and a formalised legal framework does exist – at least for private investigation firms) 
and the UK situation (in which no such obligation rests upon corporate investigators). 
An important question in such a comparison would be whether the type of regulation 
and the absence of a licensing system (combined with an even greater lack of control 
over the sector than in the Netherlands) have bearing on the manner in which corporate 
investigators provide their services and whether this affects the perceived legitimacy of 
the sector. 
As this chapter has shown, there are both similarities and differences between the 
four groups of corporate investigators. The differences are used as a marketing 
tool, setting each type of investigator apart from the others. The nature of these 
differences does not justify a separate account of each group of investigators in the 
remainder of this book though. When the differences are relevant, mention will be 
made. The above suggestion to unify legal frameworks for all corporate investigators 
should not be considered as the solution to the problem of control in the corporate 
investigations sector. As the following chapters show, the corporate investigations 
industry has, by its marketing and professionalisation of its unique characteristics, 
created a private legal sphere in which it operates. Corporate investigators largely 
remain out of sight of the state, making effective control very challenging (Williams, 
2006a). To fully understand the extent to which corporate investigators may stay 
within the private legal sphere, it is important to examine their day-to-day business. 
Thus, the investigative process is discussed in the next chapter, after which the ways 
in which the investigations are used by clients to deal with the matter at hand are 
examined in chapter 4.
43 This does not, however, mean that the UK corporate investigation sector is completely unregulated. UK 
Respondent 2, for example indicates that in addition to having to notify the Data Protection Authority 
that personal data is being processed, there might be certain additional standards that apply to 
investigative work in for example the health care sector. “Fundamentally, the back-story to everything I 
do will be UK criminal law, police and criminal evidence act, procedures and investigations act. So how 
you do your investigations will always be to that sort of standard. But then, having worked in different 
sectors, the different sectors themselves all have certain rules and regulations that are applicable to 
them” [UK Respondent 2].
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The investigative process and sources of 
information in corporate investigations44
44 A version of this chapter was published in Erasmus Law Review (2016): Meerts, C.A. (2016). A world 
apart? Private investigations in the corporate sector. Erasmus Law Review, 9(4), 162-176. I thank the 
reviewers and editors for their useful insights with regard to that paper.
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Introduction
I remember from my time in the police that we were always complaining that private 
investigators were able to do anything and could just barge in somewhere. And now 
that I’m on the private end we as private investigators complain that we can’t go in 
because we don’t have the authority to do so. If someone doesn’t want to cooperate 
we can’t do much [Respondent 5 – corporate investigator].
Private investigations are often contrasted with criminal investigations done by the 
police. A recurrent image within law enforcement is that corporate investigators 
have much leeway to perform their investigations the way they see fit because a 
legal framework is lacking.45 At the same time, corporate investigators feel restricted 
in their work because they cannot perform the same activities as law enforcement 
agents can. As we have seen in chapter 2, corporate investigators are regulated, 
although the legal framework is quite scattered over different professional groups 
and control over compliance to these regulations is rather limited. The most specific 
regulation available to corporate investigators is laid down in the Privacy code of 
conduct for private investigation firms (NVb, 2015). While this is legally binding only 
to those investigators who possess a permit, corporate investigators without a permit 
(in-house investigators, forensic accountants and forensic legal investigators) seem 
to largely comply with the rules of the Privacy code of conduct as well.
 The contrast between the view of law enforcement professionals and the 
wider public on the one hand, and that of corporate investigators on the other is 
interesting. The key point in this controversy has to do with (the absence of ) formal 
powers of investigation. Powers of investigation are, by law, granted exclusively to 
law enforcement professionals.46 As a consequence, there are no private powers of 
investigation: corporate investigators have the same investigative powers as any 
citizen. The sense of limitation, expressed by many corporate investigators formerly 
working in law enforcement, stems from this lack of official investigative powers. 
Having no access to formal powers of investigation simultaneously means, however, 
that corporate investigators can operate with considerable flexibility (Williams, 
2005). Crucially in terms of access and speed, there is no need for them to wait for the 
approval of a prosecutor or judge prior to the use of the methods which are available 
to them (although corporate investigators do need the client’s/management’s 
45 See for example the report of KRO Brandpunt, Bespied door de baas (1 June 2014) for a public image of 
corporate investigations. Available on http://brandpunt.kro.nl/seizoenen/2014/afleveringen/01-06-2014.
46 See article 141 and 142 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Stravordering – WvSv). 
Article 141 charges the prosecution, police officers, military police and special investigative agencies of 
the ministries with the investigation of criminal offences. Article 142 states that the minister of security 
and justice may define additional persons as ‘special investigating officer’.
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approval). This contrast between the perceived bureaucracy of the state apparatus 
versus the expected freedom private investigators enjoy is a reason which is often 
given by corporate investigators with a background in law enforcement, when asked 
about their career switch. 
I think we can do a lot less than the police for example. We don’t have any powers to 
retain someone. On the other hand, we might not have the threat of prison sentences 
but we do have the threat of losing your job. Don’t underestimate the power of 
that either. Keep in mind that mostly we’re not dealing with hardened criminals 
here, mostly it’s just an employee who has done something wrong. [Excerpt from 
observation 2 - informal conversation]
Although corporate security actors have no formal powers of investigation, their 
possibilities to investigate are extensive: through the (property) rights of the 
organisation as an employer, they may use much information about employees. 
When corporate investigators investigate a case, they might gather a great deal of 
information by talking to people (interviewing), by looking into internal systems 
(e.g. personnel logs), firms’ communications (email, phone records), financial systems 
(accounting, sales and other systems) and open sources (e.g. social networks) and 
by tracing assets. Much information gathering by corporate investigators relies on 
the cooperation of the people and organisations involved as it is impossible for 
corporate investigators to for example lay claim to financial records of individuals or 
organisations other than their client, or to enter premises other than those belonging 
to their client – these being powers granted exclusively to public law enforcement. 
This may mean that it proves impossible for corporate investigators to investigate 
a norm violation fully and in this case, law enforcement agencies may need to be 
mobilised by a report to law enforcement authorities. Whether or not the decision is 
made to do so depends on the client. 
A big difference is that law enforcement has powers we don’t have. That’s an essential 
difference. But the fact that we aren’t the police also has an effect on people. In some 
investigations it would be nice to have powers of investigation, for example I’m 
working on a case now in which we think there has been a kickback somewhere but 
we can’t prove it. The police could subpoena bank records and create a money trail. 
But, what I just said – people are different to us. Our big advantage is that they talk 
more easily to us. They are more relaxed with us in interviews because we’re not the 
police. So on the one hand it’s a disadvantage not to have powers of investigation, on 
the other it’s an advantage because people see you as less of a threat. [Respondent 
3 – corporate investigator]
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The greater part of internal norm violations occurring within organisations never 
reaches the criminal justice system but is investigated by and settled with the help of 
corporate investigators within the private legal sphere (Dorn & Meerts, 2009). One of the 
reasons for this is that while investigations may concern (alleged) criminal behaviour 
such as fraud, they may just as well be about behaviour that is considered undesirable 
rather than criminal, for example conflicts of interests. In the latter case, there is no 
possibility to report the norm violation to the police and no criminal investigation will 
follow (Meerts, 2013).
 This chapter follows the investigative process from start to finish, describing 
the investigative process and the investigative methods and sources of information 
available to corporate investigators. Some corporate investigative methods are broadly 
similar to those used in public policing (e.g. interviewing the people involved or 
observing someone – although the degree of duress, rights of the interviewee, etc. 
may differ), other investigative methods are more private in origin and in ‘ownership’ 
(e.g. forensic accounting methods or an audit of internal systems). At the conclusion of 
the investigative process, findings need to be reported to the client, most commonly 
in a formal investigations report. The chapter follows a corporate investigation 
chronologically, starting with the way norm violations reach corporate investigators 
and the assignment that follows (section 3), through the different sources and 
information gathering methods (section 3 and 4) to the conclusion of the investigations, 
culminating in the investigative report. Before discussing the investigative process and 
methods, section 1 reflects on corporate investigations by looking at the starting point 
of corporate investigations: the client.
1. The setting of corporate investigations – client 
centeredness
Private persons are allowed to investigate behaviour that is harmful to them – or to ask 
other private persons to do so – as long as they do not violate any laws. Legal persons 
are considered private persons in this sense and when they act as a client to corporate 
investigators, corporate investigators may use the investigative possibilities of their 
client. As an employer, an organisation has the right to control certain behaviours of its 
employees and many organisations have made provisions in the labour contract for the 
use of this information for investigative purposes (Schaap, 2008). Corporate investigators 
thus often have access to a considerable amount of information provided by the client.
 Chapter 2 discussed the different legal frameworks that apply to different 
investigators. Some investigators’ activities are regulated by law or self-regulation 
(e.g. private investigation firms and forensic accountants), while others rely on 
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disciplinary rules (in the case of lawyers, these rules are not specifically applicable 
to investigatory activities) or internal regulation (in-house corporate security). It is 
argued in the previous chapter that this situation leaves room for forum shopping 
by clients, and may lead to situations in which clients acquire the services of the 
investigator who is least regulated. However, the Dutch law safeguarding the 
protection of personal privacy (WBP) guides all corporate investigations and general 
prohibitions, such as breaking the (criminal) law, apply to all investigators. Chapter 
2 has furthermore shown that corporate investigators indicate that they are guided 
by general principles of law and that they tend to commit to the guidelines codified 
in the Privacy code of conduct for private investigation firms (NVb, 2015) and the 
guidelines for person-oriented investigations for accountants (NIVRA/NOvAA, 2010). 
Because respondents indicate they largely follow the Privacy code of conduct, this 
chapter alludes to these more specific rules when applicable.47
 The large diversity in professional backgrounds in the field of corporate 
investigations also creates a wide variety of skills and expertise, going well beyond 
those used in police investigations (Gill & Hart, 1997). These skills are applied to 
provide clients with swift results that can be used to prevent future incidents and, 
possibly, restore at least some of the damage done. The diversity in backgrounds 
and accompanying expertise make the corporate security field of interest to 
prospective clients. In his work on forensic accounting and corporate investigations, 
James Williams (2005) has pointed out certain characteristics of corporate 
investigations which are highly valued by clients. Not bound to the definitions of 
behaviour given by criminal law or by the (often slow and bureaucratic) structures 
of criminal procedure, corporate investigators may offer a high level of flexibility in 
investigative methods and solutions to clients. Secondly, the orientation in corporate 
investigations is on the client and the private troubles the client may have, rather 
than on criminal acts (which are defined in the Dutch criminal justice system as being 
against society). This means that whatever norm violation is deemed harmful by an 
organisation may be investigated by corporate investigators (and the assignment 
may also be limited to that specific norm violation). Thirdly, corporate investigations 
provide an organisation with a high level of discretion and a certain measure of 
control over the process and information flow. While following chapters show that 
there is consideration for common good considerations through non-contractual 
moral agency by corporate investigators (Loader & White, 2017), the main focus 
in corporate investigations is therefore on the client. Investigations are directed 
towards answering the questions that have been formulated in the assignment by 
the client. In addition, the internal information and systems that are available partly 
47 See the previous chapter (2) for a general overview of legal frameworks applicable to the different 
professional groups of investigators.
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determine the path the investigations will take. “At the start you will consult with the 
client about indicators, what is it we can do for you and what is it that we need to 
do to get there, what is the planning and of course what are the costs” [Respondent 
5 – corporate investigator]. Thus, the services that are provided are tailor-made to 
meet the needs of the client. For example, when investigating a suspicion of fraud, 
corporate security investigators can be very cautious in their investigations, so as to 
not create unrest within the organisation. The interests of the client are prioritised 
in the investigations and this may mean that the investigations need to take a more 
subtle road than the police would take. Police investigations might be damaging 
to the operational practices of an organisation, especially since it is difficult for an 
outsider to understand the workings of internal systems (Gill, 2013). “[The police] do 
not understand our systems. We are the experts of our own systems and we have the 
necessary access” [Respondent 16 – corporate investigator].
Ok so the police come in, take the administration. Do you have any idea what that 
does to an organisation? People go home sick, totally lost. And with us, things go 
more quietly. They don’t even notice. They do when we start interviewing and that 
will produce unrest of course but that’s at the end of the investigations. What we do 
is more subtle, we do custom made work. [Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]
The client-centeredness of corporate investigations may mean that corporate 
investigators go about the investigations more cautiously and more efficiently, but 
also that they focus on different information than law enforcement investigators 
would. An organisation is often in need of information fast so action can be taken. This 
information may not be the same as the information produced in the criminal justice 
process (as not the interests of the organisation are taken as a point of departure, but 
public interests).
A corporation wants to know what happened. I just finished an investigation for a large 
Dutch company that suspected it had some issues abroad with one of the directors. 
That has to be cleared up within three, four weeks otherwise they can’t act. No way 
that you go to the police first because that’s not going to help you. They have their own 
responsibilities. They are not going to ask the organisation, what is it you need and I will 
look into it. It doesn’t work like that. [Respondent 26 – corporate investigator]
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2. Preparation for the investigations – the assignment
Depending on the position of the investigators, an investigation usually starts with 
an intake of the assignment (in the case of an external investigator) or the report of 
a norm violation to the security department (in the case of an in-house department) 
(Williams, 2014). Investigation firms and departments differ in their backgrounds 
and structure, as reflected by the observations conducted during this research. 
This means that there are also differences in the way corporate investigators are 
notified about norm violations. For example, there are large and small investigations 
bureaus (or forensic departments within accountancy or legal firms), and there are 
large and small in-house departments within large organisations. These may all have 
their own way of organising notifications. Observation Company 1 for example – a 
private investigation firm – had at the time of observation six employees, of whom 
five were involved in (all kinds of ) investigative activities. Observation Company 2 
– an in-house security department – had at the time fifteen employees, of whom 
eleven were involved in investigative activities. In Observation Company 2, there was 
a division of labour, with one team being responsible for the intake and registration 
of cases, one team focusing primarily on desk research and one team (in the lead of 
the investigations) focussing on interviewing. Leaving these organisational details 
aside, in general notifications are done by management or, in case of an in-house 
notification system, someone within the organisation.
 Respondents suggest that not every assignment is accepted. In in-house 
departments this is more or less a decision based on priority: all cases are accepted 
in principle but during busy periods, it may be decided either not to investigate 
norm violations with minor importance, or to do so at a later point in time (which 
may very well be the same since the problem may by then be solved in another way 
by for example the manager). 
As a rule, cases are brought to the attention of the helpdesk and registered there. 
After that, cases are sent to the right place (internal, external, ICT). When it is an 
internal case, the case is prioritised (in reference to urgency, delicacy and harm) and 
the manager decides who will handle the matter. Sometimes a case will be reported 
directly to an investigator and he will start the case and register it on his name. 
Investigators also need to prioritise what to do and what not to do, sometimes there 
are just too many cases to do it all. [Excerpt from observation 2]
For those investigators working on contract basis, there is a greater necessity to 
accept cases, as they are commercially dependent on them. 
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It’s quite simple actually – basically we take on everything. In principle. Because we 
really can’t afford to say no. Once you start turning clients down because you’re too 
busy, chances are that that client will never come again. The nature of the work is 
such that you can’t say ‘things are too hectic right now, come back in three weeks’. The 
client has an immediate problem which warrants immediate action. So you need to 
get to it right away. So one way or the other, in principle it’s a yes. And we can do it. 
[Respondent 2 – corporate investigator]
If the necessary manpower is not available, other investigators may be contracted as 
an addition to the team (the same goes for in-house departments that are temporarily 
short-staffed). Both Observation Company 1 and 2 had particular investigators from 
(other) corporate investigation firms who would be used in such cases. In spite of this 
commercial necessity to accept all cases, there are still assignments that are rejected by 
corporate investigators. Respondents are wary of being used by a client; there should be 
a sound basis, or in accountancy terms a ‘just cause’, for the investigations (NVb, 2015; 
NIVRA/NOvAA, 2010; see also chapter 2). The above-cited respondent goes on to say:
So the only question is really, should we take the assignment and do we want to? 
I mean first of all, is there enough cause for an investigation? You’re dealing with 
privacy aspects here so there needs to be a valid reason to investigate. Imagine that a 
CEO comes to you and says, ‘look I have Mr. Jones here and he’s in his late fifties, rather 
expensive, we would like to get rid of him but firing him would be expensive so could 
you have a look at his expense account and see whether you can’t find something or 
other’. Well, no, sorry, we don’t do that. By the way, it’s not always that straightforward 
because if the same person contacts us, saying ‘we think that Mr. Jones is fiddling with 
expense accounts for this or that reason...’ The story is the same, it’s just told differently. 
So it’s not always possible to know exactly but you have to try. That’s why an intake 
is so important, to get an impression of the context of the case, what kinds of signals 
are there, how were they discovered, is it specific enough to warrant investigation? 
When we are convinced of these aspects we may accept the assignment. [Respondent 
2 – corporate investigator]
Respondents also indicate that it is not just a question of whether the assignment 
that is to be executed has a sound basis to commence investigations. In addition, 
investigators should be aware that clients might want to ask the wrong question, 
either on purpose or because of incompetence.
The thing I have noticed in investigations for governmental organisations is that 
they purposively – at least I think it is purposively – pose the wrong question. Maybe 
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you have read it, this case about that whistle-blower who committed suicide. And 
there were articles in the paper about officials who travelled on the expense of the 
organisations they should have been overseeing. So what happens, they hire an 
accountancy firm with no track record in investigations whatsoever and they are 
looking into the declared expenses. But that wasn’t the issue, the issue was with 
the expenses which were not declared. I think that is purposively asking the wrong 
question. The answer will be, sure there was something off in the expenses here and 
there but those were minor things and with the other expenses they found no fault. 
No of course not. But that never was the issue raised by the whistle-blower or the 
newspapers. So, in such a way investigations can be used as a lightning rod, to distract 
people from the actual issue. [Respondent 41 – corporate investigator]
Some respondents indicate they do pro bono work as well. Observation Company 1 is 
an example of this. A small portion of the yearly capacity for investigations is reserved 
for pro bono work. It was explained to me that this usually is work for individuals 
rather than organisations, although small-scale organisations (which do not have the 
funds to facilitate investigations) may also be accepted as a pro bono case.
And another thing is – assignments from individuals, how to deal with that. Individuals 
may also end up in a situation in which you think... Costs are an issue for individuals 
normally of course but sometimes you come across a case in which a very unjust 
situation has arisen and the person involved cannot go anywhere else to set it right. 
In such cases we might decide to do it anyway, even though it is a bad decision from 
a commercial point of view. Sometimes we agree on this beforehand with the client, 
then we make it pro bono. But in general what we do is, we assess what comes in, 
judge whether there is enough grounds to investigate and if that’s the case we will in 
principle take the job. With the statement in mind that we have to be available all the 
time, otherwise clients will never come back. [Respondent 2 – corporate investigator]
When a case is indeed accepted, it is customary that the ‘problem owner’ – be that 
the manager of the suspected employee, the board of directors or someone else 
– and the investigators talk about the reported norm violation in order to form a 
clear idea of the scope of the problem. The extent to which this is possible at the 
start of an investigation can differ widely. Respondents indicate that investigations 
may start with a very clear suspicion towards one person or a pretty straightforward 
problem but it is also possible that the question put to the investigators is very broad. 
It happens that the client is for example merely aware that something is not quite 
right, but cannot put his finger on the actual issue. This means that the assignment 
of corporate investigators may be very specific or pretty broad. Respondents state 
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that the goal is to define the assignment as strictly as possible before commencing 
with the investigations. This is especially relevant for investigations conducted by 
external firms (as distinct from in-house or self-investigations) and in cases in which 
a certain individual is investigated (person-oriented investigations).48 While this 
predetermined focus is helpful and beneficial to involved persons in the sense of the 
protection of their privacy, there are also some inherent dangers. 
Ok so there are suspicions against someone, we are going to investigate, that’s why 
we’re here. But it needs to be objective, unbiased. Not ‘we want to get rid of him’. 
I have done an investigation where a director voiced suspicions against another 
director, something to do with expenses and overtime. I said, I’m not going to do that. 
Because, there are three directors here and if I’m going to investigate I need to have 
the context, so I will have to look at all three. Then you’re investigating the way in 
which rules XYZ are applied. So that’s what we did and it turned out the one pointing 
the finger was no angel either. So carefulness and clarity are important in your 
investigations, making sure you are not being used as the stick to beat the dog with 
and ensuring the individual is treated fairly. [Respondent 27 – corporate investigator].
However narrow an investigation may be at the start, during the investigative process 
the scope of the assignment may, in consultation with the client, be broadened or 
narrowed down. A broader scope usually means more investigations and thus more 
expenses, which makes deliberation with the client necessary. Respondents from 
in-house investigative units indicate they have more independence in determining 
the scope of the investigations. This is also apparent from the case studies from 
observation 2, which was done in an in-house department. In 8 out of 11 selected 
cases, the investigations commenced with a broad question and the scope of the 
investigations would be expanded during the investigations. For the case studies 
from observation 1 (executed within an private investigation firm) the situation was 
reversed: in 8 out of 10 cases the investigations started with a focused question. 
However, in these cases the investigations might also be broadened during the 
investigative process, in consultation with the client.
 Respondents indicate that the dialogue with the ‘problem owner’ is especially 
relevant in the first phase of the investigations.
[The level of contact with the client] depends on the phase your investigations are 
in and the nature of the issues involved. In the beginning of the investigations you’re 
going to have much more contact with the client about things like, what kind of 
48 As distinct from broader investigations into the organisation, not focusing on an individual but on 
an issue.
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information are we going to need, what is available internally, which information will 
need to be secured right away... That’s contact on the operational level, with the IT-
department, the business line, the department that’s responsible for the issue. And the 
question is for example, will it be necessary to collect your information quietly or do 
the employees already know there’s going to be an investigation and is it ok for you to 
contact the department and deliberate? How are we going to secure the information, 
is it a lot, are we going to gather everything, digitalise the information and put it in a 
big computer so we can search efficiently later on? Or is it limited in scale and maybe 
already digitally present? Well, those are the kinds of questions that are relevant at the 
start of your investigations. [Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]
After the assignment is determined and the problem defined, the investigations can 
commence. An inventory needs to be made of the type of information available and 
location of the information. The client is an important source of information here. 
You need to be introduced to the people you are going to need within an organisation. 
Because we want to interview them or need insight in the administration and things 
like that. The decision how to investigate and who to interview is ours, we might 
discuss with the client but in principle we are autonomous in that. [Respondent 5 – 
corporate investigator]
The methods to be used depend on the case. The use of cameras may be very helpful 
to see who has taken money from a cash register but it might prove useless in case 
of loss of money through digital channels. In addition, some clients may have their 
own camera systems, track-and-trace devices or other useful tools for investigations, 
while others do not. It might happen that an employee suspected of wrongdoing is 
suspended from active duty at an early stage of the investigations so he or she is not 
in the position to cause more harm. However, in other cases the employee is kept in 
place purposively to aid the investigations by trying to catch him or her in the act. 
This also depends on the severity of the matter.
When it is someone high with a sensitive position within an organisation you don’t 
want to wait until you have the results of the investigations before you act, he will be 
suspended immediately. That person will therefore know about the investigations in 
advance. When it’s about the disappearance of items from the work floor or someone 
taking money from the till, you can wait and see what happens if you for example 
would mark a certain item [CM: to see who takes it]. There’s much less of a rush there 
and the critical risk is less prominent. [Respondent 50 – client]
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In general, corporate investigators prefer a suspension over an immediate dismissal of 
the involved person as long as the investigations are not yet concluded. “Sometimes 
the circumstances warrant immediate action. We prefer a suspension [CM: over a 
dismissal]. So they are still held to comply with your investigations because of the 
labour relation they have with the client” [Respondent 1 – corporate investigator].
 The order in which the various methods are used may differ. However, it is 
common to start with the investigation of administration and the interviewing of 
witnesses. The interview of the involved person(s) is usually reserved for the end of 
the investigations, so as to be able to confront the person with the evidence against 
him or her. During the investigations, many corporate investigators generally keep 
an investigative journal for internal use. This journal records relevant actions taken 
by the investigators, contacts they may have had with people and other relevant 
information. Especially when there are multiple investigators involved in a case, this 
may prove very useful (however, respondents also indicate the thoroughness with 
which this journal is kept differs among investigators). The journal can be regarded 
as a log and can be used for the eventual report.
 After the investigations have been concluded, a draft report is made. Relevant parts 
of the report are then usually handed to the involved person to read in accordance 
with the adversarial principle, which inter alia states that one has the right to be 
informed and be heard (see section 5.1 of this chapter). Part of the adversarial process 
is that the involved person has the right to know what has been written down in the 
report about him, and that he may react to this. After all involved persons have had 
the opportunity to make use of their right of inspection, the draft report is finalised 
and given to the client. 
As do most professional procedures, private investigations have their own language 
(Falk Moore, 1973). This could also, as Thumala, Goold and Loader suggest, be 
“‘occupational legitimation talk’ that seeks to emphasize specialist expertise, 
competence and [client]-centeredness” (2011: 296). As a commercial market, 
corporate security tries to emphasise the niche value of its services by using different 
terminology. In this way, corporate security as a semi-autonomous social field sets 
itself apart from other professional fields. Chapter 2 shows that this process also 
occurs within the field, between the different professional groups of investigators.
 In legal terms, investigative activities which are executed within the context of 
corporate security and those which are executed within the context of the criminal 
justice system are separated by a different terminology. As pointed out before, 
corporate investigators do not have powers of investigation and someone who is 
subject to corporate investigations is not protected by the rules of criminal procedure. 
Words such as ‘suspect’ and ‘interrogation’ are part of the criminal justice system and 
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therefore should not be used for investigations done in a different context. Most 
respondents from the private sector also refer to their activities with different words 
than commonly used for public investigations and some made a point of avoiding 
‘law enforcement terminology’. In the context of both observations, the same can 
be concluded: the investigative processes were defined in different terms in the 
official document than those used in criminal justice procedures and the informal 
conversations within the observation settings also followed these linguistic rules. 
Interestingly, clients and law enforcement respondents seem less rigid in their use of 
terminology. However, most respondents for example avoid the word ‘suspect’, using 
the words ‘subject’ or ‘involved person’ instead.49 The same goes for the information 
source of personal communication: private investigators do not interrogate but they 
interview (NVb, 2015). This difference in terminology emphasises the difference in 
investigative powers, as the power to interrogate someone is exclusively granted 
to law enforcement agencies. The Privacy code of conduct for private investigation 
firms also explicitly avoids the use of law enforcement terminology (NVb, 2015: 26):
This code of conduct abstains from the use of concepts that are present in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure to avoid confusion with the detection of crimes by law 
enforcement agencies. Private investigations do not take place under the authority 
and responsibility of the public prosecution office after all, and furthermore, its goals 
are different.
The use of different terminology separates private investigators and law enforcement 
on a symbolic level, something which respondents seem to underwrite. “We should 
really get rid of the image of being private coppers and get the focus on our problem-
solving capabilities instead” [Respondent 40 – corporate investigator]. In the words 
of an investigator working for Observation Company 2: “I’m no private police”. This 
difference is not purely symbolic: from an empirical point of view the differentiation 
also holds firm. Even though there are many corporate investigators with a law 
enforcement background, and their work may seem similar to the work of police and 
prosecution, there are notable differences. It has been remarked before that corporate 
investigators do not have any powers of investigation and that their investigations 
are not merely focused on crime. The point of departure – public or private interests – 
also differs between public and private investigators. Services provided by corporate 
49 This research also avoids ‘criminal law terminology’, as the use of these terms would be incorrect in the 
context of corporate investigations. An involved person for example is not a suspect in the sense of 
a criminal procedure (and as such does not enjoy the same rights). The adversarial principle could be 
interpreted as being a criminal justice term (as it is a leading principle of law in criminal proceedings), 
however in the Dutch legal system, this is a term that is used in all legal proceedings, from administrative 
to civil to criminal, and it is thus not specifically linked to the criminal justice system.
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security providers are thus more encompassing and focused on client interests. 
Below, the principle components of a private corporate investigation are discussed. 
3. Gathering information – investigative methods 
leading up to confrontation
3.1 Internal documentation 
A common first step in corporate investigations is to look at ‘the paper work’. “It’s 
difficult to assess whether the person is telling the truth and by starting with the 
financials, you can get a sense of what might have happened” [Respondent 5 – 
corporate investigator]. When business is conducted, actions are documented. This 
(digital or) paper trail is a very valuable source of information in the reconstruction 
of where the money went. Since the client usually is the organisation where the 
irregularities occurred, its records are generally available to the investigators. 
Because the client can order its employees to cooperate fully with the investigations, 
relevant parts of the organisation may deliver documented information quickly. 
These documents include ‘anything that has been written down’. “We usually start 
with the records. And that is a very broad concept of course. There are financial 
records, digital but also hard copy. Digital is for example the books, and hard copy the 
invoices, source documents, everything that the books are based on” [Respondent 
5 – corporate investigator]. 
 It depends on the types of services or products the client delivers how these 
documents are constructed, but generally there are invoices, contracts, tenders 
and project reports available. Respondents state that this is a good place to start 
the investigations, after the initial talks with the client. These source documents may 
provide an overview of what happened fairly quickly.
And then you directly have a lot of information, transactions are documented. There is 
someone ordering, there is someone who approves it, there is someone who enters it 
into the system... Payments are usually cashless, which means there are bank records 
of them. So you try to gather all relevant information, refine your knowledge and 
document it. [Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client] 
Much can be derived from the financial administration of an organisation. In case 
of a suspicion of fraud, the first step is often to identify the amount of money that 
went missing and where it went. Sometimes this provides a straightforward story 
and not much additional investigation is necessary. Outgoing payments from 
the accounts of the client often provide information on the person who received 
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the money. However, there are situations where ingenious constructions are used 
to disguise the path the money has taken and to hide the recipient. Information 
provided by the client might not be enough to trace the money or to find out what 
happened. The access to documentation is limited to internal information from the 
client, although involved persons may (and sometimes do) provide access to their 
personal accounts. Sometimes this means that – because of the lack of investigative 
powers – corporate investigators will not be able to pinpoint the problem. “There are 
situations in which you need the powers of investigation of the police. Especially in 
these financial investigations. Sometimes you need a warrant to get bank records. We 
can’t get to bank records of third parties – that would be highly illegal” [Respondent 1 
– corporate investigator]. This problem of access makes it more difficult for corporate 
investigators to investigate the norm violation fully when for example subcontractors 
are involved. “In the big investigation I told you about, there was a subcontractor 
involved and he had his administration, probably, at home. It wasn’t available at our 
client company so we figured he kept it at home. We asked him for it but he didn’t 
give it to us of course” [Respondent 5 – corporate investigator].
3.2 Internal systems
The situation presented on paper may not provide the full story to investigators 
and is liable to incorrect interpretation when used as the sole source. Additional 
information sources are necessary to answer the questions posed in the assignment. 
A logical next step is to look at other information which is internally available. 
A multitude of internal systems may provide much information for corporate 
investigations. Generally speaking, all these internal systems may be put to use for 
an internal investigation, as long as certain requirements are met (e.g. the employer 
has to announce in general terms to his employees that their movements may be 
tracked) (CBP, 2015a). Most of these systems are not meant for investigative purposes 
but can be used nevertheless. What kind of system is available depends largely on the 
(economic) activities of a client organisation. For example, logistics companies often 
have track-and-trace systems in their vehicles and security cameras are used more 
often in a large warehouse than an office floor. 
3.2.1 Communications and data carriers 
Organisations often have their own internal communications systems and they 
make use of (systems of ) hard- and software. Email-inboxes, mobile phones, 
personal computers, laptops and external memory devices may all contain valuable 
information. Privacy legislation allows for these to be investigated when they are 
owned by the employer (NVb, 2015). By extension, corporate investigators have access 
to the information provided by the use of organisational facilities by employees. 
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 There are multiple, more and less intrusive ways to investigate communications 
and data carriers. According to the widely used principles of law of proportionality 
and subsidiarity, investigative methods should be proportional to the goal (and the 
interest of the client for reaching this goal) (proportionality) and the least intrusive 
methods should be used when possible (subsidiarity). Respondent therefore indicate 
that they always attempt to use the least intrusive method of investigation. 
We don’t wire-tap telephones. But for example, our stock-traders, they may only use 
the company phones for their activities. And all these calls are registered, to make 
sure no confusion may occur later on about amounts etc. People know this, those 
conversations are recorded. And if necessary we may listen to those tapes. And we can 
make analyses of the phone records, who are they calling, what are their contacts. But 
we’re not wire-tapping for investigative purposes, listening in on their conversations. 
[Respondent 39 – corporate investigator] 
To stay with the example of recording telecommunications, it is possible to record 
a telephone conversation, but one could also use mediation to track a phone. Data 
mediation in general refers to the process in which usage data from networked devices 
(such as mobile phones) is collected and processed, usually for billing purposes (Balter 
& Bellissard, 2003). It can however, also be used in investigations. Mediation is less 
intrusive because while it shows where the phone has been and who has (been) called, 
the content of the conversation is not recorded. Often, mediation is a very useful tool. 
For example, case study 21 of the case studies, mediation was used to prove that an 
employee was near the building where some equipment was stolen on the day of the 
theft, even though he had called in sick and was no longer working in the building.
 When for example some property has gone missing it might be helpful to know 
what has been said in phone conversations or by email. Phone calls cannot be retrieved 
retrospectively so a recording device has to be present at the time of recording. When 
it comes to email, older information could be retrieved. Email-boxes may be ‘imaged’ 
and stored in a database to search. This also goes for ‘the digital environment’ more 
generally. “In the larger investigations, data recovery is a standard ingredient. This 
means that the digital environment is imaged and put in a database. This may 
become pretty complex because you have to take privacy regulations into account 
and when the data crosses the national border, this may be a problem” [Respondent 
28 – forensic legal investigator/client]. Data carriers such as personal computers, 
laptops, external memory devices and tablets can also be investigated on content or 
on activity (e.g. internet logs) if they are property of the organisation. The growing 
use of BYODs (bring your own device, usually a laptop) may in this regard prove 
problematic for corporate investigators, as it is not permitted to investigate these. 
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As mentioned before, corporate investigators lack the powers of investigation law 
enforcement has and therefore their access is limited (though still quite extensive). 
Within the boundaries of available information, corporate investigators may however 
investigate more effectively than law enforcement would, especially when it comes 
to complex internal systems.
Of course they [law enforcement agencies] may demand information and we will have 
to provide that. But often they don’t quite know what kind of information they need. 
For example they ask for the laptop of the involved person. But with that they don’t 
have access to our system, just the computer. You need authorised log in codes to 
access the system and they don’t have that. I sometimes try to explain this but unless 
you’re talking to someone from a specialised high tech team, they don’t know what 
you’re talking about. They don’t understand how our systems work. Neither do I for 
some part but we have people here who do. Generally they just look at the laptop and 
stop there. There’s an entire world of information behind that which they’ll never see 
in this way. [Respondent 43 – corporate investigator]
3.2.2 Other internal systems
In addition to the abovementioned communication systems, there are many other 
internal systems that may provide information. Many organisations for example use a 
key card system for employees to gain access to a building. These can be used to find out 
whether someone has been present at a certain site.50 Track-and-trace or GPS systems 
are also used by some employers, to keep track of their deliveries or vehicles and these 
may provide information on someone’s whereabouts. In addition, regular personnel files, 
such as a record of someone’s work history at that employer, can be used as background 
information. A more controversial internal system is the blacklist. Although a blacklist 
meant for internal use is allowed by privacy law, it is obligatory to report sector-wide use 
of this beforehand to the Data Protection Authority (CBP, 2015c).51 Many respondents 
indicate that they do not know for sure whether their blacklist meets the criteria, but they 
do keep a database with information on people who have been investigated or fired in 
the past.52 These are often used as reference points in investigations (and in the process of 
hiring new staff). Finally, the use of (hidden) cameras is not entirely free from controversy. 
Cameras may provide valuable information, for example when the footage can be used 
to ascertain which employee took money from the cash register. Although it is allowed to 
50 Although this circumstance alone is not sufficient proof, as people tend to use each other’s key cards 
even when this is prohibited by the internal code of the organisation.
51 See article 22 under 2 sub b WBP.
52 This does not necessarily mean that the blacklist does not comply. Many larger organisations have a 
privacy officer who is better informed on these issues than the respondents mentioned here.
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record employee’s movements, privacy law prohibits the use of cameras in certain places 
(such as the restroom). Furthermore, employees should be made aware of the possibility 
of camera surveillance (CBP, 2015d). “We have many cameras placed in our buildings and 
people know this, they are made aware of it. When we have for example a missing item 
at a certain location, we can look at the camera footage and see whether we can find 
suspicious actions that are not part of the work process” [Respondent 15 – corporate 
investigator]. Under certain circumstances, the use of covert cameras is allowed, however 
these rules are pretty strict. Respondents furthermore indicate that the use of covert 
cameras is the exception rather than the rule.
3.3 Open sources 
Much information can be derived from open sources. Many people are lax in the 
protection of their personal data on the internet. A large proportion of both professional 
and social life occurs online and for a person who knows where to look, the internet 
contains much interesting information. In Observation Company 2, the investigations 
were organised in such a way that some investigators focused on doing ‘desk research’. 
Desk research consists of the investigations of internal systems as discussed above, 
but also the investigation of open sources. One investigator, especially, was highly 
skilled in this type of desk research. He for example had several (fictitious) accounts on 
social media sites so he had easy access to this information. Social network sites such 
as Facebook and LinkedIn may provide a broad overview of someone’s life (e.g. posts, 
photographs, likes, sites followed) and professional network (which may be useful, for 
example to see whether a third party that is involved knows the involved employee).
 Another open source of information is the database. There are some very valuable 
openly available or on-subscription databases such as the databases containing 
information on Chamber of Commerce records, name and address data and domain 
name registration. Many investigators have a subscription to these databases. 
Additionally, traditional media and the internet more generally (and search engines 
more specifically) could also provide a lot of valuable information for investigators.
3.4 Other sources
Depending on the type of norm violation and the circumstances surrounding it, 
there are multiple additional methods of investigation at the disposal of corporate 
investigators. Observation, to take an example, may be useful, although most of my 
respondents did very few observations. Observations (and the use of camera footage) 
are for example used when an employee is suspected of sick leave fraud. Site visits 
may also prove useful to see whether the ‘reality on paper’ matches the ‘reality in 
reality’. “For example, go and take stock for yourself and make sure that that what’s in 
the administration is in fact what’s in stock. To determine that, ok, there is a possibility 
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that the warehouse keeper or someone else took part of the stock” [Respondent 13 
– corporate investigator]. Some organisations furthermore do a standard search of 
employees and their belongings when they leave the workplace.
We also search people before they leave. We use a metal detector for that as well. 
Sometimes things come to light during that. You know, situations where people take 
something that isn’t theirs and that the alarm will ring. They’re asked to empty their 
pockets and well, if something’s in there that doesn’t belong to you, you’re going to 
have a good conversation with me. [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]
Other activities of corporate investigators include the evaluation (and correction) of 
previous investigations, the evaluation of internal control systems, the calculation of 
damages in light of private action and tracing of assets. When a report is made to the 
police (which often happens only after the internal investigations have been concluded), 
law enforcement information may also be used to investigate further. However, 
law enforcement agencies are very careful with the sharing of information53, as this 
conversation with two in-house investigators from the Observation Company 2 shows: 
That’s the thing. They think there’s no room but there is. The shutters close on mention 
of information sharing but that’s not necessary. When I report a crime to the police, I 
would like to have insight in their interrogations etc. They say, ‘no, that’s impossible 
because of privacy’. They’re so afraid that they go wrong that the solution is not to 
share anything. We don’t need operational details; it would be very helpful if they 
could just give us directive information without them having to have to start an entire 
investigation. Just to let us know whether we’re on the right track. [Excerpt from 
observation 2 – informal conversation]
4. The interview: confronting the involved person
A final category of information gathering is that which occurs through personal 
communications. Usually this takes the shape of an interview with colleagues, 
managers (serving as witnesses and sources of information) and, finally, the subject 
of the investigations himself. Respondents highly value the interview as an essential 
information source. An interview with the involved person usually is the last phase of the 
investigations, in which (s)he is confronted with the information that has been collected 
with the use of the methods and sources described above. Interviews with witnesses 
53 See chapter 5 for more on public/private relations and information sharing.
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often occur at an earlier stage as they are informative (adding to the big picture, instead 
of confronting someone with it). Many corporate investigators have a law enforcement 
background and are experienced interviewers. However, there are notable differences 
between an interview and a police interrogation. For example, there is no formal caution 
at the start of the interview because the interviewee is not a suspect in the sense of a 
criminal procedure. However, respondents indicate that they do point out at the start of 
the interview that the interviewee is not obliged to cooperate and that he cooperates on 
a voluntary basis. This is also codified in both the Privacy code of conduct (NVb, 2015) and 
the guidelines for person-oriented investigations (NIVRA/NOvAA, 2010).
His statement is made freely, I mean if during our conversation he decides he doesn’t 
want to talk about it, ok that’s his decision. I’m not sure he’s going to be better off with 
that but when someone walks out the door, he walks. I’m not going to grab him by the 
neck and say, ok now you’re going to talk. [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]
The voluntary nature of the cooperation of an employee should not be overstated. 
There is a definite power imbalance between the employee and the investigators 
(providing a service to the employer). 
The conversation turned to the measure in which people tend to cooperate with 
investigations done by the in-house department. Investigator [X] stressed that they 
have no formal powers to make people cooperate and that they are dependent on 
the voluntary cooperation of people. But, as he continued “you shouldn’t overstate 
the voluntary nature. We are acting as the employer here so people do feel pressure. 
If someone refuses to cooperate he does so but we do stress that that’s not in 
accordance with being a good employee. That’s one of the things that’s challenging 
in an interview. And a lot of people are just scared, that happens everywhere, also at 
our organisation, people are afraid of management. Afraid that when they talk about 
them they’ll lose their job”. [Excerpt from observation 2 – informal conversation]
Investigators stress their independence of investigation within the assignment they 
receive. “We have our own set of rules on how we conduct our investigations and we 
give this to our client at the intake of the assignment. Sometimes they say, can’t you 
do this and that. No, sorry. These are the rules; this is how we do things” [Respondent 
2 – corporate investigator]. However, this does not mitigate the power imbalance 
much. An employee is technically free to refuse to cooperate – in practice he or she 
can feel forced to cooperate with the investigations by his employer. Investigators are 
aware of this ‘limited voluntariness’.
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We caution people at the start of an interview, so to speak, by saying they are not 
obliged to cooperate. But they feel obliged of course. Sometimes someone asks, what 
will happen if I don’t? Well then I will have to talk to your manager about that. An 
interview is very confrontational. I dare say we give high priority to fair play, we stick 
to our own procedures. But we’re not treating someone with kid gloves. If someone has 
done something wrong, it’s ok to let him feel that. We are about finding the truth, that 
can be in someone’s advantage. If you did nothing wrong and we’re totally off track, 
here’s your chance to fix that. [Respondent 44 – corporate investigator]
As discussed in chapter 2, the law dictates that private investigation firms with a permit 
implement a privacy code of conduct similar to the one drafted by the NVb and approved 
by the Data Protection Authority. Other investigators tend to follow these rules as well, 
either by taking the Privacy code of conduct as guidelines or by drafting their own 
guidelines according to the Privacy code of conduct. The guidelines for investigations 
presented in the Privacy code of conduct include for example the right of representation 
by a lawyer or union representative and the general obligation for the investigators 
to treat the interviewee with respect and refrain from applying undue pressure and 
presenting false information (see for example Grant Thornton, 2010). Regarding the 
question of undue pressure, the Privacy code of conduct (NVb, 2015: 31) states:
The mere questioning of someone by a private investigator produces a certain 
amount of pressure. As interviews are done on a voluntary basis, as a rule there will be 
no undue duress. It is hard to draw the line between what is and what is not allowed. 
Keen interrogation is in itself legitimate. It is thus allowed to confront someone 
denying involvement with evidence and to point out his weak position. Undue 
pressure is exerted, however, when physical pressure is used. Making false promises 
and verbal abuse are also illegitimate.
As an investigator of Observation Company 2 explained, this is not just a matter of 
due process: especially when there is not enough evidence to take measures against 
someone, working relations may be affected by corporate investigators’ actions. 
And you need to be careful, when we have a case in which we can’t really make it stick, 
when there’s not really enough evidence and the person does not confess, you can’t 
be extremely tough on him. If he continues to be a co-worker you need to be able to 
shake his hand in the future. At least that’s my opinion on the matter. [Excerpt from 
observation 2 – informal conversation]
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Moreover, interviewees are given the opportunity to have a break and are offered 
something to drink and eat. “As of late we also include this in the interview report, you 
know, that someone has been treated correctly, had something to drink and had to 
opportunity to use the bathroom. That’s also to have proof of this for a possible court 
case of course” [Respondent 45 – corporate investigator]. Because “the first thing a 
lawyer tries to do, also in a police investigation, is to discredit the statement that has 
been made by the involved person” [Respondent 44 – corporate investigator]. These 
basic principles are (in a more general manner) also present in the guidelines for person-
oriented investigation for accountants. Respondents indicate they are aware of the 
situation in which an involved person finds himself, especially in an interview setting. 
The complaints that I get I can count on one hand. It used to be mostly about people 
feeling pressured in interviews. I get that, if you did something wrong and you know 
it and you’re faced with two investigators who start asking you questions and who are 
trying to get you to admit you did something wrong, that is a stressful situation. I take 
these complaints very seriously. But usually it’s just the context of being investigated, 
that in itself is intimidating. The conversation in the interview may feel awkward but I 
haven’t found that rules have been broken as of yet. People are treated with respect, 
they are not held against their will or any of that. So the percentage of complaints 
is pretty low, usually all runs smoothly. We’ve started to write down some of the 
procedural precautions we always took but now it’s recorded in the interview report. 
Things like that we tell people they are there voluntarily, that they are offered a drink 
and maybe some lunch, that they were able to go to the restroom. And we ask them 
now at the end of the interview how they feel about the interview. That prevents 
many complaints. [Respondent 46 – corporate investigator] 
The rules and normative considerations guiding investigations more generally and 
the interview in particular are there to ensure a fair treatment of the interviewee 
and at the same time guard the quality of the interview, so the information gathered 
through this method may be used in whatever legal solution chosen in the end (see 
chapter 4). The rules and principles of law leave room for interpretation – it is possible 
to stay within the width of the legal framework but still put a fair amount of pressure 
on the interviewee. It depends in part on the investigator what the stance towards 
the interviewee is. Some respondents empathise with the interviewee, saying that 
they can understand the position he is in during an interview. However, most state 
for example that 
You need to be completely neutral in these things. You didn’t contribute to this 
misery, you’re just hired to get a clear picture of the mess and fix it. You need to be 
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professional about that. Of course, you need to be friendly. When someone needs a 
break, you offer him one and you record this in the interview report. ‘At that and that 
time interviewee was very emotional and we took a break’. So you also report what 
time you continued, you give the man some water, maybe suggest that he takes a 
walk in the garden. And sometimes, I join them, have a smoke, then some other kind 
of conversation unfolds. And when he’s ready, you reopen the interview. [Respondent 
1 – corporate investigator]
Interviews are generally done by two interviewers (see for example NVb, 2015). There 
are multiple reasons for this. One of these is to have a witness for what has been said 
during the interview. Furthermore, having two people present is beneficial to the 
pace of the interview. 
We conduct interviews with two people, one takes care of the conversation, the other 
takes notes. So, we can write the whole thing up on the spot and print it out and then 
the interviewee can read it and sign. When there are corrections that need to be made 
we will adapt the document, print again and sign it. The interviewee signs for having 
been made aware of the content of the interview report and he gets his own print to 
take with him. It happens that people don’t want to sign because they do not agree or 
because they want to talk with a lawyer. In that case, we sign it anyway. And sometimes 
people don’t even want to talk to us. [Respondent 44 – corporate investigator]
As the cooperation is voluntary, people may refuse their assistance in an investigation. 
This could for example mean that he or she does not want to talk to the investigators, 
or that the interview takes place but the person will not answer relevant questions. 
Respondents indicate that most people tend to cooperate. In a conversation with an 
investigator in observation 1, I was told that ‘most people are curious; they don’t have 
any experience with this kind of stuff so they come and have a look at what we do and 
what we know’. After the interview has taken place, the interviewee is asked to sign 
the interview report with the interviewers. However, the interviewee may refuse to 
do so. In this case, a note is made at the end of the interview report and in the final 
report (see also below).
4.1 The interview process
Respondents explain that although an interview is often done in a comparable 
manner, this is not according to a rigid standard. Different interviewers have different 
styles and flexibility is an important asset. In addition, the way in which the interview 
is executed depends on the position of the person who is interviewed within the 
investigations. Respondents indicate that an interview with a witness is different from 
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an interview with an involved person. Interviews with witnesses are more informative 
than confrontational and often happen at an earlier stage. (Self-imposed or legal) 
rules regarding the interview with a witness are less stringent than when it comes to 
an interview with an involved person. It is required by privacy law that an involved 
person is made aware of the investigations he is subject to at the very beginning 
of investigations (see article 33 and 34 WBP). However, there are some exceptions 
to this rule, for example for the protection of the rights of others (including the 
client) (see article 43 WBP). In practice, this means that involved persons are often 
notified about the investigations at the moment of their interview. Although there 
are situations “in which you need to talk to the involved person as soon as possible, 
you often postpone this interview until you know exactly which questions to ask, 
based on the information you gathered” [Respondent 2 – corporate investigator]. 
Respondents prefer to interview the involved person at the end of the investigations, 
since they are able to confront him with the investigations’ results by that time. In 
this way, the chance that the involved person might destroy incriminating evidence 
is also diminished, as (s)he will only be aware of the investigations at a later point in 
time. The following quote depicts the procedure respondents follow with regard to 
notifying involved persons quite nicely:
In principle, you provide the code of conduct for investigations to the involved person 
at the earliest occasion you have, unless investigative interests are opposed to this. So 
in case you have to start your investigations and the involved person is still working 
there, there’s a chance evidence will be lost. For example because he erases all files 
from his computer or removes physical documents from the administration and 
throws them in the shredder. That would be a reason not to inform him just yet. You 
will first have to secure the evidence and only after that, when you know everything is 
safe, you will notify him. [Respondent 2 – corporate investigator]
The Privacy code of conduct and general principles of law leave room for the use of 
flexibility in when to inform an involved person about the investigations. Flexibility is 
generally an important part of an interview. During one of my informal conversations 
with investigators during observation 1, an investigator talked about how interviews 
may take a very different turn from what was anticipated by investigators and responding 
to such a situation in a good way is vital. It is therefore important to stay flexible when 
conducting an interview. Respondent 5 displays the same opinion when stating:
Sometimes you decide on a certain tactic for an interview but it turns out 
very differently. I remember a case where we were expecting this person to be 
uncooperative and so we decided to start with a confrontation right off the bat. But 
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we entered and he was very open and he wanted to talk to us. You start with a certain 
tactic but just like that it’s useless and then you need to converse with someone in a 
different manner than you expected. And it also depends on the subject matter. Or for 
example when someone is very emotional. Of course there are parts you can prepare 
beforehand but when you discover during the conversation that the important stuff 
is somewhere else you have to let go of your neatly prepared list and move to that 
subject. So you can come up with a certain grid but in practice it seems that you need 
to be very flexible with that. [Respondent 5 – corporate investigator]
As this quote shows however, interviewers do apply certain tactics during an interview 
and they prepare for it (see Coburn, 2006).54 The level and depth of preparation 
depends in part on the information that is already available. When the interview is 
used as a close to the investigations, usually there already is much information and 
“you can write much down in advance, you can make a draft of the interview report 
and confront him with it. Then you add his reaction, his declaration” [Respondent 44 
– corporate investigator].
4.2 Phases in the interview process
The two investigative interviews that I was able to attend during the observations 
had a certain structure. Since this structure is also put forward by respondents, it 
seems to be more commonly used. 
There’s always a difference between interviewers, I always say, you need to do your own 
thing. But the standard elements are that you start with a social talk, an explanation of 
the context of the interview, his rights and sometimes his duties. So basically what’s 
in our code of investigations. And usually, you move from a general conversation to 
more specific elements. In this conversation, you need to explain your assignment as 
well. So, you use a funnel so to speak, as an interview technique. The more specific 
questions are somewhere in the middle of the conversation. And then you start to 
show your evidence to the interviewee. There’s a turning point in an interview from 
informative to confrontational. That structure is always there. And these interviews 
can take a lot of time. [Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]55
54 There are many (mostly US) textbooks, e-learnings and other professional information available on 
different approaches and interview techniques. In this section the broader outlines of the interview 
as a source of information are described – these very detailed instructions on how to interview are 
beyond the scope of this chapter. Additionally, the fieldwork reveals that many corporate investigators 
feel that interviewing can be taught but much importance is given to experience and following one’s 
own instincts. Although respondents state that there are no standard ways to interview, stressing the 
importance of flexibility, they seem to broadly follow the process as delineated in this section. 
55 Unsurprisingly, an investigative interview follows some of the same basic rules followed by social 
scientists when interviewing respondents (Baarda, De Goede & Van der Meer-Middelburg, 1996). 
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In general, the interviewers seem to build the interview around three phases. The first of 
these is centred on pleasantries – the interviewers start with light conversation to make 
the person feel at ease. This includes small talk, for example about a person’s job. The 
voluntary nature of the conversation is stressed in this phase. “I want to tell you that you 
are here voluntarily, which means that you don’t have to cooperate and when you want 
to leave, you are free to do so. But of course we hope you will cooperate with us” [Excerpt 
from the interview witnessed during observation 2].
 After the interviewee has had the opportunity to talk freely about what he thinks is 
the reason he is there, the interviewers start with the second phase, ‘confrontation’. 
Here the evidence that has been gathered through other channels is used to confront 
the interviewee with ‘the holes in his story’. The ambiance changes from being amicable 
to more stern. Although the interviewee is treated with respect, the situation could put 
pressure on the person even when no boundaries are being crossed.56 Especially when 
the employee is alone and without representation, he might feel pressured to talk even 
though he does not want to. The interviewers are experienced and as mentioned above, 
respondents indicate that interviews are done in couples, which brings a certain force with 
it. The situation in which people are placed, and the consequences it may have on their 
lives, is something investigators tend to take into account in an interview setting as well.
Let’s be honest, we have nothing to hide here. When we have the information to close 
a case, the adversarial principle dictates that the employee has the right to be heard 
but they don’t have to talk, they may. And I assume that there are very few people who 
will actually admit that they did it. But when we have a tight case we can say at that 
moment, ‘look it doesn’t matter whether you talk or not, we’re done. This is how you 
did it’, if necessary they can see the camera footage and such. No problem, all cards 
on the table. [But you should also be aware that that person] is often by himself in 
that interview situation. Because, as an investigator you’re not always aware of the 
impact it has on someone, you know. And taking that into account your mind-set 
is different as well for an interview. Even if someone did something wrong, he’s still 
a person. And the reasons why people do what they do may be heart-breaking. But 
the consequences of these actions as well. Because that person will have to go home 
and explain what happened. Especially with some types of norm violations that can 
be very painful. So I get it. So we try to interact on a human level, and in the end of 
the day I need to be able to look myself in the eye about how I acted. And sometimes 
I think, what a waste that this happened to this person. But that’s the way it is. I have 
done my job in a fair manner. [Respondent 18 – corporate investigator] 
56 This research has found no evidence of corporate investigators abusing their power by mistreating the 
interviewee. This does not mean however, that such a situation never occurs.
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The final phase of the interview is the conclusion. At this stage the important 
information that has been discussed is summarised and either typed up directly, 
or the notes that the interviewers have taken are checked to make sure they are 
complete. Most respondents prefer to finish the interview report on the spot. 
When it comes to an involved person, [to type the interview report at a later point in 
time] may not be the best course of action because then you run the risk he will rethink 
what he has said. ‘I said that but maybe it wasn’t wise to do so, so I want it deleted’. 
When you correct the report directly, print it, let him read it and comment and ask him 
to sign, this risk is much mitigated. [Respondent 2 – corporate investigator]
Other respondents feel that this is not really an issue and take a different approach.
We always send the interview to them and tell them to take the time to read it 
carefully, and tell them, what you send back, that’s what you agree to. Then I will edit 
it and send it again and if you say this is correct, that’s what we discussed during 
the interview. They don’t even have to sign it then but we’re trying to get the most 
objective outcome as possible. And if someone says something in the interview but 
realises later that he should have put it differently, fine. That’s his story and that’s 
what’s going to end up in the report. So we’re trying to be as transparent as possible 
in the whole process. [Respondent 18 – corporate investigator]
After the interviewee has been confronted with the information gathered during the 
investigations, the atmosphere seems to change back to amicable. The interviewers 
and interviewee might discuss what will happen next and other matters, such as the 
motivation for the transgression, also tend to be referred to. In case the report is 
typed up on the spot, the interviewee – in accordance with the adversarial principle 
– gets the opportunity to read it and comment on factual errors. He is then asked 
to sign the document, along with the interviewers. This is also on voluntary basis – 
the interviewee is not obliged to sign. “For example, this involved person refused to 
sign his interview reports. We did sign; these were the statements he made to two 
witnesses [interviewers]. So if it comes to a trial, we can testify under oath about 
this” [Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]. If the report is typed up at a later point 
in time, the interview report is sent to the interviewee to comment upon and sign. 
A refusal by the interviewee to sign the document is not considered to be overly 
problematic by respondents. When this occurs, a note is made that the document has 
been offered to the person to read and sign but that he or she has refused to do so. 
Generally, this is considered to provide enough information to make the interview 
report useable (Van Wijk et al., 2002).
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 The interview reports differ in size but they are often a summary of what has been 
said instead of a verbatim account. The interview reports available to me during 
my research were mostly limited to a few pages. This is not a good indicator for the 
duration of the actual interview – only the relevant parts of the conversation are 
summarised in the interview report. This means that the interviewers have quite 
some freedom in drawing up the interview report. However, the interviewee has 
the opportunity to amend the report when he thinks important parts are missing. 
Respondents also state that it is possible that the interviewee wants to exclude 
certain information from the interview report “for example private information that 
his manager has no business knowing” [Respondent 45 – corporate investigator]. 
In some cases, investigators may honour the request of the interviewee, when the 
excluded information is not relevant to the case. 
And when someone wants to change something we don’t agree with, we make a note 
of that and sign that too. Openness, transparency, completeness. Pro and contra. Those 
are important principles. It rarely happens that an interview report is reproduced in 
full in the final investigative report but such a comment will be mentioned in the 
report when relevant – either to support or to defy your conclusions. [Respondent 
1 – corporate investigator]
The fieldwork reveals that using the methods of investigation discussed, corporate 
investigators are often able to provide a fairly complete reconstruction of the norm 
violation. Using mediation of phones, combined with open sources such as social 
media, investigators can map who has been in contact with whom, where a third party 
lives, works, etc. Investigations into financial records and other relevant documents 
can furthermore provide insight into fraudulent financial transactions. When it comes 
to for example theft from a shop, cameras and employee log files can be very useful. 
Although these are all valuable methods and sources of information, respondents 
tend to place most importance on the interview as a source of detailed information. 
Usually, the investigations lead up to the interview with the involved person(s). In 
these interviews, information can be checked, details can be added and errors can be 
corrected – that is, when the interviewee decides to cooperate. All this information 
needs to be made available to the client in a concise and clear way. To achieve this, an 
investigative report is written.
117
Corporate investigations
5. Reporting on the investigations
 
Once the investigations have been concluded and the questions that were the basis 
for the assignment can be answered, the information has to be made available to the 
client.57 Reports are often quite short and to the point, as respondents indicate that this 
format is most appreciated by their clients. A report needs to be clear on the facts and 
easy to read (Van Almelo & Schimmel, 2014). Depending on the nature of the assignment 
and the complexity of the norm violation, reports may be merely two pages (not 
including appendices) while others may span one hundred and fifty pages. “The size of 
a report varies between assignments but thirty pages is usually about the length for us. 
Sometimes they are very factual, and then a lot of appendices might be attached, for 
example interview reports” [Respondent 36 – corporate investigator]. Some investigators 
prefer to use appendices, while others do not. For example relevant parts of interview 
reports or other findings may be integrated in the report without them being attached, 
or they may be added in an appendix. “These interview reports are for internal use, to 
build our case. They are not an integral part of the subsequent report. But we do use them 
to quote from, especially crucial parts” [Respondent 5 – corporate investigator]. Multiple 
investigations may turn out to be related.58 Whether or not these are condensed into one 
report depends on the client. For example, it was explained to me during observation 1 
that if a client wants to take different actions against different involved persons, multiple, 
separate reports for each individual might suit this purpose best. Also, the same case 
may involve multiple clients, who all receive their own report. Observation Company 1 
had multiple investigations which were concluded by more than one report. Observation 
Company 2 (an in-house investigations unit), however, usually only produced one report. 
In-house investigators have an internal client and when multiple departments are 
involved the same report may be circulated.
 It is difficult to give a standard format of an investigative report, as there are notable 
differences in the way the findings are presented. However, most investigative reports 
contain the following subjects:59 “a report is typically formatted like, what was the 
assignment, what was the scope, what did we do and what did we find?” [Respondent 36 
– corporate investigator]. Some investigators also add some legal information, a preface 
with some kind of disclaimer or other relevant information. Opinions seem to differ about 
57 Not every investigation yields enough information to answer the questions asked in the assignment. 
When this is the case, a report is made about the findings and the lack of certainty is stated.
58 For example because other norm violations are discovered within the organisation during the 
investigations that warrant their own separate investigations (often referred to as ‘by-catch’) or 
because business partners of the organisation want to have internal investigations as well to ensure 
they had nothing to do with the norm violation.
59 There are some standards provided for forensic accountants, but not all corporate investigators use 
them.
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the necessary information for a report, however there is some consensus that a report 
should at least be transparent about the presented findings and how these have come to 
the fore. The client needs to be able to make an assessment of the validity of the report 
and to interpret its findings (Rense, 2004). The reports of the cases examined during 
observation 1 (case study 1 to 10), contain a justification of the investigative efforts which 
have led to the findings presented in the report. In this sense the report also serves as a 
way to show accountability to the client. This ‘disclaimer’ is typically not part of the reports 
of the cases analysed during observation 2 (case study 11 to 21). Observation Company 
2 being an in-house corporate investigations department, it did not have a commercial 
relationship with its client, based on an official assignment and contract. As such it is 
not necessary to provide such a justification in every report.60 In these case reports, the 
explanation of the kinds of investigative methods which have been used is done in a less 
all-embracing manner. For example, although an investigator of Observation Company 2 
explained that the investigation of open sources such as social media is a standard part 
of the investigations, the use of this method is not always mentioned in the case studies 
(it is excluded when it yields no results). The investigative actions may however still be 
retraced as they are recorded in the investigative journal (if kept properly).
 Interestingly, respondents working in an in-house corporate security department 
indicate that not every investigation merits a report. In such a case, the case notes, kept 
in the investigative journal, are simultaneously the final product of the investigations.
We don’t always write a report, we get a lot of rubbish cases. It’s no use to write an 
entire report then. The rule is that when they want to fire someone, we do write a 
report for the involved business unit, with an advice attached, for example about the 
processes that made the transgression possible. But when they are just going to give 
the involved person an official warning, there will be no report. Maybe we’ll give some 
advice but nothing written down. When there is no report, your notes, the journal and 
our registration system ‘is the report’. [Respondent 43 – corporate investigator]
Some commentators suggest that it is necessary to have a predetermined goal for 
the investigations, for example a report to law enforcement authorities or a dismissal 
(Schimmel, 2011). When this has been agreed between client and investigator, this 
predetermined goal is usually presented in the report. However, in practice the 
decision what to do with the results often is made only after the results are clear. “For 
example, we hand in the report and the client says, ‘I didn’t know it was this serious, 
I want to report to the police after all’. Ok, so then we go and report to the police” 
60 As we have seen in chapter 2, investigative costs are also important for in-house departments, however 
they are usually justified in more general terms (e.g. in a yearly report, calculated over a whole year) 
and not in every investigation.
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[Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]. If the decision to report to law enforcement 
authorities is made at the end of the investigations, this may potentially provide an 
issue with the value that will be given to the evidence. The standard of evidence in 
a civil court procedure is lower than that which is used in criminal court. If a civil 
court ruling or internal solution is sought but a report to law enforcement authorities 
is deemed necessary as well, this might thus be an issue. “Improperly obtained 
evidence is not as problematic for the procedure in civil court. A civil judge will not 
easily dismiss evidence, he might reprimand you for it but he has heard it anyway 
and will use it. Plus, often it is not the only evidence you have, you can build your 
case with the other evidence as well” [Respondent 50 – client]. Cases may also be 
concluded entirely without the involvement of a judge (Meerts, 2014a), which makes 
the way evidence is gathered even less of an issue in that sense. It is not necessarily a 
case of improperly produced evidence though – the information might be gathered 
through all the right channels and according to all the rules and still not comply 
with the standard of evidence used in criminal court because it must be considered 
circumstantial. This might be enough for a civil court solution, termination of the 
labour contract or internal sanctions but it will not hold up in criminal court.
 Taking the above considerations into account, the situation may be less serious 
than one might expect. Because there always is the possibility that a client decides 
to report to law enforcement authorities after all, respondents state that they try 
to aim for the standard of evidence that is used for criminal investigations in all 
investigations. “You have the highest standards for the burden of proof there, beyond 
reasonable doubt. If it complies with that, it will comply with the others as well. So 
this way, these other settlement possibilities will all remain an option” [Respondent 1 
– corporate investigator]. As such, respondents indicate that they feel it is important 
to ‘go by the book’, both in a moral and professional sense and because in many cases 
the decision how to handle the matter is made only after the investigations have 
been concluded and the report is handed in to the client. 
 Whether or not a conclusion of findings is drawn in the report depends on the type 
of investigator. For example forensic accountants consider drawing conclusions from 
the presented facts, or providing advice to their client in a report ‘not done’ (see also 
chapter 2).”Clients always ask for a conclusion, ‘just write down what you think’. But 
that would be subjective. The report sticks to the facts. Accountants are not supposed 
to draw their own conclusions, that’s up to the client or a judge” [Respondent 36 – 
corporate investigator]. Others prefer to give some advice on how to proceed but the 
extent of this advice also differs among respondents. This respondent for example 
does include some advice on the possible ways of settlement but provides no opinion 
on the best solution in the current case:
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Every case is different, the interests involved are different. Every time you’re faced 
with a different web, different tensions. The outcome is different every time. But you 
know, I don’t really care about that. We have a job to do and do it well. You can provide 
your client with the options but I’m not going to be the one to say, this is the way 
to go. Who am I to say they should report to the police? [Respondent 1 – corporate 
investigator]
Corporate investigators with a legal background are more inclined to provide an 
advice on how to proceed:
And eventually you will come to the point that you write your report and explain 
your findings but also draw conclusions based on that. That could be that there must 
be measures taken against certain persons or that the structure of the organisation 
should be changed. And it could also lead to the question whether or not the incident 
should be reported to the police. And that’s often a tough one to answer. [Respondent 
30 – forensic legal investigator/client]
The extent to which corporate investigators may influence decisions about settlement 
of the norm violation differs, however respondents indicate that the actual decision 
is not made by investigators. The client is the one deciding. In in-house security 
departments, the division between the investigators and the decision makers may 
get blurry at times. “Whether or not it needs to be reported to the police is a decision 
that does not concern HR. They want to be in charge of that, but I am the one to 
decide whether or not I find it useful. The policy is, report every time, in practice it 
hardly ever happens. I am the one who has to go there and file the report so I am the 
one deciding” [Respondent 48 – corporate investigator].
We do the investigations and that’s it. Two of my colleagues have a different opinion, 
[they think that] when they say someone’s guilty he should be fired, [but other 
colleagues] have a more nuanced view. Our job is the investigation, getting the 
evidence and building a case that would hold up in court if necessary. The decisions 
lie with the involved manager and HR. [Excerpt from observation 2 – informal 
conversation]
5.1 The adversarial principle
Before the report is handed over to the client, the involved person will be given 
the opportunity to read the relevant parts of the report and comment upon it. 
This implementation of the adversarial principle is derived from accountancy rules, 
however, most respondents state they comply with this rule even if they do not have 
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an accountancy background (Rense, 2004). The adversarial principle relates to the 
more general principle of law of due process, which respondents claim to comply 
with. For private investigation firms with a Wpbr-permit, the use of the adversarial 
principle is codified in the Privacy code of conduct as well (NVb, 2015: 7). 
And especially when it concerns an involved person – because it’s a person-orientated 
investigation – we use the adversarial principle. The first phase of that is to invite him 
to answer some questions. And the second is that when you make a final draft of your 
report which contains parts that concern that person, you give him the opportunity 
to react to it. So he can read it and comment on it. And those comments are added 
to the final report. And I think this is a good thing and very reasonable. I think that’s 
very important, it can’t be the case that you just go about your investigations without 
ever speaking with this person and still write a report about him. Obviously, that’s not 
right. [Respondent 5 – corporate investigator]
Not every involved person takes the opportunity of reading the relevant parts of the 
report. Respondents indicate that this is not necessarily problematic, however it does 
mean that caution should be applied when presenting findings. An example from 
observation 1:
Three investigators are having a discussion about the adversarial process in [case 
X]. When possible, relevant parts of the report are send to the involved person. In 
this case however, it is decided to make the draft report available at the office of 
Observation Company 1 instead of sending it to the people it concerns. The reason 
for this is that multiple people who are involved in the case have indicated they are 
worried about consequences to themselves, should the report be circulated. To limit 
the chances of this happening, the draft report is not distributed but only available for 
inspection in the controlled surroundings of the office of Observation Company 1. To 
comply with the adversarial principle, the draft report is still available for inspection 
to the involved persons, however it will not be sent to them. The lawyer of one of the 
involved persons demands the (full) report to be sent. It is decided this will not be 
done. [Excerpt from observation 1] 
This solution is not limited to Observation Company 1. Other respondents indicate 
they make use of the option to present an opportunity for inspection at their own 
location as well, instead of sending it to the involved person.
That draft report is presented to the involved people. It depends on how sensitive 
the matter is whether that happens by sending it to them or whether we place it 
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somewhere where they can come and inspect it. If we have the slightest inkling that 
they will abuse the content of the report or that they will go public with the draft, they 
can only inspect it at our location. This is usually followed by a discussion with their 
lawyer who will state the involved person has the right to inspect the draft report 
based on the adversarial principle. Yes he does. But he does not have a right to the 
report itself. He is not our client. So he may take notice of the relevant content of 
the draft but we do not report to him – we report to our client. That’s the way the 
game is played. Usually they try to slow down the process by refusing to inspect the 
draft if it’s not actually send to them. Then we write to them again, giving them the 
opportunity to inspect the draft. Usually we give them a reasonable term of 2 to 3 
weeks to respond, followed by a reminder and a couple of weeks more. But if they 
don’t respond we will notify them that we assume that they do not want to take the 
opportunity to read and comment on the report. The suspense builds and in our 
experience, people will eventually cooperate and inspect the draft. It also depends 
on the way you communicate with them. Usually they sense the importance of 
knowing what we wrote about them. So after all that we edit the draft according to 
their comments. Which may provide another heated discussion when someone says 
‘I don’t want this to be in the report’. Our response to that is: we are deciding about 
the content, if you don’t agree please write it down and we will make sure to attach 
your comments to the final report. We will present our view on the matter and yours 
alongside it. Some people write an entire report in response, ok fine we will attach 
that too. Let the client figure out what he wants to do with it. And then we finalise the 
report and present it to the client. [Respondent 40 – corporate investigator]
The inspection of the draft report may take a substantial amount of time because 
involved persons do not respond or try to stall the investigations in a way similar to 
the one described in the quote above. During observation 1, this issue also occurred 
for an investigation which was almost finalised by Observation Company 1.
The assignment of [case X] provided Observation Company 1 with multiple additional 
assignments because other organisations that had dealt with the involved persons 
in the past want to know whether they are also affected by the norm violations. 
[Investigator] is now working on the finalisation of one of these additional reports 
and I am having a conversation with her about it. “You know what the difficult part 
is here – we have concluded investigations already which are basically about the 
same people but for different clients and different norm violations. In those cases we 
applied the adversarial principle and this particular person referred us to his lawyer. So, 
theoretically, it would make more sense for me to contact his lawyer now as well. But I 
can’t because it’s a different investigation. But the thing is, for this involved person it’s 
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not a separate matter, he’s being investigated, that’s it. He’s refused all the registered 
letters we have sent and other communications he just sent back to us. But I will have 
to send him an invitation to make use of the possibility for inspection for this case as 
well. And if he does not make use of that that’s his problem. We did everything we 
could to comply with the adversarial principle.” [Excerpt from observation 1 – informal 
conversation]
When the adversarial principle has been applied and the draft is amended, the 
report can be finalised and signed. The (lead) investigator is the one responsible for 
investigations and, in case of a commercial relationship with the client, the signature 
of this investigator is necessary. For investigations done by a private investigation 
firm, the report is often (also) signed by the director of the firm. 
 Respondents working for an external client indicate that they agree on the terms 
under which the report of the investigations may be used. If the client wants to use 
the report for other purposes than agreed beforehand, the corporate investigators 
who executed the investigations will have to agree to that. 
In the report we state the purpose for which it may be used. Should the client choose to 
use it for a different purpose than to which we agreed, he has to get our written consent 
previous to that usage. We can’t enforce that – but at least the statement is there. To cover 
our risks, make sure clients do not run off with the report and abuse it. Say a client tells 
us that the report will be used for procedure X but when he gets the report he thinks, ‘it 
suits me well to post in on my website or share the contents with the newspapers’. That 
means he has an issue with us because he’s breaching our contractual agreement. But we 
can’t really stop it from happening in practice. [Respondent 40 – corporate investigator]
The reports which are publicly available through the internet (mostly investigations 
done for (semi-)public sector organisations) contain a similar disclaimer. This 
disclaimer usually explains that the report is made for a certain client and meant 
for the purposes defined in the report and that if the report is made public, written 
consent is necessary.61 Because of the laws regulating transparency in public office 
(Wet openbaarheid van bestuur – Wob), this is partly moot though: if for example a 
municipality receives a request under the Wob-regulations, (relevant parts of ) the 
report needs to be made publicly available (unless one of the grounds for refusal 
61 See for example a 2012 report by Grant Thornton for the municipality of Eindhoven (https://eindhoven.
raadsinformatie.nl/document/184307/1/Bijlage_5_Grant_Thornton_eindrapport_TA), a 2015 report 
by Hoffmann for the municipality of Urk (http://www.omroepflevoland.nl/SiteFiles/Doc/Rapport_
onderzoek_naar_lek_E48A8C53F9EC9A01C1257DE400371DDF.pdf ), a 2012 report by Deloitte for 
Avalex (http://www.politiekdelft.nl/avalex_rapport_deloitte_20120330.pdf ) or (in a more limited way) 
the 2015 report of De Brauw for NS (https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-614489.pdf ). 
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applies, article 10 and 11 Wob). However, such a formal addition in the report does 
protect the corporate investigators against liability claims from people involved 
when the report is made public without prior consent.
5.2 Complaints procedures
Persons and organisations who feel wronged by corporate investigations or by 
the final report have recourse to civil court proceedings on the basis of wrongful 
act/tort (article 6:162 Civil Code [BW]). Corporate investigators may be held liable 
for damages in this way. When the corporate investigator in question is a forensic 
accountant or forensic legal investigator, disciplinary procedures are also open to 
people and organisations affected by corporate investigators’ actions (see also 
chapter 2). Respondents indicate that they are faced with disciplinary action or civil 
suits on a regular basis, as it is a way for the legal representation of the involved 
person to discredit the report and in this way remove the grounds for action against 
the involved person. This goes more generally for the report as “even the slightest 
detail might be problematic. If they find something that doesn’t fit, this can discredit 
the whole report” [Respondent 3 – corporate investigator]. In this way, control is 
exerted over corporate investigations and when a transgression has been made, the 
judge may correct the situation by allowing damages to the aggrieved party. 
At first I got nervous and I would think my god, we’re in trouble here. But now I know 
it’s just part of our business. It’s a standard defence strategy: if you can’t win on 
content... For example the big investigation we’ve just finalised, we and the [board of 
directors] are charged for slander by the people involved. This happens all the time. 
[Excerpt from observation 1 – informal conversation]
Before taking recourse to a civil or disciplinary court, persons affected by corporate 
investigations may turn to the complaints procedures of corporate investigation 
units. For private investigation firms with a Wpbr-permit it is obligatory to have a 
complaints procedure in place (article 18 Regeling Particuliere beveiligingsorganisaties 
en Recherchebureaus [Rpbr]), however other corporate investigators tend to have a 
complaints procedure as well.
When someone has an issue with the investigation or the outcome there are several 
recourses. For people still employed by the company there is a general complaints 
arrangement to be used for every decision by the company related to a person. This 
is not specific for actions by the in-house investigators. These complaints end up with 
the manager and there is an option to appeal to higher management. There is also an 
official employee confidant an employee could turn to. When a person has been fired 
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that usually goes through court so the employee in question then has the option to 
complain to the judge. [Excerpt from observation 2]
As this manager of an in-house security department explains, the complaint is usually 
initially dealt with by the manager of the corporate investigations department or 
corporate investigation firm.
I don’t get many complaints of people who have been the subject of investigations. 
Complaints end up with me first and I decide whether they have merit. If people 
do not agree with the way I handled the matter they can use the official external 
complaints procedure. As a matter of fact I have one complaint I am looking into 
right now. That one is about the use of our protocol for investigations and the Privacy 
code of conduct [CM: respondent is the manager of an in-house security department 
so the Privacy code of conduct is not legally binding to his investigators but is used 
nonetheless]. It is a question of proportionality here and they have a point. It’s a valid 
question to ask why we first looked at the emails instead of open sources. If you want 
to upgrade to more intrusive means of investigation you’re going to have to start with 
the ones which are least intrusive of course. [Respondent 46 – corporate investigator]
Discussion
This chapter shows that corporate investigations into norm violations within 
organisations may be executed with the aid of multiple sources of information and 
methods of investigation. These are only partly the same as the ones at the disposal 
of law enforcement agencies, since corporate investigators lack formal powers of 
investigation. This circumstance is a defining difference between law enforcement 
and corporate investigators, making the arguments put forward by pluralisation 
theories as presented in chapter 1 hard to maintain. Corporate investigators and law 
enforcement agencies are not interchangeable because of corporate investigators’ 
lack of formal powers of investigation. This seems to be underlined by the avoidance 
of ‘criminal justice terminology’ by corporate investigators. As a result of the lack of 
formal powers of investigation, corporate investigators are not able to perform some 
investigative tasks; on the other hand, this circumstance also creates much more 
flexibility in corporate investigations (Williams, 2005). A high degree of discretion 
and operational flexibility thus defines the process of corporate investigations.
 Corporate investigators’ possibilities of investigation are extensive. The fact 
that corporate investigators are working directly for a client, being responsive to 
clients’ needs, creates a greater willingness in clients to volunteer information. The 
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close connection to the client and a contractually-created duty of confidentiality 
make much information readily available. Furthermore, because of this and the 
absence of the need to wait for formal approval from for example a judge, corporate 
investigations can be executed and concluded fairly swiftly. The absence of formal 
investigative powers may have sparked the creativity of investigators to take a 
broader approach to investigations and use methods of investigation that may be 
regarded as more private in nature. The use of forensic accounting techniques, IT-
tools and open sources (for a large part digital social networks) does not fall in the 
category of ‘traditional police work’ (although, the police are also increasingly making 
use of these techniques and information sources).
 The lack of formal powers of investigation leads to more freedom for corporate 
investigators. Corporate investigations are regulated by law and self-regulation 
(although the specificity of the legal framework depends on the type of investigator 
– see chapter 2). Certain core principles of law are used by all respondents included in 
this research and by the observation companies as well. Leading normative values are 
competence and diligence, integrity, objectivity, professional conduct and discretion. 
Within this, broad principles of law such as subsidiarity, proportionality, fair play 
and the adversarial principle are central to corporate investigations. However, the 
fact that the limitations put on corporate investigations present themselves in the 
shape of (general) principles of law, makes that there is quite some room for a flexible 
application of said principles. In this way, much responsibility is given to the moral 
code of corporate investigators themselves (see also the following chapters on non-
contractual moral agency by investigators).
 One example through which this may be elucidated is that of the relationship with 
the client on the one hand, and with the people subjected to the investigations on 
the other. Starting with the latter, there is a power imbalance present in corporate 
investigators’ dealings with subjects. Corporate investigators are professionals and 
have the backing of an organisation, while subjects are usually individuals (sometimes 
with the backing of some form of representation) who are not used to the processes 
of investigation. Respondents seem to be aware of this power imbalance and 
indicate that they use the guiding principles of law described above (subsidiarity, 
proportionality, fair play and the adversarial principle) to ensure a fair treatment of 
the involved person. The procedures codified in the Privacy code of conduct and the 
guidelines for person-oriented investigations, followed by most respondents, are 
meant to protect subjects. In addition, subjects may use complaints procedures and 
recourse to civil and disciplinary court is available to them to ensure their rights. This, 
however, does depend on the resilience and pro-activeness of individual subjects.
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 Corporate security cannot force people to cooperate,62 nor is it allowed to, 
for example, enter and search private premises. This means that much relies on 
voluntary cooperation by involved persons and others within or external to the 
client organisation. Respondents indicate that many people do cooperate, which 
circumstance some contribute to the fact that corporate investigators appear to be less 
threatening than law enforcement professionals to people involved in investigations. 
However, the next chapter discusses the types of corporate settlements which may 
follow corporate investigations and which may have a serious impact on people’s 
lives. The voluntary nature of such cooperation should not be overstated. Subjects 
have a labour relationship with the client and cooperation with the investigations 
may be demanded through that channel.
 Corporate investigators must strike a balance between the interests of the 
subjects, the wider interests involved and the interests of the client. The latter are 
leading, this being contractually defined by the assignment. This is one of the main 
reasons for organisations to hire corporate investigators (Meerts, 2014b). However, 
corporate investigator respondents stress the importance of independence within 
the limits of the assignment, and are wary for too much involvement in and influence 
over investigations by the client. Once the investigations are finalised and the report 
submitted to the client, clients are the owner of the product (the report) and, as 
such, are responsible for its further use. Corporate investigators may assist in that 
by providing advice and assistance with a report to law enforcement authorities 
or corporate settlements. Chapter 4 discusses these various solutions following 
corporate investigations into internal norm violations.
62 Neither are the police of course, although they do have the power to summon documents, enter 
buildings without consent (when this is approved by a prosecutor or judge), etc.
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Corporate settlements
Solutions to norm violations constituted 
by criminal justice, private action, labour law 
and internal regulations
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Introduction
As a result of the investigations described in the previous chapter, a decision 
needs to be made about how to deal with the norm violation identified through 
the investigations (if any). This chapter describes such solutions as put forward by 
respondents. Although reporting a norm violation to the law enforcement authorities 
is a possibility in the case that a criminal offence has been committed, most solutions 
are more privately focused (Williams, 2014: 67). The different settlement solutions 
presented in this chapter relate to different parts of the Dutch legal system and 
show the unique position of corporate investigators (Williams, 2005). As discussed in 
chapter 2 of this book, corporate investigators move in multiple regulatory contexts 
and legal frameworks, which creates room for forum shopping. The interdisciplinary 
character of the sector reveals itself also in the context of jurisdiction: corporate 
security constitutes a commercial sector (regulated by private law), offering a product 
that may have an outcome either relating to public law (criminal proceedings), private 
law (contract or tort), labour law (labour relations) or internal regulations.
 In this chapter the solutions are identified as what I have previously termed 
‘private settlements’ (Meerts, 2013). As will be discussed below, not all settlements 
are (completely) private in nature. There is a ‘degree of publicness’ in them, which 
may be defined as a scale moving from public to private (ibid.). Figure 3 below 
shows a schematic representation of the most commonly used settlements. What 
these solutions have in common is that they are (often) the result of corporate 
investigations and are chosen by the client organisation of corporate security. For this 
reason, this book refers to these solutions not as private settlements but as corporate 
settlements. A key feature of corporate settlements is thus that they are a result 
of corporate decision-making within the context of organisations (as a reaction to 
internal norm violations). Corporate investigators are involved in this process, though 
the extent to which they are involved differs from case to case and from investigator 
to investigator. As discussed in chapter 2, some investigators are focused solely on 
the investigations and reporting on factual matters (mostly forensic accountants), 
while others also include advice and assistance with settlements in their services. 
Generally speaking, the decision on which kind of corporate settlement will be used 
in a specific case is not taken by corporate investigators: that responsibility lies with 
management, HR or specific employee committees.
 There are instances in which organisations are not provided with the choice 
to file an official report to law enforcement authorities. One category of norm 
violations which cannot be reported to the criminal justice system is formed by 
those norm violations which are not defined as criminal in the Criminal Code. These 
behaviours fall outside the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system. In addition, 
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there is a category of cases in which the authorities are already involved, prior to any 
conscious decision by the organisation. Cases that start with criminal investigations 
and in which corporate investigations are initiated only after the organisation has 
been informed by law enforcement authorities, are an example of this (such as is 
the case in case study 1 and 11, see the next chapter for more details). A report to 
law enforcement authorities is a logical outcome here, as these authorities have 
initiated the investigations and criminal charges are likely. Although not necessary 
per se (law enforcement authorities are already investigating ex officio), a report to 
the authorities is used in such a situation to provide the authorities with additional 
information, and as a reputation management tool as well (see below for more on 
this strategic behaviour). An official report to law enforcement authorities does not 
exclude other types of corporate settlements though, as multiple settlements may 
be chosen alongside each other in a single case. An organisation may for example 
choose to report a crime to the police, dismiss the person and launch a civil claim for 
damages based on private law.
The options presented in this chapter are reactions to a situation in which an involved 
person can be identified. However, it is also possible that the investigations do not 
provide any (definite) answers to this question. When there are serious suspicions 
against someone but no compelling evidence is found, actions are often still taken. A 
person might for example be removed from a sensitive position or access to certain 
internal data might be blocked. Still, sometimes the investigations do not provide 
even a vague suspicion that would merit such actions, in which case no further 
actions are taken against individuals. “There are of course cases that don’t have any 
consequences for employees because you might have a hunch but you’re just not 
positive about what happened. Those are the trickiest, when you know there has to 
be internal involvement but you can’t find who did it” [Respondent 14 – corporate 
investigator]. The investigations might lead to changes in the organisation more 
generally, for example more stringent procedures. Even when investigations result 
in a clear depiction of norm violations, the organisation may not act upon the 
information. For example, this situation was mentioned in an informal conversation 
with one of the investigators of Observation Company 1:
They’ll probably won’t do anything with it, which makes sense. CM: why? Investigator: 
because they can’t. To go after him in civil court would be somewhat useless, they 
can’t get the money back. The work was authorised by someone in the organisation so 
the only thing they can do is sue the person for giving unauthorised permission. But 
that person doesn’t work there anymore, otherwise it would have meant that he’d be 
fired. And if they go public, the person who should have gotten the contract for the 
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work will want compensation. So it’ll only cost more money. But they wanted to know 
what was going on so they’re satisfied with the results of the investigations. [Excerpt 
from observation 1 – informal conversation]
Sometimes the person has already resigned and there is not much hope of reclaiming 
damages so the case may end with the corporate investigators’ report of the 
investigations. “It might be that an organisation feels, ok he has resigned on his own, 
so we don’t have to go through a dismissal procedure. Claiming damages – there’s 
nothing to get there so we won’t get anything from him. Just leave it” [Respondent 
2 – corporate investigator]. Though there are situations in which ‘no action is the best 
action’, respondents indicate that generally, the organisation will react in one way or 
another, at least by improving internal procedures.
Usually, doing nothing is not an option. That’s my fall-back position in these kinds 
of situations. On one side of the spectrum you have the option to solve it entirely 
internally. So think of measures to prevent this happening again. And I always say, 
doing nothing is not an option because once you are aware of an internal issue and 
you don’t act and it does happen again, that will make you liable based on article 51 
of the Criminal Code [as being responsible for de facto committing the offence by not 
acting to prevent it]. So you really have to be careful there. But it may happen that an 
organisation wants to just solve the situation internally, for example by creating a new 
code of conduct and implementing that. It may also be that they want to involve their 
auditing accountant so then these measures which are taken to improve procedure 
have to be coordinated with the accountant. So you can choose how many people you 
involve. [Respondent 30 – forensic legal investigator/client]
When there is enough information available to take measures against individuals 
and there are no considerations opposing action, broadly four categories of possible 
consequences that follow a corporate investigation may be identified. These break 
down into criminal justice solutions (criminal justice), a resort to civil court (private 
law proceedings), settlement agreements (contract law) and internal solutions 
(internal regulations). The fieldwork shows that one major first decision point is 
whether or not to report the matter to the police.63 Below, the considerations for 
and against reporting to law enforcement authorities are discussed, after which more 
private forms of corporate settlement are considered.
63 This is, of course, only an option if the behaviour may be defined as criminal.
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Figure 3. Corporate settlement solutions following corporate investigations64
1. To report or to not report, that’s the question
There is no guideline or any directive from above with regard to the decision whether 
or not to report a case to the police, the decision is made on a case-by-case basis. A 
report to the police is not very common. There are several reasons for that. First, as 
you’ll probably know by now, the police don’t give such cases priority so they will 
almost never investigate. Secondly, we have noticed that if it does come to a court 
case, judges often will dismiss the case or apply no sanction as they see the dismissal 
as punishment enough. Thirdly, it takes a lot of time to report a case to the police, 
especially when it comes to specialist knowledge from within our organisation. It is 
difficult to make lay people understand what happened. Reputation can play a role, 
but the organisation isn’t very much bothered about that. As I said before, we are a 
reflection of society and rotten apples are found in society so they are also found 
in our organisation. When a report is made to the police, it hardly ever happens 
that we report to the police at the moment we get a case. Usually we investigate 
and see what has happened before the decision is made whether or not to report. 
Sometimes, for example in a case like [case study 11], law enforcement is already in. 
FIOD [the investigative service of the Dutch tax authority] brought the case to us. 
Then we may report during the process as the injured party. In [case study 13] it was 
decided to report because we found that there was a criminal organisation involved. 
It had happened before, in other organisations: two temps are placed in the financial 
administration department of an organisation as Trojan horses and at a certain point 
in time these persons start to falsify invoices. These are then paid to shell companies 
‘owned’ by straw men. We wanted to prevent that they carried on with their activities 
and victimise other firms, so we reported the case to the police. [CM: the police did 
not investigate] [Excerpt from observation 2 – informal conversation]
64 This schematic is an adaptation of one published in Meerts (2013: 4).
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After the investigations have been concluded, the first decision a client has to make is 
whether or not to report a (criminal) norm violation to law enforcement. Law enforcement 
authorities may be (formally) involved in a number of ways. As stated above, some 
cases start with criminal justice investigations. As a result of information provided by 
previous criminal investigations, media coverage, whistle-blowers or information from 
regulatory agencies, law enforcement agencies may initiate investigations into internal 
norm violations without the organisation that is involved having previous knowledge 
about this. This knowledge may come only when law enforcement auhtorities make a 
request for information, arrest employees or conduct a raid. 
In that big case we did recently there have been multiple raids by the police. The 
people in charge of the company had no idea. So they came to us, ‘there has been 
a raid, apparently we have a fraud problem but we are completely in the dark about 
specifics, so please investigate’. [Respondent 5 – corporate investigator]
Corporate investigators are often called in to investigate further. The information 
flow from law enforcement to the organisation is often very limited during 
criminal investigations. The corporate investigations are then meant to provide the 
organisation with information – usually law enforcement authorities will only inform 
the organisation after the criminal investigations have been concluded (which may 
take a long time). 
 When law enforcement agencies are already involved prior to corporate 
investigations, the process of investigation as described in the previous chapter is 
also influenced. In these cases, corporate investigators try to adapt their investigative 
activities to the criminal investigations. “When the police or FIOD are involved you 
have to wait to take action because otherwise you’ll disturb their investigative 
process” [Respondent 43 – corporate investigator]. This may for example mean 
that certain people are not interviewed just yet or that a dismissal is postponed. 
Respondents indicate that in these cases in which law enforcement agencies are 
already involved, they often make an official report to law enforcement authorities 
during the investigations, as this allows them to hand over information without the 
risk of breaking (privacy) laws. Chapter 5 discusses public/private relationships and 
information sharing in more detail. At this point, it is important to note that although 
the corporate investigations form independent investigations, ending in a report 
to the client, in the specific situation of law enforcement involvement prior to the 
corporate investigations, the autonomy of corporate investigators is rather limited. 
The question whether or not to involve criminal justice authorities is not relevant is 
such a case and during investigations, law enforcement authorities may influence the 
process by asking for specific information. The centre of gravity in such situations lies 
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with the criminal justice procedure: respondents indicate that they try not to hamper 
criminal justice proceedings with their investigative actions.65
 Many cases, however, start without the initial involvement of law enforcement 
agencies. Here, organisations and corporate investigators retain the autonomy 
to decide whether or not to make an official report and mobilise law enforcement 
authorities. As we have seen chapter 3, many organisations prefer to conduct internal 
investigations before such a decision is made. One reason for this is that it is not 
always clear from the beginning whether or not the norm violation may be defined 
as criminal in the sense of the Criminal Code (Klerks & Scholtes, 2001). The decision 
whether or not to involve law enforcement authorities is commonly made only after 
corporate investigations have been concluded. Below, (strategic and normative) 
considerations which may induce organisations to report are discussed (section 1.2). 
Section 1.1 focuses first on considerations organisations may have to avoid reporting 
to the authorities.
1.1 Considerations against reporting to the authorities
In the report, Observation Company 1 mentions the option of a report to the police. 
The advice was not to report to the police. The report does conclude that the actions 
can be qualified as criminal in the sense of the Criminal Code. The reasons given to 
substantiate the advice not to report in this case are that the chances the case will 
eventually reach criminal court are slim; that the criminal justice system can take a 
lot of time even in the decision whether or not to proceed with the matter, leaving 
everyone involved in a situation of doubt and uncertainty; and finally, that there is 
a real possibility of publicity, which can harm the persons involved as well as the 
organisation. [Observation 1 - investigations report of case study 5] 
It is a well-researched phenomenon that organisations do not report many (criminally 
definable) norm violations against them to law enforcement authorities (cf. Steenhuis, 
2011; Gill, 2013; Gill & Hart, 1997, 1999; Hoogenboom, 1988; TNS Nipo/WODC, 2011). 
Research by PricewaterhouseCoopers for example reveals that in cases with employee 
involvement, in 24% (for traditional crimes) and 42% (for cyber-crimes) of the cases a 
report is made to the police (PwC, 2014). Another interesting outcome of this research 
is that merely 9% of cases (of economic crime) are revealed by investigative endeavours 
of law enforcement authorities. It therefore seems a plausible conclusion that most 
cases of internal crime66 within organisations do not reach public law enforcement. 
65 See chapter 5.
66 The word crime is used here, as only crimes can be investigated by law enforcement agencies. However, the 
work of corporate security investigators is much broader and also involves non-criminal norm violations.
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There are multiple reasons for this circumstance and this section focuses on the most 
prominent ones.
 One reason to prefer a private solution over a report to law enforcement is that while 
law enforcement agencies are bound to the definitions as described in the Criminal 
Code, corporate security is not. Even if investigated, non-criminal norm violations will 
not be prosecuted. Corporate sanctions may follow corporate investigations regardless 
of whether or not the norm violation may be defined as criminal (Williams, 2005). 
This flexible way of framing norm violations has multiple benefits for organisations. It 
opens the door to the investigation and settlement of a much wider category of norm 
violations: for something to be problematic or harmful to an organisation, it should not 
necessarily be criminal.
The things we investigate are cases with an internal component and they are linked 
to either criminal behaviour or integrity breaches. You could say criminal is what is 
defined as such in the Criminal Code and integrity breaches are defined in our code of 
conduct. There are crossovers off course, for example our internal guidelines. Business 
principles. [Respondent 10 – corporate investigator]
In cases of breach of internal guidelines or other codes of conduct, often a report to law 
enforcement authorities is not an option as the behaviour cannot be defined along the 
lines of the Criminal Code. Additionally, in many cases, it remains unclear for a long time 
whether or not the behaviour can indeed be defined as criminal. For this reason, many 
organisations prefer to conduct corporate investigations to start with. In some cases it 
remains questionable whether the norm violation is ‘criminal’ or ‘merely wrong’ even after 
corporate investigations are concluded. “Let’s take theft as an example. It starts with a 
missing item. But that doesn’t mean that this item has been stolen. If we immediately 
go to the police and we have to tell them later on, never mind we found it – that doesn’t 
really reflect well on us does it? And that might mean that next time you report something 
they won’t take you seriously” [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]. In such cases, 
reporting might backfire. Contrary to this narrow approach of law enforcement agencies 
towards criminal behaviour, corporate security investigators are broader in their approach.
The forensic instruments are not just there for a quest for the truth in criminal cases. 
Our society has become so complicated that there are also norm violations outside 
criminal justice that need forensic expertise and forensic surety and truth seeking 
have become quite important there as well. [Respondent 26 – corporate investigator]
Conversely, not being bound to criminal justice definitions of behaviour also leaves 
(more) room to decide whether or not certain behaviour is (investigated and) acted 
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upon. This is an important asset for an organisation, as there might have been 
involvement from the side of the organisation in the wrong-doing. “Once the police 
are in, they often come across additional matters that might not be directly related 
to the matter at hand. Usually it’s not just one isolated incident. We come across 
these things as well” [Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]. Corporate investigator 
respondents indicate that they do report about these additional findings to their 
client but that it is up to the client what happens with this information. When law 
enforcement agencies are conducting an investigation, there is a substantial risk 
that this by-catch is also criminally prosecuted. Respondents do stress that they 
pride themselves on their independence in investigations. Some even indicate that 
they turn down an assignment when they feel that they are not able to investigate 
independently (see also chapter 3). 
I feel pretty strongly about this, when you feel you can’t conduct your investigations 
in an independent and professional manner, you have to give the assignment back. So 
if a client or a lawyer obstructs our investigations in such a way that I will not be able 
to responsibly put my signature at the bottom of the report, that it will tarnish our 
good name as investigators, well then I think you should cease your investigations. 
[Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]
The fact remains, however, that even when investigations are done independently 
and norm violations of the organisation are included in the report, the client may 
decide not to act upon that part of the corporate investigations report. Respondents 
indicate that while (punitive) sanctions often fall upon individuals, organisations 
commonly take action with regard to the adaptation of procedures as well as a result 
of the corporate investigations report. In this way, the organisation is able to correct 
the situation without being punished or held liable in criminal or civil court.
 A second, related, advantage for an organisation of a private solution is the control 
corporate investigations and solutions provide over information (discretion) but 
also over the investigative process (see also chapter 3) (Williams, 2005). Reputation 
is often mentioned as an important reason to keep things private (e.g. Aon, 2017; 
Perry & De Fontnouvelle, 2005). “Reputation is an important issue, off course – do you 
really want to air your dirty laundry in public? Rather not” [Respondent 19 – corporate 
investigator]. Similarly, Blonk, Haen, De Lannoy-Walenkamp & Van Gelder (2017: 64) 
give the advice to organisations to “carefully weigh the consequences of reporting 
or not reporting beforehand. Here we for example think of a situation in which the 
media pays attention to the case. It is not always desirable to have the name of the 
organisation used in such a context”. Interestingly, although reputation is often 
mentioned as being part of the equation, respondents state it is not always a decisive 
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factor (see also below). “You know I often say, we have about 3000 employees, just 
take a random village with 3000 inhabitants – things happen. It’s the same in a 
company such as ours” [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator].
People often say ‘It shouldn’t come out because that’s bad press’ but look it can happen 
to anyone. It happens. But just say, ‘this is bad, it shouldn’t have happened, we gave the 
orders to look into it and to figure out how we can prevent it in future. We’ve learned 
from it and we’ve held the person responsible liable, through private law or criminal law 
or whatever. We’ve done everything you may expect from us in these circumstances’. 
Hiding behind lawyers will only make the damage far worse when it comes out in the 
end. ‘If we report to the police we’ll have to face open court’. So? So be it. And we say, 
we have plenty cases to which no one takes any notice. And even if they do, fine. You 
can say: it happened and we’ve dealt with it. [Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]
In addition to the control over information flow and the possibility to manage 
the reputational damage that might occur, the control over the process is also a 
consideration for organisations.
You lose control. You don’t know how long it will take, what they’re going to 
investigate. They might say ok we’ve looked at it but by the way we also found 
something else and we’re investigating that too. It might back-fire on you. So the 
criminal justice part is the least interesting solution for organisations. [Respondent 
27 – corporate investigator]
Respondents furthermore suggest that any action an organisation may want to take 
to solve the internal problem may have to wait until the criminal justice procedure 
has come to an end.
After a report to the police, you lose control over the matter. It might be a very simple 
case but it could easily take a year and a half to reach a court and all the while you have 
to deal with someone who is just a suspect, not someone who has been convicted. So 
it is very difficult for you as an organisation to take action against him. [Respondent 
18 – corporate investigator]
The loss of control over the situation may also prove problematic in the sense that 
the prosecutor may decide not to prosecute a matter which has much impact on 
the organisation in question.67 While the norm violation may be minor in the eyes of 
67 Many instances of white-collar crime are settled out of court by prosecutors (see Beckers, 2017).
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the authorities – thus making it a low priority – the impact on the organisation may 
be significant. Public sector organisations, for example, place high value in public 
trust. A minor norm violation may do much damage to the organisation. In addition 
to the impact of the violation itself, a criminal justice procedure also has much 
impact (through reputational damage, loss of control and lengthy investigations 
and criminal procedures). In the Netherlands, public sector organisations are 
obliged to report (most) crimes committed by public officials (article 162 of the 
Criminal Code). However, because of the impact of (often lengthy and complicated) 
police investigations, in practice public sector organisations often opt for private 
investigations, just as commercial organisations do (Kolthoff, 2015: 165). 
 A third important asset of corporate investigations and corporate settlements is 
what Williams (2005) calls ‘legal flexibility’. Because corporate investigations are not 
bound to the criminal definitions of behaviour, the settlements that may be chosen 
go well beyond the criminal justice system (for more on this see below). Schaap (2008) 
poses that organisations are much more interested in repairing the damage done, 
than in retribution. To define a norm violation as criminal might not be in the best 
interest of an organisation, since the criminal justice system is not seen as providing 
an adequate solution for the problem at hand.
It’s not practical to report every one of these cases as there is no added value in that 
for us. About a year ago we had a big fraud case – in such circumstances you are going 
to have to decide whether or not to report. So will you report and never get your 
money back – or with a lot of effort and costs. Or you can choose not to report and he 
will hand over the money. Well if you can cash five million in this way, the company 
will probably choose that road. [Respondent 19 – corporate investigator]
A connected issue is the possibility of negative effects of a report to the authorities 
(NOS, 2016). This is connected to the loss of control mentioned above, since negative 
effects cannot be mitigated by corporate investigators or clients when they have no 
control over the situation.
So reporting to the police means a loss of control. This means that your production 
processes are probably going to be interrupted, because, say they arrest the guy and 
think ‘we need more information’, they’ll just come and take it. Even if you are the 
one reporting. And they might think, ‘great that you reported this but we feel that 
there might also be a suspicion against the organisation here’. So, they come and take 
your books, interrupt your production process, you have no clue what the result of 
the criminal investigations is going to be, it might back-fire on the organisation or 
management, you will get bad publicity... It’s not the case that the prosecution office 
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reports every investigation to the papers but there are cases in which they do want 
publicity. And they are in charge, the best you can do is try to exert some influence by 
consulting with them. [Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client]
Reputational issues have been mentioned above but there are also other negative 
effects of a report to law enforcement authorities. It might for example influence the 
chances of an organisation to reclaim damages. “It might mean that other parties 
will get knowledge about the fraud and they might also want their damages repaid. 
The more plaintiffs, the smaller your chances to get your damages repaid in full” 
[Respondent 2 – corporate investigator]. Additionally, a report to law enforcement 
authorities takes many hours in manpower and thus money. The services of law 
enforcement agencies may not be charged to the organisation, they are far from 
cheap according to respondents. “A big disadvantage is the time it takes to report 
something. And even more so when nothing happens with the report” [Respondent 
16 – corporate investigator]. Both corporate security respondents and clients 
furthermore feel that law enforcement agencies do not respond with adequate 
actions to reports from organisations (Gill, 2013; Rovers & De Vries Robbé, 2005). It 
takes a lot of time for a case to move from an investigation to a conviction and in 
many cases it might never reach the court. During that time, the organisation often 
has to wait to take other action (unless this has been dealt with prior to the report).
Say you have an employee who has stolen a phone or something. Someone saw, he is 
confronted, he confesses. He will be suspended, two weeks later the labour agreement 
is dissolved, done. Now look at the other side, what if we would go to the police with 
this? Fourteen, fifteen months waiting for nothing? He’ll be at home, we’ll have to 
pay him every month and wait until he’ll be convicted? Then the question is will he 
appeal or not. If he does, that’s another few months at home for him. Well, take that, 
combined with the non-communication from the police and justice department… 
[Respondent 18 – corporate investigator]
A report to law enforcement authorities is therefore not a very efficient solution 
to the problem at hand. “A procedure to get the labour contract dissolved takes 8 
weeks, the criminal procedure will not be concluded by a long shot by then. If your 
goal is reached by using labour law, there’s no added value in a criminal procedure” 
[Respondent 50 – client].
When there’s a way to get through an investigation relatively quickly and settle the 
matter at once, that’s what an organisation will choose to do over a report to the 
police. And that’s also because – I have been a policeman myself and it’s in my blood, 
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but it sometimes concerns me that the reaction to a report to the police seems to 
be more like a policy of discouragement than that they’ll actually try to help. Often 
people expect a lot from a report to the police, they think ok I have reported a crime, 
everything’s going to be ok now. And then absolutely nothing happens. [Respondent 
18 – corporate investigator]
As a ‘solution’, a report to law enforcement authorities is not seen as being very 
helpful by respondents.
Ok so there’s your report to the police. Three months later it will be discussed in a 
meeting and then they will prioritise and then they’ll make a plan and then they’ll 
have to make some room in man-hours. So about six months later they’ll start looking 
at it. That’s not really making much progress is it? And I’ve represented some victims, 
don’t think that you as a victim will be very happy with what they do with your case. 
They’re on your side? No they’re not. So I always say, please don’t get your hopes 
up. The problem-solving abilities of the criminal justice system are very, very limited. 
[Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client]
This low confidence in law enforcement is often mentioned by respondents. They 
feel that law enforcement is poorly equipped to respond efficiently to reports made 
by organisations after corporate investigations, and state that often the case is not 
investigated at all or is dismissed by the prosecutor as not being a priority (Blonk et 
al., 2017). “Financial administrative expertise is scarce within the police organisation 
and the expertise they do have is mostly used for the big cases, organised crime, 
drugs... So when you come to report a fraud, they don’t exactly rejoice. Which makes 
things difficult of course” [Respondent 2 – corporate investigator].
If you go to the police with such a case, they look at you as to say, don’t you have 
anything better for us? I mean, petty theft, that will be dismissed or maybe they get 
a minor fine or something. And the involved person would have lost his job already 
so that’s a punishment in itself. If you go the criminal justice system then and make 
a case out of it, that’s useless. The judge will say ok he’s been fired and he’ll just get a 
symbolic sentence. What’s the use of that? [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]
An additional complaint of organisations faced with norm violations is that, within 
the criminal justice system, only parts of the norm violations are investigated. A 
criminal justice investigation and a possible conviction as a result of that may be 
limited only to some specific norm violations, while the problem for the organisation 
may be far more widespread. Police and prosecution often only investigate what 
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they need for a conviction, while the organisation needs the complete picture to take 
internal measures, dismiss the person and/or reclaim damages.
And after all that, the criminal court will decide whether or not a criminal act has 
been committed and if the judge is convinced this is the case, he will sentence the 
suspect. And then the public enforcement machine has done its job. The law has been 
enforced. And whether all those things the employee did were investigated in detail 
is not really important in that perspective. [Respondent 3 – corporate investigator]
A report to law enforcement authorities is thus hardly ever the only action taken 
according to respondents. Much more than an independent measure, a report to 
law enforcement authorities is often seen as being an addition to private measures. 
Interesting in this light is the ‘optimum remedium’ argument that may be found in many 
(legal and professional) writings (see e.g. Blonk et al., 2017; Minister of security and 
justice, 2016). The idea here is that criminal law has moved away from being an ultimum 
remedium (criminal law is used as a ‘last resort’) to being an optimum remedium (criminal 
law is used as an efficient way to react to a (criminal) problem). In section 1.2 reasons 
for reporting to law enforcement agencies are discussed and it may very well be that 
in a specific case the optimum remedium argument is the reason for reporting. It is 
important to keep in mind though, that a report to law enforcement agencies is usually 
seen as an addition to the private solutions provided through corporate settlements. 
A company that is faced with such a problem has certain considerations. It wants, 
first and foremost, to make right in a private law sense: when there are damages, 
these must be compensated. Related to labour law, they have another issue on their 
hands because if someone has behaved badly, they want to get rid of him. And 
finally, there are the criminal justice considerations: the common good demands this 
to be prosecuted in criminal court, so we will report to the police. But the criminal 
justice consideration is not top priority, it’s the least interesting one for companies. 
[Respondent 27 – corporate investigator]
In short, organisations seem to be mostly concerned with finding an efficient solution, 
preferably with the reclamation of damages suffered. “It’s just not efficient for an 
employer to report to the police. They don’t even always reclaim damages [through 
civil court]. Apparently it’s just not worth it compared to the effort it takes. Let alone 
that they take the trouble to report in those cases” [Respondent 50 – client]. “And 
especially when you’re not really hurt by the norm violation as an organisation, it’s 
not in my best interest to crucify someone. My problem is solved. Done” [Respondent 
19 – corporate investigator]. Interestingly, protecting the (former) employee seems 
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to be one of the considerations not to report to law enforcement authorities. When 
someone with a good employee record transgresses once, some employers feel the 
dismissal is punishment enough.
Ok, say you’re an employee here. And I think, something’s off with her expenses. You 
may have made some claims of expenses in the past which haven’t been entirely by 
the book. The moment I decide – without prior internal investigations, it is a possibility 
– to go to the police and report, that’s quite some way off. Because I will damage you 
with that. Even if it turns out that there’s nothing there, maybe the rules were just 
interpreted differently or you’ve made a mistake – you will still have been damaged. 
That’s quite something. And additionally, I lose control over the situation, they might 
go and search your house, they might dig into your past, etc. And I won’t know any of 
that. So that might be disproportional to the situation. [Respondent 27 – corporate 
investigator]
The abovementioned considerations combine to create considerable reluctance 
towards reporting a case to law enforcement agencies. Some respondents indicate 
that even when private investigations are not an option for the organisation, for 
example because of the expenses involved, many cases will still not be reported.
I think that when they handle the matter privately, it’s something that will not be 
reported very quickly anyway. You know, if they hadn’t hired a corporate investigator. 
That wouldn’t end up with the police anyway because that’s just something they don’t 
want. [Respondent 3 – corporate investigator]
1.2 Considerations in favour of reporting to the authorities
There are many reasons for organisations not to report a norm violation to public 
law enforcement agencies, however respondents also indicate that there are reasons 
to report. Especially large and (semi-)public organisations often have a policy of 
reporting criminal norm violations to law enforcement authorities. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that they do so in practice. “Formally, our position is that 
we report to the police but often we don’t. There is a reputational issue involved here 
and especially when it comes to minor cases, you just fire the guy. It’s not worth it to 
report that” [Respondent 19 – corporate investigator]. Although some organisations 
thus have a policy to report every crime, usually a decision is made on an ad hoc basis. 
This in-house corporate security respondent lists some considerations which might 
lead to a report to law enforcement.
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Considerations are, well first of all our self-interest as an organisation. That also means that 
without a formal report you won’t get anything done from the police. And secondly, the 
claim of damages but also the use of formal powers of investigation, we have no access 
to that. Or certain information sources and paying damages to clients always requires a 
report to the police, you need to be transparent. [Respondent 10 – corporate investigator]
Respondents seem divided about whether or not to report to law enforcement 
authorities. However, the overall picture that arises from the interviews is that 
respondents do not expect a report to law enforcement authorities to provide a 
solution to the problems at hand. It is often used as an additional measure, either for 
strategic or pragmatic reasons, or as a result of moral considerations. 
If you report, there has to be a combination of measures, just a report to the police 
does not make much sense. A report is not a solution, you also need a private law 
remedy or a settlement agreement. A report to the police is never the ultimate 
solution for an employer, you’re going to have to act yourself as well. A criminal case 
does not fire the person. [Respondent 50 – client]
The above-cited respondent refers to the practical situation in which an employer 
needs to use a corporate settlement to dissolve the labour agreement and might 
additionally report the norm violation to law enforcement authorities. This additional 
action of reporting to the authorities may also be done as a result of moral sensibilities.
It is possible to settle privately but still combine it with a report to the police. Because 
they feel it’s so reprehensible that they can’t accept it and want to make an example. 
Also towards the employees, show how you handle internal fraud by reporting to the 
police. As a warning, use the possible preventative power of that. [Respondent 20 – 
corporate investigator]
On the whole, respondents seem less concerned with reputational damage than one 
would expect from literature sources (see for example Klerks & Scholtes, 2001; Jennen 
& Biemond, 2009, Coburn, 2006). Reputational damage might be a consideration 
when deciding to report the norm violation to law enforcement (as discussed 
above) but most respondents do not consider it a crucial reason, preventing them 
from reporting. According to this respondent there has been a shift in this regard as 
“before, there was a reflex in the corporate world to keep everything inside. But in the 
board rooms I frequent now you see the discussion happening that it’s actually good 
to go public. To show, things do go wrong but when that happens we are right on it. 
We are handling it” [Respondent 30 – forensic legal investigator/client].
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I always say, an organisation is a collection of people and mistakes will be made, it’s 
about human actions. The most important thing is that you stand for what you do and 
that you are transparent in doing so. And that you own up to things that go wrong 
and say ok this was bad, we take our responsibility and we’re going to fix it. You see, 
sweeping things under the rug will not help you in the long term. So we’re not going 
to advice our clients to do so. [Respondent 27 – corporate investigator]
Most cases corporate investigators deal with are minor and the reputational impact 
of it reaching the public realm will be limited. A report to the authorities might not 
get much attention in these cases, remaining unnoticed by journalists and/or the 
wider public.
Theft and fraud, it happens. And whether it’s here or at a competitor, we all have to 
deal with it at some point. My colleagues from other companies say the same. That’s 
no breaking news. And I don’t reach the six ‘o clock news with a report to the police, 
nor with a court case, believe me. [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]
However, some big scandals are dangerous to the organisation’s existence and 
respondents’ views on how to handle this differ. Most state that when it is likely that a 
norm violation will get publicity, reporting to law enforcement authorities is the wisest 
course of action. “[Reporting] is inevitable once something has reached the papers, 
then you just go and report to the police. Otherwise you appear to be covering stuff up 
or to be an accessory to the norm violation” [Respondent 27 – corporate investigator]. 
“You know, the [a large scandal] is also out in the open, speaking of reputation... You 
won’t keep that inside. So you shouldn’t try to because that will only work to your 
disadvantage” [Respondent 18 – corporate investigator]. Numerous examples can 
be derived from the media of organisations taking a different path though (see for 
example Radar, 2015; NRC, 2017). The damage of the information reaching the media in 
the end indeed seems considerable. It would be speculation to argue that the damage 
could have been contained if the organisation had been open about the norm violation 
from the moment the internal investigations were concluded. However, there seems to 
be merit in the above argument of respondents. 
 Interestingly, respondents suggest that because of a lack of specialised expertise and 
insight into the internal systems of an organisation, the police sometimes partly have 
to rely on information provided by corporate security investigators. This might mean 
that investigators may be able to provide a direction for the police investigations. This 
is a benefit for the police as police investigations may then be done more efficiently, 
however it also means that there is room for corporate investigators to leave out the 
more embarrassing details for the organisation. Many corporate investigators have a law 
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enforcement background and they prepare the report to law enforcement authorities 
in such a way that they feel it is easiest for the police to act upon the information (Blonk 
et al., 2017). “I always make the report to the police beforehand. So, I take my laptop 
and make the report in such a way that everyone who reads it may understand. So 
it’s clear even to outsiders with no knowledge of our internal processes” [Respondent 
16 – corporate investigator]. Law enforcement respondents indicate that for a case to 
succeed in criminal court, at the very least the suspect needs to be officially interrogated 
by the police with all the procedural guarantees. However, when the suspect again 
states in that formal situation that (s)he stands by the declaration made earlier to the 
corporate investigators, the law enforcement efforts may remain relatively minor. “We 
always try to shape the official report to the police as a sort of witness statement, in 
which we put all the relevant information from our investigations. So you can steer 
them a bit for the benefit of your client, point them in the right direction” [Respondent 
41 – corporate investigator]. It depends on the views of the policemen and prosecutor 
involved how much room there is for corporate investigators to influence a criminal 
justice procedure in this way (see also chapter 5). 
 Respondents also indicate that organisations occasionally report to law 
enforcement authorities “just as window dressing. They’ll report but actually they just 
want to wipe the slate clean and move on” [Respondent 27 – corporate investigator]. 
As we have seen above, organisations often do not expect much from a report to 
law enforcement authorities and some just report because ‘it looks good’. This might 
be regarded as a strategic way to manage the reputational impacts a case might 
have. Below, some other strategic considerations are discussed, followed by some 
normative considerations to report.
1.2.1 Strategic considerations
There are instances where a report to law enforcement may help the (content of 
the) investigations, because corporate investigators lack the necessary access to 
information or powers of investigation to reconstruct what happened (Blonk et al., 
2017). In such situations a report to the authorities is used as a strategic tool to get 
the police to investigate with the use of their formal powers.
There are situations in which you can’t get to the truth but it is in the company’s 
interest and that of the stakeholders to get to the truth. But as a corporate investigator 
I don’t have powers of investigation and especially when there is a third party involved 
and that third party does not want to cooperate, well that’s that for me. And they have 
their reasons not to cooperate of course. But in such a case, you might have to go to 
the police and say, look this is as far as I could go but with the use of your powers of 
investigation you can get much further. So if powers of investigation may get you 
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information that internal methods of investigations can’t provide, yes, a report to the 
police is an option. [Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client]
Respondents furthermore suggest that reporting a crime to law enforcement 
authorities might be helpful to other measures they take. A report to law enforcement 
authorities is often combined with other corporate settlements, as the problem for 
the organisation usually is not solved with such a report. However, it can be useful as 
an additional measure. It might for example strengthen private action proceedings, 
as the standard of evidence is higher in criminal court than in civil court. A criminal 
conviction has to be accepted as true by civil court (article 161 Rv [Code of Civil 
Procedure]). It is therefore likely that a civil court (when a private action is initiated) 
will accept the dismissal of the involved employee when he is found guilty of a crime 
in criminal court. However, as argued above, criminal cases take a lot of time and 
other forms of ‘private justice’ (see also Henry, 1983) are much faster. This may mean 
that the criminal case is not yet before the court at the time of a civil court hearing. 
Respondents indicate that a report to law enforcement authorities might still serve 
a purpose for civil court proceedings though, for example to show the court that the 
case is taken seriously by the organisation. “Sometimes a report to the police might 
help your civil court case. You say to the judge, we have reported it to the police, 
that’s how severe we think this is” [Respondent 50 – client]. The fact that a report to 
law enforcement authorities is made is not a guarantee for a ‘successful ending’ in the 
civil court procedure though. While a conviction usually provides enough grounds 
for dismissal or a claim of damages, a suspicion of a crime is not necessarily the 
same thing as a breach of labour contract. Even when a criminal justice procedure is 
initiated, the dismissal may still be problematic. 
But the complicated situation might arise, I know from my colleagues specialised 
in labour law, that the employee has defrauded the company, a report to the police 
might be made, there can be an investigation but it is still difficult to fire him. So he 
might still be awarded a severance payment by a judge. [Respondent 30 – forensic 
legal investigator/client].
Another way in which a report to law enforcement authorities may be strategically 
used in corporate settlements is when it is employed as a fall-back option, with the 
purpose of pushing for another type of settlement (usually a settlement agreement 
as described in section 3). In this case, a report to law enforcement authorities is often 
not made after all because the involved person agrees with the settlement agreement. 
This is another way in which the power imbalance between corporate security/the 
organisation and the involved employee, described in chapter 3, comes to the fore.
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[A report to the authorities may be presented as an alternative for a] settlement 
agreement with the involved person guaranteeing that he will repay the damages 
within a certain time span. Well, if you cooperate with that we will not report to the 
police. So that’s a trade-off, whether it’s right or wrong is another thing but clients 
may choose to use a report to the police as leverage. [Respondent 2 – corporate 
investigator]
Another strategic consideration might simply be a question of costs. Although 
reporting a norm violation to the police also costs money in the sense of time and 
resources, and possible reputational costs, some organisations do not have the 
resources to privately investigate the matter. This may mean that measures are taken 
against an employee without an investigation (e.g. when there are enough grounds 
for dismissal), however it may also mean that a report to law enforcement authorities 
is made so that the authorities might investigate and file criminal charges. As stated 
above, most respondents do not expect the report to law enforcement authorities to 
be a solution to the organisation’s problem though and many reports to the police 
are disappointing to an organisation.
I can give you an example as well of why they would report to the police. It is much 
cheaper to have the police and prosecutor look into it than to do it yourself. For 
example with a charitable organisation that might be an issue, because an internal 
investigation may cost 50.000, 100.000 euro, easily. And curators [in a bankruptcy 
case] often think like that as well, just report and let the prosecutor do it. That saves 
me the trouble. So money may be a reason to report instead of investigating for 
yourself. [Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client]
Fourthly, there is a category of organisations that is compelled to report to either 
the police or to a regulatory agency. Article 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
dictates that when a civil servant breaks the law, this must be reported to the police. 
In practice, however, even these cases are often not reported (De Vries Robbé, 
Cornelissen & Ferweda, 2008). In addition, some organisations are under heavy 
scrutiny from regulatory agencies and these might also feel compelled to report to 
law enforcement authorities. “Some companies are obliged to report, for example 
financial institutions have to disclose to the regulator for financial markets. And 
listed companies have to disclose information that might influence the stock price” 
[Respondent 30 – forensic legal investigator/client]. In these situations, it might be 
best to make an official report to law enforcement agencies as well, as part of the 
reputational management strategy.
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If it’s a listed company – they make reports to the police more often. Not always, but 
more often. It depends in part on the scale of the fraud, is it to be considered of material 
importance to the financial accountability of the organisation? That’s a difficult matter 
but if the result would have been ‘50’ and after the fraud it’s ‘-50’ then [it is of material 
importance and] the public interest is affected. And then there are those who are under 
scrutiny of a regulatory agency, they report more often. There are some arrangements 
for that, they have to report discrepancies and they often report to the police as well in 
such a case. Some regulatory agencies have leniency arrangements – if you self-report 
you might get off with a minor fine or nothing at all. That may be of importance in the 
decision. It’s a very complex field of operations, there are all kinds of organisations and 
combinations. But in none of these categories of organisations reporting to the police is 
a law of nature. [Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]
An obligation to report to a certain regulatory agency is not the same as an obligation 
to also report to law enforcement authorities. For those compelled to report to their 
regulator, this does not necessarily mean that a report to law enforcement authorities 
is also made but it might be best reputation-wise to do so. 
The regulatory agency might expect a company to report to the police. And they 
might expect the company to get to the bottom of what happened. And inserting 
criminal law into the equation means that the company can move on without being 
afraid that some government organisation might get them at a later point in time. That 
can be very threatening to a corporation. For example, say you are an international 
trading firm and there are suspicions against you from British or American or Dutch 
authorities, that may limit your business severely. You’re not able to give World 
Bank approved products to your customers anymore. And every contract has its 
anti-corruption provisions. And you’ll be excluded from public tenders from the 
government. So settling the matter with the use of criminal law has certain benefits 
for companies, it allows them to move on and participate in tenders and the like. Of 
course they can choose not to. But they do run the risk the government will step in 
anyway, for example because the guy is fired but the matter becomes known in the 
public realm anyway. [Respondent 32 – forensic legal investigator/client]
Related is the last category of strategic considerations found in the fieldwork, which 
is a prime example of forum shopping by organisations and corporate investigators. 
Here, norm violations are reported to for example the Dutch law enforcement agencies 
to avoid prosecution in another, harsher jurisdiction. Although a prosecution in the 
Netherlands does not prevent prosecution in other national jurisdictions every time, 
respondents indicate that the chances of double prosecution are limited.
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But what I wanted to say, BallastNedam [a Dutch construction company] is a case which 
is in the news right now, I suspect that they thought, let’s just go to the prosecutor 
here [the Netherlands] as fast as we can, it’s almost begging for prosecution, please 
prosecute us and keep us safe. Although, oddly enough the ne bis in idem principle 
is not recognised internationally. By most countries at least. So the nasty thing is, if 
you report to the Dutch authorities, get a settlement, that doesn’t mean you’re off the 
hook in the US if you’re involved there as well. I remember a case, Axo, 10 years ago 
or something – Axo was prosecuted in the Netherlands, it had something to do with 
trading with Saddam Hussein. But anyway, they were also prosecuted somewhere else 
but they [the prosecutors in the second country] did take the Dutch fine into account. 
I would prefer it if there was a treaty of some sorts about this. But right now, the 
unofficial trend seems to be, if you slip up try to get prosecuted in the Netherlands, 
because these prosecutions are reasonable. All my American colleagues say, had 
Van der Hoeven [Ahold] been prosecuted in the US, he would have gotten 10 years 
imprisonment. Without a doubt. [Respondent 37 – client]
Respondents are divided about the validity of the use of the ne bis in idem principle 
(the principle of double jeopardy) between different jurisdictions. However, 
internationally operating organisations may strategically choose to report a norm 
violation to the Dutch authorities to try to avoid prosecution in for example the US, 
where punishments are far more severe.
There may be a strategic interest for a corporation to self-report to the Dutch 
authorities. For example, in a case that has worldwide relevance, where American and 
English regulators or prosecutors may get involved, it might be in the best interest of 
that company to make sure that the criminal case is done here, because of our lenient 
criminal climate. The Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits the Dutch prosecution office 
to comply with requests for legal assistance in cases they are investigating themselves. 
So you sometimes see lawyers running to the prosecutor to please investigate, because 
they know the risk that there’s an American criminal investigation is greatly diminished 
then. [Respondent 30 – forensic legal investigator/client]
By forum shopping in this way, the organisation may attempt to be tried in the 
more lenient jurisdiction, aiming for the outcome which is most beneficial to the 
continuation of the organisation.
1.2.2 Normative considerations
Apart from the more strategically motivated choices for a report to law enforcement 
authorities, it seems that normative considerations also influence this process. 
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Corporate investigators are mostly focused on the client’s interests, however it seems 
that they also take other considerations into account (Blonk et al., 2017). In their article 
about the role of the public interest in the private security market, Loader and Walker 
(2017) state that private security providers and clients are moral actors. They argue 
that non-contractual moral concerns guide private security providers alongside the 
contractual concerns they have regarding the private interests of their clients. The same 
can be argued for corporate investigators specifically (see chapter 6 for more on this 
issue). Although the involvement of corporate investigators in the decision whether or 
not to report a crime to the authorities differs, often they do exert a certain amount of 
influence. Many corporate investigators have a public-sector background (mostly police, 
but also military (police) and prosecution) and this might influence the way they think 
about the necessity to report to law enforcement agencies (see also White, 2014; Van 
Dijk & De Waard, 2001). However, among the respondents interviewed in this research, 
a clear difference in opinions between investigators with and without a public-sector 
background could not be discerned. Some corporate investigators and clients feel that 
any criminal activity that has been uncovered should be reported to the state. 
I feel that when someone has stolen 200.000 euro, that person should be held 
accountable in criminal court and you should report it to the police and you should 
make an example out of him. You know, to show that you will not accept that as 
an organisation. And that you’ll do anything to make sure it doesn’t happen again. 
[Respondent 5 – corporate investigator]
Most respondents express that while they expect no actual benefits from reporting to 
the authorities, they feel it is ‘right’ to do so: “Advantages? There are none – reporting 
a crime to the police is just something we do because we believe that when you 
know there has been a crime committed against you as an organisation, you need 
to report that. Period” [Respondent 20 – corporate investigator]. Not all respondents 
agree with this sentiment, as is shown by this quote from a lawyer: 
Tell me, what do you think you will accomplish dear manager? With the interests of 
your company in mind? You don’t have the obligation to report, just look it up. So it’s 
a feeling they have, especially in the semi-public sector, of ‘didn’t we all agree at some 
point to bring all criminal offences to the attention of the law enforcement agencies?’ 
Well those who actually do it are heavily disappointed. [Respondent 28 – forensic 
legal investigator/client]
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This quote shows an interesting tension between the private interests of the client 
and the public interests that are involved when a crime is committed. The fieldwork 
suggests this is something many respondents struggle with, whether they are 
corporate investigators, clients or law enforcement professionals. Contrary to the 
widespread believe that corporate security, as part of the private security industry, 
is focused solely on private interests, ‘common good considerations’ also seem to 
influence decisions made in investigations and settlements. Reports to the authorities 
are often made out of principle, respondents suggest.
I’m working on an international fraud case now, we’ve been involved in the factual 
investigations for some time now to see what the options are. But there’s also a matter 
of principle for them, the client has been defrauded and in truth he just wants to report 
to the police out of principle. We told him, the likelihood of it being investigated by the 
police is very low, the chance of the person responsible ever serving one day in prison 
is basically zero – all of that doesn’t matter, it’s a principle thing. If that’s the goal and 
we can help him achieve that, that’s fine. But it doesn’t happen very often because it 
doesn’t solve anything. We try to be of added value to the client, it is our job to help 
solve the problem. A report to the police has added value to a very limited extent. It can 
be to satisfy the retributive needs. [Respondent 41 – corporate investigator]
The added value of a report to law enforcement authorities is not very practical but 
moral instead. A second normative consideration to report is an experienced need 
for punishment. “Sometimes the client wants to also report to the police. It depends. 
Some are furious and want to report to the police no matter what” [Respondent 2 – 
corporate investigator]. “The moment it gets emotional they feel the police should 
be involved. Private law is more about procedures, the criminal justice system is 
about the person, punishing the suspect” [Respondent 12 – police investigator]. 
The corporate settlement options that do not involve a report to law enforcement 
authorities lack the moral indignation that can be expressed by a criminal case. 
“I had this case, they had been to civil court and the person was ordered to repay 
the damages. But he didn’t have any financial means. That was a reason for the 
organisation to report to us [prosecution office], they felt he would have gotten off 
too easily. They wanted retribution” [Respondent 51 – prosecutor]. This expression 
of punishment inherent in the criminal justice system is also one of the reasons for 
organisations not to report, as organisations might feel that the actions taken against 
the employee are ‘punishment enough’. These other actions, however harsh in their 
consequences, do not express the moral condemnation present in a criminal justice 
procedure. It depends on the organisation and on the severity of the transgression 
whether or not this need to show moral indignation is felt. 
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 Thirdly, a report to law enforcement authorities may be made out of a sense of 
responsibility for the market in which the organisation operates. Some respondents 
expect some kind of preventative (moral) effect of a report to the authorities, either 
within the own organisation or within the market more generally. “My opinion is that 
you should report to the police, exactly because you want to prevent that someone 
keeps repeating this behaviour when given the opportunity. But it’s not my call, it’s 
the organisation that has to decide” [Respondent 27 – corporate investigator]. 
In that regard it may help that someone is convicted and ends up on a blacklist. Because 
if he wants to work for a competitor in future he won’t get a certificate of good conduct 
because he has the conviction. So should we fire someone without reporting him to 
the police, he will just apply for a job at a competitor tomorrow and he may continue 
with his norm violations. And it has a preventative effect within the organisation as well. 
Employees talk. So they know we are serious about it. There are stories to be told about 
managers taking stuff home and employees copying that behaviour. If you don’t act 
upon it, that bad apple will spoil the barrel. So that’s the preventative side. And looking 
at it more from a societal angle, us reporting will help to ensure that that specific person 
can’t go on with defrauding organisations. We work with many temp agencies, should we 
just get rid of the person and not report and not notify the temp agency, he’ll just be put 
at another company. And it works both ways, if a competitor gets rid of someone without 
reporting and he applies here he might get the job. Because he has relevant experience 
and a good resume, seems good. But all the while you will welcome a fraudster into your 
company without being aware of that. [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]
Case study 13 can be seen as an example of this. The reason for reporting this case 
was that investigators found that there was an organised crime network behind it and 
that Observation Company 2 was not the first victim. In order to prevent the frauds to 
continue, it was decided to report the case to the police. Investigators indicated they 
were disappointed that the police did not investigate the matter.
1.2.3 Timing of law enforcement involvement
Interestingly, respondents indicate that in cases where there is a choice whether or 
not to involve the authorities and the choice is made to do so, it is preferred to file the 
report only after the internal investigations are concluded.
Sometimes the authorities are already involved from the get-go but if you stumble 
upon the matter yourself you’re going to have to see whether there’s any validity in 
your suspicions first. It depends on the urgency of the matter but generally you want 
to take some time to assess the severity. You don’t want to act on every false alarm. 
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You have to realise, the moment an organisation is faced with something like this, it 
creates a lot of turmoil. People start to speculate, the dynamics in the organisation 
change, so you have to be very careful in dealing with that. [Respondent 37 – client]
As we have seen when discussing the reasons for organisations not to report a norm 
violation to the authorities, organisations place great value on the control over 
the investigation process and the resulting information. “Say there is a rumour, or 
something improper has occurred but they have no clue what has really happened. 
Is it just an error, are we maybe wrong or is there really something amiss? Before you 
report to the police you want to know, is there really something to be concerned 
about here” [Respondent 27 – corporate investigator]. 
Let’s say you report to the police the moment you get the feeling something’s wrong. 
If you do that and they do act upon it, you’ll lose all control over the situation. It’s 
possible that the prosecutor decides to just arrest the person. Ok so then he knows 
what’s going on right away. That could be a problem. So that means that in practice, 
many clients choose to report – when they want to do that – only after we finish our 
internal investigations. And the recoverability of assets may be of influence here. First 
you make sure you seize all assets of the involved person, maybe use a settlement 
agreement et cetera. [Respondent 2 – corporate investigator]
Finalising corporate investigations before reporting to the authorities is therefore 
considered wise from the point of view of client’s interests.
I usually tell them, do yourself a favour and make sure you investigate the matter 
first. At the end we will know what happened, if you still think you want to report – I 
wouldn’t know why, but if you still feel the justice department needs to be involved in 
this, you can report then. But it is not illegal not to report, you don’t have an obligation 
to report and you’re not doing anything wrong by not reporting. On the contrary, I 
think that if you are a responsible manager, you will investigate privately first. You 
have to take the interests of the organisation and your employees into account. You 
have to make sure that there is no unnecessary reputational damage. And the only 
thing you’re doing is saying, I want to know more before I decide how to handle this. 
[Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client]
Postponing a report to law enforcement authorities until the internal investigations 
are concluded also has the added benefit for an organisation that this enhances the 
chances of the authorities acting upon it (see also chapter 5). Traditionally, fraud 
is not a high priority for police and prosecution and respondents indicate that the 
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better the information is that accompanies a report to law enforcement authorities, 
the easier the case will be for the police to investigate (Blonk et al., 2017).
Nowadays they have lists of priorities and they have to do a certain amount of fraud 
cases every year. Well, it’s nice for them when you can deliver a case that’s a piece of 
cake. When you attach a full investigative report, including the underlying evidence, 
with a big bow around it, it makes things easier for them. So that means you’re less 
likely to end up at the bottom of the pile. So if the client wants to report to the police, 
we can help them to increase their chances of it being investigated. [Respondent 2 – 
corporate investigator]
Even though the above course of action does enhance the chances of a case being 
investigated and tried in the criminal justice system, it is far from certain this will 
actually happen. This section has discussed reasons for and against reporting a norm 
violation to the law enforcement authorities. In the remainder of the chapter, more 
private types of settlements are discussed.
2. The civil suit
The considerations set out in section 1 finally lead to a decision to report to the 
authorities or to abstain from doing that. When a report to the authorities is not 
deemed the (sole) solution in a case, other options are available. The most ‘public’ 
one of these is the use of the civil court system. As a judge is involved here, chances 
are that (some) details of the case may become public knowledge. As mentioned 
before, this does play a role in the decision making, however, the influence of fear for 
reputational damage should at the same time not be overstated. Civil courts may be 
involved in a corporate settlement after corporate investigations in multiple ways. 
For example, a civil suit may be launched against the employee for the repayment 
of damages suffered. ‘Damages’ is a broad term here, as the costs for investigations 
can also be claimed as damages. In addition, the organisation may ask the judge 
to compensate for the interest missed over the sum that has been defrauded 
and to make the involved employee responsible for possible fiscal consequences 
of the fraud. “Damages can also contain the costs the organisation has made 
for the investigations. So, the repayment of damages includes the costs for the 
investigations. However, the costs of the use of a lawyer do not fall within ‘damages’” 
[Excerpt from observation 1 – informal conversation]. Case study 1, 9, 11 and 13 are 
examples of cases in which a civil suit to reclaim damages was initiated against the 
involved persons in addition to a criminal justice procedure. In case study 6, 7 and 10 
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a civil case was brought against the employee to reclaim damages, without a report 
to law enforcement authorities.
Respondents state that they often initiate civil court proceedings in addition to 
other measures, such as a report to law enforcement authorities. The Dutch Criminal 
Code has a possibility to insert compensation measures in the criminal procedure, 
which is considerably cheaper for the organisation than initiating a civil suit. While 
costs may be compensated in part in a civil court procedure, this will only occur 
when the organisation is deemed in the right by the court. The organisation need 
not pay for the criminal procedure and the insertion of a request for compensation 
measures is therefore free of costs as well (though the compensation is usually lower 
in criminal proceedings) (Blonk et al., 2017). However, according to respondents, 
the applicability of such a request in practice is limited in many cases. The matter 
at hand is too complicated for the non-specialised criminal court and many claims 
of damages are referred to civil court. In case study 21 the other organisation that 
was involved68 reported the case to the authorities and included a request for 
compensation measures as well. However, a civil suit was also prepared to reclaim 
additional damages.
Often you see a report to the police being combined with civil court proceedings 
because, you can join as an injured party in the criminal procedure but the criminal 
judge will only take it into account for simple cases. For example, when you can say: 
‘I’ve suffered damages, see here’s the receipt’. The moment it’s more complicated than 
that he’ll refer the case to civil court. [Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]
Civil court proceedings may also be initiated by the involved employee, for example 
when (s)he feels (s)he is being treated unfairly. In this way, an employee may give 
a judge the opportunity to assess whether the actions of corporate investigators 
and their clients are lawful (see also chapter 2). Since a civil suit creates expenses in 
legal fees and litigation fees and since it requires an active stance from the involved 
person, respondents indicate that a civil suit is usually not initiated by individual 
employees. However, 
It does happen. Once I had to provide legal assistance to an organisation in summary 
proceedings that were held against it. An ex-employee who was being investigated 
started the summary proceedings to get the judge to block the internal investigations. 
68 See chapter 5. In this case, the involved person was an employee of (a subsidiary of ) Observation 
Company 2 but the damages were suffered by another company (to which the involved person was 
providing services).
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He lost the proceedings of course, there were no grounds but it does occur that 
the employee takes the organisation to civil court. [Respondent 30 – forensic legal 
investigator/client]
A civil suit by an employee is often initiated to prevent the organisation from 
dismissing the involved person. Case study 4 is an example of this. Respondents 
indicate that while it happens that a judge retracts the dismissal, usually the 
relationship between employer and employee has been disrupted in such a way that 
the labour contract is dissolved. However, the court may award the employee with a 
financial compensation in such a case.
2.1 The civil suit to terminate a labour agreement
A civil suit may also be initiated by the organisation to dismiss an employee.69 Often, 
employer and employee may have attempted to negotiate the termination of the 
contract and the conditions under which this will take place, but were not able reach 
an agreement. The dispute may then be settled in civil court. Damages are usually 
included in this civil court procedure as well. In case study 11, one of the employees 
involved was dismissed through the aid of civil court. 
 In general, a ruling by a civil court is necessary in case an employer wants to 
terminate the labour contract without the consent of the employee.70 The grounds for 
such termination may be a disrupted labour relationship or culpable malfunctioning 
by the employee. In both cases, the employer will need to make a plausible argument 
to underpin these allegations. The termination is initiated by the employer, who 
has to comply with the term of notice. When the judge agrees with the allegations, 
the employee usually has no right to unemployment benefits, nor will he be 
granted a severance payment. The judge may decide to award the employer with a 
compensation in the case of culpable malfunctioning by the employee, to be paid 
by the employee (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2015a). In the case of 
a disrupted labour relationship that can be attributed to the employer, the judge 
may grant the employee an additional compensation (Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, 2015b). 
69 This chapter only discusses types of dismissal that are used for individuals who are suspected of 
wrongdoing. There are also dismissals for economic reasons (large scale dismissals), as a result of 
bankruptcy or as a result of disability but these are unlikely to be used.
70 Not all types of termination of the labour contract merit interference by civil court. See section 3 and 4.
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2.2 The pro forma procedure
One interesting (though it seems, not very frequently used)71 possibility is that the 
civil court is asked to validate a private agreement between employee and employer. 
In this case, the two parties will have negotiated the terms of separation and will have 
come to an agreeable solution for both parties. During the pro forma procedure, the 
parties provide the judge with their agreement, who looks it over and ratifies it. The 
actual content of the agreement is not considered closely by the judge, nor is this 
desired by either party. The employee formally disagrees with the solution provided 
by the employer but simultaneously states that (s)he will not contest it if the judge 
rules in favour of the employer. This practice is described as a ‘puppet show’ by 
many commentators (see for example Beltzer, 2005). The employee merely contests 
the agreement to ensure the right to unemployment benefits will not be lost. This 
situation was deemed undesirable by the Dutch government: “the government notes 
that it is no advocate of pro forma procedures because of the unnecessary pressure 
on the judicial system. If parties agree about the terms of termination, no interference 
of a judge should be necessary” (Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2014: 89).
 As a result of changes in labour regulation, employees no longer lose their right 
to unemployment benefits by agreeing to a termination of the contract (such as a 
settlement agreement). The advantage of the pro forma procedure for the employee 
is therefore no longer present. According to respondents, the employer might still 
deem it wise to formalise an agreement with the employee through civil court. 
The added value of a pro forma procedure for an employer is that it provides more 
security than a settlement agreement (see below), because the employee has the 
option to revoke the settlement agreement, while the pro forma procedure produces 
a court ruling which cannot be contested (although the employee may still appeal to 
a higher court).
 Respondents mostly seem to feel that the pro forma procedure has become 
obsolete. “The judge does nothing really in such a procedure, I see it more as an 
extension of a settlement agreement. But it hardly ever happens, I don’t see the 
usefulness of a pro forma. We hardly ever use it” [Respondent 50 – client]. According 
to respondents, many organisations feel a dismissal or a settlement agreement is 
a much more efficient solution. Nonetheless, the pro forma procedure remains an 
option. It may be used to shorten the legally defined waiting period which is used 
by the Dutch unemployment agency before allowing benefits or in a situation in 
which it is expected that the employer will not pay the severance payment agreed to 
(ontslag.nl, 2014). It provides both employee and employer with an enforceable court 
sentence and thus with more security that the termination of the labour contract 
71 To illustrate, the pro forma procedure appears in none of the case studies.
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holds up and that agreements will be honoured, without making the details of the 
case known to the wider public. While the civil court makes the final determination, 
not only the shaping of that determination but also the choice of the court as the 
legal venue is privately governed. 
2.3 The Enterprise Court (Ondernemingskamer)
Most settlements discussed in this chapter are initiated by the (management of the) 
organisation. The Dutch private law system also provides other interested parties 
with an option to appeal to a civil court however. In the so-called inquiry procedure 
(Enquêteprocedure) other interested parties also have the opportunity to instigate 
an inquiry (articles 2:344 through 2:359 BW [Civil Code]). In this procedure, an 
interested party (shareholders, the Works council, a director) complying with certain 
conditions might bring the case before the court, to claim mismanagement of the 
organisation (Van den Blink, 2010). This is a special procedure that is held by the 
court of appeals in Amsterdam. The Court decides whether or not there are grounds 
for investigation and if there are, an investigator is appointed. This investigator is 
paid by the organisation but reports to the Court. The investigator is granted full 
access and every person involved with the organisation has to cooperate with the 
investigations. Once the investigations are completed, the investigator reports to the 
Court. The Court then decides whether or not there has been mismanagement, which 
could lead to accountability of the board of directors or the supervisory board of the 
organisation (AMS Advocaten, 2015). Pending the procedure, the Enterprise court 
may take provisional measures if necessary. These measures can be very far-reaching, 
such as the dismissal or appointment of a director, or revoking the voting rights of 
certain shareholders. These measures may also be taken when the procedure has 
been finalised (Peters, 2006).
That Enterprise Court is a special court for disputes relating to companies. It is a highly 
qualified part of the court of appeals and it is highly respected. No one will think of 
refusing the investigator access. If they do, the investigator will report to the court no 
access was granted and the court will fine the corporation, 100.000 euros a day. Its 
powers are enormous. [Respondent 32 – forensic legal investigator/client]
2.4  Some differences between criminal justice and civil court 
proceedings – the use of evidence 
The rationales underlying a criminal justice procedure on the one hand, and civil 
court proceedings on the other are significantly different. Criminal court is about 
’finding the truth’ in a dispute between the state and an offender, while civil court 
proceedings are focused on the facts as presented to the court by the parties (who 
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are presumed to be equal). This means that when some facts are not contested by 
either party (even if not ‘true’), the court will accept these facts: “in the private law 
system, the trial is organised in a certain way. You litigate based on presented facts. 
So facts which are not presented and facts which are not contested are considered 
to be true” [Respondent 40 – corporate investigator]. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the standard of evidence is higher in criminal court and the burden of proof 
lies with the state (in this case the public prosecutor). As the rationale of civil court 
proceedings is based on horizontal relationships, information presented in court is 
considered a fact when neither party contests the correctness of it. This means that 
information which may be considered circumstantial in criminal court, may serve as 
evidence in civil court. 
 The question of illegally obtained evidence is an interesting one in the context 
of civil court procedures. Case law suggests that in a civil court procedure, evidence 
is not excluded lightly. If the information which is presented to the court is deemed 
illegally obtained, this situation will usually be compensated by a (higher) severance 
payment (in the case of termination of the labour contract) or an award of damages 
to the involved employee. Whether or not the evidence is illegally obtained is judged 
by looking at the law (for example: was there a criminal offence which led to the 
information) and by principles of law used by corporate investigators, most notably 
proportionality and subsidiarity (see chapter 2) (Koevoets, 2004). The Dutch supreme 
court has ruled that evidence which is obtained illegally does not necessarily need to 
be excluded from evidence, which is contrary to the situation in criminal proceedings 
(see article 359a WvSv [Code of Criminal Procedure]).
Article 152 Rv [Code of Civil Procedure] dictates that evidence may be given by all 
means and that the evaluation of evidence is left up to the magistrate, unless the 
law states differently. In a civil court procedure the general rule is not that the 
court should ignore illegally obtained evidence. In principle, the public interest of 
revealing the truth and the interests of parties to substantiate their claims, which are 
the basis for article 152 Rv, outweigh the importance of the exclusion of evidence. 
Only when there are additional circumstances, the exclusion of evidence is justified. 
(ECLI:NL:HR:2014:942)72
Interestingly, while evidence which is illegally obtained by law enforcement actors will 
generally be excluded from a criminal procedure (article 359a WvSv), the same does not 
necessarily apply to evidence which is illegally obtained by corporate investigators and 
72 This court case was about the use of private investigators by an insurance company against a costumer. 
The more general rule the Supreme Court formulates is also applicable to the employer/employee 
relationship.
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handed over to law enforcement authorities. Case law has indicated that as long as law 
enforcement actors were not involved in the process of gathering the information, the 
information may be used in criminal proceedings.73 The evidence might still be regarded 
as illegally obtained and this might have consequences in the criminal procedure but 
just as is the case in a civil court procedure, the evidence might still be used.74
In principle, everything which is presented to the court may be used in a civil court 
procedure. Solid evidence obtained with the aid of private investigators is not easily 
removed from the procedure. But it might still be illegally obtained if you look at it 
from a criminal justice perspective. A criminal procedure is so different from a civil 
suit, they should be viewed separately. Just speaking in terms of timing for example 
– the civil court procedure will usually be done before the criminal procedure even 
started. [Respondent 50 – client]
In addition to the difference in the way civil and criminal courts handle illegally 
obtained evidence and the timing referred to by this respondent, another notable 
difference is the symbolism that is attached to civil court proceedings and criminal 
justice. As stated, some organisations feel the need to punish the involved employee. 
The criminal justice system, which is largely focused on retribution and punishment, 
is much more suited for that than the private law system (although it is not the 
organisation doing the punishing in the criminal justice system but the state75). 
Civil court proceedings, representing horizontal (though not necessarily equal) 
relationships between parties, are more about compensation than punishment.
This section has discussed multiple ways to involve a civil court, some of which are 
fairly private (the pro forma procedure), others may become much publicised (for 
example some large cases done by the Enterprise Court). In any case, the use of civil 
court is (potentially) fairly ‘open’, as the norm violation or at least relevant parts of 
it will become known to the court and hence, potentially, to the wider public. The 
sections below, discuss more private ways to settle internal norm violations.
73 See for example ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2006:AY1071 (ruling of the court of appeal Den Bosch). 
74 In this sense, the extent of judicial control over (indecent) actions by corporate investigators is thus 
rather limited. 
75 This is a result of the fact that in the Dutch system, like in many other jurisdictions, a criminal offence is 
seen to represent a dispute between the state and an offender, rather than between an offender and a 
victim. In the Dutch criminal justice system, the victim is no party to the dispute (although victim rights 
are now incorporated in the criminal justice procedure, see for example Pemberton & Reynaers, 2011).
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3. The settlement agreement: a court-free arrangement
Although some organisations prefer to dismiss an involved person themselves once the 
investigations have concluded that he or she is indeed involved, many prefer to part 
ways without the necessity of court involvement. This may be achieved by the person 
resigning (with or without the ‘encouragement’ of the employer) or by negotiating an 
agreement of separation between parties. The settlement agreement (article 7:900 BW) 
is a termination of the labour contract with mutual consent: employee and employer 
reach agreement about the terms of separation. This agreement is binding to both 
parties. This may be a contract in which parties agree on an amount payable by the 
involved person and it may also include conditions, such as the termination of the 
labour contract. “In this case, there were two people involved and we struck a deal with 
the one and the other is paying a monthly amount” [Respondent 6 – client]. Although 
“there is no binding standard – it depends on what you put in there” [Respondent 50 – 
client], respondents do indicate that a settlement agreement that is used as a result of 
norm violations usually contains the following elements:
Party 2 [employee] commits to reimbursing the financial damage of party 1 [employer] 
within 24 months after this agreement is signed. (…) [Employee] furthermore declares 
to pay the legally established interest from the moment the illegal payments were 
made until the moment these are repaid to [employer] (…) In addition, [employee] 
agrees to pay the costs made by [employer] to investigate and settle the incident. 
(…) As far as the unlawful / illegal acts of [employee] have tax implications (for 
example, but not limited to concerns in terms of VAT and wage or income tax), 
[employee] agrees to fulfil those obligations independently and to free [employer] 
of any such obligations. (…) [Employee] states to instantly (date of signature of this 
Agreement) take immediate resignation from [employer] and to directly resigning 
from employment with [employer]. (…) [Employee] agrees to irrevocably waive the 
invocation of a possible claim that this agreement is null or void and to place no 
objection or appeal against the termination of the employment relationship with 
[employer].76 [Observation 1 - settlement agreement] 
Negotiations between employer and employee resulting from the corporate 
investigations report usually form the basis for the settlement agreement. It is 
possible to hand this agreement over to a civil court for ratification in a pro forma 
76 July 2015 has seen the implementation of the new law on employment in the Netherlands. One of 
the changes in this law is that in cases of termination by mutual agreement, such as the settlement 
agreement, the employee has two weeks to change his mind (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 
2015a). The settlement agreement provided above was made before this change in regulation.
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procedure, however this is not necessary. This type of termination of the labour 
contract does not need to be approved by court because it is consensual. In many 
cases, the settlement agreement is the corporate settlement of the norm violation. 
In case studies 10, 12, 16 and 20 a settlement agreement was used to terminate 
the labour contract. In other case studies (3 and 16)77 a settlement agreement was 
used as an addition to the (one-sided) dismissal of the employee. In such a case, 
the agreement contains arrangements about a severance payment or (more likely) a 
repayment of damages.
 An interesting possible addition to a settlement agreement is a non-disclosure 
clause. Non-disclosure may also be used in other types of corporate settlements, 
in the form of a separate agreement. However, the fieldwork suggests that the use 
of non-disclosure is most likely to occur in case of in a settlement agreement. As 
discussed above, organisations might be inclined to keep the information that internal 
norm violations have occurred, quiet, for example as a result of fear for reputational 
damage (see e.g. Van Dijk & De Waard, 2001). A non-disclosure clause or agreement 
could provide a solution for this sensitive matter. Parties agree to keep both the norm 
violation and the agreement that has been reached quiet. Respondents suggest that 
the use of a non-disclosure clause is quite standard in a settlement agreement.
Ok so he’s gone with a settlement, you settle the matter there and that’s that. I’m 
rid of the guy. And you come to terms with each other about what you will and will 
not make public. You make a settlement agreement and a non-disclosure is usually in 
there - well, then we won’t talk about it anymore. From either side. We don’t always 
want that because we want to be able to talk about it. In case the next employer of the 
guy contacts us to ask, ‘how did he perform when he was with you?’, you want to be 
able to say, ‘we’ve kicked him out’. [Respondent 19 – corporate investigator]
There is no consensus among respondents regarding the use of non-disclosure tools. 
Not all respondents have experience with it and some are opposed to the practice. 
In literature, the field of private investigations is sometimes called non-transparent 
an murky (e.g. Klerks & Scholtes, 2001). The use of non-disclosure agreements does 
not do much to improve this image and some respondents highly value transparency 
(this does not mean that information is volunteered for public use however). 
Others do make use of the practice and feel it is just part of the arsenal of solutions 
organisations have at their disposal.
77 In case study 16 this relates to another employee than with whom the settlement agreement referred 
to above was made.
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To stay with the example of the guy who is kicked out. Something will be arranged 
with him, he gets something of a severance payment and it’s stated clearly: we will not 
discuss this anymore. Or the word ‘fraud’ is and will be avoided by both parties. When 
parties agree about this, they should sanction the transgression of this agreement, 
you know a reimbursement payment if someone doesn’t stick to the arrangement. So 
yes, these things happen. You know, that parties keep quiet. I think you can imagine 
that [the employee] is fair game in a way when he sits there. And when you [CM: the 
investigator] have your suspicions but you can’t make it stick, you may decide ok let’s 
do it this way. I think that in the end both parties must make the best of a bad bargain. 
[Respondent 6 – client]
With or without a non-disclosure agreement, the settlement agreement consists of 
some duties for the (ex-)employee, for which he has to sign. As this agreement is 
preceded by a negotiation, both parties may influence the outcome. In other words, 
contrary to most other forms of corporate settlement, a settlement agreement is not 
a one-sided decision taken by the organisation. A settlement agreement furthermore 
holds some advantages for the involved employee. In addition to the influence (s)
he may exert over the process, the employee retains the right to unemployment 
benefits and will usually be awarded a severance payment. Some employers find 
this circumstance problematic. “A settlement agreement has the disadvantage that it 
does not involve a registration of dismissal for this person. This means that he retains 
his rights to unemployment benefits and the like. But should we as a society pay for 
that? It was his choice to transgress. But sometimes, you have no choice other than 
to settle it in this way” [Respondent 47 – client]. However valuable, the influence of 
the involved person should not be overstated in practice (Meerts, 2014b). Although 
many settlement agreements contain wordings such as ‘the employee hereby states 
that he has entered and signed this agreement freely and without duress and is aware 
of the resulting obligations’, it cannot be denied that the employer holds the position 
of power in these negotiations (Meerts & Dorn, 2009). For one, the employer is in the 
position to report the employee to the police and to take action based on labour law. 
Respondents state that when a settlement agreement is chosen, the case is usually 
not as clear as when the organisation chooses to dismiss someone.
A settlement agreement is done by mutual consent and it has a non-disclosure 
agreement. To me, it remains a bit risky to use it because it is showing your weakness. The 
legal representative of the employee often tries to get some severance payment for his 
client. A settlement agreement often is chosen because of a lack of strong evidence and 
they know that of course. So you’re going to have to get into a negotiation. So I’d rather 
try a dismissal on the spot. [Respondent 47 – client]
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However, this is not always apparent to the involved employee and the threat of a 
conclusion to the matter with more severe personal consequences (e.g. a report to 
law enforcement authorities or a dismissal on the spot) might put him or her under 
duress to cooperate. Even though respondents indicate that involved employees are 
allowed to bring representation, not all involved persons make use of this option. 
The organisation, on the other hand usually does have legal representation and, in 
addition, the corporate investigative report. As we have seen in chapters 2 and 3, most 
corporate investigators use procedural guarantees such as the adversarial principle, 
this however does not change the fact that the investigations are predominantly 
focused on employee behaviour and much less on the organisation as such (Williams, 
2014). Respondents do indicate that they try to keep a broad view on the matter and 
also take organisational factors into account, however, the organisation remains the 
more powerful party in the negotiations. A settlement agreement is therefore much 
less one-sided than other types of corporate settlements, nonetheless there remains 
a definite power imbalance (Meerts, 2013).
It is very easy to destroy someone entirely, we are aware of the enormous power of an 
organisation compared to a single individual. And that might mean that we present 
results twice to an involved person. And that we also report information that is not 
beneficial to the client. For example, if you would claim expense accounts falsely three 
times and we investigate and say ok this is indisputable, I always also look for the 
person’s peers, how do they act in similar situations? (...) And I also check whether 
there has been a correction. Just imagine, you have written down in your report this 
person has claimed expenses thrice and you build your case on that, only to have the 
person prove at the end of the day that he has corrected it and reimbursed the money. 
[Respondent 27 – corporate investigator]
Some organisations decide to take additional steps against someone when they 
have settled through a settlement agreement, for example report the person to law 
enforcement authorities or initiate reclamation of damages. In case study 10 for example, 
the labour contract of the involved person was first dissolved through a settlement 
agreement and after additional investigations, a civil suit was brought against him to 
reclaim damages. Often, this possibility of additional action has been excluded as an 
option in the terms of the settlement agreement. An interesting case in this regard is the 
2015 news story that SNS Reaal had been reported to the law enforcement authorities 
by a former chairman as a result of breach of the settlement agreement.78 The CEO who 
was involved in the matter had come to a settlement agreement with SNS Reaal and this 
78 http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/11/07/oud-topman-vastgoedbank-doet-aangifte-tegen-
sns-1553293.
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agreement stated that the severance payment awarded to him could only be reclaimed 
by the company in the case of fraud, if this fraud was reported to the authorities within six 
months. SNS Reaal tried to reclaim the money because of fraud, however they were too 
late (but claimed to have been in time). As a reaction, the CEO reported SNS real to the 
police for falsification of documents. In this case, the involved person actively responded 
to what was in his eyes abuse of the settlement agreement (and the pending criminal and 
civil court cases), though many involved persons will not. However, the fact remains that 
there is more room for influence by the involved person in the process of negotiating the 
settlement agreement compared to other corporate settlements.
4. Internal sanctions as a solution
In addition to the above conclusions to corporate investigations, many organisations 
have their own array of internal sanctions. Some commentators use the term private 
justice specifically for this type of corporate settlement (cf. Henry, 1983). These 
sanctions and the transgressions which merit them are usually embedded in the 
collective labour agreement or in the labour contract employees sign when entering 
the working relation with the employer. These sanctions are discussed with the Works 
Council of the organisation (if available). “People know this, it is laid down in the 
collective labour agreement and they are warned [against unwanted behaviour, 
CM]” [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]. Internal sanctions range from very 
mild to pretty severe. Below, internal sanctions which keep the employee inside 
the organisation (thus retaining the labour relationship) are discussed first. Section 
4.2 goes on to consider some internal sanctions resulting in the termination of the 
labour contract.
4.1 Internal sanctions: disciplining the employee
In addition to corporate settlement options which place the reaction to the norm 
violation (criminal justice and civil court proceedings) or the involved person 
(settlement agreement) outside the organisation, norm violations may also be handled 
completely internal to the organisation. These internal sanctions are considered to be 
less severe (or ‘permanent’) than other corporate settlements by respondents, who 
indicate that they are more likely to be used when the transgression is not very serious 
or when it is impossible to produce compelling evidence against an involved person.
When you have your suspicions but you can’t prove it. In those cases someone might 
be removed from financial administration or you make sure he can’t access certain 
systems anymore. Because you might have a pretty good idea about the source of the 
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irregularities, especially when there is also outside involvement. Or if it simply has to 
come from the inside but you can’t point out who is involved. We might think, ‘it’s him’ 
and by removing that person you might solve the problem. [Respondent 6 – client]
Other sanctions include different types of warnings, the reduction of fringe benefits, 
demotion, being passed over for promotion or the denial of certain types of access.
We have different kinds of warnings, you may receive an official warning, but there’s 
also a reprimand and a serious reprimand with a conditional discharge. And then we 
have downgrading salary, downgrading pay grade. Just name it. [Respondent 18 – 
corporate investigator]
In the case studies internal sanctions were indeed used when the norm violation was 
either minor, a result of faulty internal organisation (when the norm violation was not 
too harmful) or when no specific employee could be identified as being responsible for 
the norm violation. In case study 2 and 21 the person was relocated, so (s)he could do no 
more harm. The involved employee in case study 21 was furthermore suspended from 
active duty. In case study 11, 12 and 20 some employees who had minor involvement 
in the case received different kinds of warnings, with or without the obligation to pay 
damages. In case study 12 a manager was furthermore demoted to a lower employee 
position. According to investigators from Observation Company 1, there were internal 
sanctions in case study 7 as well but which specific sanctions could not be derived from 
the case report (or the memory of the investigators).
 There is a very wide range of possible sanctions, which have to be communicated 
to employees before they may be used. This is often done in the collective labour 
agreement or the terms and conditions of an organisation. As the internal sanctions 
are part of the internal regulations there is no legally defined standard set of sanctions. 
However, the sanctions mentioned by respondents fall within the general categories of 
warnings, benefits or salary, demotion, removal of access and (temporary) suspension. 
The termination of the labour relationship may be considered to be the ‘ultimate’ internal 
sanction. Section 4.2 focuses on this.
4.2 Termination of the labour contract
One could place the termination of the labour contract under the banner of internal 
sanctions. It is however, an internal sanction which effectively puts an end to the labour 
relationship between employer and employee (which is why some respondents do not 
feel it is an ‘internal’ sanction). There are multiple ways to terminate a labour contract. 
The employer may ask a civil court to dissolve the contract (see section 2 of this chapter), 
there may be a termination of the labour contract under mutual agreement (see section 
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3), the employer might want to dismiss someone on the spot, the employee may be the 
one initiating the separation and in some cases a contract might automatically cease to 
exist after a certain period in time. Some of these have been discussed above. In this 
section the remaining relevant ways to terminate a labour contract are discussed. It is 
interesting to note that apart from case study 17 and 19 (in which no involved person 
was identified) and case study 2 (in which there was not enough evidence to dismiss the 
involved person) termination of the labour contract in one way or another was part of 
every case study.79 
 Within the possible ways to terminate a labour contract, a scale of severity can be 
discerned. A summary dismissal (‘on the spot’), with possible repayment of damages, 
would then be the type of termination of the labour contract with the most severe 
consequences for the involved employee. Compared to the settlement agreement 
discussed in section 3, there is less room to take the interests of the involved employee 
into account in these other types of termination. For example, a severance payment 
may be paid here. When the employer initiates the termination but the employee 
consents to the termination, it is not necessary to involve a court (article 7:671 under 
1 BW; Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2015a; 2015b). This leaves some 
room for negotiation and influence by the employee. By not granting consent to the 
termination, the employee forces the employer to go to court. An agreement may 
then still be inserted with regard to a severance payment or other arrangements. 
This does not necessarily have to be in favour of the employee though: in case study 
16 for example an involved person was dismissed and a payment plan for damages 
was also agreed to. Interestingly, consent from the employee is not necessary under 
certain circumstances, notably when it involves a director of a legal entity (article 
7:671 under 1 e BW). 
 Another condition under which involvement of a court is not necessary is in cases 
of ‘urgent circumstances’ (article 7:677 BW). If urgent circumstances may be argued, 
an employee may be dismissed on the spot without court involvement (however the 
employee may appeal to the court in case he does not agree). ‘Urgent circumstances’ 
include criminal behaviour or non-compliance with (internal) rules and regulations. 
This termination is initiated by the employer and the employee will lose his right to 
unemployment benefits. There is no period of notice to take into account and the 
labour contract will cease to exist immediately (‘on the spot’). The employee cannot 
claim a severance payment and will have to compensate the employer. An important 
condition for a summary dismissal is ‘immediacy’. This means that the organisation 
79 Since there are multiple employees involved in some of the case studies, this does not mean that the 
labour contract of every employee who was identified as being involved in the case has been terminated. 
In case study 5 it is unclear what kind of settlement was used as this was not in the report and the 
investigator did not remember specifically (however, the report does give the advice to use internal 
sanctions – which may include dismissal as well). 
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may take some time to investigate the matter, but will have to act as soon as it ‘has the 
facts’ about a norm violation in order to comply with the condition of immediacy. The 
condition is breached, for example, if too much time passes between the discovery of 
the norm violation and the initiation of an investigation and if only after that action 
is taken against the employee (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2015c). 
Often, respondents suggest, the employee is suspended from active duty to comply 
with this condition. As this HR manager indicates, it is not always easy to dismiss 
someone on the spot:
I have become less cautious, if you follow the advice of the attorneys too much 
you’re too careful. All they see is road blocks, they would rather be too careful than 
to take a shot. But experience shows that employees hardly ever use the condition 
of immediacy against you. Sometimes you’re just going to have to take a shot and 
dismiss someone on the spot and see whether he will fight you on it. Sometimes it’s 
not possible, your case is too weak. Investigators find that very frustrating because to 
them it is obvious. I often agree and I understand where they are coming from but we 
have to make sure it sticks in a legal sense. [Respondent 47 - client]
The more stringent demands related to a summary dismissal may mean that 
management or HR chooses the easier solution of a settlement agreement. Some 
corporate investigators express they have an issue with this practice as the feel it 
is overly cautious: “I mean, if there is much evidence, everything is there except a 
confession, they will still go for the written warning so to speak instead of a summary 
dismissal. How ridiculous is that?” [Respondent 48 – corporate investigator]. On 
the other hand, other investigators feel that a summary dismissal unnecessarily 
complicates matters. If the employee resists the summary dismissal and appeals to 
civil court, that means more work for the investigators.
Summary dismissal, I am not a fan. To be honest, I think that with a summary dismissal 
you get into a different trajectory – the person may fight it, get a lawyer, you go to 
trial and all of that takes time and manpower because we will have to generate more 
reports to help the lawyers in trial. It’s just a far-reaching decision and it’s hard to take 
it back. [Respondent 18 – corporate investigator]
A summary dismissal is often used as a sort of punishment, respondents imply. When 
the employer feels the norm violation is too serious to settle the matter by consent, a 
summary dismissal is preferred. Case studies 6, 11, 12, 15 and 20 involved a summary 
dismissal of the involved person. The above quoted respondent goes on to say:
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It also depends on how strongly you feel about the matter. When your evidence is not 
very strong but you’re certain about the involvement of this person and you’re not 
willing to compromise, you can choose dismissal on the spot and wait and see whether 
it sticks. Sometimes we’re sticking to our guns and the employee disagrees, well he 
will have to appeal to the court. The thing is, our internal systems are very complex 
and employees may be able to hide behind them. That makes the whole thing a bit 
difficult in legal terms sometimes. When someone does not say in a statement that he 
did it, that makes things more difficult. [Respondent 47 – client]
Another option is that the employee is the one terminating the contract. The downside 
to this for the employee is that he cannot apply for unemployment benefits (which is 
not specific to resignation by the employee, several other types of termination also 
mean forfeiture of the right to unemployment benefits). On the other hand, resignation 
may serve the employee as it looks better on a resume than to have been dismissed. 
For the employer, there is the benefit of not having to go to much trouble regarding 
dismissal procedures and not having to pay a severance payment. In the negotiations 
which may follow corporate investigations, these things may be taken into account. 
 When the involved person is a temporary worker or has a fixed-term contract, it is 
easier to dismiss the person than when the labour contract is for an indefinite period, 
respondents suggest. One could for example choose not to renew the contract without 
having to dismiss the person. In this case the employee retains the rights to unemployment 
benefits, no involvement of a court is necessary and no severance payment has to be paid. 
However, when the employer wants to terminate the contract before that time, the same 
rules apply as set out above. As fixed-term contracts may be entered for multiple years, 
the employer might have to act prior to the end date of the contract. If the remaining 
period is not too lengthy, respondents suggest that the employee may be suspended 
from active duty in the meantime (such as was the case in case study 21).
 An employee with an indefinite contract has a stronger position than temporary 
workers or employees with a fixed-term contract. Dismissal of a permanent employee 
requires a dossier, explicating reasons for dismissal (which may be formed by the 
corporate investigations report). Especially when it comes to summary dismissals, 
standards for this dossier are high as this type of dismissal does not include a notice 
period or court involvement. “Before you can fire a permanent employee you need a 
solid dossier, for the dismissal of a temporary employee this is not necessary. When 
they [temporary workers] transgress, saying goodbye is pretty easy, that’s just a 
matter of immediately terminating the collaboration with this person” [Respondent 
47 – client]. A temporary worker is employed by the temp agency, not by the 
organisation that uses this agency. The employer may simply not renew the contract 
(in the case of an employee with a fixed-term contract) or the services of that person 
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will no longer be used (in the case of a temporary worker). Case studies 13 and 14 
involved temporary workers who were terminated.
When a transgression is serious enough, respondents state that organisations want to 
dismiss the person and not to keep him or her inside the organisation. Some feel that 
this is a pretty severe punishment in itself. “When you fire someone on the spot, he 
doesn’t have any rights you know. No right to social security, no right to a severance 
payment” [Respondent 47 – client]. Of course, it depends on the type of separation 
chosen but the loss of employment is seen as punishment in itself. However, when 
trust is broken, it is hard to retain someone in the organisation.
If we catch someone with a theft or fraud, they’ll immediately get the worst 
punishment. That’s the end of your job here. Prosecution works differently, you might 
get a probationary sentence or a fine and get another chance. Our policy is once you 
start doing that kind of stuff, we’re going to say goodbye. That can be pretty heavy. 
Someone working for years and years with us and slipping once... But the trust is gone, 
you know. There’s no coming back from that. [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]
Discussion
This chapter has explored different types of ‘follow-ups’ for corporate investigations. 
In the case that the norm violation may be defined as criminal, organisations might 
decide (mostly after the investigations have been finalised) to report the case to 
involve the criminal justice system. There are multiple considerations compelling 
organisations to either report or choose not to do so. Both strategic and normative 
considerations may underpin the decision to report. At the same time, strategic 
and normative considerations also influence the decision not to report. There are 
various reasons for organisations to prefer to handle matters privately. Most of 
these motivations revolve around the concepts of the framing of (economic) crime; 
secrecy discretion and control; and legal flexibility and responsiveness (Williams, 
2005). In cases where no criminal behaviour is involved, a report to law enforcement 
authorities is not even an option. Some respondents suggest that they do not report 
in certain cases to protect the employee who is involved. Some moral considerations 
may therefore be discerned here as well.
 The decision whether or not to report is an important choice. Once this choice is 
made and the organisation has decided not to report to law enforcement authorities, 
other, private options remain open, as discussed in this chapter. In general terms, 
there are corporate settlements that involve a civil court, those that are based on 
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negotiations and mutual agreement between the organisation and the involved 
person, and those that are concluded by what is often called ‘private justice’: forms 
of internal sanctioning. In this chapter, the different solutions provided by different 
legal venues are termed ‘corporate settlements’. More generally they can be argued 
to provide a system of corporate justice. Within this system of corporate justice, 
corporate investigators and clients may be flexible, forum shopping in a way to get 
to the solution which is considered best suited in a certain case. This may mean that 
a report to the authorities is made out of strategic (for example because powers of 
investigation are necessary or because there is a threat of prosecution in another 
(harsher) jurisdiction) or normative considerations (for example an experienced need 
for retribution), it may mean that civil court is used to for example reclaim damages, 
that the private law system more generally is used to reach a mutual agreement of 
termination through a settlement agreement, or that internal sanctioning systems are 
used to either punish but retain some in the organisation, or to dismiss the involved 
person. All of these possibilities may be used separately but combinations between 
them often occur as well. A report to law enforcement authorities is for example 
usually combined with another corporate settlement as the report in itself does not 
solve the problem of the organisation. A report to law enforcement authorities seems 
to be regarded as an additional measure by most respondents instead of an end in 
itself. Other types of corporate settlements may also be combined, for example a 
dismissal might be accompanied by a civil suit to reclaim damages. The case studies 
used in this research are dominated by a form of dismissal, combined with another 
type or corporate settlement.
 While a driving force behind the choice for a certain settlement is ‘fixing the 
problem at hand’, certain other considerations also seem to influence the decisions 
taken. The desire to punish someone might compel an employer to either report 
the person to law enforcement authorities or dismiss him on the spot, even when a 
case might not be strong enough to do so. In other instances the necessity to repair 
the damage done and move on might make a settlement agreement the more likely 
option. It is difficult to discern a fixed decision-making process. Just as is the case with 
many other matters in the field of corporate investigations, deciding how to handle 
the matter is a decision which is done ad hoc. This chapter has however discerned 
some considerations that may steer these decisions. The next chapter focuses on 
those instances in which law enforcement agencies have become involved in the 
corporate investigations in one way or another.
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Coexistence
Public/private relations in corporate 
investigation settings – information transfer, 
information sharing and coordination
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Introduction
The focus of previous chapters has been predominantly on the considerable autonomy 
of the corporate security sector (and its clients) when it comes to investigations and 
settlements of norm violations within organisations. Although corporate investigators 
and clients see many reasons – explained in chapter 4 – to keep matters private, there 
are also instances in which law enforcement agencies are involved in one way or 
another. This strategic behaviour, making use of the resources and options of both 
the public and private sphere to achieve an optimal result, is termed forum shopping 
in this book. Forum shopping occurs in all aspects of corporate investigations, 
influencing clients in the decision which investigator to use (chapter 2), influencing 
corporate investigators in the decision which investigative methods to use (chapter 
3), influencing clients and investigators in the decision which corporate settlement 
to choose (chapter 4), and finally, when a public sector solution is chosen, influencing 
the timing of law enforcement involvement, as well as the decision where to report 
(chapter 5).
 The question of public/private interconnections in security matters has been 
introduced in chapter 1 of this book, describing the views of many criminologists 
about public/private relations in the various spheres of security: relations between 
the public sector and private security are often posed in terms of cooperation by 
the latter with the former (Hoogenboom & Muller, 2002; Hoogenboom, 2009; Dorn 
& Levi, 2009; Cools, Davidovic, De Clerck & De Raedt, 2010). By contrast, as previous 
chapters have shown, corporate security typically acts quite independently from 
law enforcement (even though many corporate security professionals are ex-law 
enforcement). In many instances the work of corporate investigations professionals 
remains completely out of sight of the public sector. As Van Ruth and Gunther 
Moor (1997: 129) state, parts of the activities of corporate security display overlap 
with police tasks – here corporate security fills the gap left by police (the junior 
partner argument). However, another significant part of corporate security’s work is 
completely separated from the criminal justice system; corporate investigators thus 
have an independent role to fulfil within the market. The corporate security sector 
may be regarded as a semi-autonomous social field, with a “capacity to generate rules 
and induce or coerce conformity” (Moore, 1973: 722). Semi-autonomous social fields 
are not fully isolated, nor completely autonomous. Legal frameworks provided by 
the state are in place for the corporate security sector, as discussed in chapter 2 – 
however within the context of these rules and the corporate security field, a high 
level of autonomy exists.
 Corporate investigators do not operate in a vacuum, free from any public 
involvement in the corporate investigations. As indicated in chapter 4, there are 
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several reasons for law enforcement to wish to be, or to be invited to be, involved 
in some corporate investigations. The question remains how such contacts may be 
conceptualised. Chapter 1 has introduced a very crude scale of relations, ranging 
from separation, through ad hoc coexistence/cooperation, to corporate security 
performing obligatory tasks for the state. The focus of this book is on the first two 
of these possibilities, the third being more extensively researched by others (mainly 
in compliance literature, see for example Van Erp, Huisman, Van de Bunt & Ponsaers, 
2008). Previous chapters have focused primarily on separation, leaving the ad hoc 
relations to be examined in the present chapter. Thus the focus of this chapter, is on 
those instances where contact is established between public and private actors. It is 
argued that, while these – relatively rare – relationships have been conceptualised by 
some researchers as a form of cooperation (see for example Van Wijk et al., 2002), the 
fieldwork reported upon here suggests that public/private relationships are rather 
more organised as coexistence.
 The following section focuses on formalised structures of coexistence between law 
enforcement actors and corporate investigators. Section 2 subsequently discusses 
public/private relationships which occur on an ad hoc basis, after which a typology 
is presented for these ad hoc (or as respondents call it, ‘case-to-case’) relationships. 
Section 4 focuses on information sharing and the existence of informal networks. A 
discussion concludes the chapter.
 
1.  Formal structures of coexistence: covenants and 
public/private partnerships
When it comes to public/private relations, covenants80 and public/private 
partnerships (PPPs) are often used as a formal tool to achieve cooperation. A PPP 
may be defined as a “legally structured form of cooperation between one or more 
state agencies and one or more private entities, aiming to develop and execute a 
shared strategy for the realisation of policy” (Hagenaar & Bonnes, 2014: 26). PPPs are 
used as governance tools by receding governments to “transfer the responsibility for 
the design and realisation of public service delivery to the private sector through 
long term contracting” (Reynaers & De Graaf, 2014: 120). In this sense, the structure 
of PPPs fits well with the ideas of privatisation, responsibilisation and the junior 
80 A covenant (in Dutch ‘convenant’) is comparable to a Memorandum of Understanding, although it may 
also be used to create a legal basis to for example share information (Rijksoverheid, n.d.). In this sense, 
a covenant is more formal than a MoU. For an example of a covenant between public and private 
actors, see the Electronic Crimes Task Force (Rijksoverheid, 2011). The ECTF is a PPP between the police, 
prosecution office and banks with the aim to reduce digital bank fraud (mostly external to banks).
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partner theory. Since the early 1990s there have been many initiatives for PPPs in 
the security field (Van Steden & Huberts, 2006). Most of these, however, are focused 
on physical security (see for example NVb, 2014). The formal goals of these PPPs are 
often formulated in language of the junior partner theory, with the private partners 
working towards public good objectives. Private security is seen as complementary to 
the public police force and is in this sense not considered to be a threat to the state’s 
legitimacy (Van der Lugt, 2001).81 Such a view point reflects a ‘social service view’ on 
private security, in which the private partner is defined in terms of the common good 
(Hoogenboom, 1990).
 There are, however, also PPPs between law enforcement agencies and corporate 
investigators/clients. Interestingly, these PPPs are focused on types of crimes that 
are typically committed from outside the organisation: for example attacks on ATM-
machines, hacking or skimming (NVB82, 2016). These are incidentally also the types 
of crimes that, according to respondents, are reported most often to the authorities 
(see also PwC, 2017). Interestingly, a similar attempt has quite recently been made 
when it comes to issues originating within organisations internally. Two pilot projects 
have been initiated, both with the aim of providing insight into the role private 
investigation firms might have with regard to criminal investigations.83 Respondents 
do not consider these pilots to have been successful. The way the pilots were 
structured is mentioned as a key factor for this – pilot 1 for example had a very narrow 
focus, which led to a disappointing influx of cases (Friperson, Bouman & Wilms, 2013). 
A follow-up pilot (pilot 2) was consequently executed, widening its net somewhat. 
This has, however, not led to more participation by private investigation firms (Kuin & 
Wilms, 2015).
 Both pilots were meant as a way to formalise the participation of corporate 
investigators in criminal justice investigations. Prosecutors and police are aware of 
the general complaint from the private sector that ‘nothing happens’ with the reports 
they make to the authorities. The expectation was, therefore, that many private 
investigators would bring in cases and the choice was made to limit the influx by 
setting some criteria for inclusion (Friperson et al., 2013). In reality, there was very 
81 See also White (2014). The author argues that the same mechanisms are at play when it comes to 
regulating the sector: because in-house security is less visible and less comparable to the police force 
than contracted-in security guards, the former are not regulated by law.
82 ‘NVB’ refers to the Dutch banking association [Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken], whereas ‘NVb’ refers 
to the Dutch representative organisation for private security [Nederlandse Veiligheidsbranche].
83 This research has a broad approach when it comes to corporate investigators – private investigation 
firms, in-house security departments, forensic accountants and forensic legal investigators all fall 
within the scope of the research. The pilots however, are focused specifically on private investigation 
firms (and then, only on those which are member of one of two representative agencies and which 
have a quality mark). For the corporate security sector as defined in this research, working on internal 
cases within organisations, no formal structures for cooperation have been put into place.
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little interest in the pilots from the private side. The target of twenty cases was 
not reached for pilot 1, settling for eight cases instead. It was therefore decided to 
expand the criteria for pilot 2 and the target of twenty cases was made (selected 
from a modest total of thirty cases). The question remains why so little cases were 
reported to be included in the pilots. One reason may be the narrow focus of the 
pilot projects on specific crimes and regional police forces. However, the authors of 
the report evaluating pilot 1 also mention a non-procedural issue: many clients of 
corporate security do not want to report the case to the police (Friperson et al., 2013). 
The private interests of the client are in such a case apparently not aligned with the 
(public) interests served by the PPP.
 Chapter 4 of this book has discussed the main reasons for organisations not to report 
to the authorities (see also, Hoogenboom, 1990). Corporate investigators may (and 
often do) influence this decision with their advice, however the decision ultimately lies 
with the client. Whether or not corporate investigators are willing to cooperate thus 
depends for a large part on the wishes of the client. This focus on the private interest 
does not fit well with the rationale of covenants or PPPs – private interests differ among 
clients and corporate investigators representing multiple clients will not easily commit 
to a structural form of cooperation, compelling them to report all cases fitting certain 
criteria. As chapter 3 and 4 show, the flexibility of corporate investigators to choose 
one of many potential venues for (investigation of and) solution to a case is one of 
the sources for its existence. Additionally, the corporate security market itself is highly 
competitive. Hoogenboom already described this in 1994. Since his publication, the 
market has diversified even more, with lawyers also entering the corporate investigations 
arena (see chapter 2). The ad hoc nature of the work, the competition between both 
investigators and clients and all these different and sometimes conflicting interests 
make uniting the ‘sector’ in public/private cooperation initiatives very challenging. 
“The repression of fraud [within the commercial sector] is highly fragmented, almost 
chaotic even” (Hoogenboom, 1994: 26). 
 These circumstances make structural, formalised cooperation difficult – only with 
those corporate investigators who have one and the same client (i.e. in-house security 
departments), arrangements may more easily be made for long-term cooperation 
(and even then different parts of this one client may take a different stance). It is 
therefore not surprising that the covenants described above all have been agreed 
between public agencies and a specific sector of economic activity (mostly the 
financial sector). The fact that there is not one representative organisation, acting 
on behalf of the entirety of corporate investigators, makes creating a policy for 
cooperation even more challenging.
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 The next section focuses on the instances in which there is contact in one way or 
another between public authorities and corporate investigators. As may be expected 
from the above, these contacts concern specific cases, rather than representing any 
ambition to formalise or institutionalise longer term cooperation.
2. Ad hoc relations – coexistence
 
The nature and composition of the corporate security sector, and the types of norm 
violations corporate investigators deal with (internal, white-collar norm violations), 
make long-term cooperation between private and public actors fundamentally 
difficult. Corporate security/law enforcement relations are characterised by their 
ad hoc nature rather than formalised long-term structures (however, this does not 
mean there are no long-term (personal or professional) relationships between 
individuals – for more on this see below). I furthermore argue that cooperation is an 
appropriate term for only a small portion of the public/private relationships, others 
being more correctly dubbed as coexistence. The public and private sphere usually 
‘keep to themselves’ – the low level of reporting to the authorities may be taken as a 
sign for that (see also PwC, 2017). There is, however, overlap between the activities 
of corporate investigators and the criminal justice system and in some cases the 
two meet. Before turning to the different types of public/private coexistence, the 
next section focuses on public/private relations more generally. The junior partner 
theory and loss prevention theory provide us with two competing arguments: on 
the one hand the private sector is seen as a subordinate to a dominant public sector, 
complementing this sector when necessary (junior partner theory). On the other, the 
private sector is seen as the private equivalent of the criminal justice system, doing 
the same types of investigations and providing corporate justice to its client; a strict 
distinction between public and private cannot be made (loss prevention theory). The 
two theories are contrasted below and found not to be applicable to the corporate 
security sector.
2.1 Junior partner theory revisited
The involvement of law enforcement agencies may come about in different ways. 
One way – the most prevalent according to respondents – is that they are actively 
involved by corporate investigators and clients, through an official report. Although 
this could be done during or even before the corporate investigations, respondents 
indicate that they usually wait until the corporate investigations have been finalised, 
to report. If, as described in chapter 4, law enforcement agencies are invited in by 
corporate investigators or their clients only after the corporate investigations have 
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been finalised, these private actors are largely able to give priority to their own 
goals. As long as law enforcement agencies have not yet been involved, corporate 
investigators may pursue clients’ interests without interference.84 One could claim 
a fair degree of autonomy for the corporate security sector here – and the primacy 
is then located in the private sphere. This autonomy may be diminished by clients 
or corporate investigators through a report to law enforcement authorities at the 
end of the investigations. By that stage, however, the organisational problem may 
have already been solved (e.g. through a corporate settlement) and a report to the 
authorities may be an afterthought. Reporting to the authorities has little priority for 
many clients and they are often not very invested in cooperation at this stage. “You 
see, they [police and prosecution] will deliberate about the case internally, that’s up 
to them, we report and then it’s out of our hands. We’ve done our duty. The rest is 
their business. Well, as far as responsibility goes I mean” [Respondent 20 – corporate 
investigator]. From the moment of reporting, the case is deemed the responsibility of 
the criminal justice system and often corporate investigators are no longer involved.
 However, when law enforcement agencies are already investigating at the time 
corporate investigations have not yet been finalised (either as a result of prior 
law enforcement action, or as a result of corporate investigators mobilising them 
during their investigations), then the centre of gravity of the investigations shifts 
and primacy comes to lay with law enforcement actors.85 In such a case, the ‘junior 
partner theory’ might be considered a useful analytical tool to understand the 
relationships. As discussed in chapter 1, junior partner theory suggests that private 
actors are used by public actors as a junior partner to reach the goals of the public 
actor (Button, 2004; Hoogenboom, 1988). Private security is in this view regarded as 
complementary to the public police, filling the void left by the police (because of 
e.g. prioritising efforts). One might say that, according to the junior partner theory, 
there is a division of labour between public and private, in which the private side 
is focused on prevention and the public side on repression: the work of private 
security ends where that of public law enforcement begins. In junior partner theory, 
the distinctions between prevention and repression and the subordinate position 
of private security are pivotal to ensuring legitimacy for the private security sector, 
which is then seen as adding to the goals of the state (public interests) (Hoogenboom, 
1990).86 This distinction between repression and prevention is not supported by the 
84 Although other considerations than merely clients’ interests may influence corporate investigators in 
the path they take (see chapter 4 for more detail).
85 Some nuance is warranted here: the moment law enforcement agencies get involved, they are ‘in 
charge’, whether that is before or after the corporate investigations have been finalised. However, if the 
involvement is at a later stage corporate investigators may act autonomously beforehand (and often, 
afterwards there is very little involvement of corporate investigators).
86 See chapter 6 for more on this issue of legitimacy.
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data collected in this research, neither can a clear division of labour be discerned. 
However, by reporting to law enforcement officials, corporate investigators and 
clients do cede the autonomy to decide on investigations and settlement options. 
Especially in cases where the investigations originate in the public sphere by criminal 
justice investigations, public law enforcement actors seem to be the dominant party, 
using (the results of ) corporate investigations to further the public good by working 
towards a criminal conviction. Even when corporate security and/or its client take the 
initiative to involve law enforcement actors in a case, the latter may demand certain 
things from corporate investigators. 
Look, the moment they [corporate investigators or their clients] come to us to report, 
things get a little bit easier because we can say: you are the one reporting, so I expect 
you to cooperate. The moment you report, you can’t turn back anymore, that ship has 
sailed. The employees who are involved, we want to speak with them as witnesses. 
I could go and track them all down, they might refuse. I can do it all myself. But I 
can also tell the organisation, look, you make sure those ten people are here next 
week, we’ll be there and we’ll interrogate them. Same rules, same level of protection 
under the law, that’s not the issue. It’s just making use of the employee/employer 
relationship. [Respondent 55 – FIOD87 investigator]
In addition to this ‘voluntary’ cooperation of organisations, law enforcement agencies 
may also subpoena information. Corporate investigators may in this way be used by 
law enforcement actors to do the preparatory work for criminal justice investigations, 
making the latter less complicated and time consuming for the criminal justice 
officials, working with scarce means. The same type of reasoning was used to initiate 
the (not very successful) pilots for public/private cooperation in criminal cases, as 
discussed above.
 That the public side may sometimes be dominant does not necessarily mean that 
corporate investigators and clients are rendered powerless in such situations. As 
we have seen in chapter 4, a report to the authorities may be used strategically by 
corporate investigators and clients. In this way, it may serve the purpose of getting 
the case investigated in the criminal justice system when corporate investigators 
provide their report voluntarily. Additionally, keeping the limited resources of police, 
FIOD and the justice department in mind (especially when it comes to fraud), public-
sector respondents indicate that they sometimes demand a certain action from 
corporate investigators before they decide whether or not to pursue the case:
87 The FIOD is the special investigative unit of the Dutch tax authority.
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FIOD might say to the person reporting, ‘that’s great that you have found irregularities 
in the books and you want to start with a clean slate but you need to make sure that 
your report is substantiated’. So, you basically tell them to do the work. These are big 
cases, taking up years and the capacity is limited – whether it is the police or FIOD, 
when it comes to these fraud cases taking up huge amounts of limited resources, if 
the state needs to do all of that itself... If you can make them do some preliminary 
work, tell them: it’s in your interest that this thing is investigated so you make sure you 
make a selection for us and substantiate your claims and then we’ll see what we can 
do. (…) Sure they can give us their entire financial administration of the last decade 
with the comment ‘I think there’s something off somewhere in there’ but that won’t 
really do. [Respondent 54 – prosecutor] 
Even in those cases in which the state essentially gives ‘orders’ to the private party, 
making them investigate and not accepting an unsubstantiated report, this is not a 
simple question of public domination. The fact that a pre-selection of the material is 
made makes the process liable to a steering influence by the private parties. 
The state has limited capacity (and expertise) and when there is a report by a forensic 
accountant they will at least have a large portion of the information available. Sure, 
they’ll need to do some things to meet the standard of evidence in court but especially 
when it comes to financial data they’re happy to get it. I have heard that they might 
even take our interview report and just ask the involved person ‘is this what you 
want to say, do you stand by it?’ Relatively easy for them this way. [Respondent 36 – 
corporate investigator]
Although it cannot be ruled out that law enforcement agencies may decide to dig 
deeper and in another direction after all – indeed, one of the frustrations of both 
public and private sector respondents is that much investigative work is repeated 
after a report to law enforcement authorities (Van der Lugt, 2001) – corporate 
investigators may influence the focus of criminal justice investigations by these 
means. The junior partner theory therefore falls short in elucidating the more 
complex social realities of corporate investigations (see also Shearing & Stenning, 
1983). Even in situations which may be considered to be directed by law enforcement 
agencies, corporate investigators cannot be regarded as simple handmaidens to the 
public sector. Indeed, corporate security firms (and departments) introduce into the 
public sphere the private interests of their clients (as a reflection of the way that 
public interests may still be influential in a fully private investigation – see chapter 4). 
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2.2 Loss prevention theory revisited
Junior partner theory, then, provides little help for public/private relations in the 
field of corporate security. One may, then, turn to the other popular theory of private 
security, which is often posed in opposition to the junior partner theory, the ‘loss 
prevention theory’ (also known as ‘economic theory’: Hoogenboom, 1990). This 
theory is primarily focused on the economic relationships between private security 
and its clients. The emphasis on loss reduction instead of crime reduction makes for a 
different focus (private versus public interests). This theory furthermore suggests that 
the activities of law enforcement and private security (especially private investigators) 
are similar (ibid.). Although the theory certainly has merit, the situation warrants a 
more nuanced interpretation. Many investigative methods, for example, are used 
by both public and corporate investigators (though not necessarily in the same way 
or to the same extent: see chapter 3); however, the range of investigative activities 
of corporate investigators is wider (and with new technologies, ever expanding). 
Furthermore, chapter 4 has shown that, although private interests are leading in 
decision making in the investigations and settlement processes, there is also room 
for public interest-type arguments. When it comes to public/private relations, the loss 
prevention theory emphasises that private security poses a threat to the exclusive 
position of the state (ibid.). This is the argument that public and private are ‘fishing 
in the same pond’ and are in that sense competitors and are (partly) interchangeable 
(depending to the needs of the person or organisation affected) (Williams, 2005). This 
is related to the ideas of nodal theorists in the sense that public and private are seen 
to be competing for the same cases (Wood & Shearing, 2007; Shearing & Stenning, 
1983). As respondents suggest, however, this is not necessarily true for corporate 
investigations, for several reasons. 
 First, for reasons described by loss prevention theory itself: the range of ‘problematic 
behaviour’ which can be the object of corporate investigations is not the same as 
that which is described as criminal behaviour in the Criminal Code (see also Williams, 
2005). For this reason alone, corporate investigators and law enforcement agencies 
are not (exclusively) working on the same kinds of cases. Traditionally, the criminal 
justice system has had difficulties responding to white-collar crime in general. There 
have been many initiatives over the years to make fraud a bigger priority within the 
law enforcement system (resulting in several different organisational forms, such 
as specialised teams) and even though a specialised prosecution office such as the 
Functioneel Parket (established in 2003) may boast some success, fraud cases still get 
relatively little attention from law enforcement agencies (see for example Verhoeven, 
2015). The establishment (and disappearance) of specialised fraud units and special 
fraud contact points is evidence of the uneasy relationship of the police organisation 
with white-collar crime (see for example Faber & Van Nunen, 2002). This is not to say 
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that there is no overlap – overlap, however, is not the same as corporate security and 
police being interchangeable. 
 Furthermore, exactly because of the differences in focus between public and 
private, the traditional lack of attention for white-collar crime within the state and 
because of certain ‘appealing’ characteristics of corporate investigators (see chapter 
3 and 4 of this book and Williams, 2005), respondents indicate that many of the 
cases which are investigated by corporate investigators would not end up within the 
criminal justice system. Chapter 3 and 4 focus on reasons for organisations to prefer 
a private solution over the criminal justice process – these will not be repeated here. 
It suffices to say that working towards a criminal conviction is not a primary focus 
of organisations. The criminal justice system does not provide the type of solution 
organisations are looking for and speaking of public/private competition would 
therefore not do justice to the social realities in the corporate investigations sector.
That’s the error in thinking you know. And it’s very persistent in this world. Thinking 
that private investigations are somehow always a stepping stone to a criminal justice 
solution. Sure, but those are the exceptions you know. If there’s no other way to solve 
a matter yourself, if the money’s gone or out of our reach. Then there’s a reason to take 
that path. But otherwise, no. [Respondent 40 – corporate investigator]
While arguing against the idea of dominance of the public sector (prevalent in the 
junior partner theory), Shearing and Stenning (1983: 502/503) state that junior 
partner theory falls short in that it is based on three fallacies: that the private security 
sector is only concerned with minor cases (leaving police to concern itself with the 
more serious matters); that it is the police who directs private security; and that the 
police have more resources to draw upon. Based on my research I agree with these 
arguments. However, the authors continue to state that the relationship between 
public police and private security is “a co-operative one, based principally on the 
exchange of information and services” (ibid.: 503). Button similarly stresses that 
the private security sector is “centred upon the reduction of losses for its corporate 
clients through preventative strategies and working in partnership with the agents 
of the state” (2004: 101), later adding, however, that many fraud investigations never 
reach the criminal justice system. Most of this book shows that ‘cooperation’ may not 
be the best term to signify public/private relationships within corporate security, as 
corporate investigators largely tend to move predominantly in their private niche. 
The next section starts with the presentation of a scheme of ideal types (figure 4), 
which is then elucidated in the following sections of this chapter with the use of 
fieldwork data.
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3. A new coexistence theorisation of corporate 
investigations
A conclusion based on the above, then, is that public/private relationships are not 
easily captured within existing theories. Figure 4 is an expansion of Figure 1 presented 
in chapter 1 of this book, the categories of which may be considered helpful ideal 
types. Within each category there is a wide range of varieties possible. Ad hoc 
coexistence may mean that cooperation – in the sense of working together – may 
ensue. However ad hoc coexistence may very well remain on the very basic level of 
two parallel investigations, only touching in very minor ways – for example because 
in the end the private side shares information with law enforcement, without much 
further contact. In other cases ‘cooperation’ may mean there is minor information 
sharing both ways. It is therefore concluded that the term ‘cooperation’ is misleading 
when it comes to describing the range of possible relationships between the criminal 
justice system and corporate investigators. ‘Coexistence’ is introduced as being a 
better term instead.
 In this section, case studies and interview data are used to examine the types of 
public/private coexistence more closely. A typology of ad hoc coexistence is introduced, 
ranging from ‘private public transfer of information’, through ‘minor mutual information 
sharing’ to ‘coordination of actions’. Case studies derived from the observations are 
used to illustrate this typology, representing good examples of the different categories 
of the typology. Similar examples are also present in the interview data.88
Figure 4. Schematic representation of ideal types in public/private relationships (2) 
88 For type A, discussed in section 3.1, a distinction is made between investigations as a sequence and 
parallel investigations. This distinction is not made for type B (section 3.2) and type C (section 3.3) 
because it is not analytically useful to do so. Although (minor or extensive) information sharing might 
occur after corporate investigations have been finalised (making it sequential), respondents suggest 
that the information flow at this point usually remains at the level of private information flowing to the 
public sector. For this reason, the distinction is only made in section 3.1 of this chapter.
Separation Ad hoc coexistence Obligatory tasks
Private-public
information transfer
Minor mutual
information sharing
Coordination
185
Coexistence
3.1 Type A – Private to public information transfer 
According to respondents, the transfer of information is the most common way in which 
public/private relations manifest themselves. Generally, information is transferred 
to the criminal justice system by private actors through an official report to the law 
enforcement authorities. As discussed in chapter 4, a report is most commonly done 
after corporate investigations have been concluded. However, there also are occasions 
in which law enforcement actors are involved in an earlier stage, for example because 
there are strategic reasons to do so (most notably because the privately generated 
information does not suffice and powers of investigation are necessary to reach 
additional information) (Meerts, 2016). Below, first those (more common) instances 
in which law enforcement actors are involved after the corporate investigations have 
been concluded are discussed, after which ‘parallel involvement’ is elucidated.
3.1.1 Private and public involvement as a sequence
Generally, law enforcement will get involved at the final stage of the investigations, 
preferably after the investigations have been concluded and a report has been made 
(Van der Lugt, 2001). One of the reasons for this, discussed in chapter 4, is that a 
well-substantiated report to the authorities is more likely to be investigated by the 
latter. “For us [the police] it is much easier if a corporate investigator comes to us after 
he’s finished his investigations. And then gives the information to us. Then we won’t 
get in each other’s way you know” [Respondent 56 – police investigator]. Corporate 
investigator respondents indicate that in such cases, they hand over their investigative 
report but usually the contact between corporate investigators and public law 
enforcement ends there. “See, the police won’t notify me about their progress. I 
hand over my material to them but they won’t call me and say, ‘you concluded this 
from your investigations but we found something else’. But if cases reach court I will 
attend” [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]. Much of the information generated 
by police investigations thus stays unknown to corporate investigators and their 
clients. Through a public court, case information may be gathered, however not all 
corporate investigators follow up on these matters.89
89 Internal corporate investigators seem more prone to attend court cases of the people they have 
investigated. This is not surprising, as those investigators who are contracted-in are not paid for this 
activity. When external corporate investigators do attend a court case, it is usually to act as an expert 
witness or provide evidence in another way.
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The description of case study 2 above is an illustration of a situation in which police 
were notified about the results of a corporate investigation, but no official report was 
made. According to the investigators this was done because police had indicated 
at an earlier stage they would not investigate and the corporate investigations did 
not generate enough evidence to change their minds. There was no further contact 
between police and corporate investigators.
 Case study 13 (below) is an example of a case which has been investigated fully 
by corporate investigators and reported to the police in the end. In the report to the 
police, the corporate investigators had given a summary of the relevant information, 
indicating that more detailed information was available when deemed necessary. 
It was a disappointment to the investigators that police did not investigate the 
matter, as they felt it would have been ‘an easy win’ for the police and prosecution. 
Furthermore, the reason for reporting was that public interest was felt to be at stake, 
as there was an organised crime network involved, using the same modus operandi to 
defraud several different companies.
Case study 2 – theft of money
In this case, a care-takers organisation discovered that money had been stolen from a 
resident of one of their care-taking facilities. This organisation decided to report to the 
police but was told there was not much for the police to go on. Observation Company 
1 was contracted to do internal investigations. Before accepting the assignment, 
Observation Company 1 made clear that chances were slim with regard to proving 
what had actually happened. In this case, there was no paper trail, no digital evidence 
or evidence of another kind. The money had been stolen from a vault, to which multiple 
people had access and there was no process in place to check who had accessed it.
 The police were notified after the corporate investigations were concluded but there 
was no conclusive evidence to report. The person who was suspected of the theft did 
not confess to it and other information was circumstantial (consisting of statements by 
colleagues and inconsistencies in the involved person’s story). The police were notified 
and given general information about the case but no official report was made. The 
police took no further action.
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Case studies 2 and 13 are examples of privately generated information moving into the 
public realm by a notification or report to the authorities. In both cases the police did 
not investigate in the end, which is something the corporate investigators learned from 
the client. In many cases, however, corporate investigators do not know what happened 
to a case once they have reported it to the police. As this prosecutor explains this is 
“because, you know, they’re no party in this process. The organisation [client] is. And the 
organisation will be notified about the process if he wants that and it’s his responsibility 
to report that back to the investigators. We don’t do that” [Respondent 54 – prosecutor].
 Case study 21, reported on in the text box below, is another example of a report 
to law enforcement at a late stage. However, the intention of (some of ) the corporate 
investigators here was to involve the police at an earlier stage in order to make strategic 
use of their powers of investigation.90 This type of strategic use of public resources has 
been discussed in chapter 4. Corporate investigators and clients make use of resources 
available in both the public and the private sphere to get to an optimal result (forum 
shopping).
90 From the case studies and observations it could not be derived why the decision was made to wait until 
the end of the investigations (as the investigators of Observation Company 2 did not know). One might 
speculate however, that the reasons for reporting at a late point in time (such as containing damage and 
getting a clear overview before reporting) are also valid here. I have no insight in the internal processes 
within the other company involved, on the basis of which this decision was made.
Case study 13 – embezzlement through false invoices to 
suppliers
In this case, invoices to suppliers were altered to contain a different bank account 
number and website. The money was then paid to shell companies instead of the actual 
suppliers. The security department of Observation Company 2 investigated the case, 
concluding in the end that two temporary workers were responsible for the alterations 
of the invoices. It was suspected by the corporate investigators that the two had been 
strategically placed in the financial administration department by an organised crime 
network with the specific purpose to embezzle money with false invoices.
 After the internal investigations were concluded, a report against the two temporary 
workers was made to the police. The report to the police contained the necessary 
information and was a summary of the report made by corporate investigators. The 
full statements made by the involved persons to the corporate investigators were not 
included in the report to the authorities, but it was stated that these ‘may be provided 
upon request’. Privately generated information was transferred to the criminal justice 
system. The police did not investigate. 
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The three case studies presented above are examples of corporate investigators reporting 
to law enforcement authorities after they have completed the internal investigations. 
Both private and public-sector respondents indicate that many of these cases are not 
investigated further by the criminal justice authorities. The presented cases studies are no 
exception in this regard: they were not investigated by the police or prosecuted (for case 
study 21 it remains unclear whether there was a police investigation and prosecution).
Case study 21 – theft of electronic equipment
In this case the security department of Observation Company 2 was contacted by the 
in house security department of another company (being a client). An employee of (a 
subsidiary of ) Observation Company 2 was suspected by the client of stealing laptops. 
The manager of the subsidiary had bad experiences with the security department of 
the client company and wanted the corporate investigators of Observation Company 2 
to take the lead. These decided otherwise, as the client company was the one affected 
by the behaviour. The journal indicates that the cooperation between the two in-house 
departments did not run very smoothly.
 In the end, a report to the police was made, however, too late according to the lead 
investigator from Observation Company 2, who uttered the opinion that law enforcement 
should have been involved at an earlier stage: “Additionally, there hasn’t been a report to 
the police (yet)! At [date] Investigator of [the client company] did say he would ask the local 
police to act swiftly but apparently this didn’t happen yet. It would have been far better, as 
far as I’m concerned, to have the police involved, they have the powers of investigation and 
could have executed a search. Now we are left empty handed. But it is as it is” [quote from 
the case journal]. In a later entry it is added that “We have given them [investigators from 
the client company] an update about our interviews and again requested them to make a 
report to the police. He said he would. We’ll wait and see” [quote from the case journal].
 Privately generated information was transferred to the criminal justice system. No 
conclusive evidence has been found to link the involved person to the thefts. The corporate 
investigators were unable to obtain the stolen equipment because it was (probably) kept 
in the involved person’s house and they are not allowed to enter. For this reason, the 
corporate investigators from Observation Company 2 were pushing for a report to the 
authorities. No information is available about whether or not the police investigated the 
case, nor whether it was prosecuted.
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3.1.2 Private and public involvement running parallel
Involvement of law enforcement agencies at the stage in which the corporate 
investigations have not yet been finalised is scarcely ever initiated by corporate 
security or its clients.91 Respondents indicate that the choice whether or not to 
involve the authorities is usually made only after corporate investigations have 
provided information to the client on the events which have occurred. However, it 
might prove important to involve authorities at an earlier stage, when investigations 
have not been terminated yet (see also chapter 4). The main reason for this is that the 
corporate investigations are not yielding the results necessary to solve the problem 
(see also Gunther Moor & Van der Vijver, 2001). 
 
If they come to [the prosecution office] during their investigations, it’s usually because 
they can’t get to the information themselves and think, the police and the justice 
department have more powers to get to things they can’t get to. For example when 
they find a missing amount of money which has been funnelled to god knows where, 
then we have more options to seize the money. [Respondent 54 – prosecutor]
Some cases that are investigated by corporate investigators actually originate 
from actions by public law enforcement agencies. Stimulated by whistle-blowers, 
supervisory agencies, tax information and/or criminal intelligence, law enforcement 
agencies (also including special investigative units of for example the tax authority) 
may investigate norm violations within an organisation. The organisation in question 
might subsequently hire (or use internal) corporate investigators to get a handle on 
the situation:
We had such a situation in a case, it started with a police raid. We were hired by the 
organisation to investigate as well. It is very difficult for us in such a situation that the 
police won’t share any information. It depends on the circumstances of course, here 
there was a lot of political pressure so the prosecutor was very wary. There was no 
information sharing whatsoever. [Respondent 5 – corporate investigator]
Typically, the organisation will receive no information as long as the criminal 
investigations are still ongoing, the only exception being the information necessary 
for cooperation with the criminal investigations (an organisation may for example be 
informed that a search will be executed on the premises). The organisation in question 
would therefore have to wait until the criminal investigations have been concluded 
and suspects indicted, to get more information. This is problematic, as no action can 
91 Although respondents indicate that some clients tend to want to report to the authorities right away 
because it is ‘the right thing to do’ (see chapter 4).
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be taken by the organisation until then (for example dismiss or suspend the people 
involved). On the subject of this lack of information sharing more generally, and the 
issues it produces for organisations, this respondent states:
So what happens when law enforcement gets involved? An organisation may report 
and they’ll tell them the case has no priority so the report is written down but they 
won’t investigate. Or they do investigate and somewhere along the lines it all breaks 
down or the case is dropped. Or they only take two or three pieces out of the bigger 
story and the involved person is convicted for that but that’s not going to solve the 
problem for the organisation. Or when action needs to be taken labour law-wise and 
the criminal investigations take two years, what are you to do with your labour issue? 
Are you supposed to suspend someone for two years waiting for a trial? And what if 
he appeals his conviction? So it’s all great, saying that it is only the police who should 
investigate but that’s not very realistic. [Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]
In such cases, corporate investigators are often hired to do a parallel investigation, 
so the organisation will be able to act. Typically, the corporate and criminal justice 
investigations remain separate and run parallel, without much contact between 
corporate investigators and law enforcement actors.
Those investigations run parallel to each other usually. There’s no information sharing 
besides that we give our results to the justice department. At most you may have a 
collegial conversation about how long their investigations will take, what parts they’ll 
investigate. But we will not be given information. We know more or less what they’re 
doing because through the client we know who they have interrogated etc. They 
always zoom in at some particular part while the client wants to have the full picture. 
[Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]
As already commented upon by the respondent quoted above, corporate investigators 
may still deduce the focus of the criminal investigations without formally getting 
information from law enforcement actors.
We have our suspicions of course, because they interrogate people and those people 
get a copy [of the interrogation report] so through those means we get to know which 
direction they’re taking. And in this case [real estate fraud], we know they are focussing 
only on some projects but which ones..? We can guess through the questions they ask. 
But that’s not even close to a full picture, essentially we don’t really know what they 
are doing. [Respondent 3 – corporate investigator]
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Case study 9 (below) is an example of early involvement of law enforcement actors. 
Both investigations ran parallel, not sharing information until the corporate 
investigations were concluded. In this case, although law enforcement agencies were 
involved almost from the start, the corporate investigations report proved leading for 
the police investigations. In an informal conversation, an investigator explained that 
the police postponed most of their investigative efforts until Observation Company 1 
provided them with a report of the corporate investigations. In this way, the corporate 
investigations report served as a guide to criminal justice investigations (being an 
example of the steering influence corporate investigators may have in criminal justice 
investigations – see chapter 4).
As discussed in chapter 4, respondents indicate that when they report to law 
enforcement authorities with the results of their own investigations, this enhances 
their chances of the case being investigated and prosecuted. This is no guarantee, 
however: many cases are still left un-investigated by the criminal justice system (as 
was the case with the case studies discusses in section 3.1.1). Investigations starting 
by criminal justice investigations efforts, with corporate investigators getting 
involved later, often are investigated and prosecuted in the criminal justice system, 
respondents suggest. As this involves an initial investment of law enforcement actors 
(which is not the case if a norm violation is initially only investigated by corporate 
Case study 9 – employee fraud
An administrative manager used his position to embezzle money. He made false invoices 
for fictitious bills, while actually investing the company’s money on his own behalf. 
Observation Company 1 was contracted to investigate and reclaim the money. At an 
early stage, a report to the police was also made, involving law enforcement actors. 
Initially, the prosecutor did not seem eager to prosecute the matter but eventually the 
case was investigated and prosecuted. For a large part, the criminal investigations and 
prosecution were based on the corporate investigations report. 
 One of the investigators has indicated that the corporate and criminal investigations 
ran parallel (they happened at the same time), without overlap between them. 
Observation Company 1 was contracted to investigate internally with the aim of building 
a civil case and reclaiming money. However, the mission statement of the assignment 
also states that “[Observation Company 1] will provide assistance in civil actions and a 
criminal report to the police”. In the end the corporate report was used as the basis for 
the prosecution. Through the report to the police, privately generated information was 
transferred to the public realm.
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investigators), this is not surprising. Investigative efforts would have already been 
made by law enforcement, making the abortion of the case less likely than in a 
situation when no manpower has been spent on the case yet.92
 Case study 20 is another example of a report to law enforcement being made 
early on. In this case, pressure from corporate clients of the organisation led to early 
reporting. It seems that, as was the case in case study 9, there was no information 
sharing between the corporate and police investigators up till the point of reporting 
the crime to the police. 
As the description of the case studies in this section shows, corporate investigations, 
commencing after criminal investigations have already started, are an addition to the 
latter, providing the organisation with information and – as police and prosecution are 
already involved – usually complementing police evidence with additional information, 
through an official report to the authorities. In these instances corporate investigations 
may indeed serve as an addition to criminal justice proceedings in the way the junior 
partner theory describes. In most instances, however, the criminal justice proceeding is 
initiated at a later point in time as an addition to the private investigations (either after the 
investigations have been finalised or during the investigations, e.g. when investigative 
powers are necessary). In this way, the assumptions of the junior partner theory may be 
considered inverted.
92 This is not to say that cases might not still be abandoned (or put on hold) by law enforcement agencies.
Case study 20 – employee fraud
The organisation of a large store which is part of Observation Company 2 was discovered 
to be faulty. Among other things there were issues with the manipulation of the rewards 
structure for sales, items were given away for free to costumers, there were problems 
with invoices and with the delivery of goods, and signatures were forged. Many of the 
identified norm violations could not be defined as criminal, but rather as being against 
corporate policy. All of this led to disgruntled (corporate) clients and the loss of clientele. 
Through pressure of these clients, a report to the police was made before the corporate 
investigations were finalised. 
 There is no mention of Observation Company 2 receiving information from the police. 
It seems that the investigations ran parallel (from the moment law enforcement got 
involved) and that the corporate investigators were not informed about the progress 
of the police investigations. Private information was transferred to the public realm 
through a report to the authorities. 
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 Respondents indicate that this type of information sharing is the most common – law 
enforcement agencies demanding or simply accepting information but not volunteering 
it. Investigations run parallel and contact is limited: the two separate investigations 
coexist. In their own domain, corporate investigators are still autonomous; however, when 
information and cooperation is demanded from them by law enforcers they will have to 
comply. In terms of primacy, the centre of gravity therefore lies with the criminal justice 
investigations. Corporate security is here merely a (very useful) bystander, in no position 
to demand information in return for their ‘cooperation’. “But if you pay close attention to 
what they [public law enforcement agencies] want from you, you may derive from their 
questions the focus of their investigations” [Respondent 27 – corporate investigator].
3.2 Type B – Minor mutual information sharing
While the coexistence between public and private actors described above only 
involves an information flow from private to public, there are cases in which there is 
some form of (minor) mutual information sharing. “Sharing information, it makes the 
picture you’re painting so much more complete than if we as the police work on our 
case and for example the bank works on theirs. If they share their information with us 
and we share ours with them, nowadays we get good results from that” [Respondent 
22 – police investigator]. In most instances, the majority of information still flows from 
private to public, however corporate investigators may also get something in return.
We get some information, for example they may tell us they want to interrogate 
someone. That kind of stuff, that they’ll keep you in the loop that something is 
about to happen. Sometimes you get the offer that when everything is done you 
get together and talk everything over. Never heard from that one again though. You 
know, information is shared but we share a lot and they share a little. [Respondent 
18 – corporate investigator]
Private sector respondents indicate that most of the information they receive is in 
line with the experiences of respondent 18 (quoted above). Usually it is not very 
detailed or informative, being more about investigative activities than investigative 
results. The information that may be shared by law enforcement may be purely meant 
as useful to corporate investigators, however often it is also beneficial to the criminal 
justice investigations when corporate investigators and their clients are aware of 
for example a planned search on the premises, since they may then ensure that the 
people who have access to certain areas of the building are present.
 Case study 1 is an example of this type of coexistence, in which some information 
was shared both ways. Although the investigators in case study 1 have indicated in 
informal conversations during observation 1 that they have done their investigations 
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separately from and parallel to the criminal justice investigations, there was some 
degree of coordination between public and private, at a later stage at least. It is 
interesting to note that although the public and private investigations merely 
coexisted for a large part, both corporate investigators and police investigators felt 
they were in good contact with each other.
Mention of minor mutual information sharing is far less prevalent than private to 
public information transfer in the observations, case studies and the interviews. 
Section 4 of this chapter focuses specifically on the issue of mutual information 
sharing. This is a pivotal point in much private/public relationships and a source of 
frustration on both sides. When information is shared by law enforcement authorities, 
Case study 1 – irregularities with construction tenders
Case study 1 was brought to the attention of the client of Observation Company 1 by a 
police raid. The police had been investigating for some time already, the organisation 
being completely unaware of this. No information was given to the organisation about 
the allegations. Observation Company 1 was approached by the organisation to 
investigate. From the initial investigations, other investigations followed.
 There was no cooperation, investigations ran parallel to each other. After some time, 
information was shared between the prosecutor and the law firm that acted as the client 
for Observation Company 1. This information was then made available to Observation 
Company 1. The information that was shared consisted of a notification that a suspect 
had been arrested, the grounds for the arrest and the scope of the investigations: “The 
investigations by the prosecution office are limited (capacity). They’ll only look into 
some dossiers. They will not investigate subject X unless we provide a report about him” 
[quote from the case journal]. The latter circumstance led Observation Company 1 to 
speed up its investigations, so police and prosecution could take the privately generated 
information about this person into account, alongside their own information.
 Although information sharing or cooperation was very limited and happened only 
at a late stage (the prosecutor initially prohibiting this), the corporate investigators 
felt they had established good contact with the police. For a long time, the corporate 
investigators were in the dark regarding the police investigations (the same being also 
true the other way around). The corporate investigators did not volunteer all of their 
information, because, as one investigator explained, “it is not in the client’s interest 
to have law enforcement access all the information from the much broader corporate 
investigations”. Such access might have led to an indictment of the organisation, as 
there were major flaws in the control structures of the organisation.
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it usually remains at the limited level described in this subsection, exemplified by case 
study 1. However, more extensive information sharing also occurs – in this chapter 
this is called ‘coordination of actions’.
3.3 Type C – Coordination of actions
Although ad hoc contacts between public and private actors commonly remain at 
the level of minor information sharing in one way or another, close cooperation also 
exists, though it is not very common according to respondents (see also Van der Lugt, 
2001). In those rare cases, law enforcement actors and corporate investigators work 
together to get the best results. This may mean that the prosecutor and lead police or 
FIOD investigators meet with the corporate investigators to talk things over.
I think both sides can benefit from just talking to each other. And to confer, to learn 
to trust each other. Say a big listed company finds out at a certain point that they 
have a corruption issue within their company. That means the company is in trouble, 
they’re going to have reputational issues and the stock value will react but it also has 
a criminal component. It also brings about an environment that we don’t want to have 
as a society. I think, in a case like that, you can benefit greatly by coordinating with 
each other early on, getting the full picture, pinpointing the problem, deciding who is 
going to do what. I can imagine that we will focus from a criminal law perspective on 
that one employee who has behaved so badly and make a case out of that and that we 
coordinate with the company and give them the opportunity to put measures in place 
to prevent it in future. And to inform their stake holders. The company will definitely 
not be served by us running around in there, searching the whole premises without 
a plan and exposing them to bad press, we don’t want that either. I think you gain a 
lot by just talking to each other early on. And that’s hard, you know, it’s hard for us as 
well, we’re not used to sharing information. Or to trust that a company will cooperate. 
We know these companies as the bad guys. So it’s a process. But for the effect you 
want to produce, it’s best to inform each other early on. [Respondent 52 – prosecutor]
As this prosecutor indicates, close cooperation may also mean that tasks are 
divided between public and private actors. Police and prosecution typically only 
investigate what is necessary for a conviction. When, for example, fifteen instances 
of embezzlement have taken place, five may end up in criminal court. Corporate 
investigators may then – sometimes with the information which has come up during 
law enforcement investigations – focus their efforts on the remaining ten instances. 
So everybody can do their own thing you know. Let the police and prosecution focus 
on the person, on the suspect and let the private investigator record the nature and 
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scope of the fraud, maybe together with the police and prosecutor especially when 
it comes to retrieving the assets. Then everybody is doing what they do best with 
respect for one-another and you just share information based on the possibilities our 
legal system grants you. [Respondent 13 – corporate investigator]
Case study 11 (see below) is a good example of this type of coexistence. In this 
case, the specialised FIOD detectives of the tax authority were investigating prior to 
the corporate investigators. From the beginning, there was much cooperation and 
coordination between the law enforcement and corporate investigators, coordinating 
their actions. For a large part, the criminal and corporate investigations were aligned 
in this case.
 
Case study 11 – theft of equipment and fencing
Case study 11 came to the attention of FIOD investigators by accident, through a traffic 
violation. It turned out that the suspect had in his possession some unusual equipment 
and had unexplained income. During their investigations, FIOD investigators discovered 
that he was an employee of Observation Company 2. The in-house security department 
was contacted and after details about the equipment were given, the corporate 
investigators found the equipment was indeed company property.
 From the start, information was shared both ways and meetings were held about 
the case. For example, Observation Company 2 was brought up to speed prior to the 
moment that the premises would be searched. This seemed to be both a courtesy 
call and a necessity, as help from the company was necessary for an efficient search 
of its premises. Seized administration was investigated by both, and the corporate 
investigators received information they required from the prosecutor and FIOD. At the 
same time, the corporate investigators also investigated some matters specifically at 
the request of the prosecutor/FIOD. Corporate investigators followed the pace of the 
criminal investigations (moving slower than they otherwise would), to avoid impeding 
the criminal investigations. Interviews were held only after the involved persons had 
been arrested and released pending trial. 
 The corporate investigations were wider than the criminal justice investigations. At a 
certain point, Observation Company 2 made two official reports to the FIOD. In addition, 
civil action was brought against two subjects and labour action was taken against other 
people involved (dismissal, official warning). An audit report was made to identify and 
fix internal shortcomings within the organisation and (an anonymised version of ) the 
case was published on the intranet of the organisation.
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Case study 11 may be considered a rare example of cooperation between corporate 
investigators and the criminal justice system. Although many respondents provide 
an example of this kind of (more or less) close cooperation, they also indicate this 
form of public/private relations hardly ever occurs. For example, in case study 11, the 
prosecutor and FIOD investigators kept corporate investigators closely involved after 
the discovery that the equipment was indeed company property, in contrast to the 
usual practice of law enforcement agencies to continue with their own investigations 
without sharing information with corporate investigators or their client. The role of 
the prosecutor seems essential for this (see for more on this below). Primacy is not 
given to either the public or private side in such cases – both conduct their own 
investigations but keep in close contact and coordinate actions so as to not impair 
efforts of the other. 
I’ve had cases in which we could coordinate at the level, ‘what are you investigating, 
what are we investigating’, because if you have reported you don’t want to impair their 
investigations. I may for example say, ‘we need to finish our internal investigations so 
we want to interview this person but let me know whether that will be an issue for the 
criminal investigations right now’. [Respondent 30 – forensic legal investigator/client]
4. A closer look at information sharing
It would be great if the sector would get a person to contact within the public prosecution 
office. So we could talk, with all the guarantees of confidentiality on both sides. They have 
some projects with private investigation firms when it comes to vehicle theft but that’s 
more about what a report should look like to get it to the prosecution. The ultimate would 
be, we did our investigations, the subject has confessed, the only thing the prosecutor 
has to do still is to interrogate again with the formal caution. If he [the involved person] 
confirms that he stands by what he said to us, done deal. Efficient for everyone involved. 
This isn’t always possible of course, sometimes they need to investigate further, use their 
investigative powers. But that’s the ultimate thing, when they can use our report with 
minor effort for them. [Respondent 1 – corporate investigator]
The above typology of different kinds of coexistence, ranging from wide apart to 
quite close, revolves in a fair measure around the level of information sharing. For 
respondents, coexistence, and more specifically ‘cooperation’, largely revolves around 
information sharing, rather than cooperation in the broader meaning of the word. 
In practice, the process of (non) information sharing results in many frustrations on 
both the public and the private side. Corporate investigators for example feel they are 
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only providing information, without getting something in return. Contacts with law 
enforcement officials are often characterised by difficulties, not merely when it comes 
to the information flow from public to private, but also the other way around.
Why does it have to be so difficult? Say I want to get in touch with the police detective 
working on the case – with whom I have talked before! – but I don’t have his number. 
I call the general number but they won’t even put me through or give me contact 
information. I just want to give you additional information for your case and I don’t 
even get to talk to the right person. Why? [Respondent 48 – corporate investigator]
Chapter 3 and 4 have discussed some of the most important reasons for organisations 
not to report to the authorities. A lack of confidence in the expertise of law enforcement 
officials is a prominent reason, as is the complaint that reports of ‘these types of 
crimes’ (white-collar crime) are not being investigated by law enforcement. Although 
this is something the majority of corporate security respondents mentioned, some 
respondents also indicate that they understand why this is the case. This lawyer, 
who sometimes acts as a client to corporate investigators and sometimes as the 
investigator himself, feels that corporate investigators should not complain: 
The other day, I was at an investigation firm or something like that and they were 
complaining that police will not react to their reports. So I told them, of course the 
state won’t act. Why should it care about a 1000 sunglasses that have been stolen, 
aren’t they your sunglasses? Take care of it yourself. Make sure you lock your container 
properly. You can report it to the government and they can write it up but don’t you 
tell me you expect this copper who needs to make sure senior citizens are not robbed 
has to go and take care of your sunglasses. And if you have a serious case and they 
won’t act because they don’t get it, well then you didn’t do your job. Then you’ll have 
to make sure your report to them is better. And that you go to the right place to 
report. [Respondent 32 – forensic legal investigator/client]
The above quote relates back to the question of which interests are/should be served 
by investigations. In chapter 4 the normative considerations involved in the corporate 
investigations and settlement process show that corporate investigators take more into 
account than the private interests of clients. Similarly, clients may feel that in a certain 
case, ‘the public interest’ is at stake and they decide to report to the authorities. As case 
study 13, discussed in section 3.1.1, shows, this assessment of interests involved might 
not be enough for the criminal justice system to take action. The general capacity of 
the criminal justice system is limited – and the capacity for white-collar offences is even 
less (Beckers, 2017).
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 Many public-sector respondents are sympathetic when it comes to the difficulties 
private parties face with regard to getting in contact with them. This public prosecutor 
for example states: “I can see why private investigators find it hard to get to the right 
people in the police. And sometimes they even are told that they can’t report because 
they’re not the victim but their client is. We really need to get rid of that kind of red 
tape” [Respondent 54 – prosecutor]. However, respondents also point out that the 
venue a private party chooses is important in this respect as well. There have been many 
changes in (especially) the Dutch police organisation in the last decade, which makes it 
difficult for corporate investigators to reach the right people (because they have been 
transferred to a different department, because the department was dissolved, etc.). 
We [corporate investigators] want to be informed, depending on the case this will 
happen. Sometimes they’ll tell you nothing, sometimes you’re informed when they 
arrest people, sometimes you read things in the newspapers, and sometimes the 
prosecutor informs us that the case is pending for trial or that they’ll take no further 
action. This depends on the person of the police officer and the prosecutor. But we 
find that if we know them from previous cases things run much smoother. Well, we’re 
only human in the end, aren’t we? [Respondent 14 – corporate investigator]
One frequently mentioned solution to this problem is to have one central point of 
communication for corporate investigators (nationally or regionally organised), as 
also suggested by the respondent quoted at the beginning of this section. In the 
past, there have been multiple (regional) ‘fraud contact points’. In the multiple 
reorganisations of the police organisation and prosecution office, most of these 
special points of contact have been abolished. It seems that only Rotterdam has 
preserved it, which is regarded as positive by respondents from both the public and 
the private sector. 
It’s hard to find the right person within the Dutch police. For me as well. In Rotterdam, 
we have a central point of contact for fraud cases. They used to be everywhere but in 
the new police structure they did not return. Rotterdam is the only one who wanted 
to retain it because it proved useful. I’m sure it will come back in other parts of the 
country as well. Organisations and private investigators need it, I mean when they 
come to report and end up at the general desk – I mean the policemen there can write 
a report but when things get a little complicated they won’t know what to do. So it’s 
convenient if they could call a fraud contact within their force. And it goes both ways, 
I mean it’s convenient for me as well if I know who to contact in, say, a bank for formal 
requests. [Respondent 56 – police investigator]
200
Chapter 5
Special contact points are often mentioned in interviews as a way to improve the 
communication between law enforcement officials and corporate investigators. As 
this respondent explains, it takes much effort to get a case to the right person within 
the police organisation:
But it means you have to put in a lot of effort because it starts with someone in 
uniform, then it gets to a department where it stays for a long time, eventually it’s 
kicked over to a different department and every time you need to push the case, ask 
who is involved, who is working on it. This case ended up at the right place but is 
certainly not a given. [Respondent 18 – corporate investigator]
Those private sector respondents who have some experience with specialised fraud 
units within the police and especially with specialised agencies such as FIOD and the 
fraud department of the public prosecution office (Functioneel Parket – FP), are much 
more positive about these contacts and about the expertise of the public officials 
than those who have dealt with general police forces and prosecutors. Not only is it 
the case that these specialised law enforcement actors have expertise when it comes 
to complex financial investigations, they also tend to be more open to the private 
interests involved in a case and to have a more comprehensive understanding of 
the laws regulating public/private cooperation and information sharing. Still, the 
question remains what the gain in information sharing would be, should there be a 
central point of entry for corporate investigators. The structural problems for long-
term cooperation as set out above also apply to information sharing (although maybe 
to a lesser extent as information sharing requires less long- to mid-term efforts for 
investigators). As a case in point one may regard the pilots meant to streamline the 
use of information generated by private investigation firms in the criminal justice 
process, mentioned in section 1 of this chapter. To facilitate information sharing on 
the cases included in pilot 2, a structure for formal, recurrent deliberation between 
police, prosecution and private investigators was put in place to discuss the progress 
of cases. The report following this pilot states that for none of the cases included 
in the pilot this was actually used – instead the (occasional) consultations occurred 
on a more informal basis (Kuin & Wilms, 2015). Van Ruth and Gunther Moor (1997: 
287) have made a similar observation almost two decades earlier in their report on 
informal information sharing by the police, based on case studies: even for formal 
information sharing, (pre-existing) social networks and informal contacts are essential. 
Respondents furthermore indicate that the role of the individual prosecutor involved 
in the case is essential for whether or not information is shared both ways. The next 
section explores this role a bit further.
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4.1  Ad hoc information sharing with the private sector: the 
importance of the prosecutor
Whether or not actual information sharing is possible for law enforcement is a highly 
debated subject. The general opinion of respondents (both public and private) 
seems to be that there is very little legal leeway to share information with private 
parties. Nonetheless, some respondents indicate that there actually is some room 
for information sharing with private actors (see also Blonk et al., 2017). From the 
interviews and case studies, a picture emerges in which the public prosecutor has a 
pivotal role in the sharing of information. Police forces are very wary when it comes 
to sharing information. Just as Van Ruth and Gunther Moor already described in 
1997, police officers seem not to be very well-informed when it comes to the rules of 
information sharing.
The police are being difficult with these kinds of things. In some areas they are more 
flexible – because the law does actually allow it when necessary for the repression of 
crime, the maintenance of public order or whatever, article 19 Politiewet [‘police law’]. 
So some police know this and know how to deal with it. But others are still: ‘no way’. 
[Respondent 40 – corporate investigator]
The public prosecutor is the leader of any criminal justice investigation. It is, therefore, 
the prosecutor who should take decisions on whether or not information may be 
shared by the police. Respondents indicate that the willingness of a prosecutor will 
determine whether or not corporate investigators may receive information. This is 
exemplified by the role of the prosecutor in the case studies mentioned above. In 
case study 11, in which there was extensive cooperation and information sharing, 
the prosecutor was willing to look for opportunities to not only receive information 
from corporate investigators but also to return the favour. The journal of the private 
investigations of case study 11 shows many details of the FIOD investigations. As 
mentioned before, this situation seems to be rather exceptional. A more common 
attitude of the prosecutor – one of caution – may be found in case study 1. While 
contacts with the police were deemed ‘good’ by the corporate investigators and 
in informal conversations with the investigators of the case it was indicated to me 
that police were willing to share information, it was prohibited by the prosecutor. 
The journal shows evidence of corporate investigators being in the dark with regard 
to much of the police investigations, as this quote from the journal exemplifies: 
“[Suspect X] has been arrested, but we don’t know on what grounds (it is not about 
[…] though)”.
 The law regulating the way the police organisation handles information, the Wpol 
[Wet politiegegevens], dictates that in general, information may not be shared with 
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others than law enforcement officers (article 15). However, article 19 of this law states 
that there are some exceptions ‘when necessary for an important public interest’, one 
of which is the prevention and repression of crime. This will happen under auspices 
of the prosecutor (article 19 Wpol and article 12 Politiewet). In the same vein, the law 
regulating the use of information gathered through judicial and criminal procedures, 
the Wjsg [Wet justitiële en strafvorderlijke gegevens], indicates in article 39f that 
information may be shared with persons and organisations outside the criminal 
justice system under certain circumstances. The heads of the prosecution office, the 
College of Attorney Generals, have drafted a policy brief on the interpretation of 
article 39f Wjsg.93 Nevertheless, the use of article 39f Wjsg is subject to differences in 
interpretation in practice.
I think the police should be obliged by law to give us information based on a checklist 
or something. When the requirements of the checklist are met they should be able 
to provide information. Now, we do everything, bring them a complete case, give 
them all our information and we get nothing back. They just say ‘we’re not allowed 
to’. But there is a policy brief from the prosecution office which indicates that some 
information may be given to parties concerned. They have to take proportionality and 
subsidiarity into account, look whether or not the motives of the party concerned are 
pure, things like that. So it is possible but the police hide behind privacy regulations. 
They say ‘wait for the court case, you can ask for the information then’. But it will take 
forever for a case to get to court, and that is if they even decide to prosecute. We 
need the information now, it’s relevant now, we need to take action now. We could 
be wrong you know, maybe the police will find out with their powers of investigation 
that it wasn’t him, or maybe we couldn’t quite get to the truth and didn’t get to an 
involved person in the first place. You need their information then. And they’ll say ‘we 
can’t give you that, you know this, having a police background’. But it is possible. So I 
called the prosecutor and told him about this policy brief. Well, within half an hour it 
was in my mailbox. [Respondent 48 – corporate investigator]
The quote presented above shows that not all prosecutors are aware of the guidelines 
provided by the College of Attorney Generals. Although there does seem to be some 
legal leeway as described above, the dominant view on both the public and the private 
side seems to be that the possibilities are very limited. Some police professionals 
are even unwilling to cooperate with private actors in any way (Van Ruth & Gunther 
Moor, 1997). However, some respondents indicate that this might be due in part to 
the fear of – especially – the police to act illegally on this account. “But us police-
93 See https://www.om.nl/organisatie/beleidsregels/overzicht-0/privacy/@86303/aanwijzing-0/.
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people, we’re just afraid to speak you know. Police-people have the tendency to be 
afraid to do something out of bounds. One wrong remark to a lawyer and there’s a 
feature in the newspapers tomorrow. So police and prosecution tend to be reluctant 
when it comes to sharing information” [Respondent 9 – police investigator]. Lack of 
specific knowledge about the rules exacerbates this reluctance – actors know there 
are rules but not the details of these rules, which makes them extra wary (Van Ruth 
& Gunther Moor, 1997: 266).94 This reluctance is interesting in light of the arguments 
private sector respondents put forward on a different topic – the fact that they see a 
discretion deficit in the criminal justice system. As explained in chapter 4, clients and 
corporate security investigators feel that the sensitive information which they hand 
over to the criminal justice system might be volunteered to newspapers and such. On 
the other hand, one of the key features of the corporate security sector is its emphasis 
on discretion and secrecy (Williams, 2005). This highly-valued characteristic however, 
seems to be regarded as a bad trait in law enforcement. The fact that it is very difficult 
for corporate investigators to receive information from law enforcement actors is one 
of the major grievances of corporate investigators. 
Look, we’re bound to regulation as much as they are. Maybe even more. The 
government has to take the law into account, we have to do that as well but in 
addition to Dutch law, the law of every jurisdiction we’re in applies. And just looking 
at Dutch regulation – we can’t just share information about our clients. So saying they 
[police] can’t share anything and we can share everything is nonsense. They might get 
into trouble internally within the police organisation, for us it might be a hundredfold 
worse. So that’s no argument not to share. I think we should all try to find a way. And 
I’m not talking about investigative information about any active cases, I don’t want 
that. I have no use for it and don’t want to run the risk of compromising a criminal 
investigation by knowing too much. [Respondent 10 – corporate investigator]
While there is consideration for this from the side of law enforcement, respondents 
simultaneously emphasise the importance of such rules, especially for law 
enforcement information.95
94 Van Ruth and Gunther Moor also point to the possibility that this vague understanding of the rules 
might actually lead to more informal information sharing because people then fall back on what they 
themselves feel is appropriate. The authors were writing at a different time than the one this research is 
examining and the growing pressure on the police organisation in the last decades might explain why 
I have found little evidence pointing in this direction. Respondents anecdotally indicate that informal 
information is now more difficult and less prevalent than before (although, it is possible, of course, that 
this has to be attributed to nostalgia).
95 This is not to say corporate investigators do not see the value of these rules – many of them state they 
understand, however they would like (limited) access, based on certain standards.
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We are bound to strict rules when it comes to information gathered through criminal 
investigations. Which is appropriate because we are bound to be cautious with 
a suspect’s information, that’s his right. That’s why we’re doing the whole criminal 
justice thing in the first place, otherwise we could just use vigilante justice. It’s not like 
we find it desirable to have someone stand in the square in the scaffold for everyone 
to mock. That’s the thing we didn’t want. So those rules are important but at the 
same time, I do get that the corporate sector feels they are just providing information 
without getting anything in return. [Respondent 52 – prosecutor] 
The situation, described in 2001 by Klerks, Van Meurs and Scholtes – that law 
enforcement professionals are not quite sure which information they may legitimately 
share – seems to still hold true. Law enforcement professionals tend to be overly 
cautious, even though there is some manoeuvre room for them. As this public 
prosecutor from the specialised fraud office, quoted directly above, continues:
I am still bound by these strict regulations, but if you try to understand one another 
and look for each other’s interests, then you’ll see that there is some room. Within 
those rules, there are some possibilities left. One important reason for me to share 
information is when a company has been aggrieved. An aggrieved party has the 
right to do damage control. And in the context of damage control I can give them 
certain information, giving them the opportunity to control their damage. It’s not 
the full record of course but at least some parts. And I can for example tell them we 
have seized assets, so they can try to confiscate that. We can at least give them the 
opportunity to get the money back in that way. [Respondent 52 – prosecutor]
Much, then, relies on the knowledge of individual law enforcement professionals 
with regard to the legal framework and on their willingness to cooperate or share 
information with private parties.
A prosecutor can share information with the person or organisation affected, that’s 
article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [article 51 WvSv]. And information such as 
‘we found these assets’, that won’t hurt the suspect [in his defence]. I’m not interested 
in his personal circumstances, his bad childhood et cetera. So if the prosecutor doesn’t 
want to share that with me that’s ok, I don’t need to know. So it’s possible to share 
information while respecting each other’s position. And I feel it’s perfectly normal for 
a prosecutor to have certain demands, quality-wise, for the information we give them. 
And I have been baffled for years why this isn’t working in practice. [Respondent 13 – 
corporate investigator]
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To summarise, there are formalised opportunities to share information between 
public and private investigators. Much of the legal leeway in this regard rests on the 
rights the organisation has as the aggrieved party (in the same way that many of 
corporate security’s investigative possibilities rest on the rights of the organisation 
as an employer). This provides an additional barrier as some law enforcement 
professionals do not regard corporate investigators as the ones who are entitled 
to the information, even when they are explicitly acting on behalf of their client. 
Discretion on the side of the criminal justice system – often claimed by corporate 
investigators and clients to be lacking (information is seen to be leaked to journalists) 
– is a frequently mentioned barrier for information sharing. Many commentators 
therefore, have expressed the fear that information is shared illegally, through the 
informal circuit. Section 4.2 focuses on such informal networks.
4.2 Informal networks
Above the importance of ‘knowing the right people’ has been touched upon. As a 
result of the law enforcement background of many corporate investigators, there are 
many long-term connections between corporate investigators and law enforcement 
professionals (Williams, 2005). The networks existing between (public and private) 
investigators are subject of much debate. One recurrent theme in literature is the 
danger of old boys’ networks (see for example Hoogenboom, 1988). This concept comes 
down to the informal use of contacts between former police officers, now working in 
the private sector, and their former colleagues (Van Ruth & Moor, 1997). The term ‘old 
boys’ network’ has a negative connotation and is usually used to signify the misuse of 
former contacts to get to information one should not have. Despite the concerns which 
are voiced frequently, there is little evidence of misuse of contacts occurring regularly 
(Klerks, Van Meurs & Scholtes, 2001).
 Although it cannot – of course – be absolutely ruled out that illegitimate use of 
contacts takes place,96 respondents stress the counter-productiveness of such an 
approach for the goal they want to reach (which is, finding a solid solution to problems). 
Pragmatically, the utility of any ‘grey’ information that might be given by police to 
corporate investigators would be strictly limited, as it cannot be included in any reports 
compiled by the latter. “Should they [the police] give us information we shouldn’t have 
and the truth comes out, they’re in trouble. Plus, it’s useless to me anyway. If I get 
information I’m not allowed to use, well it’s nice to know but what good does it do me? 
We both know this. So it’s pointless to try and get informal information” [Respondent 
15 – corporate investigator]. Although utility may be limited as a recognised source of 
96 Recently, the court of Oost-Brabant has ruled that a police officer had illegally accessed police systems 
to gather information for a former colleague (see ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2016:7193). These kinds of cases are 
rare though.
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information, illegitimately obtained information may still have value as a starting point 
or a general direction for corporate investigations. In this sense, illegitimately obtained 
evidence may have a purpose for corporate investigators (and law enforcement alike). 
From a strictly rational point of view, illegitimately sharing information may sometimes 
be beneficial and sometimes be harmful. Interestingly, both public and private sector 
respondents stress the counter-productiveness of illegitimate working on the longer 
term (by tarnishing their and the client’s reputation) and the fact that it is ‘morally wrong’. 
We may discern the non-contractual moral agency discussed by Loader & White (2017) 
and at various points in this book. The principles of law used as guidelines for corporate 
investigations may produce a (moral) consciousness for corporate investigators, leading 
them to weigh pragmatic and normative considerations at different stages of their 
professional activities. As this corporate investigator states: “you need to protect each 
other in that sense and make sure you don’t do anything compromising to yourself or 
the other” [Respondent 40 – corporate investigator].
I have cut my ties with former colleagues, I don’t want to get anyone in trouble. 
Leaking information from within the force will cost them their jobs. I have a lot of 
friends and family there but you shouldn’t ask for information they’re not allowed 
to give you. And besides, that information is useless. I can get much more valuable 
information from the internet than from the informal circuits. [Respondent 48 – 
corporate investigator]
Many respondents stress this duality of, on the one hand finding no use for illegally 
obtained information, and on the other not wanting to risk the permit (in the case 
of private investigation firms) or more generally their own reputation. Chapter 2 has 
shown that many corporate investigators claim commitment to the rules as not to 
jeopardise their good reputation.97 At the same time, they also indicate that they 
believe there are (mostly small firm) investigators who do illegally obtain information.
If one of our investigators would obtain illegal information, that’s it for him – he’s 
done. Immediately. Leaving aside that the client wouldn’t be served with it anyway, 
on the contrary it can only do harm. It will be no help to you. But I’m sure it happens. 
There are enough little investigation companies who use their old police contacts to 
get information. [Respondent 41 – corporate investigator]
97 In this manner, the ‘non-contractual moral agency’ of corporate investigators also has a more 
instrumental side: a good reputation is essential for the commercial survival of the corporate 
investigation unit. 
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The same goes for colleagues working in other parts of the private sector, also 
belonging to the (old boys’) network:
Private-private cooperation is just as interesting I think. Cooperation and information 
sharing are important issues there as well. There still is regulation for it of course but 
it’s somewhat less strict than when it comes to public/private. And there is a large 
willingness to cooperate within the legal boundaries when you really need each 
other. There are a lot of people with the same background in most in-house security 
departments. There are many informal contacts. Some people might call it an old boys’ 
network but I don’t like to call it that. I have said from the very beginning, when I came 
to work here and also when I had a managerial role: I don’t want us to embarrass former 
colleagues. It’s no use and it will always catch up to you, it will only bring you trouble. I 
just don’t want that. But within the legal possibilities you can still do a lot. If you know 
people well, when you trust them not to abuse the information you give them, you 
might step over the line every once in a while, into a grey area. But only when we know 
that the person providing the information, the person getting the information and the 
person whose information it is are all in agreement. For example: at a certain point I 
got a call from someone within our organisation, he had found a wallet and wanted 
to return it to its owner. But he didn’t have a clue who that might be. There was a ATM 
card in the wallet. So I called my contact with that bank and explained why I wanted 
the information and asked if he could give me the address. Strictly speaking, he’s not 
allowed to give me that kind of information because of privacy regulation. But it was 
obvious what we were going to do with it and because it was done in the context of 
service provision, he could defend his actions. And of course we’ll tell the person who 
is involved how we got his information. He’s only going to be happy with it because he 
got his wallet back. [Respondent 46 – corporate investigator]
Interestingly, this respondent is very critical of informal/illegal information sharing, 
but at the same time he admits to sharing some information with ‘pure intentions’.98 
When the person with whom the information is shared is trusted and the person whose 
information is shared is not harmed but actually served by the action, the willingness 
to ‘move into the grey area’ seems to be greater. This may be a result of the focus of 
corporate investigators on normative considerations and principles of law rather than 
on formally defined laws: since they focus on (legal) principles, rules may occasionally 
be broken in order to make the principles prevail. Respondents also indicate that they 
sometimes warn current employers about a former employee, either in the context 
of a pre-employment screening or on their own account. Although the information 
98 Interestingly, had the bank employee contacted the person instead of the corporate investigator of the 
organisation who found the wallet, there would have been no privacy issue.
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shared usually stays along the lines of very vague insinuations – being careful not to 
actually give information – this is usually enough to set off alarm bells for the current 
employer. One could therefore definitely argue that this type of informal information 
sharing crosses the line of what might be allowed by privacy regulation. In the same 
vein, this police detective states that he may sometimes move into a grey area to try 
to help. 
In my experience, with the private investigators I have dealt with, they know how to 
report. Nine out of ten of these guys have been a police detective so they have the 
experience. I have to say, that’s good. They know how things work around here. And 
they might come here to discuss a case kind of off the record, like what are the options, 
see where we stand. Their client does not always want to give the information to the 
police. But when they come here like that, it’s confidential. And we know that there 
are situations which are on the edge with regard to what you share with each other. 
But you have to know each other then. Trust is the basis of everything. The contacts 
we have with private investigation firms, with banks, you know each other and at a 
certain moment you know that you can trust the other not to abuse the information 
given to him. If I say ‘this is a blue cap but it is supposed to be a red cap but you 
shouldn’t know that’, they will not use that information. Because the second they do, it 
is done. We are restricted by laws and everyone knows that. And the other way around 
a private investigator might say ‘I have this information and my client does not want 
you to know but here it is’. Because he might have to give us that information to get 
his case together. We won’t record it then but we will try to do some things to help 
each other out. Within limits. [Respondent 56 – police investigator]
Interestingly, because of the general lack of knowledge on what may be legitimately 
shared, information that is regarded to be in the grey area, may actually be 
legitimately given to an organisation who is considered to be affected by the norm 
violation (making the information transfer, thus, legitimate). Whether information is 
shared legitimately or illegitimately, trust seems to be a key factor.
[That cooperation] was also more based on contacts, [Investigator] has a police 
background. He indicates ‘it is a small world. You share information because you know 
you can trust one another and you won’t get each other into trouble with your actions. 
[That part] is not based on rules and laws or guidelines. I know what I can share with 
the police without giving them information that would harm their case. This is why 
they trust me and why we can share information. When you trust each other you put 
effort into it and you make it work. But we more often come across situations where 
nothing is shared in the name of privacy. People then say that privacy legislation 
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prohibits information sharing but that’s not necessarily the case, you have enough 
room. I call that a fear to burn yourself on cold water [CM: you’re afraid you break the 
rules but there is no rule to break]. Then you hit a wall right from the start.’ [Excerpt 
from observation 2 – informal conversation]
Respondents (both public and private) generally indicate they are wary of illegal 
information sharing. In their 1997 publication Van Ruth and Gunther Moor (1997: 152) 
state that their respondents feel that ‘the heyday of the old boys’ network is over’. The 
authors describe a situation in which especially police officials have become more and 
more careful and aware of illegitimate information sharing. This incidentally seems to 
work both ways: it is not merely a matter of the risk of corporate investigators trying 
to get easy access to classified information, but also of law enforcement professionals 
trying to get to private information without having to go through the (cumbersome) 
official criminal justice channels. This is what Marx (1987) calls the ‘hydraulic principle’: 
the outsourcing of ‘dirty work’ by police to the private sector.
It works both ways – I don’t want my people to just give information to the police 
either. The reason for this is that we are also bound to discretion to our clients. So I tell 
the police, you need to be careful not to sabotage your investigations in that way. So 
make sure you ask me for information through the formal channels and summon the 
information from me. But what does happen are yes/no questions, as I call them: so 
they might ask us ‘we have found this, does it look familiar?’ ‘Would it be useful for us 
to subpoena this information?’ And answering that is also sort of a grey area but still 
on the right side I think. But if you’re strict you’d have to say without a subpoena I’m 
not giving you anything – which makes it a very slow process of course. But in the end 
and above all, you don’t want to impede the police investigations on the grounds that 
formal procedures have not been followed. [Respondent 14 – corporate investigator]
Law enforcement agencies are regulated by the laws mentioned before when it comes 
to information sharing with others. This is not the case for corporate investigators, 
however, they do have to comply with privacy regulations and often there is a duty 
of confidentiality towards the client. With a formal subpoena from a law enforcement 
agency, these duties are overruled and corporate investigators and clients need to 
provide the information demanded by law enforcement. Respondents indicate that 
they are careful not to ‘over-share’: they hand over the specified information but not 
more than necessary (as was the case in case study 1, explained above). 
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 Other than outright illegal information sharing, the above quote shows there are 
certain grey areas in which, technically, there may be no information sharing but 
information may still be gathered. This kind of general, or what respondents call, 
‘directive’ information seems to be the most valued and sought after in public/private 
relations. For both public and private investigators, who are focused on their own 
investigations, it is valuable to know whether they are ‘on the right track’. “We don’t 
need operational details, it would be very helpful if they could just give us directive 
information. Just to let us know whether we’re on the right track” [Respondent 48 – 
corporate investigator]. The type of information sharing ‘in the grey area’ referred to 
above generally stays within this category respondents suggest. The police detective 
quoted above continues:
I think the type of information that a private investigator wants is directive. It shouldn’t 
be cardinal information, that’s just not allowed. But you may help them a little, say 
‘you have to go right or left’. They might ask you, ‘what are your thoughts about 
this case’? I think you may help each other in these minor ways. But it depends who 
you ask. If you ask some other police detective they might tell you ‘look the private 
investigator hands over his information [by an official report] and I will use that in the 
criminal justice procedure and that’s that. We won’t discuss it because I can’t’. I guess 
it depends on your private beliefs as well. But I think we accomplish the most if we 
just discuss matters and try to trust each other. [Respondent 56 – police investigator]
Informal networks have an additional purpose, other than sharing information. 
Former colleagues in law enforcement agencies may be used as a point of reference 
for ‘procedural’ questions such as where to report a specific case. Having a wide 
network of (former) colleagues may provide both corporate investigators and law 
enforcement actors with an easy entrance. It is not always clear to the corporate 
investigator where a case should be reported:
Or the question is, is this a police case or a FIOD case? We’ll search for the best place 
for the case to go and yes you may use your network for that. Making contacts, having 
an informal conversation whether or not they might be interested in the case and 
whether they have the space to do it, what would be the timing of the investigations, 
which information do you need, what can we do for you here. But these are the bigger 
cases and luckily these are scarce. [Respondent 38 – client]
Above, the difficulties corporate investigators have to ‘get to the right person’ within 
for example the police organisation have been discussed. Having a former colleague 
there might help with that. 
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It matters enormously. I still cannot enter a police station in the larger cities without 
running into someone I know. It makes for an easier conversation. But the same goes 
the other way around. Every once in a while, we help former colleagues when they 
run into something they don’t understand. I think at a professional level there should 
be room for such a thing. But it doesn’t mean we actually share information with each 
other. [Respondent 41 – corporate investigator] 
In this way, both public and private actors benefit from the networks forged between 
them. Turning briefly to information sharing and informal contacts between (corporate) 
organisations, one may conclude that the same goes within the private sector. It may 
happen that multiple organisations turn out to be involved in a certain case. Case study 
21 is an example of this. In such instances, it may prove very helpful for investigators to 
know the investigators involved at the other organisation.
There also are contacts with other colleagues who do the same work for other companies. 
Not everything is black and white, there’s a large grey area and it’s important that you 
cross no boundaries. For example, I got the urgent advice from a colleague from a telecom 
company to tell the police they should subpoena the telephone records of a certain number 
because there were some interesting leads there. No sensitive information was shared but 
now we were able to tell the police, go and check it out. Well, it took months but they did 
look into it and they arrested the guy in the end. [Respondent 18 – corporate investigator]
Nevertheless, there are also plenty of reasons for private actors not to cooperate with 
each other (Hoogenboom, 1994). From a commercial point of view it is prudent not to 
share information with competitors. Interestingly, however, respondents indicate that 
they do share basic information within their informal networks. Respondents stress that 
no personal or specific information is shared here about individuals, however, modus 
operandi might be shared. In this way, corporate investigators may benefit from each 
other’s experience: “I have a vast network of other security managers of other companies 
and we talk and now and then you hear something about drivers being robbed or 
something like that” [Respondent 15 – corporate investigator]. Mostly though, and similar 
to the information sharing between private and public, information sharing between 
private actors seems to be limited to a certain case in which both actors have a stake 
(such as case study 21).
Informal (and formal) contacts between public and private and within the private realm 
are thus not just important for (incidental) cooperation, but have value for the finalisation 
of investigations as well. Having contacts and knowing people works to create trust and 
‘goodwill’, which are essential to get things done within large organisations (Hoogenboom, 
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1994). The room granted by the legal framework will still be useless if no-one is willing 
to make use of it. As discussed above, the willingness and knowledge about the rules 
of individual police and prosecutors is essential in information sharing. It is important 
to note at this point that one cannot simply speak of ‘public law enforcement’ or ‘the 
corporate security sector’ in this sense: within both the public and private sector many 
different opinions, interests and connections make public/private coexistence either 
easier or more difficult (Yar, 2011: 11).
Discussion: public/private relationships and information 
sharing as a source of frustration
This chapter has discussed the relationships between public and private actors in 
the field of corporate security, defined here in terms of coexistence rather than 
cooperation. Despite the good intentions which seem to be present in both the public 
and the private realm, there is very little actual cooperation taking place. For reasons 
presented earlier in this book, many organisations prefer to keep the corporate 
investigations within the private sphere. In those cases that public law enforcement 
is involved – either ex officio or by a decision from the involved organisation – the 
contacts between public and private often still remain very limited. This chapter 
has given some examples of cooperation – however, respondents indicate that 
usually the formal contacts between public and private go no further than corporate 
investigators presenting information to law enforcement agencies through a formal 
report to the authorities. As such the term coexistence may be better suited to the 
mutual relationships in most cases.
 One consequence of this limited contact is that there is no clear notion within Dutch 
law enforcement agencies with regard to the corporate investigations sector. Neither 
the width of corporate security’s activities, nor the number of investigations done by 
corporate investigators, nor even the size of the sector, are manifest to law enforcement 
actors. “We have to accept that we don’t have insight into that. No, we don’t know. We 
see it when people come and report, then we know. And sometimes you see it from the 
side lines. But that doesn’t come close to a full picture” [Respondent 52 – prosecutor]. 
I think, if I am being completely honest, that it is one big black hole for us (laughs]. 
Maybe there are people in the FIOD who think they know but I wonder how they 
would know. There’s not a lot of [scientific] research on it. Keep in mind that we are 
present in two fields – you may report either to the police or to the prosecution, 
so there’s a difference there. So we don’t even know from each other [police and 
prosecution] how many corporate reports there are. We are involved more than usual 
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because we have a close cooperation with the prosecution office [on fraud]. But I have 
no clue whatsoever on how much [corporate] settlements there are. No. How should 
I? Especially when it goes through civil court or they keep in internal. We keep an eye 
out in the papers and we might get a nice case through those channels. And then 
they [organisations] say ‘but we handled it already’. Sure, but I’m going to have a look 
anyway. But that is through the newspapers. How else would we know? There’s not 
much more we can do. And I have to say – we are swamped with fraud as is so we are a 
bit reluctant to actively search for more. [Respondent 55 – FIOD investigator]
Law enforcement respondents generally only have some experience with corporate 
investigators, in specific cases. Their overall opinion of the corporate security sector 
may be considered to be rather positive.99 “My experience is that their investigations 
are good. I don’t think they just speak to the liking of their client. They know that 
that’ll be the end of them getting assignments” [Respondent 9 – police investigator]. 
However, this is based on only very limited contact with corporate investigators.
 Partly, this may also be caused by the scattered nature of the corporate security 
sector and the low level of control that is exercised by the state, as described in chapter 
2. All of this has some consequences for the public/private relationships (which are often 
characterised by frustration rather than cooperation) but also for the use of information 
from corporate investigations in criminal justice procedures. Although reports and 
other information from corporate investigators may be used in criminal court, not all 
law enforcement actors feel comfortable doing this. As shown above, the pilots aimed 
at simplifying the use of this type of information by the police did not prove overly 
successful. Although public law enforcement respondents are generally rather positive 
about corporate investigators, they remain wary when it comes to the information 
gathered by them. “Those private investigators, they don’t have to follow rules. We 
can use the information because it’s handed to us, we don’t have to wonder whether 
it’s obtained legitimately. Of course, [if we’re going to use it] we check the evidence, 
whether it holds up to the burden of proof in a criminal case” [Respondent 21 – police 
investigator]. This quote refers to the situation that criminal justice officials may make 
use of information provided to them even if this information is gathered in an illegitimate 
way (Blonk et al., 2017). This is discussed in more detail in chapter 4. Even though 
illegitimately gathered information may therefore formally be used in the criminal justice 
procedure, many law enforcement respondents do not feel comfortable with this. The 
consequence of this attitude is that in most cases, much effort is put into checking the 
information provided by corporate investigators. Often, respondents suggest, a full-
99 Possibly this is a rather new development, as literature often shows a negative stance from law 
enforcement professionals towards the private sector (c.f Hoogenboom, 1994). See with regard to the 
image of the private security industry more in general inter alia Thumala, Goold & Loader (2011).
214
Chapter 5
blown criminal investigation follows, which repeats much investigative efforts by the 
corporate investigators in the context of criminal law. Many corporate investigators have 
expressed their frustration about this, as they believe it is unnecessary. Public-sector 
respondents on the other hand indicate that they are concerned that possible illegal 
actions of corporate investigators are being used to obtain information. This is a concern 
voiced in the literature as well (see for example Hoogenboom, 2006). The case law leaves 
room for the use of illegally obtained evidence: illegally obtained evidence may be used, 
as long as police and prosecution have not been involved in the gathering thereof.100 
Regardless of the admissibility in court, many law enforcement professionals feel uneasy 
when they have no insight into how the evidence is gathered, leading them to either 
dismiss the information from corporate investigators or to reproduce it ‘the right way’. 
“Sometimes I get a private dossier, you know when a case has been investigated by 
a private investigator, and we will see what they have done. Often we need to repeat 
the entire investigation to give it the proper legal grounds” [Respondent 22 – police 
investigator]. This will take a lot of time and because many corporate investigators 
are quite pessimistic regarding police expertise when it comes to white-collar crime, 
corporate investigators often feel it is a waste of time and resources. This, adding the 
fact that the case, once reported, is out of their hands makes for an uneasy relationship 
between public and private in many cases.
 Interestingly, one of the assets valued most by clients when used by corporate 
investigators, the use of discretion, is a source of frustration for corporate investigators 
and clients when used by law enforcement professionals. Information sharing is 
often a rather awkward process and the direction is one-sided: from private to public. 
Corporate investigators and clients complain that once a case is being handled within 
the criminal justice system, it will become public knowledge – the criminal justice 
system is seen to suffer from a discretion deficit (Williams, 2005). However, in public/
private information sharing, corporate investigators complain that law enforcement 
professionals use too much discretion in the sense that the information sharing from 
public to private is often minimal to non-existent. This focus on discretion on both 
sides complicates public/private relationships further.
On the public side of things, law enforcement actors often also feel frustrated with 
public/private interactions. Many corporate investigators, having a law enforcement 
background, think they know police procedures but actually end up harming 
100 See for example ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2006:AY1071 (ruling of the Court of Appeal Den Bosch). In its ruling the 
Court decided that as the police had not been involved in the gathering of evidence, they did not have 
a directive role in the actions of the private investigators. It is noteworthy that in this case the evidence 
was not obtained illegally but the legal representation of the defendant expressed concerns because 
his client had not been interrogated by the police but interviewed by private investigators (leading 
him to be protected by less legal safeguards). 
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the criminal investigations by being too proactive. An example of this is that the 
documents provided by the corporate investigators may have a certain classification 
of the offence, while the prosecutor wants to indict the suspect for something else 
(e.g. because that will provide a stronger case).
What I don’t want them to do is to qualify the behaviour for me. They might think the case 
is about falsifying documents but I might want to charge the suspect with something 
else. So I’d say stick to what you know, you see that this person has wrongfully taken 
money, let me worry about what crime it is. [Respondent 51 – prosecutor]
When all documents provided by corporate investigators contain an (erroneous) 
legal qualification of the conduct, this may present the prosecutor with problems 
in court as the defence may use this against the prosecution, respondents suggest.
 In the same vein, law enforcement respondents indicate that although they 
mostly think corporate investigators cooperate quite well with them, they sometimes 
volunteer only certain information and ‘are being difficult’ with other information.
When they themselves report, they’ll cooperate because they want the case to be 
investigated soundly. But if we stumble upon something, for example in another 
investigation, their interests might be different and information ‘might get lost’. They 
might not want to report the case to us officially and then it gets more difficult to get 
your information from them. [Respondent 21 – police investigator]
Under circumstances, this may lead to a feeling of being used for a private agenda 
and as a tool to get certain information through the use of law enforcement’s 
investigative powers. As stated before, corporate investigators and clients might 
not always volunteer all information in a certain case. Law enforcement might still 
subpoena the information – but for that to be possible, the prosecutor must be aware 
of the existence of the information.
What we volunteer to the outside world is not necessarily the full story of course. It 
also depends on in which country it all takes place, on the reach of legal privilege etc. 
Part of our strategy is answering the following questions: what should be the role 
of our lawyers and when should we use them and what exactly is protected? That 
doesn’t mean that in certain countries you may not be forced to hand everything over 
anyway. And of course you don’t want to write down any nonsense but you also don’t 
want to for example involve people who were only at the side-lines in all of this and 
get them into trouble. [Respondent 37 – client] 
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The distance and misunderstandings between law enforcement actors and corporate 
investigators hampers cooperation, as much relies on trust and familiarity. Pre-existing 
contacts are important, not just to get information from one-another but also to ‘get 
things done’. Knowing the right people in the police and prosecution organisations 
means for corporate investigators that they may find a capable person who is willing to 
take on their case. For law enforcement officials it means that they are more ready to trust 
the information provided to them. Additionally, relationships of mutual trust help to cut 
red tape on both sides of the fence. Of course, the danger of moving into a grey area or 
even outright abuse of (informal) networks is a real possibility in this context. However, 
only anecdotal information about such abuses can be found. Respondents do indicate 
that they sometimes move into the grey area (‘with good intentions’) and that they are 
sure some illegal information sharing exists. None of the respondents could point out a 
specific example of this though.101
A conclusion of this chapter is thus that even in those instances where public and 
private meet on a ad hoc basis, the prevailing situation is that of coexistence rather 
than cooperation: once a report has been made, that does not necessarily mean that 
cooperation will occur. Many instances of what respondents call ‘cooperation’ are more 
accurately defined as private actors handing over information to public actors (‘type 
A’ discussed in section 3 of this chapter). The pilots discussed earlier come to the same 
conclusion: “in practice there is no cooperation. (…) Specifically, the ‘cooperation’ is 
about investigative reports being handed over by private investigation firms to the 
police’ (Friperson et al., 2013: 48). Cooperation in the sense of coordination of actions and 
mutually sharing of substantial information remains the exception. First, it is made rather 
difficult by law on the public side, and by law and by codes of conduct on the private side. 
Additionally, the forms of information that might potentially be shared may practically 
be usable only within the context in which they were generated. Finally, contradictory 
time-orientations and attitudes to ensuing publicity of on the one hand corporate 
security as defined by its clients (valuing a quick resolution and limiting publicity and 
potential reputational damage) and of public law enforcement (wanting a watertight 
case and quite tolerant of publicity, for reasons including deterrence) on the other, limit 
the opportunities for working in tandem (Gill, 2013). The reluctance of law enforcement 
officials to share information with corporate investigators (while sharing the case with 
the general public in the end through a public court case) further hampers cooperation.
101 Of course, it is impossible to tell whether respondents tell the truth about this sensitive subject. However, 
there are very few court cases involving illegal information sharing between corporate investigators and 
law enforcement professionals and in the observation settings – in which I had full access – no evidence 
of such abuses was found. This nevertheless does not necessarily mean that it never occurs.
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 In this chapter we have seen that efforts to cooperate in a structural manner are scarce 
when it comes to internal norm violations. Additionally, those efforts that do exist seem 
to be quite unsuccessful. The reasons for this may be found in structural and cultural 
characteristics of the corporate security market. Most notably, the fragmented nature 
of the corporate security market, the diffuseness of interests involved and the fact that, 
in the end, it is the client who decides about involving the authorities, make long-term 
cooperation very difficult. Corporate security as a market thrives by the grace of its use 
of flexibility in the framing of economic crime; secrecy, discretion and control; and legal 
flexibility and responsiveness to clients’ needs (Williams, 2005; Meerts & Dorn, 2009). The 
market exists because of the possibility of separation from and coexistence with (and 
sometimes strategic use of ) law enforcement. Indeed, corporate security professionals 
consider the criminal justice system to be unable to provide solutions to the problems at 
hand: bringing in law enforcement serves a purpose (from a private point of view) only 
when a client feels that it has been so much hurt that there is a need for retribution, over 
and above the (otherwise more efficient) corporate settlements available. Additionally, 
in some cases there are strategic advantages which make a report to the authorities an 
appealing option. Generally speaking however, respondents do not seem to have high 
hopes with regard to the criminal justice system. As shown in chapters 3 and 4 this is 
one of the reasons for the existence of a corporate security sector: corporate security 
can coexist with law enforcement agencies because it markets services which only partly 
overlap with the criminal justice system.
 Similarly, law enforcement respondents have indicated they would like more 
cooperation. At the same time they are generally pleased with the work of corporate 
security and the existence of the sector. Although most would like to be informed, 
this does not have to be shaped as a formal report. A well-substantiated corporate 
investigation report may make police investigations significantly easier, especially 
in cases involving complicated financial matters. Nonetheless, certain actions based 
on their powers of investigation remain necessary for law enforcement actors – for 
example to interrogate the suspect within a formal interrogation setting. Formal, long-
term cooperation with corporate investigators would provide considerably additional 
work for a police (and prosecution) organisation not very well equipped to deal with 
the kinds of norm violations corporate security deals with, without necessarily yielding 
successful results.102 
102 The special fraud department of the prosecution office (Functioneel Parket) and the investigative service 
of the tax authority (FIOD) are the exceptions here. However, there also is a limit to the amount of cases 
these agencies may handle. Furthermore, more cases brought to trial would also increase the pressure on 
the courts and judges to both handle more cases and get specialised knowledge.
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 To conclude, both the public and the private security sectors seem to put much 
emphasis on ‘cooperation’ but contacts generally remain at the level of coexistence.103 
Although this was not a specific focus of this PhD research, interviews with public 
and private sector respondents seem to point towards a certain ambivalence in this 
regard. Following the train of thought of Thumala, Goold and Loader (2011), one 
might put this in the context of a search for legitimacy. Although the authors are 
writing about the private security sector more generally, some of their observations 
might hold true for corporate investigations as well. In its search for legitimacy, 
corporate security uses “symbolical borrowing as a (self ) legitimating device” (ibid.: 
295). The authors furthermore state that “the importance of this [public/private] 
partnership narrative lies in its implication that all members of the extended police 
family share similar values and can draw on the same reservoir of public support. The 
fact that the industry offers post-retirement employment to many ex-police officers 
reinforces this idea” (ibid.: 294). Interestingly, many corporate security providers try to 
steer clear of any analogies with the public police, as we have seen in chapter 3. This 
mechanism might therefore be less pronounced than in the wider private security 
sector.104 However, when it comes to public/private relations it is striking that the 
public/private partnership narrative seems on the one hand quite tenacious but on 
the other does not yield any tangible ‘results’.
103 See also the 2017 New Years’ blog of the president of the NVb mentioned in chapter 1 (http://www.
veiligheidsbranche.nl/blog_voorzitter_nl.html).
104 Corporate investigators for example do not have identifiable uniforms which mirror those of the police. 
See also White (2014).
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Introduction
The purpose of this research is twofold. First, it aims to take the corporate security 
sector out of its state of relative invisibility by describing its day-to-day activities, the 
rules regulating corporate investigators’ professional behaviour and the composition 
of the field. Second, the research focuses on public/private relations. In doing so, 
it provides an alternative to the state-centric discourse used in most criminological 
literature by focusing on the semi-autonomous role of the corporate security sector. 
The research brings extensive qualitative empirical material into confrontation with 
a number of theoretical perspectives that have been articulated within criminology 
about private security – most notably, junior partner theory, loss prevention theory, 
nodal theory and the anchored pluralism perspective – and finds the closest ‘fit’ to be 
with what Canadian criminologist James Williams (inter alia 2005) has described as 
the commodification of the dark number of economic crime (Williams’ ‘juridification 
thesis’). Underlying all those criminological streams of work we can discern both a 
focus on the state as the (implicit) point of theoretical departure, and a common 
commitment to democracy and transparency. Although the former is not part of the 
perspective used in this research, the latter is. This research advances those values 
by interrogating the practices and values of the corporate security industry, making 
recommendations for reform. The corporate security sector acts with a high degree 
of flexibility within the semi-autonomous social field, both in relation to investigative 
activities and in relation to other actors. In this context, the state remains a key player, 
by adding a normative (‘retribution’) dimension to corporate settlement solutions 
and as the source of democratic control over the market. My perspective may, then, 
be regarded to be a reconsideration of the state-centric discourse, one that takes the 
semi-autonomous position of corporate investigators as the point of departure, while 
also being sensitive to the role of the state. 
 From the descriptions based on the research data, some cross-cutting themes 
emerge. This concluding chapter takes a closer look at these, while answering the 
research questions and, additionally, explores some directions future research on 
corporate investigations and corporate settlement might take. To reiterate, the 
research questions motivating this research were as follows:
Central research question
What is corporate security, how can its shifting relationship with law enforcement 
be conceptualised and what is its significance for the wider society? 
In particular:
1.  What are the raison d’être and methods of corporate security in providing 
corporate justice? 
2.  How does this stay within – or breach – regulatory/legal frameworks? 
3.  How wide, in practice, is the sphere of discretion for corporate security, either 
to act alone, without informing public law agencies, or to inform and possibly 
to task them? 
4.  When, how and why does separate working change into case-sharing? How 
does this reflect the public and private interests at stake? 
5.  What are the consequences of the flexible relationship that corporate security 
has with law enforcement?
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The first section of this chapter focuses on answering the research questions. In doing 
so, this chapter starts with summarising the most important findings of the research 
as related to the research questions. From this discussion of the research questions, 
some themes emerge which deserve some special attention. These cross-cutting 
themes emerging from the research are discussed in sections 2 through 7. Section 
2 starts with an reflection on the (semi-)autonomous role corporate investigators 
may take in their investigations and (assistance with) settlements. Section 3 goes 
on to focus more in-depth on the importance of forum shopping in the context 
of the corporate security market. The issue of limited control over the activities of 
corporate investigators and their clients is the subject of section 4. Section 5 moves 
beyond the semi-autonomous social field of corporate investigators, to reflect upon 
public/private relations. The way in which corporate investigators deal with different 
interests, guided by normative and pragmatic considerations, is discussed in section 
6. It is argued that in the commercial context of corporate security provision, there is 
some room for non-contractual moral agency. Section 7, then, takes this argument 
and discusses the issues of legitimacy and the role of the common good in the face 
of private interests.
 From the discussion of the answers to the research questions in section 1 and the 
cross-cutting themes presented in section 2 through 7, policy implications emerge. 
Section 8.1 discusses the implications this research may have for attempts to govern 
the corporate security market. Section 8.2 specifically focuses on the more theoretical 
Introduction
The purpose of this research is twofold. First, it aims to take the corporate security 
sector out of its state of relative invisibility by describing its day-to-day activities, the 
rules regulating corporate investigators’ professional behaviour and the composition 
of the field. Second, the research focuses on public/private relations. In doing so, 
it provides an alternative to the state-centric discourse used in most criminological 
literature by focusing on the semi-autonomous role of the corporate security sector. 
The research brings extensive qualitative empirical material into confrontation with 
a number of theoretical perspectives that have been articulated within criminology 
about private security – most notably, junior partner theory, loss prevention theory, 
nodal theory and the anchored pluralism perspective – and finds the closest ‘fit’ to be 
with what Canadian criminologist James Williams (inter alia 2005) has described as 
the commodification of the dark number of economic crime (Williams’ ‘juridification 
thesis’). Underlying all those criminological streams of work we can discern both a 
focus on the state as the (implicit) point of theoretical departure, and a common 
commitment to democracy and transparency. Although the former is not part of the 
perspective used in this research, the latter is. This research advances those values 
by interrogating the practices and values of the corporate security industry, making 
recommendations for reform. The corporate security sector acts with a high degree 
of flexibility within the semi-autonomous social field, both in relation to investigative 
activities and in relation to other actors. In this context, the state remains a key player, 
by adding a normative (‘retribution’) dimension to corporate settlement solutions 
and as the source of democratic control over the market. My perspective may, then, 
be regarded to be a reconsideration of the state-centric discourse, one that takes the 
semi-autonomous position of corporate investigators as the point of departure, while 
also being sensitive to the role of the state. 
 From the descriptions based on the research data, some cross-cutting themes 
emerge. This concluding chapter takes a closer look at these, while answering the 
research questions and, additionally, explores some directions future research on 
corporate investigations and corporate settlement might take. To reiterate, the 
research questions motivating this research were as follows:
Central research question
What is corporate security, how can its shifting relationship with law enforcement 
be conceptualised and what is its significance for the wider society? 
In particular:
1.  What are the raison d’être and methods of corporate security in providing 
corporate justice? 
2.  How does this stay within – or breach – regulatory/legal frameworks? 
3.  How wide, in practice, is the sphere of discretion for corporate security, either 
to act alone, without informing public law agencies, or to inform and possibly 
to task them? 
4.  When, how and why does separate working change into case-sharing? How 
does this reflect the public and private interests at stake? 
5.  What are the consequences of the flexible relationship that corporate security 
has with law enforcement?
222
Chapter 6
implications of the research, by arguing that public/private relations within the 
setting of the investigation of internal norm violations in organisations are more 
correctly seen as coexistence, rather than cooperation. It is expected that a focus on 
cooperation by policy makers will not be effective in producing the desired results. 
Section 9, finally, suggests some possible strains of future research, following from 
the research.
1. The research questions
Research question 1 – The modus vivendi of the corporate security market
The corporate security sector exists of four main groups of investigators – in-house 
security departments, private investigation firms, forensic accountants and forensic 
legal investigators. Although the market is fragmented based on professional 
background and legal frameworks, fieldwork suggests that corporate investigation 
units tend to diversify their employees, thus combining the expertise of multiple 
professional groups to meet the demands of clients. Corporate investigators do not 
have access to the same information as law enforcement authorities, because corporate 
investigators lack formal powers of investigation. Within the limits of what is allowed, 
corporate investigators may act efficiently and swiftly to gather a considerable 
amount of information through the investigation of internal documentation, internal 
systems, open sources and personal communications. Acting as an extension of an 
organisations’ management, corporate investigators have access to much information 
regarding employees. Although corporate investigators cannot enforce cooperation, 
and may thus be said to be reliant on voluntary cooperation, the client can enforce 
cooperation by using its status as an employer. The voluntary nature of employee 
cooperation should therefore be assessed critically. The raison d’être of the corporate 
investigation sector lies primarily in the fact that a customised solution to internal 
norm violations is provided to clients, which is designed to provide an efficient 
solution without causing additional harm and which takes client interests as a central 
point of reference. Because of the possibility to work across jurisdictions, corporate 
investigators can be flexible with regard to the types of behaviour they investigate 
(which is not necessarily criminal), the investigative methods they employ and in the 
solutions towards which they work.
Research question 2 – Legality: the legal frameworks
In general terms, no corporate investigator is allowed to break the law. In addition, 
the law regulating the use of personal data applies to all investigations. Specific legal 
frameworks, however, differ from investigator to investigator. Interestingly, an overview 
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of the legal frameworks applicable to the different corporate investigators reveals that the legal 
context does not align with the tendency of corporate investigation units to simultaneously 
specialise and generalise their services. While most corporate investigator-respondents 
indicate that they work with corporate investigators with different professional backgrounds, 
the regulations remain dispersed and unclear to most of the people involved. The fact that only 
private investigation firms are obliged to get a permit by the Wpbr (the law regulating private 
security companies and private investigation firms) is seen as peculiar by many respondents. 
In practice, corporate investigators with different professional backgrounds seem to broadly 
follow the rules defined by the Privacy code of conduct for private investigators, either by 
applying it directly to their investigations, or by following the broader principles of law which 
are codified in the Privacy code of conduct. In this way, corporate investigators broadly follow 
the same norms, in spite of the absence of generally applicable rules. Respondents stress the 
importance of principles of law such as proportionality, subsidiarity and fair play as guiding 
norms for their investigations. There are little indications of corporate investigators breaking 
the rules or the normative guidelines they use, however respondents indicate that they assume 
that laws and (self-)regulations are occasionally broken (by others). The differences in legal 
frameworks furthermore create room for forum shopping – also making it unnecessary to 
break or bend the rules, because of the room created by the differences in the legal contexts.
Research question 3 – Autonomy and strategic tasking
Within the private legal sphere corporate investigators enjoy a high degree of autonomy. 
Corporate investigations are guided by an assignment from a client and within that assignment 
(and the limits of – mostly – privacy regulation), investigators may use the methods they 
deem fit. When searching for a solution to the norm violation, corporate investigators and 
clients draw upon multiple jurisdictions. By forum shopping among public and private legal 
systems, optimal solutions may be provided to clients. Solutions may be found in criminal 
law (a report to the authorities), private law (a civil suit based on tort or a settlement 
agreement), labour law (termination of the labour contract) and internal regulations of the 
employing organisation (multiple forms of internal disciplinary action). In many instances, 
the choice for a corporate settlement may be made autonomously by a client, with the aid of 
corporate investigators. In some cases, there is not much room for such a choice, for example 
because authorities are already involved. In other instances, the choice whether or not to 
report does remain in the private field and pragmatic and normative considerations may 
compel an organisation to report the case to law enforcement authorities. By presenting 
the case in a certain manner to the authorities, corporate investigators may be able to give 
some direction to the criminal justice investigations and (possible) prosecution. The decision 
what to investigate and prosecute lies with law enforcement authorities, however, corporate 
investigators may sway these decisions in a certain direction. In many cases, law enforcement 
authorities are reliant in part on corporate investigators (without a report, law enforcement 
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authorities often remain unaware of the norm violation and corporate investigators 
are specialised investigators with regard to complicated financial investigations). 
Therefore, there is a considerable sphere of discretion for corporate investigators and 
clients to either act alone or to involve law enforcement authorities. A criminal justice 
solution may be deemed desirable to supplement a corporate settlement solution 
(which reasoning essentially reverses the argument of the junior partner theory of 
Kakalik and Wildhorn).
Research question 4 – Public/private relations and the interests involved
Private and public interests are both involved in corporate investigations and they are 
both considered in a decision to involve law enforcement authorities. Private interests 
of the client are leading and considerations such as efficiency and damage control 
often lead to a solution outside the criminal justice system. However, pragmatic 
considerations such as the need for powers of investigation and a wish to avoid 
harsher punishment elsewhere, may lead to an official report to law enforcement 
authorities based on private interests. Although a commercial actor, corporate 
security also takes public interests into account. Normative considerations, such as 
a sense of responsibility towards society or towards the market, and a perceived 
need for retribution, may lead corporate investigators and clients to report a case 
to the authorities. In more general terms, public interests are taken into account in 
purely private solutions as well. Procedural rights of the involved person are less 
pronounced in corporate investigations, but the normative considerations corporate 
investigators use as a guide for the investigations do lead them to focus on principles 
of law such as proportionality, subsidiarity and fair play. Corporate investigators also 
indicate they are wary of being used for indecent purposes by a client.
 When public/private relations occur in a case, this is done on an ad hoc basis. 
Although many informal contacts exist between corporate investigators and law 
enforcement professionals, cooperation efforts aimed at the longer-term have 
proven to be unsuccessful. A typology of coexistence – ranging from private to public 
information transfer, through (minor) mutual information sharing to coordination – 
can be used to accurately describe public/private coexistence. Only in the case of 
coordination, one may legitimately speak of cooperation. However, respondents 
indicate that coordination is rare. Coexistence usually does not surpass the level of 
information transfer from corporate investigators to the criminal justice system.
Research question 5 – Theoretical and practical consequences of public/
private coexistence
Practical consequences of the considerable autonomy of corporate investigators 
and of their relative distance to the criminal justice system may fall upon clients, 
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involved individuals and upon (Dutch) society. Using corporate investigative services, 
organisations may solve their norm violations efficiently in multiple ways, through 
multiple legal venues, without having to cede control or risk much openness. The 
corporate security market may provide organisations with both investigative services 
and assistance in settlements. From discovery to solution, a norm violation may thus 
remain entirely out of sight of the criminal justice system. Strategic use of public 
resources may furthermore lead to a higher probability of getting a case investigated 
and prosecuted by the criminal justice system if that is desired. Another practical 
consequence, which may be of more relevance to the involved individuals and 
society in general, is that there is very little insight in and control over the corporate 
security sector by law enforcement agencies. This may have practical consequences 
for the involved person, as his procedural protection is rather limited in a setting of 
corporate investigations and settlements. From a rule-of-law point of view, such a 
situation may be problematised. Corporate investigators display some measure of 
non-contractual moral behaviour and tend to apply general principles of law (thus 
protecting the involved person this way). However, this is based on the normative 
considerations of individual corporate investigators and clients and even though 
there are possibilities to enforce compliance with rules and guidelines, this relies for a 
large part on the active stance of the parties involved (the involved person, the client 
and the corporate investigator). Another practical consequence is that the criminal 
justice system is not clogged by cases it would most likely dismiss anyway because of 
a lack of capacity and a shortage of specific expertise.
 Conceptually, consequences fall on the way we view public/private relationships. 
The high level of autonomy and the active use of the criminal justice system by 
corporate security actors make the state-centric discourse (whether it is used by 
claiming a dominant, or a diminishing state) a bad fit with the corporate security 
market. Instead of trying to fit the social reality of the corporate security sector into 
the state-centric discourse, it might be better to try to fit conceptual notions of public/
private relations into the social reality by emphasising the flexibility of corporate 
investigations within the semi-autonomous social field. Within the corporate security 
market, private actors are acting for a large part independently from the state, 
generally not involving the criminal justice system. Much of the investigations of and 
reactions to internal norm violations thus remains entirely out of sight of the criminal 
justice system. When law enforcement actors are involved, this is usually because 
they are actively sought after by corporate investigators and their clients.
Central research question
To summarise, the corporate security sector is a commercial provider of investigative 
services, involved in the investigation and settlement of internal norm violations. The 
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sector largely acts as a semi-autonomous social field with a high level of discretion, 
flexibility and autonomy. Public/private relationships are largely ad hoc and occur 
when corporate investigators or their clients feel the need to involve the criminal 
justice apparatus. Cooperation is fairly rare, public/private relationships being better 
conceptualised as coexistence, with public and private actors meeting only on an 
ad hoc basis. This means that the state has little insight into what happens in the 
corporate security sector. Consequently, the private sector tends to fend for itself 
in instances of internal norm violations. While this has the benefit for society that 
the criminal justice system is spared the trouble and costs of investigating and 
prosecuting these matters, it also means there is little to no democratic control over 
the corporate security sector.
Cutting across the research questions, there are a number of themes emerging from 
the research which deserve some additional attention. The next six sections of this 
chapter discuss these in more detail.
2.  Corporate security as a semi-autonomous social 
field within a private legal order
As many scholars have indicated, private investigations, and corporate investigations 
more specifically, happen in a field of mystery (see e.g. Hoogenboom, 1994). Chapter 
3 and 4 describe that many of the activities of corporate investigators indeed stay 
within the private sphere: investigations are done by private actors and solutions 
are sought in private remedies (private law or, more specifically: labour law). As an 
extension of the employer, corporate investigators have many sources of information 
at their disposal. The lack of formal legal powers is not necessarily a restriction for 
corporate investigators. Because corporate investigators are able to use the access 
to information the organisation has as an employer, their practical access may even 
exceed that of law enforcement. Although law enforcement agencies may formally 
claim any information (unless protected by legal privilege), this formal power may 
not prove extremely useful when law enforcement does not know ‘where to look’ 
or how to interpret the findings. Modern organisations have grown so complex 
that even for people inside the organisation, some of its processes are difficult to 
understand. It may therefore prove impossible for outsiders, who are rarely trained 
specifically for fraud investigations or familiar with the commercial world, to interpret 
the information they may gather through formal powers. Even if all relevant data 
would be handed over by the organisation (which, as respondents suggest, is 
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not necessarily the case),105 it takes skilled eyes to reconstruct what happened. 
Corporate investigators are in a better position to efficiently gather, interpret and 
use information from inside the organisation. In-house investigators may be in the 
best position in this respect, however external corporate investigators also get the 
access (and cooperation) necessary for the investigations. Employers have quite an 
extensive right to information regarding their employees and they may also order 
their employees to cooperate with the investigations. Furthermore, automated 
processes leave traces. Much information which is at corporate investigators’ disposal 
is therefore ‘private information’. Although there certainly are instances in which the 
involvement of law enforcement agencies is desired, in many cases the step to involve 
law enforcement agencies in an investigation is therefore not a necessary one. 
 There are many reasons for organisations to prefer a private solution over a criminal 
justice procedure and keep matters within the private legal order. These are described 
in chapter 3 and 4. Much specialised expertise is available in this diverse field. As 
noted in chapter 2, many corporate investigation units (whether they are internal to 
an organisation or contracted-in) now employ investigators of all four professional 
groups discussed as being part of the corporate security sector in this research. They 
therefore often have a high level of expertise and much experience with regard to the 
types of non-conformities that organisations are faced with (and the corresponding 
methods of investigation). Both investigations and solutions may be tailor-made to 
the organisation, disrupting normal organisational processes to a limited extent and 
providing swift and efficient solutions. Within its private legal sphere, corporate security 
may act with considerable flexibility with regard to the investigative methods and 
solutions. Furthermore, the orientation on the private troubles of clients rather than 
on criminal offences, ensures an organisation that the problem is addressed, whether 
it may be defined within the limits of criminal law or not. Additionally, the possibility 
to retain information in the private sphere (giving the organisation the chance to do 
damage control) and to have some measure of control over the process through an 
assignment agreement, is highly valued by organisations. Law enforcement, conversely, 
is seen as slow, inefficient and causing much additional harm by its focus on openness. 
The information collected in this research suggests that a criminal prosecution, when 
sought after by organisations and corporate investigators, is hardly ever the only 
resolution. Rather, it is seen as an additional step that may be taken, over and above 
a private corporate settlement. Respondents indicate they do not expect the criminal 
105 This is not necessarily a case of ‘deceit’ by the organisation. Coming back to the quote of respondent 
43 presented in chapter 4: the information which has been asked for is provided, but that may not 
necessarily be the full story. Access to an employee’s laptop for example does not mean access to the 
internal system of the organisation. The criminal investigations of the laptop will thus in such a case be 
limited to the hardware of the laptop. The same goes for other types of information.
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justice system to provide a solution to their problem: corporate settlements are used 
for that. Thus, in providing investigative results and solutions to clients, corporate 
investigators largely remain within their semi-autonomous social field. 
Corporate investigators thus largely operate in a private legal sphere in which they 
market corporate investigations and corporate justice. However, the research also 
reveals that claiming that organisations fully stay within the private legal sphere for 
their solutions to internal norm violations would be a too narrow view of social reality. 
Apart from those instances where no choice is available (law enforcement agencies 
are already involved ex officio), pragmatic and normative considerations may open the 
door to law enforcement involvement in a case. A criminal justice procedure adds a 
normative dimension to the corporate investigations: when punishment and moral 
disapproval is felt to be necessary, a criminal justice procedure is deemed much more 
suited than a private solution. In addition, the criminal justice system may be used 
strategically – when information is necessary that may only be obtained by using formal 
powers of investigation, a report to law enforcement authorities may be made as well.
3. Forum shopping within and across a private legal 
sphere
The semi-autonomous social field of corporate security may on the one hand 
be considered ‘closed’ in the sense that it mostly stays within the private sphere, 
however on the other hand it is quite open: different legal venues are used to provide 
an optimum solution to a client. This flexibility may just as well lead to a public law 
solution as one based on internal regulations, depending on the details of the case. 
One of the key features of corporate security is its ability to engage in forum shopping 
(Williams, 2006a). Forum shopping occurs in multiple ways and is used by multiple 
actors to get to the optimal result in a specific situation.
 First, the fragmented nature of the professional market for corporate security 
creates room for clients to forum shop for the investigator who is best suited to meet 
their investigational needs. Every professional group of corporate investigators has 
unique selling points compared to the others because of professional background, 
expertise and the legal framework within which the investigations take place. 
Although the different players in the market tend to diversify the background of their 
employees so to be better able to meet the investigational demands clients might 
have, they do market themselves along the lines of these professional advantages. 
Second, investigators try to find the investigative methods which will deliver the best 
results in a certain case, taking the principles of law of proportionality and subsidiarity 
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into account as well. While some investigative methods and information sources 
are generally used in most investigations (such as the interview with the involved 
person), some cases provide additional sources of information or warrant a different 
approach. For example, a track-and-trace device may be useful when multiple high-
end items go missing in a short period of time but for a case of construction fraud a 
site visit may be more suitable. Third, the options of corporate settlement provide the 
backdrop of much forum shopping. The mere fact that corporate investigators and 
clients may work towards and choose from multiple legal venues for a settlement of 
the norm violation creates a high level of flexibility. Within the different jurisdictions 
(public or private law or internal regulations), there are more choices to be made. 
Within the private law system for example, recourse to a civil court may be made 
based on tort or based on breach of the labour contract. The private law system 
furthermore provides the option of an out-of-court solution through a settlement 
agreement. Corporate settlements may be combined, making the choices for different 
forums even wider.
 When it comes to the decision whether or not to involve law enforcement 
authorities, multiple pragmatic and normative considerations may come into play. 
The need for investigative powers may be one pragmatic consideration, another may 
be that the organisation runs the risk that it will be prosecuted in a harsher national 
jurisdiction than the Dutch. Although the principle of law of double jeopardy is not 
internationally recognised, chances of severe punishment for the organisation are 
reduced by such an action because even if prosecuted again, the prosecutor (and 
judges) in the second jurisdiction are likely to take the prior punishment into account. 
The extensive use of forum shopping thus means that while most of corporate 
investigators’ activities remain within the private legal sphere, moving towards the 
public legal environment may provide an optimal solution in certain cases as well.
 The above should make clear that stating that corporate security is a semi-
autonomous social field should not be taken as a statement that it is a homogenous 
field: it is indeed highly fragmented and fluid, both in its composition and in its 
service provision. The fragmentation of the field (many different corporate security 
actors, working for many different clients, with many different interests) makes it 
furthermore difficult to get comprehensive insight into or exert effective control over 
corporate investigators’ activities. The different rules applicable to the different actors 
make for a field which is “fragmented, almost chaotic even” (Hoogenboom, 1994: 263). 
Adding to this that most of the activities never reach the criminal justice system, it 
is not surprising that there is no clear view within law enforcement agencies of what 
‘corporate security’ actually is in practice. In many cases, forum shopping options 
make it rather easy for corporate investigators and clients to keep law enforcement 
authorities at bay.
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4. Control and accountability in the context of a semi-
autonomous corporate security sector
Many commentators express a certain degree of uneasiness with regard to the 
existence of this private legal order (see e.g. Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011). From a 
rule-of-law standpoint, the (very) limited control over and insight in the day-to-day 
practices within the corporate security sector may be considered to be problematic. 
Corporate investigations can have a large effect on the people and organisations 
involved and there is a potential for abuse: there is little democratic control over 
the private legal sphere in which corporate investigators operate. As we have seen 
in chapter 2, extensive access and lack of formal powers do not lead to a situation in 
which ‘anything goes’. The legal restraints put upon corporate investigators are indeed 
less stringent than those put upon police. As Stenning (2000: 337) argues, however, 
it would be incorrect to assume that (democratic) control over police organisations is 
more effective for this reason alone.
Those who argue that the public police are highly accountable and the private police 
hardly accountable at all, usually arrive at this conclusion because they only consider 
the kinds of accountability to which public officials are subject and, not surprisingly, find 
that private police are nowhere near as accountable in these ways as are the public police. 
(…). They frequently overstate the effective public accountability of the public police 
by focusing on the ways in which they are theoretically accountable while not paying 
sufficient attention to the very real (and well documented) limitations of the effective 
accountability which is able to be accomplished through these mechanisms in practice.
The research that provides the foundation for this book did not focus on police 
accountability and neither will this concluding chapter. It is important, though, while 
discussing the limited amount of public control over the corporate security sector, to 
keep in mind that democratic control over police organisations does not automatically 
lead to effective accountability either. In addition, the lack of public control does not 
mean there is no legal framework in place or no control over corporate investigators’ 
activities. Many (informal/self ) regulations are guiding corporate security’s actions. 
The nature of these frameworks is often not that of a legally binding rule, rather they 
are used as guidelines. Respondents suggest that they are generally guided by the 
principles of law behind the guidelines – all corporate investigators who have been 
interviewed or observed in this research (claim to) abide to certain leading principles 
of law – most notably proportionality, subsidiarity and fair play. Additionally, civil 
(or even criminal) liability serves as a fall-back option for those who are wronged by 
corporate security’s activities.
231
Conclusion and discussion
 Whether or not ‘problematic’, control over corporate investigators by the state is 
limited. Just as is the case with most investigations and settlements, most safeguards 
and controls also stay within the private (legal) sphere. Only private investigation 
firms are obligated to get a licence from the Ministry of Security and Justice, and 
as we have seen in chapter 2 the control over the licences is purely administrative. 
The scattered nature of regulations (different investigators having to comply with 
different legal frameworks) furthermore creates a rather ambiguous legal context. 
There are two interesting circumstances that may be noted in this regard. The first 
is formed by the confusion about the applicability of the permit system of the Wpbr: 
some forensic accountant-respondents do have a permit and some do not. Forensic 
accountants are not obliged by law to get a Wpbr-permit. Secondly, there is a 
pervasive fallacy in the corporate investigation profession that forensic accountants 
are the investigators who are most strictly regulated. As chapter 2 shows, this is not 
the case as forensic accountancy rules are based on (non-binding) guidelines and 
principles of law (which are, however, used in disciplinary proceedings). Another 
pervasive fallacy around regulation is that of the (im)possibilities of public/private 
information sharing: many (mostly public-sector) respondents are not aware of the 
opportunities within the legislation for information sharing. The legal context of the 
corporate investigations field is thus not entirely clear to the professionals working 
in it. Because much of corporate investigators’ activities stay within the private legal 
sphere, the criminal justice system is furthermore not in a position to exert much 
control. All of this adds to the state’s lack of insight in and knowledge about the 
corporate security sector. The control over corporate investigators’ activities is thus 
largely located in the private legal sphere as well.
 The system of safeguards in place for corporate security’s actions has a different 
rationale than the one in place for the criminal justice system. Where the safeguards 
within the criminal justice system are mostly focused on protection of the (relatively 
powerless) citizen against (abuse of power by) the state (representing vertical 
relationships), the private law-rationale of the Civil Code implies a certain level of 
equality between parties (representing horizontal relationships). Authors such 
as Meershoek and Hoogenboom (2012: 20) remark that “as long as citizens have 
access to a judge and non-judiciary institutions of appeal, elementary civil liberties 
are guarded”. This may be true, however, such a view glosses over the differences 
in ability to effectuate these possibilities for control. If you have been harmed by 
corporate security’s actions there are private law remedies available to you – but 
these require an active stance from involved individuals. Furthermore, the equality-
of-parties argument can be considered unhelpful in this context. In the case of 
corporate investigations and corporate settlements, a definite power imbalance 
may be discerned between the organisation (employer), corporate investigators 
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and legal council on the one hand, and the involved person(s), possibly with 
legal representation, on the other (Piret, 2005). The commercial interests and 
professionalism of corporate investigators protects against gross abuses of power in 
most cases according to respondents (see also Berndtsson, 2012). There are, however, 
concerns about the protection of the involved person and the power imbalances 
within the private legal sphere. These are fair concerns. Private organisations and 
corporate investigators attempt to counter these issues by taking general principles 
of law into account, and by prescribing procedural guarantees in the investigations 
and settlements, however the possibility of abuse still remains.106 In addition, the 
market for corporate investigations and corporate settlements exists by virtue of 
the mobilisation of symbolic capital. This means that the reputation of the sector as 
providing a legitimate professional service, convening authority, is essential to its 
professional existence. For the sector to be successful in its commercial endeavours, 
it is thus vital that it is viewed as a legitimate actor beyond the private legal sphere 
in which it mostly operates (see also below). It is therefore important to note that the 
private legal sphere exists by virtue of “the legitimacy afforded by the public sphere 
and the ability of industry practitioners to mobilize formal legal sensibilities, rights 
and obligations and to invoke public modes of recourse in circumstances in which 
they are warranted” (Williams, 2006b: 219).
5. The myth of public/private turf wars – the matter of 
competition versus separation
Above, the activities of corporate investigators were placed within a semi-
autonomous social field. This contradicts the state-centric discourse commonly 
used for crime control (Van der Lugt, 2001). A thought-provoking observation by 
Hoogenboom (1994) in this light is that private investigations affect the exclusive 
position of the state on crime reduction. This is a reasonable argument, which follows 
from the idea that the state is the leading actor when it comes to crime control, 
and that involvement of other actors serves as an impeachment of said monopoly 
(Van der Lugt, 2001). This is the starting point of most theoretical arguments about 
public/private relations within the security field. The junior partner theory claims 
that private actors are junior partners to the state, advancing the state’s objectives 
by their actions and acting as a fall-back option for the services the state cannot 
(fully) provide. When defined in this way, Hoogenboom (1994) argues, the private 
sector is no threat to the legitimacy of the law enforcement system as it serves as a 
106 They still are present in police investigations as well – however there the control and procedural 
guarantees are more strictly regulated.
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supplement to this system. The activities of the private sector are thus considered to 
be different from those of the police. 
 Interestingly, public-sector respondents interviewed in this research have voiced no 
significant concerns with regard to the argument of breach of, or threat to, the monopoly 
on crime control (White, 2014). In 2001 Van der Lugt already expressed his wonder about 
the lack of concern by law enforcement professionals with regard to the role of private 
investigators, compared to the uneasiness they feel when it comes to the role of private 
security guards. This is in line with the argument of (in)visibility that White uses to explain 
why the most visible forms of private security are regulated in the UK, while other types 
of private security that are less visible, are not. Those private security actors who move 
in a private sphere are not regarded as posing a threat to the repression-monopoly held 
by the state, in the same way that parents may discipline their offspring without posing 
such a threat. Interestingly, corporate investigations may move out of the private legal 
sphere into the public sphere but even then, public and private may still be regarded 
as functionally separate. The failed pilot projects discussed in chapter 5, aiming to 
streamline the use of information gathered through corporate investigations in criminal 
justice proceedings, may be regarded as an indicator that the rationale within corporate 
and criminal justice investigations is too different to streamline in one go. 
 One might argue, then, that the public/private separation (in Williams’ (2005) words, 
‘bifurcation’) which has often been renounced by scholars focusing on private security, 
remains a relevant concept for the corporate security sector. Instead of a blurring 
between public and private into some kind of hybrid entity, as is so often argued to 
happen in other forms of private security (see Johnston, 1992), there are boundaries 
between public and private, with corporate security mostly remaining within its private 
legal sphere. This separation is based on multiple characteristics of the public and private 
sectors. First, the cases corporate investigators deal with are not necessarily the same as 
those that end up in the criminal justice system. For one, not all cases investigated by 
corporate security involve criminal behaviour. These are breaches of internal regulations, 
business standards or other norms. In those cases, there is no functional overlap between 
corporate investigations and criminal justice investigations. There is, however, also a large 
category of norm violations that may be defined as criminal (as they are criminalised in 
the penal code) but are not defined as such for various reasons (see chapter 4).
 Secondly, it can be argued that there is a difference in rationale between corporate 
investigations and criminal justice investigations – and not just in the sense that 
commercial parties are focused on loss prevention and state actors are focused on 
crime reduction (Hoogenboom, 1994). The fact that most of corporate investigators’ 
activities are within a commercial context, within the private law system, makes the 
cases they investigate, and the legal frameworks that are used for those investigations, 
follow the rationale of the private sector. Within the private law system equality 
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of parties is generally assumed, as is the agreement on ‘facts’ (unless contested). 
Although elements of criminal justice (such as the adherence to procedural justice) 
are inserted in corporate investigations and corporate settlements, the dominant 
rationale is that of the private law system. Problems are solved as efficiently as 
possible, defined as a business or labour conflict and dealt with accordingly. Whether 
or not the behaviour is (also) criminal is often an after-thought. 
 Thirdly, different interests are served by private and public-sector investigations. 
Although questions may be asked about the validity of such a claim, state-led 
investigations essentially serve public interests (Loader & White, 2017). The Dutch 
criminal justice system defines crime primarily as a dispute between the offender and 
the state: the (legal) person affected by the norm violation is no party to this dispute.107 
As such, there is little room for the inclusion of his private interests.108 Conversely, 
corporate investigators focus mostly on the private interests of clients, keeping them 
central to all their proceedings (while also taking public interests into account when 
possible). This leads to a difference in approach to both the investigations and the 
solutions provided.
While there seems to be a tendency to ‘cooperation talk’ in both the public and the 
private sector, not much seems to come of it. As described, the nature of the sector 
(fragmented) and of the activities (focused on private interests) and the high level of 
autonomy within the private legal sphere, together with a difference in rationale and 
focus between the public and private sectors are likely to make any form of structural, 
long-term cooperation between law enforcement and corporate investigators very 
difficult. But, although the cooperation narrative is pervasive, very few (public and 
private sector) respondents seem to have an issue with this tendency to separation. 
Many respondents indicate that they feel corporate investigators are fully capable of 
providing their clients with the kinds of results the criminal justice system does not 
offer. As shown in this book, the services of corporate security go beyond criminally 
defined behaviour. Additionally, there is a focus and client-centeredness in corporate 
security’s work which makes corporate investigators and settlements – although at 
times overlapping – essentially different from criminal justice investigations and 
procedures. One of the findings of the research is thus that there is no competition 
between public and private in the sense of nodal theory (see inter alia Wood & 
Shearing, 2007; more on this below). The competition-argument implies, as does the 
loss prevention theory mentioned by Hoogenboom (1994), that police and private 
investigators’ activities are similar and that in such a sense, public and private are 
107 However, in recent years the position of the victim has been strengthened, for example by the formal 
right to speak in court (see for example Pemberton & Reynaers, 2011).
108 Although individual law enforcement professionals may take private interests into account as well.
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basically interchangeable. Although the activities in themselves may be regarded as 
similar,109 the context in which they are executed (the private or the criminal justice 
sphere) ensures a continuation of the public/private bifurcation. This is not a rigid or 
unchangeable separation – indeed, as we have seen, there are many possible forms 
of overlap – however, it is the ‘default position’ of the sector.
 Fundamentally, a shift needs to be made from a public-sector oriented gaze (or 
state-centric discourse) to one that recognizes the autonomy of corporate security 
actors. Hoogenboom has long argued for such a shift in the criminological gaze (e.g. 
2007). As we have seen, there is simultaneously an overlap between and a difference in 
the activities by the public and the private sector in this field. Crucially, the difference is 
not the one as described in the junior partner theory – in most cases it is not a question 
of the corporate investigations industry being supplementary (or ‘junior partner’) to 
law enforcement activities. Rather, fieldwork suggests that the criminal justice system 
is seen as the supplement to corporate settlement solutions. Whether or not an 
internal norm violation is reported as a crime to the criminal justice authorities is in 
most instances an afterthought for the organisation involved. Chapter 4 has shown 
that even in cases where a report to the authorities is made, this is mostly done in 
addition to a private solution. There may be moral or pragmatic considerations for such 
a decision (see chapter 4) but it is often seen as the extra step, not the main solution. 
All of this makes the hierarchical view of crime control as a state-mandated activity, 
or alternatively as a “common regulatory enterprise” within a networked reality (with 
all actors having the same implicit interests, goals and objectives) one that is hard to 
maintain (Williams, 2006b: 212). Rather, one should recognise the multitude of actors, 
interests and professional backgrounds influencing the investigative and settlement 
activities within the private legal order (ibid.). 
 Throughout this book, relations between corporate investigators and law 
enforcement actors have been presented as the exception rather than the rule. 
In chapter 5 the term ‘coexistence’ is introduced as a better-suited term than 
‘cooperation’ and a typology of co-existence is presented, ranging from a more or less 
one-sided action from private actors (type A – ‘private-public information transfer’), 
through more or less mutual but limited information sharing (type B – ‘(minor) mutual 
information sharing’) to what one may term actual cooperation (type C – ‘coordination 
of actions’). In most cases in which criminal justice actors get involved, private to 
public information sharing occurs (type A). Often, as respondents indicate, the 
109 An important side note here is that although the activities are largely similar, they are not 
interchangeable. The fact that corporate investigators do not have powers of investigation means 
that they cannot perform all the activities law enforcement professionals could in the same situation. 
Similarly, corporate investigators can provide their clients with services law enforcement agencies do 
not provide (such as asset recovery and the improvement of compliance systems).
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information received from corporate investigators needs to be thoroughly checked 
by (mostly) full-blown criminal justice investigations to make it fit into the rationale 
of the criminal justice system. As a bare minimum, the suspect will be interrogated by 
the police with all the procedural cautions but fieldwork shows that in most instances 
police will ‘re-do’ the investigations entirely. 
6. Normativity and pragmatism in corporate investi-
gations and settlements – a case of non-contractual 
moral agency?
Above, the different foci of rationale in corporate investigations and criminal 
justice investigations were discussed. This is not to say that there is no room for ‘the 
rationale of the criminal justice system’ within corporate justice. Many corporate 
investigators have a criminal justice background and their way of approaching their 
work incorporates some parts of the criminal justice rationale. This manifests itself in 
multiple ways and is aptly termed ‘non-contractual moral agency’ in a wider context by 
Loader and White (2017): the actions of corporate investigators which cannot be said 
to be contractually mandatory but are done because they are ‘right’. Some of these 
are made contractually mandatory – because corporate investigators have inserted 
them into their code of conduct – others are not. Non-contractual moral behaviour 
that is made mandatory for part of the sector is the use of certain principles of law. In 
the Privacy code of conduct, which is binding to private investigation firms, the most 
important of these principles of law are codified. The same goes for the guidelines 
used by forensic accountants. Other investigators tend to also use these principles of 
law, in an effort to ensure due process. Moreover, more stringent rules and additional 
principles of law may be inserted in the individual codes of conduct of corporate 
investigation units. The use of these principles of law – most notably proportionality, 
subsidiarity and fair play – is meant as a safeguard to counter the power imbalance 
between employer and employee and to strengthen the formal position of the 
latter. The use of said principles of law and broader normative considerations works 
to enhance the legitimacy of corporate investigations as well. In this sense, it is a 
reputational matter for corporate investigation units. The interviews and observations 
in this research indicate that in addition to this commercial incentive to ‘play fair’ 
(which is more a practical, strategic consideration than a normative one), many 
corporate investigators also do so out of normative considerations. They are aware 
of the power they represent in the investigations and although they make use of 
that power (by putting pressure on an involved person to cooperate, by demanding 
information, et cetera), they seem to try to do so ‘responsibly’ (see chapter 4).
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 Non-contractual moral agency may be most apparent in situations in which the 
moral behaviour goes against commercial interests. This may be the case when 
corporate investigators hand back an assignment because they believe they are 
being used by a client in an illegitimate way or because the investigations are in 
danger of not being independent and objective. This is a loss of income on the short 
term and will most likely lead the involved client to take his business elsewhere in 
future.110 Another manifestation of non-contractual moral agency is the pro bono 
work some respondents do. Corporate investigators do not get paid for these cases 
(or they might use a heavily reduced rate). Pro bono work is reserved for cases in 
which corporate investigative services are very welcome but the client is not able to 
pay for them (for example when a norm violation is discovered in a small-business 
environment).
 The general principles of law many corporate investigators claim to take 
into account, constrain them in general terms from using illegitimate means of 
investigations. However, it may under circumstances lead to behaviour which is 
considered ‘right’ even though it is not allowed. The instances which were mentioned 
by respondents concerned minor (privacy) violations which benefited the person 
whose privacy was violated (see chapter 5). Additionally, corporate investigators and 
clients may find themselves in a grey area by acting in a way which they think is right 
towards other market players. An example of this is one employer giving another 
employer a warning sign about a (future) employee.
 In advising clients whether or not to report a norm violation to the authorities, 
corporate investigators may insert normative considerations as well. When the norm 
violation is deemed too severe (mostly cases involving physical harm) or when 
a need for retribution is felt by the client, corporate investigators may advise the 
client to make an official report. Indicative of this is that the corporate investigator 
respondents, as well as the clients who were interviewed in this research, point out 
that they do not expect much from a report to the authorities: they often do so 
because they believe it is the right thing to do.
 Thus, the focus on normative considerations and principles of law as guidelines 
for corporate investigators’ activities fits within the non-contractual moral agency 
Loader and White (2017) would like to introduce into private security more generally. 
As we have seen in chapters 2 to 4, corporate investigators tend to place great 
value on principles of law as guidelines for their professional action. Additionally, 
their (and their clients’) introduction of normative considerations into the process 
of investigating and settling, may be said to go beyond what is needed in their 
contractual relationship with clients. In this way, the non-contractual moral agency 
110 However, because it might boost the reputation of the involved corporate investigators, it might be a 
commercially smart move in the long run. 
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of corporate investigators may ensure the (partial) inclusion of public interests into 
the setting of private corporate investigations and settlements. However, as long as 
the adherence to this principles of law and inclusion of other than strictly private 
interests is based on voluntary action, the potential problem of non-compliance 
remains present. 
7. Legitimacy and the common good
The legitimacy of private security has been a recurrent theme in literature. In their 
article about the private security sector more generally, Thumala, Goold and Loader 
(2011) suggest that there is a moral ambivalence in this sector about the industry’s 
condition and legitimacy. Although many of the claims made by the authors do not 
necessarily fit with the fieldwork reported upon in this book, the authors do raise some 
interesting points.111 With regard to the need for justification of the market for private 
security, the authors state: “the industry may exist to make money. But making money 
selling security does not seem like justification enough”. Like my respondents, the 
professionals interviewed by Thumala et al. “crave a wider worth and credibility, long to 
be well-regarded and thought of as an activity which is socially valuable” (2011: 297). 
When asked about their general opinion about the existence of a corporate security 
field, many public-sector respondents indicated that they felt a bit conflicted: on the 
one hand, they seemed to agree with the widely-held (but often implicit) opinion in 
criminology that crime should be dealt with by the state (which may be said to be a 
normative stance). On the other, they express the opinion that corporate investigators 
are generally better equipped to deal with these specific matters without public 
sector involvement (which is a more pragmatic approach). Interestingly, corporate 
investigator-respondents tend to not just point to arguments based on the market 
while justifying their work – such as that there is a demand for their services and that it 
is a legitimate business (Hoogenboom, 1994). Instead, respondents stress their role in 
the provision of a service which serves not merely the private interests of clients, but 
also adds to the common good (for example by correcting the lack of interest by police 
and the justice department and by providing a customised service). When talking to 
corporate investigators, a frequent comment is that the criminal justice system is not 
focused on the types of crimes organisations are concerned with. A consequence is that 
on the one hand reports to the authorities are not very often made, and on the other, 
111 The authors refer for example to problems of poor quality of staff, ‘cowboy traders’ and a connection to 
(organised) crime. These issues are less pronounced in the corporate security sector: the quality of staff 
for example is regarded as higher than in the public sector (although, as chapter 2 shows, there is no 
uniform system of education or quality markers available).
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that many cases which are reported are not prioritised by law enforcement agencies 
and thus either investigated at a late point in time or not at all. Additionally, the position 
of the (legal) person affected by the crime is rather peripheral in Dutch criminal law. 
A crime is primarily seen as a crime against society. This means that the way a crime 
is investigated and handled in the criminal justice system does not fit very well with 
the interests of those directly involved: police and prosecution often only investigate 
what they need for a conviction, while the organisation needs the complete picture. 
Furthermore, the criminal justice process is very slow and no ‘solution’ is provided to 
the problem at hand (see chapter 4).
 Corporate investigators view themselves as providing a (public) service by offering 
a (professional) answer to the organisation’s problem. Because of their background 
and experience, corporate investigators are well-suited to do the investigations and 
help with the settlement, it is argued. In this way, the interests of the client are served, 
society is served because redress is made and professional procedures are in place to 
ensure the people involved in the investigation are treated fairly.
You may wonder whether the criminal justice system is always the best way to go to 
get to the classic goals of the penal system. Internal investigations are often much 
faster and more effective. The company is corrected and restored, the person is fired, 
so the legal order is restored. In the end, that’s the most important goal of our legal 
system, isn’t it? So actually, internal investigations serve a lot of the classically intended 
purposes of criminal law. [Respondent 28 – forensic legal investigator/client]
The above comment may also be interpreted as a legitimising effort of the corporate 
security sector. Both within the sector and across it, legitimising efforts are made by 
stressing the inability of the criminal justice system to meet the demands and needs 
of organisations when faced with internal norm violations. In this way, corporate 
investigators position themselves as professional (and importantly, independent) 
experts in their field, combining this symbolic capital with a commodification of trust 
(Williams, 2006b).
 Corporate investigators thus see their general role as providing a service to their 
clients, but at the same time transcending the mere private interests as well. When 
it comes to the common good and the role corporate investigators may play in its 
constitution (for the better or the worse), some issues may be identified. Above, the 
power imbalance between employer and employee has been discussed. Even though 
corporate security providers indicate that they try to put systems in place to ensure 
due process, this power imbalance continues to exist within corporate settlements. 
In those cases that do not reach a court for reasons of private interests (such as 
efficiency and reputation) the control over the process lies with the investigators and 
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the client. Because their private interests are served with the corporate settlement, 
there is a real possibility of abuse. In addition, even without breaking any rules or 
regulations, investigators and others involved may pressure the involved person to 
cooperate with the investigations and settlement, for example by threatening to 
report the matter to the police even though they do not intend to do so. In such a 
case, the values of the rule-of-law in a democratic state may come under pressure. 
These values tend to be taken into account, but might suffer from their collision with 
the private interest of the client.
 The above represents the question of the role of public interests (or ‘the common 
good’) within the private legal sphere. Loader and White (2017) discuss models to 
ensure public interests in private security provision, concluding that it is not enough 
to cleanse the market from unruly security providers through regulation and quality 
standards, or to communalise the market by the redistribution of tax payer money so 
as to ensure equal access to the private security market. Cleansing and communalising 
the private security market fall short in ensuring public interests in so far as they 
leave no room for non-contractual moral agency of security providers. Although both 
models provide a solution to what they see as the problem with regard to the public 
interest (respectively ‘cowboys’ and unequal access), they are essentially neo-liberal 
in their approach in as far as they consider the market as essentially ‘good’ (Loader 
& White, 2017). According to the authors, public interests are involved in more ways 
than that. Loader and White therefore propose to ‘civilise the private security market’ 
by adding to the abovementioned cleansing and communalising models, the use 
of principles of law: “embedded in these settings, principles invite and mutually 
orient all actors who make up regulatory space” (2017: 179). The authors envision 
an ‘inclusive deliberation’ between stake-holders to ensure social solidarity in the 
provision of private security. For this, public and private institutions are essential. 
Police and trade associations are mentioned as obvious choices: “in the civilizing 
model, police forces are viewed not as top-down regulators of private security, but 
as one side of a public-private partnership, which rests upon, and, therefore deepens 
the principles of inclusive deliberation and social solidarity” (2017: 180).
 While the focus on principles of law described above fits well with the realities of 
the Dutch corporate security market, the proposition of a public/private partnership 
(in the widest sense of the word) deliberating and putting into action the use of such 
principles does not. This book has shown the inward focus of the Dutch corporate 
security market, only rarely stepping outside its private niche to involve law 
enforcement actors such as the police. The statement that private security aspires 
to be police-like which gives the police considerable power to “communicate the 
importance of public values and commitments to the industry” (Loader & White, 2017: 
180), has already been dismissed in several places in this book. Corporate security 
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respondents seem, on the contrary, to stress the non-police-like nature of their 
activities, preferring not to be seen as private police. The distance that exists with 
public law enforcement – notwithstanding the transfer of personnel and knowledge 
between the two – makes such a view hard to maintain. 
 Similarly, the role of trade associations is rather limited within the Dutch 
corporate security sector. Many respondents indicate they are not member to a trade 
association, and if they are it is one that is specific to their professional background 
(e.g. (forensic) accountant). Just as there is no overarching legal framework for all 
corporate investigators in the Netherlands, there is no overarching trade association 
(although, initiatives have been made in this regard, see chapter 2). Any role trade 
associations would play in the advertising of public interests through principles 
would necessarily remain limited to their members. However, intervention into the 
market by either police or a trade association would not only seem impractical, but 
it can be said to be superfluous as well. The next section of this chapter focuses on 
some alternative options which may provide a more practical solution to the issues 
of limited control possibilities over the corporate security market. The formulation 
of generally applicable principles of law, as suggested by Loader and White (2017) 
seems not to be necessary as corporate investigators seem to adhere to the same 
principles of law already. In doing so, and in their awareness of effects of their work 
beyond the specific private interests of the client, corporate investigators seem 
to endeavour to add in a positive way to the constitution of the common good. 
However, the question may be posed whether such an approach, using normative 
considerations and principles of law, is solid enough as a legal framework guiding 
corporate investigators’ activities as the possibilities of control over the sector remain 
limited in this way.
8. Policy implications
8.1 Governing corporate security – looking forward
In his 2006 article, James Williams discusses some of the fundamental issues related to 
regulating the corporate security sector (2006a). Some of the key characteristics of the 
sector produce barriers, not only to structural forms of public/private cooperation, but 
also to attempts to regulate or govern the sector. The relative invisibility of corporate 
investigations and settlements, the large potential for forum shopping and strategic 
use of legal venues, the multiple interests involved and the fragmented nature of the 
sector in terms of professional actors and legal frameworks, all make comprehensive 
control very difficult. Be that as it may, corporate investigators also share common 
characteristics. One important commonality is the work itself: although corporate 
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investigations and settlements are tailor-made and client-centred, the investigative 
activities largely align within the sector. The tendency within the sector to combine 
the expertise of corporate investigators from multiple professional backgrounds in 
one corporate investigation unit adds to the common ground between corporate 
investigators. Furthermore, a common focus on principles of law as guidelines for 
professional behaviour seems to open up possibilities for regulation.
 While there seems to be sufficient common ground for the governance of the sector 
based on an overarching legal framework, this research shows that such a framework 
is currently lacking. One might pose the question whether this is problematic. The 
premium corporate investigators put on principles of law may be a protection 
against misconduct – however, as long as the application of such principles is based 
on voluntary action by individual investigators and as long as the legal frameworks 
are unclear and only limited control is exercised over the sector, the possibility of 
misconduct and abuse of power still lurks. In this light, a useful analogy might be made 
with the ‘principles-based’ approach to (financial) regulation that has been applied pre-
financial crisis. This Anglo-Saxon term for public control over private self-regulation 
within a broad public regulation framework (focusing on ‘principles’ rather than on 
prescriptive rules), in practice came down to de-regulation. Many commentators have 
linked this form of regulation to the financial crisis of 2008. In hind-sight it has become 
clear that this type of ‘light-touch regulation’ is vulnerable (Black, 2011). A crisis-trigger 
such as was available in the financial markets is not available in the context of corporate 
investigations and, as mentioned, there are few indications of gross abuses or major 
problems. However, the analogy with the 2008 credit crunch and the role of regulation 
in this, does alert us to vulnerabilities of such an approach. The focus on principles of 
law as guidelines for investigatory activities may be seen as a useful common ground 
to build upon in regulating the corporate security market. In absence of a widely-
applicable permit system, much relies on the willingness of individual corporate 
investigators (and clients) to follow these principles of law and act upon a breach of 
said principles. 
 I would therefore suggest making the Wpbr [Law on Private Security Companies and 
Private Investigation Firms] and the Privacy code of conduct for private investigation 
firms applicable to all investigators who deal with individuals in their day-to-day 
business. This implies a shift by making the nature of the activities and the potential 
for breach of privacy of the subject of investigations the defining measure in asserting 
the applicability of the law, instead of the position of the investigators in relation 
to the client (CBP, 2007). This would mean that forensic accountants, forensic legal 
investigators and in-house investigators would all become required to get a permit. 
This is not a magic bullet in the sense that problems still remain. For example, the 
role of legal privilege should be determined, although case law seems to point in the 
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direction of non-applicability for investigative actions (see chapter 2). Another issue 
that still remains is the control over the permit holders. In the current system, the 
control of permits and compliance to the conditions of these permits is virtually non-
existent. One of the reasons for this is that the police cannot spare the resources to 
provide effective control. This issue will be exacerbated when more investigators would 
be required to get a permit. I would suggest to both change the conditions of control – 
re-introducing some form of control on content, for example the yearly report private 
investigation firms had to submit in the past – and to place the control in the hands of 
another regulatory body. My suggestion would be the Dutch Data Protection Authority 
[Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (AP)] as much of the applicable regulation is focused upon 
the WBP, the Dutch privacy law.
 From the standpoint that corporate investigators are not a form of privatised police, 
placing the control in the hands of the Data Protection Authority makes more sense 
than the current situation in which the police organisation is responsible for control. 
The research shows that police/corporate investigator relations are ad hoc and often 
rather cumbersome. It would alleviate the pressure on police without being detrimental 
to their information position, since the current control system is virtually non-existent. 
Ad hoc relations between corporate investigators and police would continue to exist in 
cases in which pragmatic or normative considerations bring an incentive to corporate 
investigators and clients to involve law enforcement authorities in a case. For the Data 
Protection Authority such a change would provide a large workload. However, since 
the AP is involved with corporate investigators already, in approving the Privacy code 
of conduct, it would in my opinion be the most efficient and effective solution. Most 
of the concerns uttered about corporate investigators’ activities are not about criminal 
acts (the realm of law enforcement) but about breaches of privacy (the realm of the AP). 
Furthermore, in a 2007 advisory letter to the Dutch government, the AP (at the time 
still called CBP) itself has suggested that it may be involved to a greater extent in the 
control over the permit system, stating that: “the CBP would gladly enhance the current 
cooperation112 with regard to the permit system by being in charge of the control over 
compliance with the norms set in the Privacy code of conduct, although the CBP is 
currently lacking the capacity to do so” (CBP, 2007: 1). It would, therefore, be necessary 
to provide the Data Protection Authority with the additional resources required to act 
as an efficient regulator for the Wpbr-permit system.
 Tightening control over corporate investigations and settlements in this way does 
produce more administrative work for corporate investigators. This was one of the 
reasons to exclude in-house corporate investigation units from the permit system 
(State secretary of justice & minister of the interior, 2009). In its search for legitimacy, 
112 This cooperation is formed by the advice the Data Protection Authority provides to the minister of 
security and justice when a request for a permit is being assessed.
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the corporate security sector seems to ask for a better system of control – at least the 
corporate security respondents in this research do. In addition, in the current situation 
many of those corporate investigators who are not obliged to have a permit either do 
have a permit or act like a permit holder by using the Privacy code of conduct. I would 
therefore not expect much resistance from the corporate security sector – indeed a 
wider and more effective permit system would be beneficial to the legitimacy of the 
market. Additionally, from a level playing field perspective, the new situation should 
benefit the market as a whole.
The above suggestions might mitigate some of the issues identified in this research, 
they will not abolish them completely. Much still depends on the willingness of 
individual corporate investigators and clients to use the principles of law such as 
protection of the involved persons as part of their non-contractual moral agency 
(Loader & White, 2017; see also section 6 above and chapter 4 and 5). The Privacy code 
of conduct is a useful tool but non-compliance to it will not lead to any consequences 
for the investigator as long as no-one knows about it. The changes in the control system 
suggested here would not lead to very extensive knowledge of individual cases: a very 
detailed description of every action in every investigation, or a standard mandatory 
insight in the investigation reports would be impractical and I believe, undesirable as 
well. As we have seen, the corporate security sector exists by virtue of its marketing of 
some strategic advantages (the use of secrecy, discretion and control; its legal flexibility 
(forum shopping) and the way economic crime is framed). If these characteristics cease 
to exist because of stringent regulation, clients would find different solutions, moving 
away from the professionalised and regulated corporate security market. It is not only 
corporate investigators who engage in forum shopping and strategic use of legal 
venues – the same may be said about their clients. Forum shopping is not undesirable 
per se (for the reason that it may just involve a search for an optimal outcome without 
negative side effects) – but it might lead to a situation in which either investigators or 
clients look for a specific context in which they are not regulated or accountable, which 
situation is objectionable from a rule-of-law point of view.
 The nature of the professional activities of corporate investigators produces a focus 
on their private niche, which is not necessarily detrimental to public or private interests 
but it does lead to a sphere of obscurity. It is essential that a context is provided in which 
all who are involved may trust the quality of corporate investigations. This goes for 
the people investigated, for organisations using the services of corporate investigators 
(clients), for other corporate investigators, for law enforcement authorities and for the 
judicial system. In those instances in which law enforcement is involved, law enforcement 
actors should be able to rely on the professionalism of corporate investigators. As we 
have seen, trust is essential to public/private coexistence. Cooperation is possible 
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within the limits of the law, however the room for manoeuvre that exists is not much 
used because of trust issues (among other things). Non-compliance with the Privacy 
code of conduct may currently be corrected by legal representatives of the people 
involved, by law enforcement professionals, by a (civil or criminal) court and by clients. 
This however depends for a large part on the assertiveness of the involved person and 
the moral agency of clients. Only for private investigation firms, it may currently lead to 
loss of livelihood through forfeiture of the permit.
8.2 Revisiting the cooperation mantra
Extensive, long-term public/private cooperation is not realistic in the field of corporate 
security because of the structural characteristics of the market, as referred to above. It 
would therefore be wise to let go of the emphasis on public/private cooperation and 
focus on the social reality of public/private separation. In doing so, room will be created 
to value both the criminal justice system and the corporate security sector in their own 
right. The junior partner-perspective remains pervasive in public/private cooperation-
talk but this research shows that the social reality is much more complicated than that. 
Efforts to streamline private cooperation in criminal justice procedures have as of yet 
been unsuccessful – maybe it is time to introduce a new approach. 
 Respondents (both private and public-sector) indicate that in the ad hoc contacts 
they have, trust and familiarity are important. The fraud contact points that have 
disappeared after a reorganisation of the Dutch police organisation are mentioned 
as being beneficial to the value of ad hoc contacts. Letting go of the emphasis on 
cooperation does not mean that ad hoc coexistence will cease to exist. Normative and 
pragmatic considerations from the corporate side, and (from the law enforcement 
perspective) criminal investigations in which corporate investigators are investigating 
as well, will continue to lead to ad hoc contacts. This research has introduced three 
general types of ad hoc contacts: private to public information transfer, (minor) mutual 
information sharing and coordination of actions. For all these types of coexistence, 
the reinstatement of (fraud) contact points would be beneficial. It would not solve 
the problem of different logics guiding the investigations; law enforcement officials 
may still feel the need to reproduce (part of ) the investigations by using their powers 
of investigation in many cases. However, law enforcement respondents also suggest 
that in some cases they (would like to be able to) make only minor efforts before 
presenting the privately generated information to the court in a criminal justice 
procedure – if that information is useful and trustworthy. Familiarity between (public 
and private) investigators and mutual trust may make this more likely.113 Similarly, the 
113 Too much familiarity is not to be aspired either, since that may lead to collusion and informal 
(illegitimate) information sharing. As of yet, this does not seem to be a major concern in corporate 
investigator/police relations. However, it would be wise remain wary of the possibility.
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information flow from public to private that may ensue in some cases may benefit 
from the (fraud) contact points. Currently, few law enforcement professionals seem 
to be aware of the possibilities for information sharing with corporate investigators 
and much is reliant on the willingness of individual prosecutors and investigators. 
Having a formal contact point, specialised in contacts with corporate investigators 
and clients, would potentially remove some of the hesitation. It would provide both 
public and private sector professionals with a point of entry based on contacts, when 
they are in need of one in a specific case. Furthermore, a knowledgeable point of 
reference may be valuable for both public and private sector professionals.
 The above should be placed in the context of ad hoc coexistence rather than longer-
term cooperation efforts. Corporate investigators and law enforcement professionals 
largely stay in their own sphere of action but meet on an ad hoc basis. Stating that we 
need to let go of the cooperation mantra does not mean that no form of cooperation 
will ensue in specific cases. However, it is not necessarily something to aspire to on a 
structural level.
9. Reflections – this research and beyond
Through this research I have endeavoured to shed light on the market for corporate 
investigations and corporate settlements. The research adds to criminological 
knowledge, both about the market itself and about public/private relations. The 
methodological approach chosen has allowed me to give a rich description and 
analysis of the subject, which was the goal of the research. A qualitative research 
approach, combining different methods through triangulation, has the advantage 
that it allows the researcher to explore the subject matter in-depth. The approach 
is also necessarily (and purposively) selective as it focuses on certain parts of the 
field. Here, the focus has been on the four main groups of corporate investigators 
– in-house security departments, private investigation firms, forensic accountants 
and forensic legal investigators. Because their day-to-day business was central to the 
research, a choice was made to select the majority of respondents from corporate 
investigators. For future research, it would be interesting to focus more specifically on 
the upcoming profession of forensic legal investigators. This research has consciously 
focused on the corporate security market in the broad sense of the word. Differences 
between the corporate investigator groups have been found, but there are enough 
similarities to claim that they are part of the same professional market and therefore, 
that they should be answerable to the same legal framework. Future research focusing 
on investigators with a specific professional background could provide even richer 
information on the day-to-day activities of corporate investigators. In doing so, one 
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might also focus on specific specialisations such as the ever more relevant corporate 
cyber investigations.
 Furthermore, an emphasis in future research on clients, in the form of HR 
managers and general management, would be interesting, and may provide a deeper 
understanding of the choices made in corporate settlement procedures. Some practical 
issues may be attached to such an approach, since it is difficult to find clients of 
corporate investigative services (not much is publicised in for example the newspapers 
on corporate investigations), who are also willing to participate in such a research 
(as corporate investigations are based on discretion). In this research, clients were 
contacted using the snowball method by asking corporate investigators for contacts. 
Such an approach may prove effective in future research as well. Another innovative 
angle for research on corporate justice would be to focus on the involved people who 
have been subject to corporate investigations and corporate settlements. This is likely 
to be a hard-to-reach group. First of all, since corporate investigations and settlements 
are often not publicised, it is difficult to find involved people. Through contacts with 
corporate investigators and clients, names might be found but the focus on discretion 
and privacy regulation would make them unlikely to volunteer such information. 
Second, since there may be little or no linkage between potential respondents – unless 
they turn out to involve one or more ‘rogue’ corporate security providers or organised 
groups – snowballing from one such respondent to another would be impractical. 
Another way to receive information on involved persons would be to use case law of 
criminal or civil court cases in which internal investigations have (also) been done. This 
would, however, severely limit the scope of the research, as only a limited amount of 
cases in which corporate investigations have been done end up in court.
 In addition to the new angles suggested above, it would be interesting to 
supplement the information retrieved through this research by a quantitative study. 
Although saturation was achieved in this research in the sense that no additional 
information or respondents resulted from the research after a certain point and this 
may be taken as an indication that the information gathered is valid and reliable, a 
quantitative study may provide specific information which cannot be derived from 
qualitative research methods. Such a study could map the number, skill-sets and 
technical resources of corporate investigators; how many organisations make use of 
their services; and which cases end up in the criminal justice system. For this, it may 
be very helpful if the permit system is expanded to all corporate investigators, since 
that would provide an overview of the scope of the corporate security market in the 
Netherlands. Such a research may thus have to be postponed until the time when the 
permit system is altered to include all professional corporate investigators.
 This research is focused on corporate investigations into and corporate settlement of 
internal norm violations. Because the norm violations are internal, there are more options 
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to react to the norm violation than in cases in which the norm violation is external to 
the organisation. In addition, internal norm violations are often claimed (inter alia by 
respondents) to be more dangerous to an organisation than external threats (which may 
be reflected in the higher level of reports to the authorities for external crimes, see for 
example PwC, 2014). It would be interesting to compare the two types of norm violations 
in future research. In addition, a similar comparison could be made between criminal and 
non-criminal norm violations: is there a difference in the way organisations react to the 
different types of norm violations?
 For reasons discussed in chapter 1, the role of regulatory agencies in the field of 
corporate security has not been a subject of this research. The aim of the research – 
to provide an overview of the Dutch corporate security sector – makes the inclusion 
of all (potentially relevant) regulatory agencies impractical. The fact that corporate 
investigators are used in a wide variety of (economic) sectors, means that in different 
situations a multitude of regulators may be involved. However, it would be possible 
(and interesting) to focus more specifically on the relationships between the regulatory 
agencies and corporate investigators within a specific sector. Examples may be the 
relationships corporate investigators may have with the Radio Communications Agency 
[Agentschap Telecom] when working in the context of the telecommunications sector, or 
the role of the Dutch Healthcare Authority [Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit] in relation to the 
health care sector. Especially if control over a renewed permit system would come to be 
exerted by the Data Protection Authority, therefore making that authority the regulator 
for the entire corporate security sector, it would be very interesting to look at the relations 
between this regulatory agency and corporate investigators. With regard to the extended 
role the Data Protection Authority would take in the control over the more elaborate 
permit system as suggested here, it would be relevant to do an impact study in future, to 
assess the way in which the changes would affect the different stake-holders.
 One last strain of research that would be important to pursue is more international 
in nature. This is relevant because corporate investigators move across multiple national 
jurisdictions. The forum shopping activities (as discussed in chapter 4, section 1.2.1), 
choosing the most agreeable jurisdiction to be prosecuted (if the organisation itself is to 
blame), provide an example of the ease with which corporate investigators move across 
national boundaries (in stark contrast to the difficulties law enforcement agencies have 
with this). Finally, as noted in chapter 2 above, it would be useful to deploy a comparative 
perspective in order to explore to what extent the specific (regulatory) history of the 
Netherlands has affected the way in which the corporate security market has developed. 
 The strains of future research proposed here may build upon the insights provided 
in this research. Most importantly, it would be necessary to approach the corporate 
security sector as a semi-autonomous social field, without using the lens of a top-
down state-centric discourse. The discourse promoted in this research theoretically 
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assesses corporate investigators as semi-autonomous actors, while also taking into 
account the role of the state as a key player – one that adds a normative (‘retribution’) 
dimension to corporate settlement solutions (when involved in that), and one 
that is the source of democratic control over the market. In further exploring the 
social realities of the corporate security market – and the coexistence of corporate 
investigators with law enforcement agencies and other state actors within it – it is 
important to stay clear of stereotypical portrayals of ‘public’ and ‘private’. The non-
contractual moral agency of corporate investigators, be that to provide themselves 
with legitimacy or out of normative concerns, creates space for other than purely 
commercial considerations. A key word describing the corporate security market 
is flexibility – it plays a pivotal role in the services provided, the legal frameworks 
applied, the interests served and in the relationships with public actors. It would be 
wise to bear this in mind in future work.
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Advocatenwet
[Law on the legal profession]
Bpbr –  Beleidsregels private beveiligingsorganisaties en recherchebureaus
[Decree on Private Security Companies and Private Investigation Firms]
Bta –  Besluit toezicht accountantsorganisaties
[Decree on the Control over Accountants]
BW –  Burgerlijk Wetboek
[Civil Code]
Politiewet
[Police Law]
Rpbr –  Regeling private beveiligingsorganisaties en recherchebureaus
[Regulation on Private Security Companies and Private Investigation Firms]
Rv –  Burgerlijk procesrecht
[Code of Civil Procedure]
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Verordening op de beroepseed voor accountants
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[Law on Private Security Companies and Private Investigation Firms]
Wpol – Wet politiegegevens
[Law on Police Data]
Wta – Wet toezicht accountantsorganisaties
[Law on the Control over Accountants]
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[Law on Disciplinary Proceedings for Accountants]
WvSr – Wetboek van Strafrecht
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WvSv – Wetboek van Strafvordering
[Code of Criminal Procedure]
Wwft – Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme
[Law Preventing Money Laundering and the Funding of Terrorism]
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ECLI:NL:HR:2014:942 [Supreme Court of the Netherlands]
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:248 [Court of The Hague]
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ECLI:NL:TACAKN:2016:49 [Accountancy Chamber]
ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:118 [Court for Trade and Industry]
ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2016:7193 [Court of Eastern-Brabant]
114 The abbreviation ‘ECLI’ means European Case Law identifier. The abbreviation following that denotes 
the country, in this case the Netherlands (‘NL’). The abbreviations that are presented after the country 
code identify the type of court. The explanations of these abbreviations are given above.
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Summary
This research answers the following central research question in relation to the 
market for corporate investigations in the Netherlands: What is corporate security, 
how can its shifting relationship with law enforcement be conceptualised and what is its 
significance for the wider society? To answer this question, information was gathered 
with the aid of qualitative research methods. Fieldwork consisted of interviews, 
observations and case studies. 59 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
corporate investigators (33), law enforcement professionals (16) and clients (10). The 
two (full-time) observations were done to get to a better understanding of the daily 
activities of corporate investigators. The first observation took place with a private 
investigation firm and lasted seven weeks. The second observation took place with 
an in-house security department and lasted six weeks. Additionally, 21 case studies 
were analysed as a result of the observations. In this summary, the key findings of the 
research are discussed as reported in the main text.
The corporate security sector consists of professionals, providing specialised and tailor-
made ‘high-end’ security services to their clients. Although corporate investigators may 
be involved in additional activities (such as pre-employment screenings and drafting 
and implementing integrity codes), this research focuses on the investigative activities 
of corporate investigators: mainly forensic accountancy, (private) investigations 
more generally, IT-investigations, asset tracing, and (assistance with) settlement 
and prevention tactics. There are four main groups of corporate investigators in the 
Netherlands: private investigation firms, in-house security departments, forensic 
accountants and forensic legal investigators. The research focuses on the activities of 
corporate investigators in relation to internal norm violations (within the employee/
employer relationship).
 One of the main concerns of this research is the conceptualisation of the corporate 
security sector. The junior partner theory and loss prevention theory provide us with 
two competing arguments: on the one hand the private security sector is seen as a 
subordinate to a dominant public sector, complementing this sector when necessary 
(junior partner theory). On the other, the private security sector is seen as the private 
equivalent of the criminal justice system, doing the same types of investigations and 
providing private justice to its clients; a strict distinction between public and private 
cannot be made (loss prevention theory). The ideas related to nodal theory may also 
be relevant to the corporate security market. In short, nodal theory suggests that that 
security is provided by a range of different providers, from which security consumers 
may choose. The state is seen as one of these providers but not as the primary one. In 
addition to the nodal perspective on security, another pluralistic perspective is that of 
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anchored pluralism, which similarly holds that the security market is characterised by 
fragmentation and pluralism but contrary to the nodal standpoint, it does prioritise 
the state over other venues of security. The anchored pluralism stance is that the state 
still has a vital role to play as the main provider of justice, and as the legal ‘anchor’ of 
security provided by private actors. 
 The above theories all (implicitly or explicitly) use the state as the theoretical 
point of departure. Whether it is a matter of privatisation and responsibilisation 
(conscious acts by the state) or a matter of (unintentional) growth of mass private 
property, the assumption remains that the state was present in a dominant way 
and that this presence is diminishing. As will be apparent from what follows 
below, the role of the state is better conceptualised by its absence, when it comes 
to internal norm violations within organisations. Many internal norm violations 
never reach the criminal justice system. When the norm violation is reported to law 
enforcement authorities, this report is often used as a supplement to a corporate 
settlement solution (which effectively reverses the argumentation of junior partner 
theory) and corporate investigators and law enforcement actors should be viewed 
as functionally different for several reasons (which effectively refutes the argument 
of loss prevention and pluralistic perspectives that there is interchangeability and 
competition between public and private (corporate) security actors). The growth of 
the market for corporate investigations should rather be seen as a commodification 
of the dark number of internal norm violations. The perspective taken in this research 
is that the corporate security sector acts with a high degree of flexibility within a 
semi-autonomous social field, both in relation to investigative activities and in 
relation to other actors. In this context, the state remains a key player, by adding 
a normative (‘retribution’) dimension to corporate settlement solutions and as the 
source of democratic control over the market. The perspective in this book may, then, 
be regarded to be a reconsideration of the state-centric discourse, one that takes the 
semi-autonomous position of corporate investigators as the point of departure, while 
also being sensitive to the role of the state. 
The legal bases of corporate investigations are found in multiple legal frameworks. 
Other than general laws such as the Criminal Code and the Data Protection Act, 
an overarching legal framework is not available to corporate investigators. Only 
for private investigation firms does a specific law exist in the form of the Law on 
Private Security Companies and Private Investigation Firms [Wpbr], and most notably 
the Privacy code of conduct which is attached to that law. As a consequence, only 
those corporate investigators who work in a private investigation firm are obliged to 
get a permit. For forensic accountants and forensic legal investigators, the general 
legislation applies which is created for the professions of accountant and lawyer. 
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In addition, guidelines for person-oriented investigations (which are based on 
principles of law) are available to forensic accountants. In-house investigators are 
predominantly regulated by internal regulations. Even though the legal frameworks 
of the various corporate investigators differ, in practice most corporate investigators 
seem to follow the Privacy code of conduct for private investigation firms. Corporate 
investigators also stress the importance of principles of law and normative 
considerations as guiding norms, applying principles of law such as proportionality, 
subsidiarity and fair play to their day-to-day activities. The different legal frameworks 
provide clients and corporate investigators with the possibility of forum shopping. 
The control over corporate investigators’ activities is limited and relies for a large part 
on involved individuals, corporate investigators and clients. Examples of abuse by 
corporate investigators are rare; however, the lack of effective (democratic) control 
and the fragmented nature of legal frameworks create possibilities for such abuse. 
 Partly as a result of the differences in legal frameworks, the various groups of 
investigators identified in this research have specific selling points relative to the 
others. In-house investigators’ strong suit is that they are highly knowledgeable with 
regard to the client organisation. Private investigation firms, on the other hand, are 
more general in their services and because they are external to the organisation, 
they are regarded to be more independent. Forensic accountants are independent as 
well, and in addition they are the experts on financial investigations. Forensic legal 
investigators, finally, add legal knowledge to the investigations, providing a client 
with a legal interpretation and assistance with settlements. Although the various 
investigators lay emphasis on these differences, thus taking commercial advantage 
of the dissimilarities, corporate investigation units tend to diversify the background 
of employees, combining the different professional groups to be able to respond to 
clients’ investigative demands. Corporate investigators tend to also set themselves 
apart from law enforcement authorities, by using different language (avoiding 
criminal justice terminology). Corporate investigators do not view themselves as a 
private police force.
With regard to the corporate investigation process, some generalities may be discerned. 
Corporate investigations start with an assignment from the client. In this assignment, 
corporate investigators try to ensure that their investigations will be executed 
independently and objectively. Investigations remain dependent on the client 
though: the client determines the scope of the investigations and his private interests 
are central to the investigations. Furthermore, much information used in corporate 
investigations is information that is available to the client as an employer – and by 
extension, to corporate investigators. In this way, corporate investigators have many 
investigative possibilities, in spite of the fact that they lack the powers of investigation 
271
granted to law enforcement officials. As a consequence, corporate investigators are to a 
considerable extent reliant on the cooperation of the organisation and the individuals 
involved. Cooperation by the involved person is only voluntary to a certain extent, as 
the organisation may use its position as an employer to pressure an involved person 
into cooperating. While choosing the methods of investigation, corporate investigators 
tend to apply the principles of law of proportionality, subsidiarity and due process. The 
most commonly used sources of information by corporate investigators are internal 
documentation (financial administration, contracts); internal systems (communications 
systems such as email and telephone; data carriers such as computers; and employee 
systems such as entrance registration); open sources (databases, (social) media); and 
personal communications (the interview). Other sources such as observations, site 
visits or information derived from a criminal justice procedure may also be used. The 
interview with the involved person is generally done at the end of the investigations. 
In this way, investigators are able to confront the involved person with the information 
already gathered. In line with the adversarial principle, the interviewed person is given 
the opportunity to react to the interview report. After the investigations have been 
finalised, a draft report is made, and, in accordance with the adversarial principle, 
provided to the involved person. After the subjects of the investigations have had the 
opportunity to react to the draft report, the final report is submitted to the client.
 After the report has been finalised, a settlement of the matter is often sought. 
Several reasons may be identified which make the use of corporate investigators with 
regard to both investigations and settlements appealing to organisations. Corporate 
investigators are not bound to the definitions of behaviour given by criminal law, 
nor by the (often slow and bureaucratic) structures of the criminal justice procedure. 
As a result, they may offer a high level of flexibility in investigative methods and 
solutions. Secondly, the orientation in corporate investigations is on the client and 
the private troubles the client may have, rather than on criminal acts (which are 
defined in the Dutch criminal justice system as being against society). This means that 
whatever norm violation is deemed harmful by an organisation may be investigated 
by corporate investigators (and the assignment may also be limited to that specific 
norm violation). Thirdly, corporate investigations provide an organisation with a high 
level of discretion and a certain measure of control over the process and information 
flow. These circumstances combine to make corporate investigations and corporate 
settlements appealing to organisations: organisations tend to prefer not to report to 
law enforcement authorities. 
 Considerations against reporting to law enforcement authorities are, then, a loss 
of control over information and over the process; the (limited) scope of behaviours 
that fall within the reach of criminal law; the limits to solutions provided by the criminal 
justice system; and a low level of confidence in the problem-solving capabilities of 
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the criminal justice system. However, a report to the authorities may still be made as 
an addition to a corporate settlement, based on pragmatic (strategic behaviour) and 
normative considerations. Powers of investigation may be necessary to retrieve valuable 
information. Another pragmatic consideration may be provided by forum shopping 
possibilities, based on the use of the ne bis in idem principle: being prosecuted in the 
Netherlands may prove beneficial to an organisation because it may soften prosecutors 
and judges in jurisdictions which are regarded to be harsher with regard to white-
collar crime. A need for retribution or a sense of obligation towards society constitute 
examples of normative considerations. Corporate settlements may be provided through 
different legal venues. In addition to the option of using the criminal justice system by 
reporting to law enforcement authorities, the private law system may be used by filing 
a civil suit to reclaim damages or to terminate the labour agreement, by going through 
a pro forma procedure or by initiating a process with the Enterprise court. In addition, 
the private law system may be used to end the labour contract through a settlement 
agreement. Internal regulations may be used to discipline the employee, ranging from 
administering a warning to a summary dismissal.
The nature and composition of the corporate security sector, and the types of norm 
violations corporate investigators deal with (internal, white-collar norm violations), 
make long-term cooperation between private and public actors fundamentally 
difficult. As a result, public/private relations are better conceptualised as (ad hoc) 
coexistence than cooperation. Most notably, the fragmented nature of the corporate 
security market, the diffuseness of interests involved and the fact that, in the end, it is 
the client who decides about involving the authorities, make long-term cooperation 
very difficult. Corporate security as a market thrives by the grace of its use of flexibility 
in the framing of economic crime; secrecy, discretion and control; and legal flexibility 
and responsiveness to clients’ needs. The market exists because of the possibility 
of separation from and coexistence with (and sometimes strategic use of ) law 
enforcement. Two pilots, meant as a way to formalise the participation of corporate 
investigators in criminal justice investigations, were not very successful as a result 
of the above reasons. A conclusion, then, is that public/private relationships are 
not easily captured within existing theories of private security. A typology of ad hoc 
coexistence, rather than cooperation, is introduced, ranging from ‘private to public 
transfer of information’ (type A), through ‘(minor) mutual information sharing’ (type 
B) to ‘coordination of actions’ (type C). Type A, private/public information transfer, 
may either occur as a sequence (law enforcement authorities being involved only 
after corporate investigators have finished their investigations) or may run parallel 
(law enforcement authorities being the initiator of the investigations, or corporate 
investigators inviting law enforcement authorities in at an early stage). When 
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investigations occur as a sequence, corporate investigators are usually not involved 
beyond providing criminal justice authorities with the corporate investigations report 
through an official report. When investigations run parallel, mutual information 
sharing may ensue but more commonly the public and private investigations remain 
separate – and again the involvement of corporate investigators (begins and) ends 
with the transfer of privately generated information through an official report to the 
authorities. Type B, minor mutual information sharing, includes information flowing 
not just from private to public, but also in the other direction. This type of information 
sharing is less prevalent according to respondents. In most instances, the majority 
of information still flows from private to public; however corporate investigators 
may also receive something in return. This information is often rather general, being 
more about investigative activities than investigative results (for example corporate 
investigators may be informed of a search on the premises or that a certain suspect 
will be taken into custody). Type C, coordination of actions, is quite rare according 
to respondents. In those cases, law enforcement actors and corporate investigators 
work together to get the best results. This may mean that the prosecutor and lead-
police or FIOD [tax] investigators meet with the corporate investigators to talk things 
over. Information is shared both ways, investigative actions are coordinated and a 
division of labour may evolve, in which corporate investigators and law enforcement 
actors share information about the matters they themselves will not pursue, but are 
relevant to the other. 
 Public/private relations largely revolve around information sharing. This is often 
a source of frustration for corporate investigators because of a perceived lack of 
expertise and willingness by law enforcement officials. Many law enforcement 
professionals seem to be unaware of the possibilities for information sharing within 
the criminal justice system. Respondents indicate that the position individual 
prosecutors take with regard to information sharing is crucial to what will be possible 
in practice. Relative to general police forces and prosecution offices, corporate 
security respondents and clients highly value specialised fraud units within the 
police, FIOD investigators and the specialised prosecutors of the Functioneel Parket 
(FP). Respondents from both the public and private sector would welcome the (re)
institution of central contact points within the police organisation and the prosecution 
office. Respondents indicate they are wary of informal information sharing, however 
it does exist. The utility of illegitimately obtained information may be limited in most 
cases but it may be used as directive information (to guide the investigations in a 
certain direction). Non-contractual moral activity may lead corporate investigators 
to avoid the illegal sharing of information (because it is ‘wrong’), but it may 
simultaneously lead them to actually share information ‘in a grey area’ (because it 
is ‘right’). Breaches of privacy law mentioned by respondents occur with regard to 
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directive (and often general) information, rather than them being gross abuses of 
privacy law. Informal networks serve more purpose with regard to entrance into the 
criminal justice system, respondents suggest. Former colleagues in law enforcement 
agencies may be used as a point of reference for ‘procedural’ questions such as where 
to report a specific case. Having a wide network of (former) colleagues may provide 
both corporate investigators and law enforcement actors with an easy entrance.
To summarise, the corporate security sector is a commercial provider of investigative 
services, involved in the investigation and settlement of internal norm violations. The 
sector largely acts as a semi-autonomous social field with a high level of discretion 
and autonomy. Corporate investigators and clients use forum shopping within and 
across the private legal sphere to get to the optimal outcome. This means that the 
state has little insight into what happens in the corporate security sector. While 
this has the benefit for society that the criminal justice system is spared the trouble 
and costs of investigating and prosecuting these matters, it also means there is 
effectively little to no democratic control over the corporate investigation sector. As 
an important implication of the research, it is suggested that a Wpbr-permit should 
be made obligatory to all four corporate investigator groups. The control over such a 
permit-system should be given to the Data Protection Authority.
 The tendency of corporate investigators to stay within the private legal sphere, and 
outside of the criminal justice system, does not limit the sector to a purely commercial 
rationale. Through (non-)contractual moral activity, normative considerations 
influence the corporate investigation and settlement processes in addition to 
pragmatic and commercial considerations. Public/private relationships are largely ad 
hoc and occur when corporate investigators or their clients feel the need to involve 
the criminal justice apparatus. Cooperation is fairly rare, public/private relationships 
being better conceptualised as coexistence, with public and private actors meeting 
only on an ad hoc basis. The commonly used state-centric discourse has proven to be 
unhelpful to conceptualise public/private relations between law enforcement and 
corporate investigators. Rather than putting emphasis on cooperation, we should 
investigate the corporate security sector in its own right. Most importantly, it is 
necessary to approach the corporate security sector as a semi-autonomous social 
field, without using the lens of a top-down state-centric discourse. The discourse 
promoted in this research theoretically assesses corporate investigators as semi-
autonomous actors, while also taking into account the role of the state as a key player 
(be it on the background) – one that adds a normative (‘retribution’) dimension to 
corporate settlement solutions (when involved in that), and one that is the source 
of democratic control over the market. In further exploring the social realities of the 
corporate security market – and the coexistence of corporate investigators with law 
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enforcement agencies and other state actors within it – it is important to stay clear 
of stereotypical portrayals of ‘public’ and ‘private’. The non-contractual moral agency 
of corporate investigators, be that to provide themselves with legitimacy or out of 
normative concerns, creates space for other than purely commercial considerations. 
A keyword describing the corporate security market is flexibility – it plays a pivotal 
role in the services provided, the legal frameworks applied and the interests served 
and in the relationships with public actors. 
276
Samenvatting
Normovertredingen begaan door werknemers van organisaties worden vaak 
onderzocht en afgehandeld door corporate onderzoekers. Het doel van dit 
onderzoek is de corporate onderzoeksector in Nederland en zijn relaties met het 
strafrechtelijk systeem inzichtelijk te maken. De onderzoeksvraag die leidend is 
geweest voor dit onderzoek luidt: Wat is corporate onderzoek, hoe kan de wisselende 
relatie van corporate onderzoekers met politie en justitie worden geconceptualiseerd 
en wat is de relevantie voor de Nederlandse maatschappij? Deze vraag is beantwoord 
aan de hand van empirisch materiaal, verzameld met behulp van kwalitatieve 
onderzoeksmethoden. 59 semigestructureerde interviews vormen de basis van 
het onderzoek, waarvan er 33 zijn gehouden onder corporate onderzoekers, 16 
onder professionals uit het strafrechtelijk systeem en 10 onder opdrachtgevers van 
corporate onderzoeksdiensten. Daarnaast zijn twee observaties uitgevoerd, gericht 
op corporate onderzoekers. De eerste observatie is uitgevoerd binnen een particulier 
onderzoeksbedrijf en had een duur van zeven weken. De tweede observatie is 
uitgevoerd binnen een interne veiligheidsafdeling van een groot Nederlands bedrijf 
en had een duur van zes weken. Tenslotte zijn er 21 particuliere onderzoeksdossiers 
geanalyseerd, voortvloeiend uit de twee observaties. Deze samenvatting geeft de 
belangrijkste resultaten weer van het onderzoek.
De corporate onderzoeksector bestaat uit professionals die zich bezighouden met het 
aanbieden van gespecialiseerde en op maat gemaakte diensten op het gebied van 
forensisch onderzoek. Hoewel de professionele diensten meer omvatten (bijvoorbeeld 
het uitvoeren van pre-employment screenings), richt dit promotieonderzoek zich op 
de forensische onderzoeksactiviteiten van de corporate onderzoeksector, bestaande 
uit forensisch accountancy-onderzoek, cyber onderzoek, particulier onderzoek 
meer in zijn algemeenheid, het opsporen van vermogen, (assistentie bij) de 
afhandeling van de normovertreding en het treffen van uit onderzoek voortvloeiende 
preventiemaatregelen. Het promotieonderzoek richt zich op de werkzaamheden 
van corporate onderzoekers in relatie tot interne normovertredingen (binnen de 
werknemer/werkgever relatie). In Nederland zijn er vier (beroeps)groepen die zich 
bezighouden met dit soort onderzoeken – particuliere onderzoeksbureaus, interne 
veiligheidsafdelingen, forensische accountants en forensische juridische onderzoekers. 
 Een belangrijk onderwerp in dit promotieonderzoek is wijze waarop de corporate 
onderzoeksector theoretisch benaderd moet worden. Een aantal theorieën over 
publiek/private relaties kan worden besproken en beoordeeld als niet (volledig) 
toepasbaar. De junior partner theorie gaat uit van een relatie waarbinnen de 
overheid dominant is en de private sector ondergeschikt. De private sector is vanuit 
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dit oogpunt aanvullend aan de overheid (de ‘junior partner’). De economische 
theorie (ook wel loss prevention theory) daarentegen, stelt dat publieke en private 
veiligheidsactoren vergelijkbaar zijn en dat zij met elkaar in competitie zijn. Een strikt 
onderscheid tussen publiek en privaat is vanuit deze gedachte niet te maken. De 
nodale benadering op veiligheid stelt dat veiligheid wordt aangeboden door een 
veelheid aan actoren en dat de staat daar een van is. Het verankerde pluralisme 
perspectief tenslotte is het eens met de stelling dat er veiligheidsnetwerken bestaan 
met een veelheid aan actoren, maar plaatst de staat wel in een bevoorrechte 
positie hierbinnen. De beschreven theoretische benaderingen nemen allen de staat 
(impliciet of expliciet) als uitgangspunt. Of het hierbij nu gaat om privatisering en 
responsabilisering (als een bewuste actie van de staat), of om een (door de staat 
onbedoelde) groei in grootschalig privébezit, de assumptie is dat de staat aanwezig 
was in het veiligheidsveld en dat deze aanwezigheid afneemt. Wanneer het gaat om 
onderzoek naar en afdoening van interne normovertredingen binnen organisaties, 
kan de positie van de staat echter beter worden beschreven als afwezigheid. Veel 
interne normovertredingen bereiken nooit het strafrechtelijk systeem. In de gevallen 
dat er aangifte wordt gedaan, wordt de strafrechtelijke afhandeling van de zaak 
vaak gebruikt als een aanvulling op een corporate afdoeningswijze (wat ingaat 
tegen de propositie van de junior partner theorie dat het private veld het publieke 
veiligheidsveld aanvult). Daarnaast kunnen corporate onderzoekers en publieke 
opspoorders worden gezien als functioneel afwijkend van elkaar (wat ingaat tegen de 
ideeën van inwisselbaarheid en competitie van de economische, nodale en verankerd 
pluralisme perspectieven). In plaats daarvan kan de groei van de sector worden 
gezien als de commercialisering van het dark number van interne normovertredingen. 
De benadering die gebruikt wordt in dit promotieonderzoek is dat de corporate 
onderzoeksector een grote mate van autonomie en flexibiliteit tentoonspreidt binnen 
een semiautonoom sociaal veld, zowel in relatie tot onderzoekwerkzaamheden als 
in relatie tot andere actoren. Hierbinnen is een belangrijke rol weggelegd voor de 
overheid, doordat het een normatieve (retributie) dimensie kan toevoegen aan het 
corporate onderzoek. Daarnaast is het van belang dat de overheid een rol speelt in 
het toezicht op en de controle over de corporate onderzoeksector. Het ingenomen 
theoretische perspectief kan dan ook worden beschouwd als een heroverweging 
van de theorieën die de staat als (impliciet) uitgangspunt nemen. De semiautonome 
positie van corporate onderzoekers wordt hier als uitganspunt genomen, zonder 
daarbij de rol van de staat uit het oog te verliezen.
De regels rondom corporate onderzoek zijn niet voor alle onderzoekers strikt vastgelegd. 
Alleen voor de particuliere onderzoeksbedrijven geldt een vergunningplicht onder 
de Wet particuliere beveiligingsorganisaties en recherchebureaus (Wpbr). De andere 
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beroepsgroepen van corporate onderzoekers hebben slechts algemene regelgeving (in 
het geval van accountants en advocaten), richtlijnen (in het geval van accountants) en 
zelfregulering (in het geval van interne veiligheidsafdelingen). Echter, de Wet Bescherming 
Persoonsgegevens, en andere algemene wetten zoals het Wetboek van Strafrecht, zijn 
van toepassing op alle corporate onderzoeken die worden uitgevoerd. Daarnaast blijken 
de geïnterviewde corporate onderzoekers in de praktijk de Privacy gedragscode, die 
is opgesteld en wettelijk bindend verklaard voor particuliere onderzoeksbedrijven, 
grotendeels te volgen. Het blijkt dat de verschillende onderzoekers dezelfde 
rechtsbeginselen en principes gebruiken in hun onderzoek, met als belangrijkst: 
proportionaliteit, subsidiariteit en (rechts)gelijkheid. Op deze wijze probeert men 
democratische beginselen uit het strafrecht, zoals het recht op een eerlijk proces, 
in het private onderzoek te integreren. Ondanks het commerciële karakter van 
het corporate onderzoeksveld wordt er op deze manier ook ruimte gecreëerd 
voor normatieve overwegingen. Het (democratische) toezicht op de corporate 
onderzoeksector is vrijwel afwezig en in de praktijk sterk afhankelijk van de 
inspanningen van betrokken personen, klanten en corporate onderzoekers zelf. 
Er zijn weinig voorbeelden bekend van grove rechtsschendingen door corporate 
onderzoekers, maar door de ruimte die wordt geboden is er wel potentie tot 
misbruik en forum shopping.
 De gefragmenteerde aard van de regelgeving resulteert in combinatie met andere 
kenmerken in verschillen tussen de verscheidene corporate onderzoekers. Interne 
veiligheidsafdelingen zijn in een unieke positie ten opzichte van de opdrachtgever 
omdat zij onderdeel van de organisatie van de opdrachtgever zijn en dus veel inzicht 
hebben in de organisatie. Particuliere onderzoeksbedrijven daarentegen zijn extern 
aan de opdrachtgever en dus onafhankelijker en zij bieden algemenere diensten aan 
dan andere corporate onderzoekers. Ook forensische accountants worden gezien als 
onafhankelijker en, daarnaast, als expert op het gebied van financieel onderzoek. 
Forensische juridische onderzoekers tenslotte, onderscheiden zich voornamelijk 
door hun juridische kennis en de verdergaande mogelijkheden tot assistentie met 
de afhandeling van de normovertreding. Hoewel de verschillende beroepsgroepen 
vanuit commercieel oogpunt de nadruk leggen op de verschillen, blijkt dat de 
meeste corporate onderzoeksafdelingen en -bedrijven juist onderzoekers aannemen 
met verschillende professionele achtergronden om zo een optimale dienstverlening 
te kunnen aanbieden aan opdrachtgevers. Naast deze nadruk op de verschillen 
met andere corporate onderzoekers, worden door respondenten ook de verschillen 
met politie en justitie benadrukt. Dit uit zich onder andere in het vermijden van 
strafrechtelijke terminologie. Corporate onderzoekers zien zichzelf niet als private 
politie of justitie.
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Corporate onderzoekers kunnen voor een groot deel zelfstandig en onafhankelijk 
van politie en justitie opereren bij het aanbieden van onderzoeksdiensten en bij het 
assisteren bij de afdoening van normovertredingen. Een corporate onderzoek wordt 
uitgevoerd op basis van een opdracht van de opdrachtgever; corporate onderzoekers 
proberen deze op zodanige wijze te formuleren dat zij binnen de grenzen van de 
opdracht onafhankelijk kunnen werken. Corporate onderzoeken blijven echter deels 
afhankelijk van de opdrachtgever aangezien deze de reikwijdte van het onderzoek 
bepaalt en corporate onderzoekers grotendeels afhankelijk zijn van de informatie 
die de opdrachtgever aanlevert. Via de opdrachtgever, tevens werkgever van de 
betrokken werknemer, hebben corporate onderzoekers verregaande toegang tot 
informatie, ondanks dat de opsporingsbevoegdheden die kunnen worden ingezet 
door politie en justitie niet tot hun beschikking staan. In onderzoeksmogelijkheden 
en oplossingen zijn corporate onderzoekers heel flexibel en kunnen zij efficiënt 
werken. De medewerking van de betrokken werknemers is belangrijk voor het 
onderzoek. Deze medewerking kan slechts tot een bepaalde hoogte als vrijwillig 
worden gezien, aangezien de opdrachtgever als werkgever druk kan uitoefenen om 
medewerking te bewerkstelligen.
 Bij het bepalen van de methoden van onderzoek die worden ingezet worden 
corporate onderzoekers deels geleid door rechtsbeginselen zoals proportionaliteit, 
subsidiariteit en (rechts)gelijkheid. Informatiebronnen en methoden van onderzoek 
die veel worden ingezet zijn interne documentatie (financiële administratie, 
contracten); interne systemen (communicatiesystemen zoals email en telefoonverkeer, 
gegevensdragers zoals computers en werknemerssystemen zoals de registratie 
van toegang); open bronnen (databanken, (sociale) media); en persoonlijke 
communicatie (interviews met betrokkenen en getuigen). Daarnaast kunnen andere 
informatiebronnen worden ingezet, zoals observatiegegevens en informatie uit een 
(openbaar) strafrechtelijk proces. Het interview met de betrokkene vormt over het 
algemeen het sluitstuk van het corporate onderzoek. Op deze manier kunnen de 
onderzoekers de betrokkene confronteren met de verzamelde belastende informatie. 
De betrokkene wordt, volgens het beginsel van hoor- en wederhoor, de mogelijkheid 
geboden om het interviewverslag te lezen en hierop te reageren. Na afronding van 
het onderzoek wordt een conceptrapport opgesteld, waar de betrokkene ook inzage 
in krijgt (ten aanzien van de voor hem relevante delen) en waar hij op kan reageren. 
Tenslotte wordt het definitieve rapport aangeboden aan de opdrachtgever.
 Na de afronding van het onderzoek volgt er veelal een afhandeling. Er zijn 
verschillende redenen waarom organisaties corporate onderzoek en particuliere 
afdoeningsmogelijkheden prefereren boven een strafrechtelijk aangifte. Corporate 
onderzoekers zijn niet gebonden aan de definities die in het strafrecht worden 
gebruikt, noch aan de formaliteiten en het (tijdrovende) strafrechtelijke proces. Als 
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gevolg hiervan kunnen corporate onderzoekers flexibeler te werk gaan. De focus 
op de belangen van de opdrachtgever is een tweede kenmerk dat gunstig is voor 
opdrachtgevers. In tegenstelling tot in het strafrechtelijk systeem, waarin niet de 
belangen van de organisatie, maar de belangen van de maatschappij centraal staan, 
kan elk gedrag dat als schadelijk wordt ervaren door de opdrachtgever worden 
onderzocht in de context van een corporate onderzoek (en kan de opdracht worden 
beperkt tot een specifiek voorval). Ten derde bieden corporate onderzoekers kun 
cliënten een hoge mate van discretie en controle over de informatie die naar buiten 
komt en (tot op zekere hoogte) over het onderzoeksproces.
 Redenen om geen aangifte te willen doen bij strafrechtelijke autoriteiten zijn dan 
ook een verlies van controle over informatie en het proces; de (beperkte) reikwijdte 
van wat er kan worden onderzocht als misdrijf; de beperkte mogelijkheden tot (buiten-
strafrechtelijke) afdoening; en een beperkt vertrouwen in het probleemoplossend 
vermogen van het strafrechtelijk systeem. Er zijn echter ook normatieve en 
pragmatische overwegingen die leiden tot de beslissing aangifte te doen. 
Pragmatische overwegingen zijn bijvoorbeeld dat de opsporingsbevoegdheden van 
de politie noodzakelijk zijn om tot bewijs te komen of dat het in het voorkomende 
geval beter is om een vervolging in Nederland te initiëren (zodat een vervolging 
in een andere, strengere jurisdictie kan worden vermeden of afgezwakt [ne bis in 
idem]). Dit laatste is een van de vele voorbeelden van forum shopping die binnen 
de corporate onderzoeksmarkt kunnen worden ingezet. Normatieve overwegingen 
zijn bijvoorbeeld dat de opdrachtgever behoefte heeft aan retributie of dat er een 
verantwoordelijkheid wordt gevoeld naar de samenleving toe. Deze overwegingen 
kunnen er toe leiden dat de afstand die normaliter bestaat tussen corporate 
onderzoekers en politie en justitie wordt verkleind, en dat men actief probeert politie 
en justitie te betrekken in het onderzoek.
 Een belangrijke uitkomst van dit promotieonderzoek is dat corporate 
onderzoekers door middel van forum shopping gebruik maken van de mogelijkheden 
die de verschillende rechtsstelsels (strafrecht, civiel recht, arbeidsrecht en interne 
regelgeving binnen organisaties) bieden om tot een zo efficiënt en positief mogelijke 
oplossing te komen voor hun cliënt. Naast een strafrechtelijke vervolging kan men 
gebruik maken van het civielrechtelijke systeem door een civiele rechtszaak aan te 
spannen ter vergoeding van schade of ter beëindiging van een arbeidsovereenkomst, 
door een pro forma procedure te initiëren of door het initiatief te nemen tot een 
procedure bij de Ondernemingskamer. Daarnaast kan het civielrecht worden 
gebruikt door het sluiten van een vaststellingsovereenkomst ter beëindiging van de 
arbeidsovereenkomst. Interne regelgeving kan bijvoorbeeld worden gebruikt voor 
de disciplinering van de werknemer, variërend van een waarschuwing tot ontslag op 
staande voet.
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De aard en samenstelling van de corporate onderzoeksector en het type 
normovertredingen waar corporate onderzoekers zich mee bezig houden zorgen 
er voor dat formele samenwerkingsverbanden met politie en justitie over een 
lange termijn moeilijk te realiseren zijn. De gefragmenteerde aard van de sector, de 
verscheidenheid aan betrokken belangen en het feit dat de opdrachtgever en niet 
de corporate onderzoeker bepaalt of er wel of niet aangifte wordt gedaan, staan 
hieraan in de weg. De flexibiliteit van corporate onderzoekers en de mogelijkheid 
om zonder inmenging van het strafrechtelijk systeem te werken zijn essentiële 
kenmerken voor het voortbestaan van de sector. Een belangrijke uitkomst van het 
promotieonderzoek is dan ook dat publiek/private relaties niet moeten worden 
gezien in het licht van een dominante overheid en ondergeschikte private actoren. 
Publiek/private relaties draaien vaak eerder om naast elkaar bestaan (co-existentie) 
dan om (langdurige) samenwerking (coöperatie). Convenanten en publiek/private 
samenwerkingsverbanden blijken in de praktijk niet goed te werken en op basis van 
het promotieonderzoek kan worden gesteld dat kortdurende, zaaks-gerelateerde 
contacten veel vaker voorkomen. De mate waarin informatie wordt uitgewisseld 
en wordt samengewerkt binnen deze contacten verschilt. Het promotieonderzoek 
introduceert een typologie voor deze ad hoc co-existentie, variërend van ‘privaat 
naar publieke informatieoverdracht’(type A), tot ‘(beperkte) wederzijdse informatie-
uitwisseling’ (type B), en ‘coördinatie van handelingen’ (type C). Type A, privaat/
publieke informatieoverdracht, kan voorkomen als een sequentie maar er kan ook 
sprake zijn van twee (gelijktijdige) parallelle onderzoeken. Corporate onderzoekers 
zijn vaak niet verder betrokken bij het strafrechtelijk onderzoek dan het overdragen 
van hun eigen onderzoeksresultaten via een aangifte. In het geval van parallelle 
onderzoeken is er meer kans op samenwerking, maar ook hier gaat het vaak slechts 
om informatieoverdracht. Bij type B, beperkte wederzijdse informatie-uitwisseling, 
wordt de meeste informatie door private partijen aan politie en justitie aangeleverd, 
maar in dit geval krijgt de private partij ook (in beperkte mate) informatie terug. 
Volgens respondenten komt dit type informatieoverdracht minder vaak voor dan 
type A. De informatie die met private partijen wordt gedeeld is vaak vrij algemeen 
en meer gericht op onderzoeksverrichtingen dan op onderzoeksresultaten (zo 
wordt bijvoorbeeld de informatie gedeeld dat een doorzoeking plaats zal vinden 
op een bepaald moment en bepaalde locatie). Type C, coördinatie van handelingen, 
tenslotte, komt volgens respondenten weinig voor. Bij dit type co-existentie werken 
corporate onderzoekers en politie, FIOD en justitie samen om de zaak tot een 
goed einde te brengen. Dit kan betekenen dat er regelmatig overleg plaatsvindt, 
dat informatie over en weer wordt gedeeld, dat onderzoekshandelingen op elkaar 
worden afgestemd en dat een vorm van arbeidsverdeling plaats kan vinden.
282
 Een groot deel van de publiek/private contacten vindt plaats in het kader van 
informatie-uitwisseling. Doordat corporate onderzoekers de perceptie hebben dat 
politie en (in mindere mate) justitie expertise en bereidheid tot informatiedeling 
missen, is dit vaak een bron van frustratie. Veel publieke opspoorders blijken de 
mogelijkheden die de wet biedt om informatie te delen inderdaad niet te kennen. 
Respondenten geven aan dat de opstelling van de individuele officier van justitie 
cruciaal is om te bepalen of er informatie wordt gedeeld in een specifiek geval. Ten 
opzichte van de politieorganisatie en het openbaar ministerie in hun algemeenheid 
zijn respondenten positiever ten aanzien van gespecialiseerde fraudeonderzoekers 
binnen de politie, de FIOD en het Functioneel Parket. In dit kader wordt er gepleit 
voor (her)introductie van een (de)centraal fraudecontactpunt binnen politie en 
justitie ter bevordering van de onderlinge relaties in specifieke zaken. Respondenten 
geven verder aan terughoudend te zijn met informele informatie-uitwisseling en 
dat de bruikbaarheid van informeel verkregen informatie beperkt is. Normatieve 
overwegingen kunnen informele en illegitieme informatie-uitwisseling tegen gaan 
(omdat het ‘verkeerd’ is), maar tegelijkertijd kunnen normatieve overwegingen 
informele en illegitieme informatie-uitwisseling ook in de hand werken (omdat 
het juist ‘goed’ is in het onderhavige geval). Informeel verkregen informatie bevat 
over het algemeen slechts algemene informatie die een onderzoek in een bepaalde 
richting kan sturen. Op basis van dit promotieonderzoek kan worden gesteld dat 
het informele netwerk door zowel corporate onderzoekers als politiemensen eerder 
wordt gebruikt om een aanspreekpunt te vinden dan om op een illegitieme wijze aan 
informatie te komen. 
Samenvattend kan worden gesteld dat de corporate onderzoeksector (forensische) 
onderzoeksdiensten aanbiedt en betrokken is bij de (advisering ten aanzien van) 
afdoening van interne normovertredingen binnen organisaties. De sector kan 
grotendeels als een semiautonoom sociaal veld opereren, waarbinnen corporate 
onderzoekers een hoge mate van discretie en autonomie genieten. Forum shopping 
tussen en binnen jurisdicties wordt door onderzoekers en opdrachtgevers gebruikt 
om tot een optimale uitkomst te komen in een specifieke zaak. Dit leidt ertoe 
dat er weinig zicht is vanuit de overheid op onderzoek naar en afhandeling van 
normovertredingen binnen organisaties. Dit betekent enerzijds dat het strafrechtelijk 
systeem tijd en kosten bespaart wat betreft de opsporing en vervolging van deze 
normovertredingen, maar anderzijds ook dat er weinig zicht en democratische 
controle is op wat er in de corporate onderzoeksector gebeurt. Een belangrijke 
aanbeveling is dan ook dat alle vier de groepen van corporate onderzoekers 
vergunningplichtig worden gemaakt en dat zij zich allen te houden hebben aan de 
Wpbr en de bijbehorende Privacy gedragscode. Verder wordt er naar aanleiding van 
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dit promotieonderzoek voorgesteld het toezicht op het vergunningstelsel neer te 
leggen bij de Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens.
 Vanuit theoretisch oogpunt is het belangrijk om de corporate onderzoeksector 
en de relaties die er bestaan tussen deze onderzoekers en het strafrechtelijk 
systeem in een ander licht te beschouwen dan gebruikelijk is. In plaats van de rol 
van de staat te benadrukken, is het zinvol om de sector te benaderen als een (semi)
autonoom veld. Binnen een dergelijke benadering is het echter ook belangrijk om 
de rol van de staat mee te wegen. Op momenten dat het strafrechtelijk systeem 
betrokken is bij een zaak voegt deze een normatieve (retributie) dimensie toe 
aan het corporate onderzoek. Daarnaast is het van belang dat de overheid een rol 
speelt in het toezicht op en de controle over de corporate onderzoeksector. De 
normatieve en pragmatische overwegingen die invloed uitoefenen op beslissingen 
binnen onderzoek en afdoening, zorgen ervoor dat het werkveld van corporate 
onderzoekers niet uitsluitend kan worden gedefinieerd als puur commercieel. Een 
sleutelwoord in relatie tot de corporate onderzoeksector is flexibiliteit – ten aanzien 
van de aangeboden diensten, de regelgeving, de betrokken belangen en in het kader 
van de relaties met publiekrechtelijke actoren speelt flexibiliteit een belangrijke rol.
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1 This is a selection of the most relevant seminars and workshops that have been attended during the 
PhD research.
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